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## BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND LIFE\*\*

THE MEETING POINT OF JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET  
AND MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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**Abstract:** This article explores the philosophical dialogue and intersections between two prominent 20th-century thinkers: José Ortega y Gasset and Martin Heidegger. Despite their different cultural and linguistic contexts, their reflections converge on questions of human existence and engagement with the world. The study examines their central concepts, such as Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" and Ortega's "ideas and beliefs," providing an in-depth look at how humans interpret and inhabit reality. The analysis highlights both differences and parallels in their approaches to examining the world and human existence. While Heidegger employs a terminology rich in philosophical neologisms, his analysis of *Dasein* and care (*Sorge*) resonates with Ortega's concept of the "radical reality" of life. Conversely, Ortega emphasizes the necessity of engaging a broad audience and stresses the role of human imagination in constructing the world. The article also investigates the importance of cognition as a mode of "being-in-the-world" for both philosophers. Despite methodological differences, both thinkers conclude that the human being and the world they inhabit are inseparably linked. This work deepens the understanding of philosophical resonances between two intellectual traditions and offers new directions for further study.

**Keywords:** Ortega, Heidegger, Ideas, Beliefs, Dasein, Existential Philosophy.

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Sometimes, a polemic between thinkers does not imply that they conduct it directly. It is possible that this polemic does not involve an exchange of letters or, as is customary today, attacks on social networks. Still, it is easy to find in the author's footnotes or in conversations with students if we are lucky enough to get such evidence. A similar case seems to occur concerning the polemics of one of the essential Spanish thinkers of the 20th century, José Ortega y Gasset, with another, no less significant thinker, named the *evil Alemannic magician* by Jean Amery—Martin Heidegger. We know of two of their meetings, which took place at conferences and were described

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by Heidegger. One transpired in Darmstadt, and the other in Bühlerhöhe, and both, according to Heidegger, turned out to be significant enough for him to remember and record in his diary entries (Heidegger, de Lara, 2014).

From the same notes, however, we know that Heidegger was not familiar with Ortega's philosophy. He was familiar with some of the texts, even if they were translated (*ibid.*), but this fact itself testifies to at least an interest in Ortega's thought. This is emphasized by José Luis Villacañas Berlanga, among others, in his analysis of Ortega's work. Commenting on Heidegger's description of his meetings with Ortega, he says the following:

Son las palabras de un gran filósofo sobre otro, pronunciadas con una profunda voluntad de justicia y con una innegable grandeza. En ellas apreciamos una debida comprensión de las dificultades de ser un filósofo español en aquel tiempo, de su soledad y de su heroicidad. Por eso las hacemos nuestras sin un ápice de reserva (Villacañas Berlanga, 2023: 15)<sup>1</sup>.

Ortega's views on Heidegger are also very well-known to us. In addition to the footnotes in his texts, where the German thinker often appears as someone with whom Ortega agrees or disagrees (Ortega y Gasset, 2017a), it is also emphasized that Ortega put forward similar theses much earlier than the German thinker; they just did not become so widespread; but in all cases, Heidegger is the one in discussion with whom Ortega is interested. Ortega's intellectual struggle would last his entire life, and even in his most recent major publications, we will find references to Heidegger's work more than once. Their aforementioned meetings took place at conferences held in 1951 and 1952, three years before Ortega's death. Nonetheless, it remained crucial for him to engage in discussions about the philosophical ideas that mattered to him within the same intellectual sphere as Heidegger and to debate their points of disagreement.

