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## FROM THE EXECUTIVE EDITORS OF THE ISSUE

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In this final issue of the 2023 volume, we turn our attention to the timely and important topic of feminist philosophy. The term “feminist” encompasses a diverse range of perspectives and approaches, making it crucial to provide a brief explanation of how it is used in this issue. This issue’s articles engage with both the philosophical perspectives of women authors and the philosophical inquiries into the experiences and challenges faced by women in society. Hence, the issue opens with an article by SOFIA PORFIRYEVA and MARIIA STENINA, which utilizes critical phenomenology to analyze and compare the ethical approaches to nonviolence proposed by Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed. In the next article, ANASTASIYA ADAMOVA defines the problem of the subject in feminist discourse within the concept of motherhood. The issue then proceeds to explore the works of female philosophers who were once prominent but have since become marginalized in the field, with several articles dedicated to highlighting and analyzing their contributions. The first of these is a study by YEKATERINA KOSHOLAP that examines the role of women within the Cadet Party, while the second is an article by LYUBOV BOGODELNIKOVA that sheds light on the contributions of M. V. Bezobrazova. Following these are a study by SOFYA NIKIFOROVA and YEKATERINA MIKHEYEVA that explores the philosophical ideas of Raya Dunaevskaya, and an article by OLGA LEVINA and TIMUR SAYEV that delves into the contributions of Damaris Cudworth Mash, a key thinker in the history of natural law theory. Finally, the issue concludes with an article by DIANA GASPARYAN that applies a feminist lens to the philosophical works of M. Bakhtin.

The second section of “Studies” features four articles, the first of which is an analysis by MAIIA-SOFIIA ZHUMATINA of Hegel’s theory of art in relation to the concept of temporal discursive violence. This is followed by an article by MAKSIM MIROSHNICHENKO that explores the ethical implications of current developments in biotechnology. The remaining two articles, written by MAXIM GORBACHEV and VASILY SHANGIN, focus on topics related to logic, epistemology, and ontology.

The “Translations and Publications” section, a hallmark of our journal, features a transcription and English translation of a previously unpublished manuscript by Hugh of Saint-Cher. FEDOR NEKHAENKO, the translator and transcriber, also provides a comprehensive introduction that situates Hugh

within his historical context and examines the significance of the manuscript for scholarly inquiry. The translation is a critical edition, which means that it includes the original text with manuscript and critical apparatus, alongside the English translation, allowing scholars to engage with the material in a deeper and more nuanced way.

The issue concludes with two insightful book reviews. The first, written by ROMAN USTYANTSEV, evaluates a recent publication by José Luis Villacañas Berlanga on the influential Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. The second, authored by DIANA GASPARYAN and ALEKSANDR KOCHKOVSKIY, examines a recently published monograph on Mikhail Bakhtin's work.

Finally, the last section of the issue is a review of the conference panel on liberal theory in the 21st century, held at the “World/Worlds of the Future” conference organized by the School of Philosophy and Cultural Studies of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY:  
TIMELY PROBLEMS, FORGOTTEN NAMES

STUDIES. PART 1

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ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ. ЧАСТЬ ПЕРВАЯ

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Porfiryeva, S. I., and M. V. Stenina. 2023. "Semantics of Nonviolence : Judith Butler's Performativity of Vulnerability and Sara Ahmed's Queer Lines" [in English]. *Filosofiya. Zhurnal Vysshey shkoly ekonomiki [Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics]* 7 (4), 13–26.

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SOFIA PORFIRYEVA, MARIIA STENINA\*

## SEMANTICS OF NONVIOLENCE\*\*

JUDITH BUTLER'S PERFORMATIVITY OF VULNERABILITY  
AND SARA AHMED'S QUEER LINES

Submitted: Oct. 30, 2023. Reviewed: Nov. 30, 2023. Accepted: Dec. 06, 2023.

**Abstract:** In the article, we consider the approaches to the ethics of nonviolence suggested by Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed. Butler's project is rooted in Monique Wittig's concept of «material violence». By extending the meaning of this term to gender and normative violence, Butler articulates the ethics of nonviolence. The latter involves concepts of radical equality and interdependence. A practical complement to the Butler project can be found in the works of Sara Ahmed, who investigates the possibility of opposing violence within institutions. She develops the concept of the «feminist ear», based on phenomenology, which we suggest considering as a tool to implement the ethics of nonviolence. Being an attitude that can be adapted due to methodology requirements or in political practice, Ahmed's feminist ear refers to Bourdieu's metaphor of the «sharped eye» by which a researcher can objectivate their doxic (or «native») experience. Considering these parallels, we investigate his theory of symbolic violence, internalized and reproduced in systems of dispositions. Bourdieu's striving to reveal a material side of ideology confronting that of intellectualist tradition partly matches Wittig's intuitions. By introducing the notion of habituality, we can reconsider the very question of ideology's potential overcoming that cannot be performed using intellectual endeavor. This impossibility leads Bourdieu to criticize classic phenomenology because of its ignorance of social conditions and the natural attitude. Inverting the usual working strategy of Husserlian phenomenology, he takes a natural attitude as a framework of his research, revealing the initiation rituals to the symbolic structure. The article suggests some strategies to overcome it.

**Keywords:** Material Violence, Feminist Ear, Normative Violence, Symbolic Violence, Nonviolence, Butler, Ahmed, Bourdieu.

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Rien n'est à faire, tout est à défaire.

*Laura Lamiel*

Feminist critique of violence has a long history and many faces: on the one hand, it contains works of fiction (especially autofiction) that record slow

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and routinized acts of violence; on the other hand, there are theoretical works that conceptualize notions of “violence” and “nonviolence.” It is apparent that violence does not exist *per se* but is always transitional, establishing a certain hierarchy. The latter can be based on gender, biological sex, skin color, economic status, or religion — that is, anything that makes a living being (in this case, a human being) vulnerable in the dominant normative system. In this paper, we will focus on the projects Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed put forth, highlighting their qualitative synergy. For Butler, violence is a performative practice that results in putting vulnerable bodies in a precarious state. Ahmed narrows her focus on studying institutions, primarily universities, and explores violence within the phenomenology of space. In the second part of the article, we will focus on the notion of symbolic (discursive) violence, especially apparent in the ethnological field. By focusing on the possibilities to overcome this violence we will present a conceptual framework within which its critique can be understood as a personal trial requiring a particular attitude toward lifeworld. We argue that these projects establish a theoretical foundation for nonviolence as an ethical stance and, more importantly, provide specific practices to counter normative violence.

#### MATERIAL VIOLENCE: FROM GENDER PERFORMATIVITY TO VIOLENCE PERFORMATIVITY

One of the central aspects of the state of nature myth, as Butler notes, is the fact that it speaks about the figure of an adult, self-sufficient *man* (Butler, 2020: 30). Furthermore, his gender identity emerges not from social empowerment but from social individualization, wherein the individual consistently identifies as a man. In the ideal world of this fantasy, interaction with another individual becomes possible only through conflict. At the same time, in the background is a figure of the woman that the man desires. The image of this woman is so illusory, that “(w)e cannot even fault the representation of women in the scene, because she is unrepresentable.” (ibid.: 34). Similar fates befall other unrepresentable or invisible individuals who do not conform to the settings established by the dominant framework. Performative acts transform nonviolence into the power of these unseen individuals, allowing them to reaffirm their presence as vital and valuable. Below, we will see how these acts are possible and how they affect the struggle against violence. In *The Force of Nonviolence*, one can find references to the pivotal (and thus mainstream) works related to violence and nonviolence, such as those by Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, Frantz Fanon, and

Sigmund Freud. However, within the conceptual framework, Butler remains aligned with Monique Wittig, even though Wittig's name is not explicitly mentioned in the text.

