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On the Epistemological-Ontological Transition Made by Illusionism and Realism**


Abstract: This article is about the discussion between realists and illusionists on phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal properties or qualia. The author considers what he calls the epistemological-ontological transition — the transition from epistemologically significant statements to ontologically significant ones. The option to avoid such a transition is tested in order to overcome some obstacles that it can bring to the discussion. The paper provides examples of the transition made by both camps as well as some advantages and disadvantages of rejecting it. The author comes to the conclusion that there are meaningful arguments for both options. On one hand, rejection of the transition to ontology may be beneficial for the following reasons. First, it tends to puzzle the opponents and to slow the discussion. Second, the very reason for the transition is poorly justified. Third, the core of the discussion between illusionists and realists — or at least its argumentative part — is rather epistemological, hence, moving to ontology might blur key arguments. On the other hand, one might aspire to save the transition due to the ontological roots of the discussion which must lead its argumentative part. The author then points out that eliminating the transition does not assume denying the ontological significance of the present discussion and that the problem of the nature of consciousness is definitely worth considering — but, perhaps, after the epistemological part of the problem is carefully analyzed.

Keywords: Illusionism, Realism, Phenomenal Consciousness, Epistemology, Ontology.


An Obstacle to the Discussion

There are many particular problems that arise within the discussion on illusionism (the theory of consciousness) between illusionists and realists about phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal properties. Illusionists state that there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness and that

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people are merely disposed to assuming its existence. Realists argue that phenomenal properties exist and differ from physical ones in some way. As I see it, the problems and disagreements between these sides may be divided into the following groups: explicit conceptual, implicit conceptual, explicit meta-conceptual and implicit meta-conceptual. Explicit disagreements are most obvious and easy to separate from other problems. They are the central parts of the discussion and serve as its fulcrums. For explicit conceptual, one can mention such points of the realists-illusionists discussion as the status of the zombie argument (Frankish, 2016), the existence and the nature of “what-it-is-likeness” or qualia, the acquaintance problem (Dennett, 2019), role of debunking argument (Chalmers, 2020) and the coincidence problem (ibid.: 7), among others, which the theory of consciousness needs to address and at which most of the arguments are aimed.

Explicit meta-conceptual problems often become part of the conceptual group as the reason for the clash of intuitions. They are rooted in methodological features which, at least partly explicitly, determine how arguments are built and how they work. The zombie argument is a good example of such problems’ role in the discussion. While realists can move from the possibility of imagining zombies to the claim that explanation in physical terms will be not sufficient for consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), such a shift is quite problematic from the illusionist perspective (Zhong, 2021). However, they are more likely to deny the zombie argument than give up some physicalist points to let it be significant, like Zhong suggests. As Frankish puts it, people are akin to zombies if the only thing the latter lack is phenomenality; or zombies cannot coherently be imagined if enough is known about the role of physical mechanisms in terms of consciousness or what seems to be phenomenal experience (Frankish, 2016). Another example is illusionists’ claim about ontological economy: they suggest making no considerable shifts in the scientific worldview because it is itself valuable for its proved consistence (ibid.). Such problems are also discussed and refer to the nature of conceptual claims on both sides, as they are often the very reason for differences in conceptual schemes.

While explicit problems lead the discussion and encourage developing arguments, implicit ones are, rather, obstacles to it. For this reason, they are often omitted and cannot be discussed or solved. Implicit conceptual problems emerge when arguments are determined or inspired by some ontological or worldview intuitions, making those arguments hard to beat due to the fact that the explicit argument is referred to as the premise. But one
will most likely fail in convincing an opponent if they introduce counterarguments to a statement while that opponent is protecting another statement, one that has not even been articulated. In most cases, such an obstacle arises when both sides strongly believe in different ontological judgements. It makes productive discussion almost impossible, as these judgements are often poorly and indirectly justified. In the context of illusionism-realism debates, the implicit conceptual problem resides with physicalist (Frankish, 2021) and anti-physicalist (Goff, 2016; Lipus & Bregant, 2022) intuitions, for instance. Although this implicitness is sometimes explicated, as in the papers mentioned above (however, they also do so in passing), this is rather an exception. The way I see it, even when the explication occurs, both sides might hesitate to engage with it, because most possible arguments support a picture of the world preferred before. That is why the omitting strategy can be more productive, in this case, than explication. It might force to concentrate on solvable parts of the discussion, constituted by the explicit problems described above. The influence of the unarticulated remains, but it becomes less destructive. It likely is not a coincidence that implicit problems remain unspoken, for hidden obstacles might not lessen the productivity of dialogue.