The language of both thinkers also differed significantly. From the beginning, Ortega focused on a broad audience, published articles in newspapers, gave open lectures, and used language that was easily accessible to his listeners and readers. His texts show what a bright and ironic orator he was; he knew how to win over the audience. Some of his publications, including those mentioned in this work, were originally just such open lectures. His intellectual opponent took a slightly different approach. Heidegger's

<sup>1</sup>"They are the words of a great philosopher about another, spoken with a profound will for justice and undeniable greatness. In them, we perceive a proper understanding of the challenges of being a Spanish philosopher at that time, of his solitude and heroism. For this reason, we make them our own without a trace of reservation."

texts are full of neologisms and his own interpretations of terms, even if they already had a significant philosophical history. At some point, he completely refuses to use any commonly used philosophical definitions. In his last works, especially in *Veiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, he completely switches to an exclusively German one, primarily created by him in his earlier works. Of course, all this makes getting acquainted with his philosophy somewhat problematic.

However, despite all their differences in approaches to publications and treatment of readership, Ortega and Heidegger would have had nothing to argue about if the development of their philosophical thought had not led them to the same questions. One of these questions is the existence of man in the world. This fundamental theme occupied many thinkers at the beginning of the 20th century, and each found their own answers. Ortega put forward his ideas as early as 1914 when his *Reflections on Don Quixote* was published, and it was developed within the framework of his “theory of ideas and beliefs.” This “theory” is not so much a rigorous system as an attempt to describe the possible space for finding an answer to this aforementioned question. At the same time, Heidegger proceeds from the fact that to puzzle out the essence and meaning of human existence, it is necessary to revisit the question of being itself, and from this point develops his concept of *Dasein*. Could these ideas, at any point, intersect?

This article is devoted to an attempt to give a preliminary, very rough answer to this question. We realize that a complete analysis of the resolution to a dilemma as fundamental as the question of human existence can take countless pages, yet still be incomplete. In this regard, we will begin our comparison exclusively within the framework of one category: the description of how man perceives himself in the world and what attitude he builds towards it from the points of view of José Ortega y Gasset’s theory of ideas and beliefs and Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of being-in-the-world. However, even such a description can lead us to an excessive blurring of the boundaries of this article, because the very terms “ideas y creencias” (*ideas and beliefs*) in Ortega’s philosophy and Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” occur many times in different works and contexts. In this regard, we have decided once again to limit the scope of the works under consideration to only those in which either a direct study of the concept of “ideas and beliefs” is encountered or where we find a direct polemic with Heidegger. Thus, the list of works included in the study is as follows: *En torno a Galileo* (1933), *Historia como sistema* (1935) and *Ideas y creencias* (1940), *El hombre y*

*la gente* (1957) in the case of Ortega, and *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* and *Being and Time* in the case of Heidegger.

Based on these works, we will try to mark the beginning of reflection on what man's existence in the world means to Heidegger and Ortega.

It should also be noted that Ortega and Heidegger are often compared, or at least mentioned in the same context, and each time the differences in their views on various philosophical issues are emphasized. We, in turn, would like to take a slightly different approach and show that, despite other points of reference in the search for a philosophical answer to the question of the meaning of human existence, and despite the difference in terminology and views, the thought of Heidegger and Ortega, at times, reveals some interesting intersections. These overlaps, in turn, do not mean that one thinker is "first" or "more correct" in seeking an answer to one of the fundamental philosophical questions, but rather show that despite all their differences, finding similarities is also possible.

#### A VIEW OF THE "WORLD" AND "BEING" IN IT

Ortega describes the world in terms of what it will give us, that it is a "radical reality" (Ortega y Gasset, 2017b: 587) in the sense that within it, the roots of world order are found. Later, he proceeds to examine it more closely, gradually discovering more and more details that make the world itself possible. First, the ideas and beliefs based on which we create, each in our own way, a description of the reality in which we are present (*estamos*). Here, we would like underline that Ortega places an emphasis on the creative ability of the human imagination. In other words, a person invents the world based on how they see it (Ortega y Gasset, 2017d: 326). Ortega also stresses that this applies equally to everyday and more niche spheres of life, for example, to science, which for him is a similar "fantasy." Still, it should be understood that the "fantasy" here is not a derogatory connotation as it might seem at first glance, but simply a way of defining it as the same invention of the world by man as many other things.