*The Force of Nonviolence* can be ascribed to Butler's post-9/11 works, including *Precarious Life* (2004) and *Frames of War* (2009). However, it is not fair to consider Butler's reflection on violence and nonviolence apart from her gender studies. The nexus between gender theory and critique of militarism represents a paper, *Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism"* (Butler, 1992), published two years after *Gender Trouble*. Sanna Karhu (Karhu, 2017) notes that in *Contingent Foundations*, Butler speaks about the concept of material violence that first appeared in Wittig's essay *Straight Mind* and as the better option for the term "ideology":

When we use the overgeneralizing term "ideology" to designate all the discourses of the dominating group, we relegate these discourses to the domain of Irreal Ideas, we forget the *material (physical) violence* that they directly do to the oppressed people... (Wittig, 1980: 105–106; emphasis added).

As an example, Wittig draws attention to pornography as a part of the dominant heteronormative discourse that "signifies that women are dominated" (ibid.: 106). Among other things, she underscores a crucial aspect of this material violence, which we will delve into later:

As a harassing tactic it has another function, that of a warning. It orders us to stay in line and it keeps those who would tend to forget who they are in step; it calls upon fear (ibid.).

Hence, material violence is embodied in any dominant discourse that forces the body to fit the established settings. Wittig contends that the discourses of heteronormativity and binarity play a defining role, portraying a man as inherently dominant and independent while positioning a woman in perpetual confrontation vis-à-vis the man. Her reflections on material violence and the political meaning of the gender category became the foundation for Butler's theory of performativity and further conceptualization of terms like "normative violence" and "gender violence" (Butler, 2020; see also Karhu, 2017: 29–34).

Wittig herself hardly uses the notion of "norm";<sup>1</sup> however, for Butler, it becomes a crucial conceptual tool. While Wittig understands social

<sup>1</sup>As S. Karhu notes, the term "norm" is used by M. Wittig once in *Paradigm* (1979). See: Karhu, 2017: 31, n. 12.

force as permanent and monolithic, Butler subverts this confidence in stability by addressing norms as historically and socially contingent. In other words, force and violence are necessary but insufficient conditions for the functioning of norms (Butler, 2020), which should also be considered from a *temporal* perspective. Butler expounds upon the temporality of norms through a framework derived from Jacques Derrida's interpretation of John Austin's theory of performative speech acts (see Butler, 1997: 146–151). Derrida argues that precisely because of repetition, language units could be recognized and reused through the citation. In the same way, the norm as a discursive practice is viable only because of the repetition, which is a temporal process.<sup>2</sup> Temporality simultaneously establishes norms and makes them fragile and changeable. The normativity of violence, in turn, is also performative and temporal; that is, it can change. Further, we will show how said contingency allows the demolition of violent norms.

#### BODIES SOCIALIZED IN SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

This persistent reminder of the material character of ideology aligns with the strategy of thinking about this phenomenon in Pierre Bourdieu's oeuvre and becomes especially noticeable in his approach to violence (Bourdieu, 1998a). He shows that any attempt to think of ideology in terms of *imaginary* and *symbolic* meets a severe trap that consists of precipitate division between imaginary and real, spiritual and material, false and true. Such a trap originates from the early Marxist definition of ideology as a false consciousness opposed to an objective world. Hence, some following attempts to apprehend ideology have tacitly adopted this division that implies a possible comeback from imaginary to real (science, production, or class struggle). To avoid charges of intellectualist philosophy and to show the material existence of ideology, Bourdieu introduces the notion of *dispositions* (practical schemas) instead of categories (cognitive structures). These dispositions arrange our *doxic experience*—everyday perceptions and anticipations that phenomenology explores under the notion of *natural attitude*. However, even acknowledging Husserl's merit in its elaboration, Bourdieu does not consider natural attitude as a *simple* undergird of everyday life from which one should, as quickly as possible, proceed to a phenomenological one. In other

<sup>2</sup>See also: "Construction not only takes place *in* time, but is itself a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of this reiteration" (Butler, 1993: 10). Hence, instability is a *deconstitutive* possibility in the very process of repetition.



words, he does not seek to reduce the usual and inevitably naive standpoint of our being-in-the-world to start the investigation, as Husserl used to. Instead, he uncovers the carelessness of such a definitive reduction that goes together with the ignorance of social conditions that make such a *natural* attitude possible. These dispositions are, in turn, impregnated by dualist taxonomies (masculine and feminine, raw and cooked, top and bottom, and cultural and natural) covering such natural domains as time and space. But the *natural* character of gender differences is proved retroactively: social repartition of work is justified by a backdating reference to the anatomic constitution. In other words, symbolic constitution transmits an arbitrary social *nomos* to necessary present *phusis* (Bourdieu, 1998a: 40). Thus, the domain of the feminine is determined by a diacritical construction with a continuous reference to the masculine as different, and this difference outlines the champ of “I can” and “I will.” The cognition of dominated groups is, in fact, *recognition* of the symbolic order they endure and its establishment as a gnoseological order of the world,<sup>3</sup> common sense of representations, and, consequently, praxis.

Given this, symbolic violence cannot be apprehended as something spiritual or fading secondary to the physical physical, unless we fall into naive materialism. Instead, it should be considered in terms of the objective character of its subjective experience.<sup>4</sup> Hence, in this problem statement, a potential critique of symbolic power or an emancipatory shift from this setting has a form of performative disobedience involving subordinated bodies. In this sense, there is no way to exit it by a simple act of cognitive realization (ibid.: 63). Habitual (or, following Bourdieu’s terminology, *habitualized*) structures of violence are inscribed onto bodies, and not only in minds: their corporeal existence entails a stable repeatability that inertially outstrips social conditions lying at their origins. One can better understand its potential overcoming by emphasizing the practical shape of symbolic violence.

Ethnological material gained in Kabylia (northern Algeria) and largely used by Bourdieu in *La domination masculine*, as well as in a number of

<sup>3</sup>Cf. the definition of symbolic power in (Bourdieu, 2014: 210; translated by M.S.): “Symbolic power as a power to constitute the given by its enunciation, to make see and make believe, to transform the vision of the world [...] is executed only if it is recognised, i. e. unrecognized as arbitrary.”

<sup>4</sup>Similar reflexion on the necessity to consider other types of violence besides the physical can be found in bell hooks’ work (hooks, 1997). This broader definition is needed in order to shift the (over)focus from extreme forms of violence leading to acceptance of its “average” manifestations.

previous volumes, causes us to question the pertinence of the ethnological motif lying behind the whole conceptualization. At first glance, ethnology, an endless confrontation between the query of structural universals and respect for plurality, causes more trouble than it is worth. Being a part of scientific practice with its striving to apprehend the Other, ethnological research reproduces distinctions between researcher and informant, knowledge and ignorance.<sup>5</sup> One distinction also appears during fieldwork: that of the “ethnologizing” and “ethnologized,” introduced by Jean-François Werner (1999) (Clifford, 1983) and destined to show the redoublement of symbolic violence. Thus, the challenge for an ethnologist is to overcome this epistemic asymmetry to lead the symbolic structure into the light and not to reificate it for the sake of descriptive objectivity (Bourdieu, 1998a: 159). Another challenge is to find out the way to proceed.