The situation with implicit meta-conceptual problems is quite different. Explicit ones contribute to the discussion and can be regarded as problems that need to be solved. Implicit conceptual disagreements become an obstacle, but they are also less influential. Implicit meta-conceptual problems contribute to the puzzlement of the illusionist-realist discussion and to the methodology used by both sides. The problem of defining phenomenal consciousness (Niikawa, 2021; Schwitzgebel, 2016) would be a prime example. I think it is clear enough that the answer to the question of whether phenomenal consciousness (PC) is illusory strongly depends on the very notion of PC.

However, in this paper I want to pay attention to another implicit meta-conceptual problem, which is the epistemological-ontological transition (EOT) being made by illusionism and realism. By this transition I mean one of methodological instruments used by both sides of the discussion, which justifies the possibility of a move from epistemological or epistemologically significant statements to ontological or ontologically significant ones. In this case, any statement about knowledge itself or the knowledge of particular things (not the things themselves) is referred to as epistemological—the possibilities, features and limitations of this knowledge. The term ontological is used to describe things themselves, their nature. Such
a transition presents a problem in the shape of an obstacle to the discussion, because it is not obvious that knowledge of the nature of what is called phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal property can be deduced from the understanding of what is called phenomenality. For example, a grasp on how introspection works does not inherently entail a comprehension of the (non)physical nature of introspective mechanisms, especially that of the nature of consciousness. At least, not without some articulated and justified steps that are often skipped by both realists and illusionists (I will consider this in more detail in the next sections). This is the first reason for the mentioned transition being problematic. However, I would like to note that its explication will not address the this issue because of the second problematic aspect: the transition cannot be made sufficiently at all— even explicitly. It will, nevertheless, continue to puzzle both sides because of the difference in their fundamental ontological intuitions that bring them to contrasting ontological conclusions from the same (at least in part) epistemological data. That is why I will consider that it is possible to reject the move from epistemological statements to ontological ones or to make it on the next level of the discussion, after the epistemological problem of phenomenal consciousness is solved.

REALIST CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION

First, I want to draw attention to the realist case of EOT. It must be mentioned that at least two types of realism can be found: conservative and radical (Frankish, 2016). The former tries to maintain physicalism, arguing that at least some of the specific characteristics of phenomenal properties are real but their nature remains physical (ibid.). The latter suggests radical shifts in our picture of the world as phenomenal consciousness seems to be too anomalous and cannot be explained within the current science without postulating special qualitative properties different from physical ones (ibid.). In terms of the present paper, I will accept Frankish’s claim that conservative realism collapses in illusionism (ibid.). Consequently, I will concentrate on radical realism comparing its EOT with that of the illusionists. This comparison includes observation of some arguments or statements which demonstrate the EOT made by both sides under discussion. Here I will not discuss whether the EOT is worth avoiding, as in this part I just want to show that the EOT actually occurs.

One of the most common examples of the transition is made from the statement about the existence of a unique acquaintance with what is called phenomenal properties. As they are given directly and are, in terms of
the direct acquaintance, themselves subjective, ineffable and intrinsic, they have to be nonphysical in some sense, as people are not acquainted with physical properties in the same way (Chalmers, 1996: 192). While there is a significant gap between being aware of something as having a physical property and it actually having it (scientific knowledge can be mistaken), there is no such gap in the case of awareness of experiential properties, hence to be aware of something having $X$ and to have $X$ means the same (Nida-Rümelin, 2016). On the first step, some epistemological statements about how phenomenal consciousness became apparent are given; on the second step, the EOT transition is made, and, as Goff puts it—if phenomenal properties obtain all those unique characteristics, they require ontological commitments (Goff, 2016). The present argument works due to the premise that this transition is possible—if there is an epistemological situation $q$ then it has to have particular ontological consequences. This very premise I will consider further. Leaving behind the reasons for the EOT occurring, mentioned examples demonstrate its presence. This is how the discussion might progress, but this would be begging the question against the option of changing the way it evolves, as there is no guarantee of it going in the best way. Back to the structure of the mentioned example, Goff insists on the principal compatibility of such a view with third-person science—especially if radical realism adopts Russelian monism (ibid.). However, such compatibility can be seen as an opportunity to not broaden ontology and instead admit that there is still much to discover about the physical world.