Martin Heidegger, on the other hand, takes a different path. He believes his starting point dawns at a more fundamental question that he is rediscovering, that of being, which had fallen into oblivion since ancient times and invites to turn to it anew (Heidegger, 1967: 1; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 21) to grasp how "being," while being an extremely general concept, is nevertheless fundamental to understanding how we comprehend ourselves in the "world." Later, he explains that we are interested not so much in all beings in general

but in specific beings, such as *Dasein*, the being of man, because it is through it that man discovers the world “given to him.” Here, Heidegger makes an exciting move and, through the “analysis of *Dasein*,” shows how the world unfolds before us and encloses us within.

At this point, it already becomes evident to us that there are some similarities between Ortega’s “theory of ideas” and Heidegger’s reasoning about the structure of *Dasein*, which have made it possible to draw parallels in how they approached the analysis of the world as such. However, we are interested in only one aspect: the world is understood simultaneously as perceived and interpreted by both thinkers. However, this would be too broad a generalization. Let us analyze this thesis based directly on Ortega and Heidegger’s texts.

#### THE WORLD IS A SET OF “IDEAS” AND “BELIEFS”

Ortega’s theory of ideas has undergone several significant changes since its appearance in the text *Around Galileo* and was finally formed in the much later *Ideas and Beliefs* and *Man and People*. By this time, it included not only “ideas” and “beliefs,” but also “doubts” that arise as a result of the fact that “beliefs” cease to work.

...in the basic firmament of our beliefs, here and there, like gigantic hatches, abysses open — the emptiness of doubt (Ortega y Gasset, 2017d: 608, 616).

That is, gradually, as a result of living our lives and trying to discover ways of describing them that are more or less rational, as it seems to us, we turn to them to the same extent as to the question of what constitutes life for the individual. In this case, it is not so important what exactly this question is, But what is more important is the very fact of turning to the radical reality of life with the fact that it is not clear to us. Instead, we must somehow master this reality and clarify it due to the search for answers to these questions. This is what Ortega calls the process of forming ideas, from which, in turn, beliefs will derive (ibid.). One important point worth noting separately, is that Ortega tells us that doubts are beliefs, albeit with a different structure (ibid.). Thus, the process of our appeal to the world, to the reality in which we find ourselves, appears to us as follows:

- (1) We, against our will, find ourselves in an unavoidable reality, which we can also call life;

- (2) This reality is radical because it is the basis for all other realities, including scientific “ideas” and various “beliefs”<sup>2</sup>;
- (3) We try to understand this reality as it is given to us and described by others. According to Ortega, man does not exist independently, but is constantly subject to the influence of others and society;
- (4) Within the framework of explaining this reality, we have ideas that, after a while, turn into beliefs that we no longer try to analyze from the point of view of representing reality but are (*estar*) in them, believe in them;
- (5) However, over time, we question them because the reality of life shows us that these beliefs do not fully coincide with what we see. Here, we return to life as a radical reality and repeat the third and subsequent steps.

This moment of repetition is of the most tremendous significance to us. The point is that we have not just described some reality of life once, and then it has frozen for us forever, like an insect stuck in amber and retaining an eternal appearance, but we return to our attempts to describe it again and again. The radical reality that is life itself and the world we find ourselves in creates circumstances that force us to continue searching for an answer to how this world is presented to us.

Here, we can find similarities between the ideas in the *Prolegomena* text and Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. The latter notes that *Dasein*’s being-in-the-world “has always been scattered or even split with its facticity into definite modes of being-in” (Heidegger, 1967: 57; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 78). Here, he enumerates the various ways in which being-in can manifest itself in the world. These are recognition, interrogation, consideration, making particular objects of existence, and many more. We, however, are interested in this similarity, the appeal to the world where we have found ourselves against our will. Now, we must somehow reveal the reality of its existence to ourselves. But what does “must” mean? Is there something among Heidegger’s definitions that could be like this endless attempt to describe and interpret the reality we find in Ortega? The closest image to this would be the one we mentioned earlier, which is the image of being “pre-occupied” with reality. *Dasein* “cares” about the world it inhabits, adopting a perspective that can be understood as an “idea” or a “belief,” depending