In one of his later lectures, *Participant Objectivation*, Bourdieu credits his ethnological experience for providing him with a sharpened eye that captures some structural similarities between dominant forms of masculinity.<sup>6</sup> He uncovers the trick he mastered during fieldwork: a sort of to-and-fro movement that allows a researcher to objectivate their own doxic experience while preserving natural engagement in the field. The latter presumes that a researcher is always-already provided with a sort of indigenous experience: Bourdieu, in this point, recalls the ceremonies of initiation existing in French Academies, but we can also refer to greeting habits or celebratory meals, the perception of which is guided by shared conventions. Given this, the procedure in question consists of a return to individually lived but shared experiences that should be objectivated, i. e., subjected to sociological critique. Considered unreliable in previous traditions, doxic experience offers

<sup>5</sup>The last is deeply rooted in the distinction between theoretical and practical (phenomenological) attitudes. The last is based on non-reflexive experience that can not be objectivated in first-person perspective (as, for example, a native speaker can barely explain the grammatical structure of their language) but can be taught by demonstration. Inaccessibility of the theoretical side of a practice to its performer is considered as an epistemological asymmetry between a researcher and their informants (Bourdieu, Randal, 1998b).

<sup>6</sup>The example Bourdieu offers in this lecture is pertinent enough to be quoted in detail: “[H]aving discovered in Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse* (1929) mythological structures that I would not have noticed had my eye not been sharpened by familiarity with the Kabyle (and more generally Mediterranean) vision of the division of labour between the sexes, I was able, thanks to the extraordinarily subtle analysis that Virginia Woolf develops in that novel of how the dominant masculine is dominated by his domination, to discover in return the limits of the lucidity of an anthropologist who has not managed fully to turn anthropology against itself” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2003: 290–291).

a practical standpoint in the critique of symbolic violence and is the only medium to *perform* it.

(UN)GRIEVABLE LIVES

One of the normative goals of *The Force of Nonviolence* is an attempt to form “a political imaginary of the *radical equality* of grievability” (Butler, 2020: 57; emphasis added). The very category of the “human” works as a differential norm: some human beings gain their humanness by default, while others have to struggle for it (Butler, 2009: 76). Hence, varied lives undergo disparate evaluation: “Some group is, then, covered by my expanded claims of self-defense, and they are understood to be worthy of a violent protection against violence” (Butler, 2020: 44).

Life’s worth is delineated by the alignment of performative actions with established norms, which is — at least, in Western societies — determined by that said subject from the myth of the natural state. The goal of nonviolence, then, is to struggle with this divisional principle by overcoming the idea of self-sufficiency and independence, which are the motors of eternal conflict.<sup>7</sup> Butler does not justify vicious colonization dependence, but suggests it stems from a “renewed and revalued notion of interdependency,” which can help to “formulate another view of social solidarity and of nonviolence” (ibid.: 41). Which type of interdependence is she talking about in *Frames of War*:

If, as the philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas claims, it is the face of the other that demands from us an ethical response, then it would seem that the norms that would allocate who is and is not human arrive in visual form. These norms work to *give face* and to *efface* (Butler, 2009: 77; emphasis original).

The assertion of this thesis can be found in Lévinas’s example of the hounded, who are already given away even before the roundup and the bullying.<sup>8</sup> *I* (moi) is always in an ethical or ascetical position in relation to the Other. This relation does not have any beginning or *arche*: *I* am already in a relationship with the Other even before *I* find out about this connection. In other words, the subject is always a hostage of this

<sup>7</sup>Quite like fantasies of the natural state, where the independence and autonomy of one person (man) is compromised by the presence of the Other, who also has independence and autonomy.

<sup>8</sup>While examining the parallels between Butler and Lévinas, we drew on Anna Yampolskaya’s outstanding translation of Lévinas’s lectures into Russian. Lévinas’s original thought implies that ethical obligations apply to a very *limited* group of people united by cultural and religious (Judeo-Christian) contexts.

interdependence. The Other does not just demand an ethical response from us but calls it into question. Lévinas points out — the death of the Other makes me doubt myself.

For both Lévinas and Butler, responsibility is the synonym for interdependency. Reflecting on mourning practices, she notes that differential norms are valid in life and even after death — some lives will undoubtedly elicit mourning, while others may not be seen as requiring expressions of grief.<sup>9</sup> The latter are treated as if these lives cannot be lost, since it is believed that these lives are not life in the real sense; that is, there is no need to declare mourning for them. In his turn, Lévinas highlights that my non-indifference to the other has an irreducible significance of sociality. Those who are pushed out into “the zone of non-being”<sup>10</sup> (Butler, 2020: 18) and doomed to precarity have no choice but to practice *nonviolence*, i. e., physical affirmation of the claims of life and the right to be mourned after death. Radical equality — as the essential element of the ethical position of nonviolence — is possible only with the recognition of absolute interdependence. As Butler argues, our equality is defined by the fact that there is a possibility for any living interconnection to be destroyed, and each such destruction strikes at the interdependence that forms our world.

#### PRACTICE OF NONVIOLENCE AS ONGOING STRUGGLE

The project of nonviolence proposed by Judith Butler begs the question: how is it possible to practice nonviolence, given that the human is already an outcome of the violent norm and simultaneously reproduces it? Or, more specifically, how can one in a vulnerable position struggle against systemic violence? Butler examines vulnerability together with anger, perseverance, and resistance; she argues that “(v)ulnerability *ought not to be* identified exclusively with passivity; it makes sense only in light of an *embodied set*

<sup>9</sup>The difference between grieved and ungrieved lives is perfectly shown by the cartoon *Coco* (2017). The plot revolves around the celebration of El Día de Muertos — the day when a bridge of orange velvet petals appears between the World of the Living and the World of the Dead and living people can meet their deceased relatives and friends. However, only those whose pictures are present on the memorial altar can pass from the World of the Dead to the World of the Living, that is, anyone who is still remembered by the living. The forgotten dead are not only deprived of meeting their living relatives, but in time, they cease to exist at all, even in the World of the Dead, and disappear forever. Memory, which also has temporality, is a tool for “quoting.” In real life, a bridge of velvets connecting the World of the Living and the World of the Dead is, for example, the “Return of Names” action in memory of the victims of political repressions.

<sup>10</sup>Butler uses this term following Frantz Fanon.

of social relations” (Butler, 2020: 131; emphasis added). Nonviolence does not arise from nowhere; it is always related to violence. The challenge is not to overcome this vulnerability and act from a powerful position but to expose this vulnerability and, thus, declare oneself. Even when “agency is blocked,” there are different ways to enter “the force field of violence” (ibid.: 132). Butler gives an example of refugees who demand documents or freedom of movement. Mobility (as any other practice involving the body) requires space; that is, streets do not provide room for civic engagement by default, but infrastructure benefits are not available for everyone (especially for those in a vulnerable position; Butler, 2015: 126). In other cases, appearances in public spaces can be dangerous. Then the body, as Butler notes, shifts to another space:

Sometimes the demand is made with the body, through showing up in a place where one is exposed to police power and refusing to move. The cell phone image of the petitioner makes the virtual case for the actual life, and it shows how life depends upon its virtual circulation (Butler, 2020: 133).