Nevertheless, commonly anomalous phenomenal properties present the epistemic and explanatory gap, which results in explanatory problems for the scientific view. Realists, unlike illusionists, can claim that these problems prove the inconsistency of scientist ontology, as it is more obvious that there are phenomenal experiences than that every truth should be explicable from the fundamental physical truth about the world (Balog, 2016). Although I share some of Balog intuitions, I think it cannot be concluded that physicalists cannot address these problems without saving their current ontology and the assumption mentioned above.

Realists can also introduce Moorean arguments for the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness (Kammerer, 2022). However, illusionists would easily avoid them because of the EOT they also make. Moorean arguments are aimed at the demonstration of the existence of one’s experiences; but illusionists do not deny this existence—they deny the particular ontological status of existing and therefore some of the features treated as essential which are epistemologically—not ontologically—significant.
Another realist camp EOT example is one made for saving the current discussion field without considerable changes. It is often thought that the distinction between hard and easy problems is a key feature of the modern philosophy of mind. Whilst this is reasonable, it helps to be aware of some ontological baggage this distinction often brings. In cases when the hard problem is considered not as a mark of the epistemological gap, but as an ontological statement (I mean when the difference between these types of problems is automatically taken as the argument for the existence of unique non-physical properties), one is faced with the fact that the EOT would have a huge impact on the discussion. I believe that one of the reasons for illusionists to replace the hard problem with the illusion problem is that ontological baggage does not necessarily come up alongside the hard-easy problems distinction. As Frankish puts it, the notion of phenomenal consciousness introduced by Chalmers leads naturally to the appearance of the hard problem and panpsychism (Frankish, 2021). Some approaches are even ready to adopt one of the central illusionist ideas about the principal fallibility of introspective knowledge in order to save the concept of the hard problem (Prinz, 2016; Schriner, 2018).

The last, but nonetheless important example of realist EOT I will mention is one made because of intuitiveness. It is counterintuitive to think that phenomenal consciousness is illusion (epistemological statement); that is why — realists would claim — there are phenomenal properties which are both epistemologically and ontologically unique. The problem of counter-intuitiveness is one to be solved by illusionists (Kammerer, 2016), but this again begs to claim that this feature of illusionist theory is the argument for its inconsistency and for the postulating of some ontological characteristics of phenomenal properties. In addition, it needs to be taken into account that the statement about the counter-intuitiveness of a thought concerned with the features of awareness of one’s states of consciousness is radically different from one about the nature of these states. The transition which is made here is even more notable than the one in the case of direct acquaintance, although it is often mediated by supporting arguments for counter-intuitiveness being a sign of the unique epistemological situation which is then treated as a trampoline to the EOT mentioned in the first example.