<sup>2</sup>To us this difference between the verbs “to have,” which applies to “ideas,” and “to be,” which is used to explain man’s situation, seems especially important when we speak about “beliefs” and “doubts.”

on the context. It then begins to reflect on existence based on how it is presented through direct engagement with the world and how it aligns with an already established system of “ideas” or “beliefs.” Thus, if we were to try to present the structure of knowledge of the world in terms of how *Dasein* reveals himself in it, we would get the following preliminary sketch:

- (1) *Dasein* is the being of being, which can question its being (Heidegger, 1967: 8; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 28);
- (2) This question has a specific direction, but it is not about being. It is about creating and describing some conceptuality of being *Dasein*, which is questioned on its being (Heidegger, 1967; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022);
- (3) This being is “in.” At this point, we turn to the fact that this “in” implies the world in its totality given to *Dasein*;
- (4) Turning to the world means that we begin to be interested in it, show concern for it, and try to gain an understanding of it, as we wrote above.

These two lines of interpretation of the world, from the point of view of addressing it and finding “ideas” to describe it — are very similar. However, there are also significant methodological differences that allow the thinkers to arrive at different results. While Ortega, in his interpretations of ideas and beliefs, follows the path of expanding his theory’s terminology and descriptive possibilities, Heidegger, on the other hand, tries to seek in the opposite direction and exhaust each of the conceptual points he cites as much as possible. In other words, if we take another look at how Ortega explains the functioning of “ideas,” we will see that, at some point, he tells us that the entire problem lies in our language, which we use without proper care, failing to make distinctions where we should. That is why we have this distinction between “ideas” and “beliefs” and then between “beliefs” and “doubts.”

At the same time, Heidegger’s thoughts constantly revolve around exact terms or concepts. Before taking another step in reasoning, he tries to exhaust his terms, completing an etymological or conceptual analysis of each. An excellent example of this approach will be the case described in the second chapter of this work concerning the term “being-in,” in which the preposition “in” has been considered with particular care. This leads Heidegger to the critical conclusion that *Dasein*’s being has the essential arrangement of being-in-the-world.

## MAN IN THE WORLD

Within the framework of this section, it seems appropriate to turn, in addition to the texts mentioned above devoted to “ideas” and “beliefs,” to Ortega’s posthumously published work *Man and People*. Initially, he read it as a short course publicly in 1949–1950 in the Instituto de Humanidades. We refer to this text because it allows us to assess man’s role in the world directly. In this case, we are interested in “man” as one who takes direct part in the invention of the world, in its reconstruction based on his ideas and how he reveals himself in his beliefs. That is why this text, within the framework of the current section, is of special interest to us, and, therefore, we will refer to it within the framework of this analysis.

Let us turn directly to Ortega’s text. As already stated, we will find theses about life as a “radical reality,” which we encountered earlier. Their essence boils down to the fact that the life of each person is their own life and must be considered from within themselves (1), that a person must do something while being in the circumstances (2), which, in turn, presuppose the presence of various possibilities and, consequently, freedom (3). Finally, that life is incommunicable (4); another person cannot live my life for me (Ortega y Gasset, 2017c: 243–245, 266–267). The last point is of particular interest to us because it also assumes the presence of “responsibility”; “everything I do, and therefore think, feel, desire, must make sense.”<sup>3</sup> That is, our interaction with the world is somehow connected with the fact that our ideas about it are somehow manifested; the world is filled with meaning for us based on how we think about it.

Ortega tells us the following:

Only that which I think, desire, feel, and do with my body is human every time I act *as the subject, the creator of all these states* when everything happens to me as such. Consequently, my thought, for example, acquires a human dimension only when I think of something when I guess the meaning of this or that fact (ibid.: 268–269).