Thus, the physical body extends into the digital realm—acquiring room in spatial and temporal space. The Internet provides conditions for the body to be asserted, or in Butler’s words, for “emphatic and public indexical demonstration” (ibid.). The proliferation and replication of images depicting the protester (or an individual trapped in a precarious situation) on the Internet allow for establishing a tangible presence, thereby manifesting the genuine corporeal vulnerability of individuals. However, it does not mean that the digital realm is a safe space; sometimes, it is even more dangerous, as it makes monitoring and deanonymizing other people’s activities possible. In nonviolent struggle, the Internet’s function is to make visible those who are usually invisible. For example, the *Woman, Life, Freedom* movement made visible the death of 22-year-old Iranian Mahsa Amini, who died in a Tehran hospital on September 16, 2022. She was arrested by the religious morality police of Iran’s government for allegedly not wearing the hijab following government standards. Nonviolence is not limited to corporeality; it is rooted in the inherent ties that transcend corporeality, unfolding, differentiating, and embracing the external world (Butler, 2015: 129–131).

## TWISTING LINES

Above, we mentioned that in Wittig's reflections on violence, the material violence forces subjects to "stay in line"<sup>11</sup> (Wittig, 1980: 106). Corporeality and space, which are (not) occupied by bodies, play crucial roles in the critique of violence. The body is orientated in space, however, questions remain regarding where it is oriented. Guided norms direct the body in the "right" way, usually associated with the *straight* line, while deviation is considered wrongheaded. This deviation, twisting—queer—line, is in the focus of Sara Ahmed's studies (Ahmed, 2006). Normativity, she argues, is a consequence of the repetitiveness of bodily practices<sup>12</sup> over time, or "the bodily horizon, a space for action, *which puts some objects and not others in reach*" (ibid.: 66; emphasis original). Accessible objects assemble themselves in a line, along which people are gathered. Assembly, in turn, is not a neutral but a directive action, because to gather somewhere, it is necessary to "follow specific lines" (ibid.: 81). For example, people have to be connected by family ties to gather *around* tables for a family dinner. The roots of these ties lie in similarity or repeatability. And what is repeated, at some point, becomes invisible and imperceptible, as well as dominating and forcing. In Ahmed's words, spaces and bodies "are the effects of such straightening devices" (ibid.: 92).

Twisted or queer, the line always draws attention. To start this line—or, at least, to find said option—means to begin noticing the repeatability of form of familiar things. This break from the common entails *disorientation*, that is, an unusual and uncomfortable body position; in these conditions, the body is knowingly *vulnerable*, losing its footing and compelled to seek something to cling to.<sup>13</sup> Among other things, disorientation involves becoming an object (ibid.: 159). Sometimes disorienting does not require any action from a person—it is enough simply to enter into the world where there is no room for one.<sup>14</sup> Ahmed suggests considering this disorientation not

<sup>11</sup>Separate from Wittig, but with reference to Freud, Sarah Ahmed gives her interpretation of the phrase in line: one "stays the line" by being oriented toward marriage and the continuation of the generation. See: Ahmed, 2006: 72–74.

<sup>12</sup>Bodies, Ahmed notes, take form through reference to those objects that are within reach. If Butler begins with the "natural state," Ahmed begins with the "natural setting" in phenomenology. That is, the world is not just "spread out" (as Husserl was saying), it already has a certain form, which consists of more or less familiar things (ibid.: 28).

<sup>13</sup>Ahmed finds a similar concept of disorientation in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (ibid.: 4).

<sup>14</sup>These are bodies that do not conform to established "normality," by which are most commonly understood as white heteronormative bodies.

as a moment of despair but as a *radical* possibility. The very exposure to this possibility reveals vulnerability, as described by Butler, and becomes a starting point for nonviolence.

#### MIND THE GAP!

As we have shown above, for Butler, the concept of performativity remains relevant not only for issues of gender, but also for ethics of *nonviolence* that begin by asserting its bruised position. Ahmed, in turn, speaks mainly of *nonperformativity*—speech acts in which the stated action is not performed (Ahmed, 2012: 113; Ahmed, 2017). In more recent works, she refines the concept of nonperformativity, that is, it refers to policies that are fixed but not actually enforced (Ahmed, 2019), especially nonperformative statements of various institutions and organizations, where performativity hides the emptiness (Ahmed, 2021).<sup>15</sup> Once this emptiness is discovered—usually because of the act of normative violence—victims who find themselves in it can file a formal complaint. Usually, the procedure for filing a complaint is already described in the regulations in the form of “flowcharts, with lines and arrows that give the would-be complainer a clear route through” (ibid.: 47). However, in most cases, this route is not easy to take, and it may deliberately discourage the complaint by making it more difficult to file.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, all these bureaucratic procedures also have a temporal dimension, an instrument of normative violence. In his phenomenological analysis of waiting, Imad Shouery shows that it is associated with absence and anxiety, especially if it is bureaucratic (Shouery, 1972).

An act of nonviolence, according to Butler, is a person’s assertion of their vulnerable position. However, are these performativities (assertions) visible or heard if the bodies are in this gap? In essence, is it possible to argue that straightening devices intend to marginalize individuals further, pushing them “beyond the margins into the zone of non-being” (Butler, 2020: 26)? Violence destroys connections; practicing nonviolence requires

<sup>15</sup>Sara Ahmed has in mind, for example, the various codes of ethics of universities or other organizations, which are performative statements but are not actually applied.

<sup>16</sup>The complexity of the process of filing a lawsuit in a rape case is perfectly illustrated in the play *Prima Facie* by Susie Miller. The main character of the play, Tessa, first acts as a lawyer on the side of the accused in rape cases. All these cases are just a “game of law” for her, and her task is to find inconsistencies in the victim’s stories (“If the story has holes, then point them out”) in order to save her client. Soon she herself becomes a victim of rape and goes through all the stages of filing a complaint and then appears in court as a victim. Her monologue once again emphasizes how devastating material violence can be.

forging those connections anew, for example, through developing a “feminist ear” (Ahmed, 2017; 2021), a practice that allows to hear (see) what is usually silenced. Ahmed suggests that the feminist ear should be seen as an institutional tactic and research methodology that seeks to combat material violence (ibid.: 34–37). At the same time, it is impossible to designate a particular organization or individual as the bearer of such a feminist ear. The specificity of this tactic is to be such an “ear” for each other — that is, not only in isolated acts of publicizing deeds of injustice, but on an ongoing basis. Violence, in the broad sense of the word, happens constantly and becomes a matter of course. At some point, it becomes so familiar, that one no longer notices it or does not want to notice it on purpose since it seems impossible to do anything about it. The struggle against violence often ends with a warning: “I know that this can happen so I will avoid it,” but this is not enough, as such a maxim remains mute. It is essential to keep talking about it, to keep telling stories because “We have to keep saying it because they keep doing it.”<sup>17</sup> In *Complaint!* (ibid.) Ahmed shows how she practices feminist ear by collecting stories of violence and harassment in a university setting of students and faculty. Another example of a feminist ear is the journalist project *Schoolgirls*<sup>18</sup> by Nastya Krasilnikova, where she reveals a long history of sexualized violence at the Summer Ecological School. To practice a feminist ear, one does not have to obtain certain positions; on the contrary, sometimes the held position can get in the way of hearing and seeing what is essential. The feminist ear is not something one is born with but something anyone can cultivate as part of nonviolent resistance.

#### CONCLUSION

The ethic of nonviolence cannot replace practices of normative violence in one day. Its mission is to methodically confront acts of violence through the physical assertion of the right to life through speeches, gestures, refugee tent camps, assemblies, and other actions. However, the situation of marginalized people is such that they are not seen by the dominant majority that institutes normative violence. Moreover, such normative practices aim to make these people invisible. The weak point of any norm, including a violent norm, is its temporality. A norm is alive as long as it is cited. Hence, nonviolence is, first and foremost, about stopping repetition and establishing new practices that restore broken relationships. Sara Ahmed’s feminist ear tactic is one possible

<sup>17</sup>The slogan of Sarah Ahmed’s book *The Feminist Killjoy Handbook* (2023).