ILLUSIONIST CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION

To stress possible puzzling effects of the EOT, I will concentrate on those cases of it from the illusionist camp which are quite similar to realist one. To begin with, here is EOT made from the statement about the lack of the
unique acquaintance with what is called phenomenal properties. If there is a chance to be mistaken about one’s own phenomenal properties, the knowledge about these properties can be totally mistaken; therefore, they lack all those unique features realists attribute to them (Frankish, 2016). However, phenomenality still seems to have those properties and illusionists are ready to introduce quasi-phenomenal properties that just seem to be non-physical (because of EOT by realists) but due to the aforementioned possibility of being mistaken (Dennett, 2020) about phenomenal consciousness, this seemingly is the evidence of a real mistake for illusionists (epistemological statement) and they claim these properties are physical (ontological statement). I see this as a good demonstration of an EOT clash which may be described in the following way: for realists, phenomenal properties seem to have unique features that make them different from physical properties and they are non-physical; for illusionists, phenomenal properties only seem to have unique features and they are physical properties. I am not quite sure whether both sides can reasonably move from the features of phenomenality and statements about the knowledge of these features to the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness. Moreover, realists are even ready to agree with a part of the illusionist epistemological program — e.g. the possibility of a mistake about the external world based on the introspective access to the experiences. That is why Hamphrey, as I see it, calls himself a surrealist (Hamphrey, 2016). It can be said that we are mistaken when we think that there is something beautiful, funny or that the people in the theater scene actually fight and suffer, but this mistake creates real mental events: red color, being actually a wave of a particular length, is really experienced as red and this experience is real. Such presence of the contrary ontological implications based on the similar epistemological situation again demonstrates the EOT from one type of statements to another which is a distinct one.

The anomalous character of phenomenal properties is also the reason for illusionist EOT. As those properties seem anomalous and resistant to third person perspective and scientific analysis (epistemological statement), these properties do not exist and are some physical processes (ontological statement) that are shown to us as non-physical because of distortion by introspective mechanisms, within which we get our knowledge about phenomenality (Frankish, 2016). It looks puzzling when the same background leads to controversial conclusions. Possibly, the EOT made by both sides is a consequence of the existence of an implicit meta-conceptual problem concerning the ontology. This problem becomes even more of an obstacle
when both camps make the EOT in terms of the anomalous character of that which is called phenomenal consciousness.

A similar situation occurs with the hard/illusion problem transition. While hard problem discourse is perceived by realists as essential within the current philosophy of mind and especially within the discussion on phenomenal consciousness, the illusionists consider it too mysterious (epistemological statement), comprising undesirable ontological baggage that one should eliminate to progress (Frankish, 2021; Frankish & Sklutová, 2022). However, such passage implies posing a similar type of question as the one asked by realists when they deem illusionists unable of solving the illusion problem, which replaces the hard one. If the hard problem is genuinely complex, this does not render it unsolvable or mean that its existence should be denied. Still, illusionists do not agree and are ready to argue the statement that there is no third-person scientific solution to the hard problem, making EOT inspired by the denial of the epistemological status of phenomenal consciousness (PC) defended by realists. If the PC notion introduced by realists contributes to mysterious discourse (Frankish, ed., 2017) (epistemological statement), PC should also be eliminated (ontological statement).

Counter-intuitiveness is also significant for illusionists. It is counterintuitive for them that we should adopt a picture of the world which is different from one offered by natural sciences, with its proven consistence and effectivity (Dennett, 2016; Frankish, 2016). There are some papers that are aimed at justifying the compatibility of scientific achievements with the reality of phenomenal properties (Goff, 2016; Schwitzgebel, 2016), but illusionists remain unsatisfied with these arguments because of the EOT made by them affecting their intuition about the principal explicability of the world in physical terms. It is counterintuitive to think that the world cannot be explained within physical terms (epistemological statement)—so, there are no phenomenal properties that seem to be resistant to this type of explanation (ontological statement). This particular case of the EOT is remarkable as it is made in different ways because both camps find the alternative counterintuitive: realists do not see anomalous character as reason enough for rejecting anomaly; illusionists do.

Here it is suitable to mention another example of EM transition made within the problem of the PC explanation; debunking arguments for illusionism. If something can be explained without appealing to it, there is reason to believe that it does not exist (Chalmers, 2020). So, if PC can be explained in physical and functional terms, belief in it ought to be rejected (Dennett, 2020) as can be done with UFOs. It is an interesting example of
EOT, as such an explanation possibility does not entail debunking. That is why realizationists emerge, who claim that although we can introduce debunking explanation, the phenomenon explained and the content of the explanation is realized by real phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 2020). This realizationism demonstrates how one can doubt at least one type of the EOT: if our beliefs about $x$ can be explained without $x$ (epistemological statement) it does not automatically mean that $x$ does not exist (ontological statement). There seems to be some sense in this if one can be imaginative enough to introduce debunking arguments to almost everything, but how imaginative one is can hardly affect (non)existence in some cases.