<sup>3</sup>It is worth pointing out, and this is one of the reasons why we have decided not to include the text of *Man and People* in the first chapter of our work, that Ortega already said it before, especially in lesson VI of his work *Around Galileo*, which we have already analyzed.

“I used to say that life is loneliness, radical loneliness. By this he did not intend to express a more or less vague appreciation of life. It is something very simple, precise and unquestionable, a truism, more of a very fertile consequence. Life is everyone’s: everyone has to live their own life on their own. Our toothache hurts us and only us” (Ortega y Gasset, 2017c: 609).



This is what the concept of “responsibility” that we mentioned earlier is related to. To be “responsible” in this context means that we do something, somehow address a “thing” and give it meaning, because we have “ideas” as a result of our creative activity about how this thing should function for us.

In this way, Man and the World are no longer separated from each other; as Ortega himself notes, “we find ourselves on the other side of the thousand-year dispute between idealists and realists” (Ortega y Gasset, 2017c) and assert that the world is an infinite number of things, affairs and problems that confront Man and that he becomes such as himself precisely because at each moment he takes into account all these “things” and “circumstances of life.” He endows them with meaning through the ideas that arise in him in each situation and defines them through the beliefs which he sustains at the moment.

At first glance, it may seem that this model of the description of Man and the World does not coincide very much with what we find in the text of the *Prolegomena* and *Being and Time*. Still, there is one aspect in which we can also find a very curious similarity. It is connected with the term that we had already used earlier when we spoke of that particular attitude to the world that *Dasein* manifests, and it is associated, first of all, with the concept of “care.” In the previous chapter, we talked about it and mentioned that *die Sorge*, “care,” is for Heidegger “*Dasein*’s being,” that is, a “construction” (Heidegger, 1967: 61–62; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 82–83) of being-in-the-world in which being-to-the-world *Dasein* itself is “preoccupation.” In other words, the endowment of the being in which *Dasein* reveals itself meaningfully.

Thus, man’s being-in-the-world is not merely a trait or property that man could do without or which we could ignore in our analysis. Still, man is directly related to the existence of the world, which is mediated by the presence of certain circumstances, as Heidegger himself points this out, but he also connects it to the world of “care,” understood ontologically, as opposed to “anguish” or “experience,” which are understood ontically. The ontological structure of “care,” whose detailed analysis, however, lies beyond the scope of this work, contributes to a person’s turning toward the world and the things within it. It generates the same “concern,” that is, it imbues them with sense and meaning. The ontological structure of “care,” whose detailed analysis goes beyond the boundaries of this work, contributes to the fact that a person begins to turn to the world and the things within it, producing the very same “concern” that endows them with meaning and significance. Note that this term should not be interpreted as something

exclusively active, for example, “taking care of the garden” or “taking care of health,” when a person completes some actions that we could describe with the help of the term “care.” These examples are also predominantly ontic. At the same time, Heidegger speaks of its ontological significance:

Even when I don't care about something, when I leave something unattended, rest, or withdraw from something, even these cases fundamentally modify the same way of being. Even when I do nothing but simply doze in the sun, I am thus at peace, and my being retains this specific character of preoccupied being-in-the-world. This applies to any being-at..., to any involvement in something (Heidegger, Aspiunza Elguezabal, 2006: 200)<sup>4</sup>.

In other words, by the very fact of being-in-the-world, *Dasein* retains this character of “preoccupation” with this being-in-the-world. This kind of interpretation, together with the term mentioned above — “circumstances,” which we find in the text of *Being and Time*, allows us to say that “care” is used by Heidegger in a very similar manner to that which we described above when we spoke of Ortega.