<sup>18</sup>The *Schoolgirls* project website: <https://uchenitsy.libolibo.me/>.



practice of the ethics of nonviolence. This ear tuning is associated with a radical reorientation in space and exploring new ways of (co)existence.

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## СЕМАНТИКА НЕНАСИЛИЯ

### ПЕРФОРМАТИВНОСТЬ УЯЗВИМОСТИ ДЖУДИТ БАТЛЕР И КРИВЫЕ ЛИНИИ САРЫ АХМЕД

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**Аннотация:** В статье анализируются подходы к этике ненасилия Джудит Батлер и Сары Ахмед. Проект Батлер корнями уходит в концепцию «материального насилия» Моники Виттиг. Расширяя значения этого термина сначала до гендерного насилия, а затем до нормативного насилия, Батлер формулирует проект этики ненасилия. Последняя основывается на идеях радикального равенства и взаимозависимости. Практические дополнения к проекту Батлер можно обнаружить в работах Сары Ахмед, которая ставит вопрос более точно: как возможна борьба с насилием в рамках институций? С опорой на феноменологическую философию она разрабатывает концепцию «феминистского слуха», которую мы предлагаем рассматривать как инструмент для реализации этики ненасилия. Поскольку «феминистский слух» — это установка, применяемая как в академической работе, так и в политической практике, она отчасти напоминает введенный Пьером Бурдье образ «этнологической зоркости» — способности исследователя объективировать свой собственный докисический или «аборигенный» опыт. Отталкиваясь от этого мотива, мы обращаемся к его теории символического насилия, усваиваемого и воспроизводимого в системах диспозиций. Стремление Бурдье показать материальную сторону идеологии, противопоставив её интеллектуалистским трактовкам, отчасти совпадает с мотивами, развитыми у Виттиг. Тематизация габитуальности позволяет иначе поставить вопрос о возможном преодолении идеологии, для которого оказывается недостаточно одного интеллектуального усилия. Для Бурдье такая недостаточность становится поводом для критики классической феноменологии, в которой не был поставлен вопрос о социальных условиях возможности естественной установки. Переворачивая характерную для феноменологии стратегию работы, Бурдье делает полем своего исследования естественную установку, в которой воспроизводится символическое насилие. В статье обозначаются возможные стратегии его преодоления.

**Ключевые слова:** материальное насилие, феминистский слух, символическое насилие, ненасилие, Батлер, Ахмед, Бурдье.

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## MOTHERHOOD AS THE SUBJECT-FORMING ELEMENT OF THE WOMAN REPRESENTED BY FEMINISM\*\*

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**Abstract:** This paper is dedicated to defining and solving the problem of the subject in feminist discourse through analyzing the concept of motherhood and investigating how women are introduced to it. The problem derives from lack of a single utopian future without oppression in feminism, and, inherently, the absence of a fully actualized subject. Therefore, the need arises for a type of individual that is suitable for representational politics, one able to absorb potentially infinite numbers of actors while maintaining a feminist focus. The first part of the paper shows that previous feminist attempts to identify women have failed to meet the challenges of feminism, excluding certain circles of women, etc. The analysis is conducted on the basis of a generalized representation of the feminist subjects of essentialist and anti-essentialist tendencies. The second part of the work is devoted to the construction of a new subject based on motherhood, which is considered one of the subject-forming elements. This proposed foundation is then correlated with the critique of how women are introduced to motherhood and why it, as the basis of the feminist subject, might allow to form a new type of subject. Thus, previous understandings of femininity are critically viewed as implicit in motherhood, and are replaced by the concept of a subject in which motherhood is not a condition of its existence, but one of its fundamental elements.

**Keywords:** Feminist Subject, Woman, Feminism, Motherhood, Essentialism, Anti-Essentialism.

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### TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF THE FEMINIST SUBJECT

Within the framework of patriarchal discourse, the concept of “woman” lacks definition and is used according to an internal intuition: women are seen as subordinate to men and in opposition to them. The origins of this intuition lie both in the unreflective borrowing of the division into females and males from the animal world and in the reproduction of the social myth of the “weak woman,” as described by Beauvoir (De Beauvoir, Malakhova et al., 1993). For a long time, femininity was thought of by analogy with

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masculinity and was correlated with it, so the subjectivity of women in patriarchal discourse was not articulated, which led to the perception of women as objects. Feminist discourse sought to move out of this approach and break it down by beginning to articulate the concept of “woman” and forming a stable subject.

Feminist discourse was first to position women as active subjects. In connection to the discussion on defining woman as a subject in feminism, it is customary to distinguish its essentialist and an anti-essentialist branches. Of course, it is inaccurate to speak of a pure division, since anti-essentialism also needs to imply some essence, and essentialism often refers to the “mobile” in the sense of a changing state. In this paper the terms essentialism and anti-essentialism will be used in their in its broadest sense—the problem of the division will be omitted as it is not an obstacle for further reasoning. The divide is necessary in order to describe existing feminist positions and to present their critique more clearly. For the purposes of this article, it will be considered that both positions reclaim female subjectivity, but construct it in relation to the patriarchal: either, as in the case of essentialism, through the presence of some shared experience acquired through patriarchal oppression, or through a pluralistic relation to the patriarchal, as in the case of anti-essentialism, which formulates female subjectivity as including the patriarchal experience to varying degrees.

Thus, feminist female subjectivity is determined by oppression from the patriarchy, thereby it always contains some essentialized idea of the oppression of the female subject.<sup>1</sup> Anti-essentialism, in this sense, tries not to universalize the experience of oppression, but to preserve it as some basis for the experience of the feminine. Along with this, the search continues for a concept that would aid women in reclaiming their femininity, that is, something that in a utopian feminist future would be preserved for the woman taken out of oppression. Thus, one can immediately say that the experience of patriarchal oppression is not determinative—in which case each successful step in the struggle for women’s rights would seem to reduce the level of femininity of those whom feminism seeks to represent.

Hence, the more substantial female subject must be embodied, on the one hand, in elements subject to patriarchal oppression and, on the other hand, in characteristics that will not be lost in overcoming oppression. The first and perhaps most obvious way of defining woman in this way was proposed by essentialist feminism.

<sup>1</sup>This is necessary to preserve feminism as a movement that fights for women’s rights.

Frequently, a key characteristic of women in essentialist feminism is the biological difference from men. *Sex difference*<sup>2</sup> (Irigaray, 1993) allows for a “generalization” of the experience of all women through genetic, sexual, chromosomal and other differences. The often overly simplistic biological division<sup>3</sup> specifies the relationship between “subject and discourse, subject and society.” (ibid.: 14) “The natural” becomes the basis of the essential: the male hunter and the female gatherer define a vector for attributing characteristics far from the obvious to each sex. Man is metaphorically expressed through time and self-perception, while woman — through space, signifying her maternal and fertile potential. *Binarities*, according to Luce Irigaray, always veil power and hierarchical relations. By introducing something third — a third gender, a discourse independent of male and female, a cyborg without gender, etc. — they are deconstructed and lose their universalist and total claims to represent the universal. However, the natural binary opposition remains the common essential experience for women.