IS REJECTING EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION AN OPTION?

Considering the mentioned examples of the EOT made by both sides of the discussion, one could notice some puzzling consequences of its application connected with opposite interpretations of the same input data or with the lack of methodological agreement on its mechanisms. However, such puzzlement does not necessarily have to result in accepting the rejection of the EOT by both realists and illusionists. In the following part I will consider some arguments for and against the option of eliminating the EOT in terms of the present discussion.

First I will appeal to the reasons why it could be relevant to stop making the epistemological-ontological transition in the discussion on phenomenality between realists and illusionists. I would say the EOT, to some extent, often moves us away from key points of the discussion, which are epistemological. On the one hand, one can claim that the debate on phenomenal consciousness is actually concerned with the ontological status of PC—whether it is physical or nonphysical (or whether it exists at all). There is some sense here, as the very EOT is made precisely because both sides want to come to the conclusion on the ontology of PC within the discussion. On the other hand, however, this shift to ontology is made on the basis of the assumption about the possibility of the transition from the arguments and implications about the epistemological side of the PC problem (features of access, fallibility etc.) to conclusions on the PC ontology. But the fact is that both sides preliminarily disagree on these conclusions and the core of the discussion is epistemological. By the “core” here I mean that most (if not all) illusionist and realist arguments are not aimed at the confirmation or refutation of the ontologically significant statements about PC. They are actually aimed at describing the features of PC as an epistemological situation (to which extent it is unique compared to other epistemological situations, e.g.
external perception). Recently Frankish stated, if my interpretation is correct, that, despite the move to ontological statements about the nature of what is called PC, it is done not from the argumentative part of the illusionism-realism discussion, but from the implications of this part, that are indeed concerned with the epistemological features of the introspective properties or qualia. That is why the discussion is not actually about the hard problem of consciousness, but about whether such a problem exists at all. It depends, I would say, on whether there is a unique epistemological situation of qualia with their special features (Lewis, 1999) or what-it-is-likeness (Nagel, 1974) revealed via introspection. In addition, the very illusionist and realist approaches are epistemological by nature, as the former is built on attacking the unique epistemological access to phenomenal properties (or their unique epistemological status) (Dennett, 1988; Frankish, 2016) and the latter defends specific forms of acquaintance with them, which makes them, first of all, epistemologically unique (Chalmers, 2013; Kammerer, 2022; Nida-Rümelin, 2016). All the above leads to the thought that the EOT is not essential for the present argument as its core is not connected with ontology, but with the epistemological status of what is called PC. But if it is not essential—meaning that a huge part of the discussion will remain the same without it—it can probably be avoided with the aim of making the debate more focused and less puzzling for the opponents. As it can be clearly seen, a lot of existing arguments between illusionists and realists occur because of the different direction of their ontological steps made after making epistemologically significant statements. However, these steps are not required for the statements themselves and, rather, place obstacles to productive discussion, as there are no observable opportunities to overcome appropriate disagreements because of their implicit and meta-conceptual nature. There appears to be no place for the discussion on the fundamental dualism or physicalism in terms of phenomenal consciousness discourse (probably, it is even useful for the very discourse). But if so, there should also be no place for the influence of this discussion as it is doubtful that we should include the ontology in the notion of phenomenal consciousness (Niikawa, 2021).

Nevertheless, the reason for the option being discussed based on the idea that the EOT is not the essential core of the discussion does not require its full and ultimate elimination. I do not think we cannot make ontologically significant statements about the PC. The suggestion is rather to follow

1In personal conversation
It is possible to begin with only one side of the question, if the side itself becomes the ground for the EOT and for implications on the ontology of PC. If these steps are logically disparate, they likely can be separated methodologically without any considerable damage. This would even help to find out the specific features of PC as an epistemological situation in a more effective way as they will be not under the shadow of ontological baggage, which both camps often try to avoid before appropriate conclusions are drawn.