#### THE ROLE OF COGNITION IN THE WORLD

When we talked about how the world is described within the framework of Ortega's “ideas” and “beliefs,” we mentioned the role in which he will respond to “doubts.” Recall that “doubts” are gaps in the fabric of the world that a person had previously perceived as definite. However, attempts to solve the problem of the appearance of these gaps lead to the fact of the very existence of this “doubt,” which is also a belief (Ortega y Gasset, 2017e: 1023); at the same time, “cognition” should not be understood solely as a set of specific facts that we receive because of considering an unavoidable reality. Ortega emphasizes this when he says,

Cognition is not reduced to the sum of raw facts and bare dates. Both facts and dates are useful, of course, but they are not reality; they do not possess reality in themselves, and precisely for this reason, they cannot convey it to our understanding (Ortega y Gasset, 2017d: 629).

Here we go back to the very beginning of our analysis when we looked at the text of *En torno al Galileo* and said that cognition, in Ortega's opinion, helps us to create reality as “pure fiction.” Thus, it links the productive

<sup>4</sup>“Even if I do nothing and only doze off and thus stay in the world, I have this specific being of worrying being-in-the-world — every dwelling with, letting myself be taken along” (Heidegger, 1979: 214).

faculty of imagination, which allows us to invent a description of reality, and cognition, which helps to extract different aspects of reality from specific facts. Thanks to such work, we get more ways to interpret reality, and if it coincides with our interpretations of our ideas about it, then we consider the knowledge we have gained to be true. The very work of revealing reality in this way is what Ortega calls “science.” Thus, our knowledge, in general, and science, in particular, are the aggregate of a relatively large number of ideas that we have arrived at as a result of the fact that some of our “beliefs” have changed their type and turned into “doubt.” The reality, Ortega concludes, “it is not a fact, something given or bestowed, but rather a construction that humans create using the material provided” (Ortega y Gasset, 2017d: 531).

From all that has been said, we can draw a significant conclusion that will inform us of the vital role that knowledge plays, not only from the point of view of its increase, but from the point of view of how man reveals himself in the world. Ortega speaks of cognition, which, sooner or later, can become scientific cognition or science, as, for example, in the previous paragraph. However, the matter is not limited to this. Even if this knowledge never takes the form of scientific knowledge, we understand that we are talking about an individual trying to describe in some way a world about whose beliefs they have doubts. We know, and Ortega also notes that doubts do not appear “suddenly,” but the fabric of beliefs in which a person resides is constantly thinning until “doubts” appear. However, it follows from this that cognition does not seem “instantaneous” or “sudden,” but rather that the thinning of “belief” occurs over a relatively long period, as well as the process of cognitive activity, which also realizes itself in time and takes into account new circumstances. Consequently, we can say that cognition is not just a form of activity that we use or do not use at our discretion, but a particular way of being in reality, a way of being in the world. It is our knowledge when confronted with the world that discovers “holes” in it, which it tries to “fill” with ideas, from which, perhaps, new “beliefs” will break through.

This way of being in the world is unique to the being that is man because, along with being in the world, it also contributes to the fact that this world, under the influence of a constant direction of thought on every “object,” in the broadest sense of the word, changes for this particular person. That is, we are talking about the fact that a person lives in a reality that is not only never “complete,” but capable of changing precisely because such a mode of being as the being of the “knower” is inherent in man.

In both texts, after a preliminary analysis of being-in-the-world, Heidegger moves on to the role of knowledge in relation to this being, focusing instead

on exploring cognition as a phenomenon. For Heidegger and Ortega, it is evident that knowledge is not the object of knowledge itself but must “be somewhere else” (Heidegger, 1967: 60; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 81–82). However, it is not a physical place but a “way” of being-in-the-world:

- (1) “Cognition of the world is a mode of being *Dasein*, namely a way that is ontically based in being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of this being” (Heidegger, 1979: 217; Heidegger, Aspiunza Elguezabal, 2006: 203);
- (2) “Cognition is the existential mode of being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1967: 61; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 82).

Even though the definition of Being and Time seems shorter, the interpretation that follows it seems much more detailed than in the first case. From the beginning, Heidegger tells us that cognition is *Dasein*’s way of being. This alone would be enough for us to assert the closeness of this idea to what we find in Ortega’s text because it asserts that it is precisely cognition that is the means for being-in-the-world of human existence, which is precisely what *Dasein* is. However, let us also turn to Heidegger’s comments in Being and Time, because there we find another critical aspect.