Another explanation of the inherent difference between men and women in essentialist feminism is the division of culture into masculine and feminine as something natural, pre-discursive. Masculine culture is seen as a culture of violence and feminine as a that of silence (Gilligan & Snyder, Arkhipova, 2020: 35). The culture of violence is viewed by essentialist feminists through the lens of the public, whereas the culture of silence through the lens of the private. Thus, the masculine is closely associated with the accumulation of economic capital, with political inclusion (Friedan, 2010), with power and advantage in the liberal arts (Woolf, Akopyan, 2019: 21–26), with consciousness and with the publicity of one’s position (Hayden, Krasil’nikova, 2022). The feminine, on the other hand, is constructed as a culture of subjugation, as situated within the institution of family and motherhood, as a culture of the bodily, closed-off, and connected to the culture of the home — to the space of unpaid female labor and the multiplication of capitalism (Marton, 2000: 219–242). This is precisely how a woman became<sup>4</sup> (De Beauvoir, Malakhova et al., 1993: 336), but, unlike the “becoming” in anti-essentialist feminism, which will be discussed later, this concept assumes that the one who becomes a woman is necessarily female. The overall experience that a woman must have, needs to have been determined

<sup>2</sup>The term is introduced by Luce Irigaray in the eponymous work.

<sup>3</sup>For example, such a division may not consider the experiences of intersex persons.

<sup>4</sup>Simone de Beauvoir was one of the first feminists to speak of gender as a construct, defending the thesis that women become women by cultural coercion.

by the experience that a man will have as a result of a willful decision. Thus, the experience gained immediately after birth is of necessity determined by the experience of the other.

The concept of woman in the framework of essentialist feminism is constructed on the assumption that all women have some common experience: biological or cultural; either a “natural” crystallized biological essence or a product of social and economic relations.

The ideas of essentialist feminists were quite productive in describing women until the rise of poststructuralist ideas. The biological “common experience” does not stand up to the criticism of intersectional feminism, which points to multiple identities affecting women’s experiences. Biological generalizations fail to account for the experiences of intersex persons and the experience of transgender dysphoria, which go against what is suggested by such generalizations. However, communicating some common cultural experiences to women proves even less stable.

The critique of essentialist feminism is based on the fact that this kind of experience excludes the colonial experience of women, including the experience of women of the Soviet period. The culture of silence, described above, and its foundations, including theoretical ones, are derived from the experience of female theorists who lived in what used to be colonizing countries (England, Spain, France), and their experience differs in many ways from that of women from colonial or less developed countries. The division is also irrelevant for women who lived in the USSR, where the institution of family and childbearing was taken out of the private realm and women’s political participation was observed at all levels of the government hierarchy.<sup>5</sup> As a result, the contradictions between the ideas of essentialist feminism and the actual experience of women became the basis for the development of anti-essentialist ideas.

Within this new anti-essentialist framework, women theorists proposed a non-universalist conception of the feminine. They had sought to find a grounding of female subjectivity that, on the one hand, would represent the greatest number of women and, on the other hand, articulate a stable subject as required by representational politics.

<sup>5</sup>Naturally, different periods of development and degradation of women’s rights in the USSR are not to be ignored, including the abolition of the right to abortion and the return of the family institution to the status of a private one, but it is not enough to speak of the same cultural experience of women in the USSR and women in capitalist Western countries.

First, anti-essentialist feminists try to construct a definition of woman through her judicial and political status. That is, through over-body institutions that seem to accumulate women's experiences independently. In such a framework, the feminine and the masculine are seen as a "cage"<sup>6</sup> of set practices, words, and legal statuses that prescribe someone to be called man or woman. To be a woman means to be in some status as a woman, relative to legislation or proto legislation. This definition of the feminine allows to get rid of the universalizing notion of patriarchy, which does not include the experience of matriarchal societies (Haraway, 2006).

Second, the feminine is defined through the violence of gender standards (Butler, Sarkisov, 2022: 24–25). Of course, it can be said that gender norms are violent a priori and that masculinity is determined in this way no less than femininity, but this division should be looked at spectrally and, in a sense, from an intersectional position. Thus, if there exists a hierarchy from the completely masculine to the absolutely feminine, then each step from one end of the spectrum to the other is an experience of gender violence. Those who experience this more intensely turn out to possess more "femininity" and vice versa. Thus, femininity turns out to be the perception of a set of violent norms based on gender oppression. Understanding gender oppression requires clarification on a theoretical level, but in this paper, I will attempt to utilize some of the cultural conventions discussed by anti-essentialist feminists. Those individuals who perceive a gendered violent experience at the same time receive a feminine experience (ibid.: 54–58). This definition allows for a hierarchy of oppression to be constructed that will not depend on identity and biological sex.

The concept of the feminine for anti-essentialist feminism demonstrates the desire of female theorists who support this approach to avoid attributing some common essence to all women, since the rejection of such an essence leads to the rejection of the concept of identity, and, consequently, to a reconstruction of "woman," a rejection of the submissive position.

In summary, both approaches turn out to be quite problematic: neither of them finds something that does not contain a contradiction — either a substantive feature of women is emphasized that excludes certain groups of women from feminist discourse, or the basis of women's subjectivity turns

<sup>6</sup>The concept of the cage as a collective image first appears in Paul Preciado's *Je suis le monstre qui vous parle*, but similar images (trap, snare, entrapment, jungle) are used in other works of anti-essentialist feminist theorists. For example, by Judith Butler, Wendy Brown, Teresa de Lauretis, Donna Haraway, and others.

out to be vulnerable to the feminist struggle of reducing oppression. The reason for these contradictions is absence of confidence in the notion that patriarchy will ever end—there seems not to be a unified utopian concept of what the ideal feminist future would be, because the vast variety of types of oppression and ways to combat them could be explored further. The fact remains, however, that oppression exists and the points of its application (biological, cultural, social, political, legal, etc.) have been used productively by feminists in defining female subjectivity. That said, I also find that elements of female subjectivity in essentialist and anti-essentialist feminism have something in common, and that is motherhood.

As discussed above, for essentialist feminists the definition of the feminine is based on attributing to women some essence that would be distinct from masculine. This turns out to be crucial for feminists, since the binary division into male and female by gender or cultural difference serves the reproductive purposes of the coercive reproduction system: a feminist definition of the feminine, based on some shared experience, necessarily includes a connection to the experience of motherhood, to reproduction, among others. Breaking the implicit connection between woman and motherhood would lead, they argue, to the destruction of gender as an attribute and the possibility of getting rid of the binary opposition of male-female.

The experience of motherhood envisioned by essentialist feminism includes not only the act of directly gestating, giving birth, and then raising a child, but also pre-experiential practices. These usually include behaviors that society replicates before a girl is of childbearing age. For example, within the medical discourse that constructs the “normality” of motherhood—medicine perceives women through the perspective of their role as mothers: medical examinations, representations of the body, and medical restrictions on women are often motivated by the issue of fertility (Shchurko, 2012: 69–90). Also, for instance, one can talk about the concept of “normative motherhood,” which is brought up in girls from childhood: playing mother-daughter games, reading fairy tales and watching cartoons in which childbirth takes place in a heterosexual registered marriage, reproduction in the media of ideas about the age at which a woman should give birth to a child and raise them, including criticism of “early” or “late” motherhood, etc.