The mentioned baggage refers to another possible argument for avoiding EOT at the present level of the realist-illusionist discussion. Although illusionists would claim that the epistemologically significant statements made by realists require special ontological implications (e.g. if we have a direct access to PC, PC is nonphysical), these implications are rather required by the premise that there can be something nonphysical and some unique features of PC in an epistemological situation have to bring about a unique ontology. The same is for illusionists who think that there cannot be anything nonphysical and the lack of those unique features means that there is no special ontology. But the case is that the ontological premises often become the arguments for the epistemological views of the camps. Precisely illusionists can claim a) that there are no nonphysical properties — therefore b) it only seems that the introspection provides a unique epistemological situation (as physical properties do not provide such situations) and this means c) PC is physical. However, it sometimes seems that c) is equivalent to a). Therefore makes the premises replace the arguments. Realists can do the same: a) there can be nonphysical properties — therefore b) it does not just seem that the introspection provides a unique epistemological situation (as nonphysical properties do provide such situation), and this means c) PC is nonphysical. Keeping in mind that the argumentative part of the discussion is about the existence of a special epistemological situation, it seems that this existence should be confirmed or refuted by the arguments concerned with the features of this epistemological situation — not by any premises or consequences of this existence. If it is not possible to discuss PC without bringing ontological baggage, then we should probably start the discussion from the basic ontological question “can something (non)physical exist?” However, neither illusionists nor realists want to discuss this (at least this is how the discussion is currently presented). Hence, it could be relevant to leave ontological baggage behind and focus on the features of epistemological situation of what is called PC. Again this does not mean that there will be no returning to the question on what ontological consequences
epistemological situation \( x \) has, where \( x \) is the result of the realist-illusionist discussion. It will simply be made on the second step.

The last possible reason for avoiding EOT is doubtfulness of the very possibility of such a transition on any step of the discussion leaving behind some positive methodological contribution. One can claim there are no sufficient reasons to choose one of the EOT strategies — the realist or illusionist one. It can be demonstrated both in terms of overall relation between epistemology and ontology (see Rorty, 2009), and within the actual discussion, where the two camps have to take each other’s dismissal of the opponent’s EOT seriously. What is important here is that the problem lies not with who is actually right about the nature of PC — one of the two is, and it is no reason to reject both ontological conclusions just for lack of knowing who is wrong. The case is that there are probably no sufficient grounds to make the transition from, whether we face a unique epistemological situation in case of PC to the claim about its (non)physical nature. As illusionists would argue, it is economically justified not to broaden our ontology if we have no reason to broaden our epistemology as PC provides no radically different epistemological situation. And economically it is (however, physicalist ontology will face other difficulties — especially if it is specifically illusionist – as the its epistemological grounds casts a shadow on the possibility to justify any ontology; see Brown, 2022). But if we have no conceptual reasons to broaden ontology it does not mean our current ontology corresponds to reality (for illusionists the correspondence is no less important (Frankish, 2016)). Still, PC can be either physical or non-physical even in case of illusionism (see Tartaglia, 2016). This very diversity also proves that there is no need to make a particular type of EOT in the illusionist case as well as in the realist (remember the conservative realists who are proponents of physical nature of real phenomenal properties). Even if we do have such conceptual reasons (particularly if realists are right about the features of epistemological situation), it hardly means that reality is not purely physical as (and illusionists could agree) there is still much to know about it. There are indeed papers suggesting the possibility to stay physicalist without making any EOTs or concerning the incoherence of the illusionism coming with the EOT (Lipus & Bregant, 2022; Zhong, 2021). A familiar strategy of avoiding making ontological conclusions on the nature of consciousness, based on the statements about its epistemological features, was proposed, for example, by Husserl (Welton, ed., 1999). This strategy’s suitability for the realist-illusionist discussion is not excluded, taking into account that this appeal to a phenomenologist hardly begs the question
against illusionism as previously concentrated on the subjective experience and the latter does not reject its existence (Frankish, 2022).