If we now ask what manifests itself in the phenomenal datum of knowledge itself, we must state that knowledge itself is based in advance in the already-being-in-the-world as the essential constitutive of the being of presence. This being-under is, in the nearest way, not just a numb gaze at the naked present. Being-in-the-world as a preoccupation with the preoccupied world *is captured*. To be cognition as a contemplative determination of the present, a preceding deficit of the preoccupied need-to-have-to-deal with the world is required (Heidegger, 1967: 62; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022: 83).

In this case, we are talking about cognition, being-in-the-world, and care as related concepts that give us some idea of the world together. This is because, as a result of caring for the world, we also do, and this follows, among other things, from the analysis of “care” that we gave in the previous section, some cognitive work. “Care” then appears to us as a relation to the world in which we find ourselves, and knowledge results from interpreting some things in the world to which we have turned our “concern.” This is one of the main coincidences that we would like to emphasize. This is not to say that cognition is a process of obtaining facts. Still, both Ortega and Heidegger emphasize its role as a way of being-in-the-world, interpreting it and, to some extent, creating the reality in which man finds himself. Later, Heidegger concludes this thought as follows:

Based on this mode of being to the world, which allows the beings encountered within the world to meet only in their pure appearance (εἶδος), and as a mode of this mode of being, a special gaze into what is thus encountered is possible (Heidegger, 1967; Heidegger, de Lara, 2022).

That is, we should say that a means of being-in-the-world such as cognition allows us to find, in a certain way, within the reality that we encounter the things that we can later interpret as having to do with the proper order of things.

#### CONCLUSION

Indeed, we cannot assert that these ideas coincide entirely. Moreover, even the terminological apparatus of both thinkers is quite different. Nevertheless, we see that within the framework of the interpretation of knowledge as a certain way of being-in-the-world, as a way of inventing ideas, giving definitions and forming scientific knowledge, significant similarities are found between the thinkers. This intersection, along with others that can be seen when comparing the philosophies of Ortega and Heidegger, all deserve separate, meticulous research.

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## БЫТИЕ-В-МИРЕ И ЖИЗНЬ

ТОЧКА ПЕРЕСЕЧЕНИЯ ХОСЕ ОРТЕГИ-И-ГАССЕТА И МАРТИНА  
ХАЙДЕГГЕРА

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**Аннотация:** Статья исследует возможный диалог и пересечения взглядов двух выдающихся мыслителей XX века: Хосе Ортеги-и-Гассета и Мартина Хайдеггера. Несмотря на разные культурные и лингвистические контексты, их размышления пересекаются в вопросах человеческого существования и взаимодействия с миром. Авторы анализируют их ключевые концепции, такие как «бытие-в-мире» у Хайдеггера и «идеи и убеждения» у Ортеги, которые позволяют углубленно рассмотреть, как человек осмысливает и оживает реальность. Центральное внимание уделяется различиям и сходствам подходов к анализу мира и человеческого существования. В частности, подчеркивается, что, хотя Хайдеггер использует терминологию, насыщенную философскими неологизмами, его анализ *Dasein* и заботы (*Sorge*) перекликается с концепцией Ортеги о «радикальной реальности» жизни. Ортега, напротив, фокусируется на необходимости диалога с широкой аудиторией и подчеркивает роль человеческого воображения в создании мира. В статье также рассматривается значимость познания как способа «быть-в-мире» у обоих философов. Несмотря на методологические различия, оба мыслителя приходят к выводу о неразрывной связи человека и мира, в котором он существует. Работа способствует лучшему пониманию философских переключек между двумя интеллектуальными традициями и предлагает новые направления для дальнейших исследований.

**Ключевые слова:** Ортега-и-Гассет, Мартин Хайдеггер, бытие-в-мире, идеи и убеждения, *Dasein*, экзистенциальная философия.

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