Thus, the definition of femininity in the discourse of essentialist feminism reproduces patriarchal attitudes about a woman’s need to be able to carry, give birth to, and raise a child. The function of a woman as a mother is the most important, it defines the “essence” of the feminine both culturally and biologically, and becomes the basis for breaking binary oppositions, since



the elimination of the woman-mother connection implies a redefinition of the feminine in feminist and patriarchal discourses.<sup>7</sup>

Within the framework of anti-essentialist feminism, motherhood is not directly included in the definition of the feminine, as this position involves breaking the relation with the corporeal, the biological. Often this connection is consciously eliminated. The mother is brought closer to the concept of “maternal body,” which refers to the relation of inseparability and dependence of the infant on the mother, rather than indicating the subject (Kristeva, 1980: 135).

The juridical and political status that anti-essentialist feminists use as one possible definition of the feminine, in fact, not only defines the feminist subject, but also provides a referent for the women who possess these statuses. That is, by defining woman as that which feminism represents women, theorists seem to confirm the connection between the feminine and the maternal, for at the state, society, or community level in which status is established, the referent for status can often be a woman performing a reproductive role. Indirect references to this are found in law, mass media, propaganda, state medical policy, and others. Those institutions that are supported by the state and in which it represents a woman, become the main ones for the status bearers within this state, and thus the elimination of the status of the maternal function as the main female function does not happen.

Speaking about the definition of the “completely female” as the most exposed to gender-based violence, it is worth paying attention to the essence of the latter. Its expressions can be found particularly often in bodily harm, in the expropriation of women’s bodies (Aristarkhova, Zhayvoronok, 2017: 53). The female reproductive function is seen as a capacity that needs to be actualized. That is, the possession of the ability to give birth is not defined in terms defending its bearer’s right to use it at will, rather, it is understood as a function that must be “given away.” Hence, the sacrifice of motherhood is perceived not only as a woman’s own decision, but also as the result of gendered violence: the exceptional child-bearing potential is made irreplaceable, therefore it is necessary to commodify it or the knowledge of it.

Thus, within anti-essentialist feminism, a similar connection between the feminine and the maternal emerges, although not explicitly. The feminine

<sup>7</sup>Of course, this eradication of communication involves the transfer of “procreative responsibility” to another actor.

is defined through supra-bodily, supra-cultural aspects, but remains independent only as long as it is the subject of feminist representation; in “real” women, the connection seems implicit in the chosen aspects.

Therefore, both essentialist and anti-essentialist feminism do not sever the connection between the feminine and the maternal and, in defining women, are rooted in practices that perpetuate their statuses as either mothers or potential child-bearers. Interestingly, despite the absence of any fixed definition of the feminine in patriarchal discourse, aspects of this perception of the feminine also influence the feminist view of the subject.

#### THE UNIVERSALITY OF MOTHERHOOD: CONSTRUCTING A NEW TYPE OF FEMALE SUBJECT

The implicit incorporation of motherhood into the definition of the female subject, it seems to me, may be a substantive aspect of female subjectivity that, on the one hand, is linked to all the areas of female oppression articulated, and, on the other, is the basis for a stable female subject separated from the goal of the feminist movement, whatever it may be. The feminine subject is one that has the possibility of engaging with the real-maternal and has a pre-experience of the maternal.

The pre-experienced maternal and the real-maternal is the way in which women are generally introduced to motherhood. That is, motherhood comprises the actual status of woman as a mother and her potential parental status, which includes aspects of motherhood that are internalized before actually giving birth. At the same time, the experience of motherhood for a woman in the first status is different from that in the second status. Therefore, it is necessary to consider, first, how a woman is introduced to motherhood before her direct experience of it, along with the patriarchal attitudes it incorporates, and, second, how it differs from the actual status of a mother.

In analyzing how a woman’s pre-experience of motherhood is forced upon her, it is necessary to study approaches towards the body and the norms of gender socialization. The former shows that, often, the perception of women as mothers reduces “mother” to a space (Aristarkhova, Zhayvoronok, 2017: 27): the female body is mainly seen as a receptacle for the child. The latter approach showcases how women’s gender socialization presupposes motherhood as an “ethic of care” in the private domain, which is seen as a space of legitimate coercion to ensure the reproduction of the image of the perfect mother.

To begin with, let me consider the female bodily experience in the optics of the maternal. Here I include any experience related to the conceptualization of the female body as a potential maternal body. The very fact of such conceptualization refers to the understanding of the body as a project that must be reconciled with sociocultural ideals: the social system manifests itself in corporeality (Bordo, 2013: 83), which means that the woman's body is perceived as the body of an object within the patriarchal gaze. This perception emasculates and imposes bodily practices (Gol'man, 2018: 130) that, because the culture itself presents women as "more corporeal," realizes the social institutions of marriage, religion, and medicine by exercising control over women's bodies. In capitalist societies, this control is intensified because of the influence of a woman's reproductive age on her working capacity (Walby, 1990: 213–234).

The control of women's bodies based on their ability to bear a child shapes the "maternal destiny" of the body in the woman's consciousness and thus determines the patterns of her behavior, which reproduce the attitude about the need to fulfill the reproductive function. Sandra Bartky writes that even in societies in which there exists resistance to patriarchy, new forms of body domination are emerging that are based on a normative heterosexual femininity that must lead to the start of a family (Weitz, ed., 1989: 25–45). Thus, the current situation appears to be one of transforming norms for the female body, at the top of which the reproductive function always remains, hidden by cultural layers. For the woman, this again means mediated acceptance of the experience of preparing the body for motherhood.

The more cultural layers and the desire to hide the root cause of the objectification of women's bodies, the less obvious to women the practices of objectification of their bodies become. At the same time, the patterns of behavior associated with women are perceived and reproduced by them forcibly (De Beauvoir, Malakhova et al., 1993: 40). Thus, a woman, in relation to her body, turns out to be either in a situation of unreflective development in accordance with coercion, or in a situation of purposeful change based on the negation of patriarchal patterns and destabilization (Stankovskaya, 2010: 110). In the first case, there is a complete entrenchment of the woman in the matrix of reproductivity; in the second case, the woman's body is in the matrix only within the framework of state control over the body, since in the sphere of the private, the woman can arbitrarily change the boundaries of the body's transformation (*ibid.*: 110–114). Of course, transformations coming from the sense of self cannot rid women of the primary perception gained because of social experience of their bodies.

Thus, patriarchal social institutions implement practices aimed at tying the need to give birth to a woman's body and reproduce the practice of depriving women of their subjectivity. The consequence of such practices creates a woman's perception of her own body as a mother's body, an incubator body, and maintains it until the woman begins to reflexively relate to it, which, as it was found, can only happen in the sphere of the private, but not the public.

Now to consider the supra-bodily experience of providing the maternal. Here I include patterns of behavior, patterns of actions, "necessary" social experiences, etc., which patriarchal society postulates and replicates as feminine. It is important to note that culture develops corporeality at the symbolic level (Dondokova, 2019: 24–26), so the experience of corporeality cannot be considered without linking it to the cultural component of female subjectivity, again based on the feminist experience of representing women as subjects.

First, it is necessary to pay attention to the peculiarities of a person's identification as a woman. It turns out to be mainly parental, largely due to the girl's inclusion in the continued relationship with her mother. This inclusion determines the acquisition of female gender role and cultural superstructure in the form of imitation of the mother.<sup>8</sup> This includes the imposed experience of motherhood: from the simplest forms, such as playing mother-daughter or baby-bon dolls, to more complex ones, such as the specifics of women's check-ups at health clinics. A doll for a girl is a child, and this experience should prepare the girl, if not to fulfill maternal duties, then at least to accept that her subjectivity is defined through motherhood and caring for offspring.