Nevertheless, one can find some reasons against rejecting the EOT. To show them more clearly I will focus on the reverse side of the arguments mentioned above. First, one can say that despite the core argumentative part of the discussion being about epistemology, this part is still secondary, as the arguments are aimed at the intuitions about the nature of what is called PC—whether it actually exists and therefore whether the hard problem of consciousness is cause for concern. That is why we cannot separate these parts to discuss epistemology and ontology step by step without making the EOT, as we can just miss the reason for the whole discussion. However, I believe both parts can be treated as significant even without moving from one to another in terms of the current level of the realist-illusionist discussion, where disagreements about the PC as an epistemological situation prevail. Here I also want to stress that rejecting the EOT is rather a methodological option which will hardly affect the roots and aims of the discussion, as they seem to be independent from the way we lead it.

Second, one can claim the premises which influence the EOT and which are to be set aside in case of adopting the option, are the main content for both the realist and illusionist approach. If the EOT is so ubiquitous, then we can deny some ideas that are crucial for both realist and illusionist approach. This depends on what is called the main content: it can be the answer to the question of the PC nature and existence or the reasons for why we should think of PC nature and existence in a particular way. In the first case, we have to admit that without the EOT both camps will lose their “main content.” However, in the second, they will not.

The final reason against rejecting the EOT is that the transition is necessary for the discussion despite the possibility of its grounds being questionable. The EOT is kind of a common place within the philosophy of the mind and the illusionist-realist argument, which not only made it possible, but also leads it due to the points mentioned before. Moreover, there are ways to approve the transition. The present paper is not the place to discuss these ways, but they definitely exist, just as ways to doubt the possibility of the EOT do, as shown above.

**CONCLUSION**

Summing up the analysis of the EOT rejection option, I would point out again that it is actually hard to say whether it must be done or not, as it is rather a methodological feature leading to conceptual postulates than
a conceptual postulate itself. Therefore, it can hardly be asserted whether the EOT is a mistake and should be rejected. Indeed, all arguments but the last one are aimed at some positive impact on how the discussion is ongoing and still there is no guarantee that it will become less puzzling and more productive. However, taking into account all the mentioned arguments, I think there is a chance for it. It will not become a silver bullet, but at least this can eliminate some obstacles and would not tie one’s hands in terms of argumentation because all the epistemological statements about the phenomenality made by illusionists and realists are significant without ontological conclusions. They would probably become even clearer due to the focus on the epistemological part of the discussion. While illusionism is worth considering because it can be true (Frankish, 2016), the option of avoiding the EOT is also worth considering because it can be useful even if we are too interested in the content of the discussion to contribute to more productive ways to lead it.

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Об ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЧЕСКО-ОНТОЛОГИЧЕСКОМ ПЕРЕХОДЕ,
СОВЕРШАЕМОМ ИЛЛЮЗИОНИСТАМИ И РЕАЛИСТАМИ


Аннотация: Статья посвящена дискуссии между реалистами и иллюзионистами о феноменальном сознании, феноменальных свойствах, или квалиа. Автор рассматривает эпистемологически-онтологический переход, совершаемый обеими сторонами, — переход от эпистемологически значимых утверждений к онтологически значимым. Оценивается возможность избежать такого перехода, для того чтобы преодолеть некоторые препятствия, которые он может привнести в обсуждение. В статье приводятся примеры перехода, осуществляемого как реалистами, так и иллюзионистами, а также некоторые аргументы за и против его совершения. Автор приходит к выводу, что есть значимые аргументы в пользу обоих вариантов. С одной стороны, мы можем отказаться от перехода к онтологии на текущем этапе дискуссии. Во-первых, это ставит в тупик оппонентов и тем самым замедляет продуктивное взаимодействие. Во-вторых, сама причина перехода недостаточно обоснована. В-третьих, суть дискуссии — по крайней мере ее аргументативной части — между иллюзионистами и реалистами скорее эпистемологическая и переход к онтологии размывает ключевые моменты спора. С другой стороны, мы можем сохранить переход, обращаясь к онтологическим корням дискуссии. Затем автор указывает, что устранение эпистемологически-онтологического перехода не предполагает отрицания онтологической значимости настоящего обсуждения и проблема природы сознания определенно заслуживает внимания, но, возможно, после того как будет тщательно рассмотрена эпистемологическая сторона проблемы.

Ключевые слова: иллюзионизм, реализм, феноменальное сознание, эпистемология, онтология.