Second, women are often referred to as being "at the center of the reproductive sector of medicine" (Zdravomyslova & Temkina, eds., 2009: 7). This includes the influence of the bureaucratic organization of medicine, the limitation and lack of sexual education, the low effectiveness of contraceptive policy, and the monopoly of the power of medical knowledge (ibid.: 8–9). Because of the special position of women in the reproductive system of the state, the medical system, in fact, lacks not only the resources to correct the above problems, but also the motivation, since such policies would entail a decrease in fertility rates and a potential increase in women's reproductive autonomy (Fuko, Naumov, 1999). In this way, the process of medicalization

<sup>8</sup>That said, boys, as Chodorow writes, are not as included in the relationship with their father, due to upbringing under the sign of differentiation from others.

of motherhood turns out to apply not only to being directly under the supervision of doctors during pregnancy, but also in a pre-experienced form, which cannot but lead to another cultural layer for women, predetermining their attitude to motherhood and themselves as mothers.

Third, the notion of “perfect motherhood” (Mitsyuk, 2015: 22), which includes a generalized image of a good mother broadcasted through media and mass culture, must be mentioned. Such an image of a woman is closely connected with ideas about the moral revival of society (Lozinskiy, 1904: 49), with the sanctity of motherhood and with the culture of mother’s participation in the life of the child, conscious refusal of other ways of self-realization (Mitsyuk, 2015: 23–25). The reproduction of this image should lead to the consolidation in the woman’s consciousness of some basis of motherhood, which she should internalize and repeat. Such images typically do not include the negative experiences and complexities of motherhood, as their task is to illustrate a purely idealized experience that would be perceived unreflectively. Social threats of family destruction, childlessness, and women’s unhappiness become not one of many possible options for the development of a woman’s life after refusing to give birth, but an imminent fate (Zdravomyslova & Temkina, eds., 2009: 115).

Therefore, the supra-bodily experience of motherhood is related to three main directions. First, with the experience of female identification, which includes a patriarchal idea of the female gender role unreflexively imposed on girls. Second, with the special position of women in the medical system: inequality in information entrenches women in a state of ignorance of the truths and negative elements of motherhood. Third, with the image of mothers in culture, which often broadcasts a very limited view of motherhood (Sassatelli, 2011: 123–143).

Certainly, it can be said that all the above-mentioned representations of supra-cultural pre-experienced motherhood are undergoing changes in developed countries: the availability of information inspires critical thinking, skepticism, etc., but this experience is one of the main for women, as seen earlier.

To explain why patriarchal attitudes are incorporated into the bodily and supra-bodily practices described above, it makes sense to turn to the structures of patriarchy itself (Walby, 1990). Sylvia Walby identifies six interacting structures. For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in three of them: patriarchal cultural institutions, patriarchal sexual relations, and the patriarchal state. The patriarchal cultural institutions include medicine, family, various media, etc. These institutions reproduce patriarchal

attitudes and influence women's self-determination (Walby, 1990: 90–109). Among the ways of reproducing pre-experienced motherhood that have been examined; there is a certain amount of these patriarchal social institutions. They prescribe both bodily and supra-bodily patterns of behavior for women. Patriarchal sexual relations are manifested in “compulsory heterosexuality” and the reproduction of heterosexual relations (*ibid.*: 110–128). This structural element is also involved in the reproduction of the patriarchal in the pre-experienced motherhood granted to women: when one talks about the perception of the female body as an incubator and the female identification of herself through the mother figure. Finally, a patriarchal state that seeks to protect patriarchal interests and the threat of demographic crisis (*ibid.*: 151–173). State-controlled medicine, state propaganda and channels of power, and legislative restrictions on women's rights entrench in women's minds an idealized experience of motherhood that needs to be duplicated.

In fact, it seems that motherhood is much more contradictory than patriarchal conceptions of it. First, a woman's body, perceived through its reproductive function, “bends with nausea and malaise” (De Beauvoir, Malakhova et al., 1993: 281); for the first time, a woman's body exists not only for herself but also for another. Patriarchal structures prepare the woman only for the realization that, having reached fertility, she will have to reproduce the species, but do not declare that the woman loses part of the rights to her own body, which is now between the body of the subject and the body of the object. The woman loses the independence of her body in a way that she never had before the moment of motherhood, even while under the patriarchal designation of “incubator body.” With the bodily experience of motherhood often comes the fear of the biological act of childbirth, which together with the religious, moral, and legal attitudes that influence their decisions, comes into conflict, and brings the woman into a situation in which pregnancy is a drama experienced by the woman within herself (*ibid.*).

Speaking about the supra-body correlation between the pre-experience and the experience of motherhood, it is impossible not to consider that women who decided to experience motherhood have a certain cultural basis that determines their vision of being a mother. A purely patriarchal perception of the image of motherhood often leads a woman into a state of cognitive dissonance (Chodorow, Oreshin, 2006: 249), which results in non-acceptance of the child or maternity, and hence in a woman's rejection of what previously defined her as a woman. In the opposite case, with too strong a sense of unity between mother and child (*ibid.*: 250) that the

patriarchal structure offers, there is a lack of distance between them, and the woman turns the child into an object that becomes determinant in the formation of her subjectivity.<sup>9</sup> Interactions with the child are, as it were, a continuation of the experience of motherhood, only manifested not in pregnancy, but in the process of upbringing and socialization of the child.

It turns out that in the pre-experienced form of motherhood, it is mythologized, and during its direct reception, the real image of the mother is uncovered. Motherhood is exposed, the veil of patriarchal attitudes is removed from it, hiding the ambiguity of the mother's position, the inaccuracy and falsity of the image created by patriarchy. The maternal role of women in the patriarchal framework finds its realization in caring for children and enjoying motherhood, while such perceptions are not fully reliable, and sometimes even false.

Furthermore, a woman having a maternal experience finds herself in a position that a structure based on the perception of the feminine as the negation of the masculine is unable to perceive, because the experience of motherhood cannot be described through the masculine. If patriarchy, which presents the female as an object, were successful in defining the experience of motherhood through the masculine, then the actual experience of motherhood would be virtually at odds with pre-experienced motherhood. Yet this seems not to be the case, and the gap between actual and pre-experienced motherhood is a lacuna that points to an exclusively non-patriarchal experience that cannot be understood in non-feminist terms and defined in a patriarchal framework because it does not fit as a binary opposition to any male experience.

For the feminist perspectives that were discussed at the beginning, it is the pre-experiential understanding of motherhood that is most important, yet it appears not to be enough to understand the realized phenomenon of motherhood. The fact that it also contains a pure non-patriarchal experience also ought to be considered when talking about female subjectivity.

Several insights may be gained from an understanding of female subjectivity. First, the female subject becomes maximally fluid: one might consider "absolute" motherhood as carrying a child and giving birth together with the assignment of the reproductive function to the woman — in that case, the function can be partially or completely transferred to the state and artificial

<sup>9</sup>This is manifested at the linguistic level in the form of "we-formulations:" "we have eaten," "we are going to bed" — this refers only to the child's actions, which is a symbolic indication of a woman's definition of herself as a mother.

reproduction, and society, as a result, becomes genderless,<sup>10</sup> since the woman in the “absolute sense” will disappear. Or one can view motherhood as pure potency — the predisposition or ability to either bear or give birth to a child, or both, and also to raise it — in this sense, a multigender society may be achieved, in which femininity and masculinity are correlated in different proportions in each individual, depending on the amount of pre-experience and actual maternal experience. Second, it solves some of the problems of feminist theory — the resulting subject’s substance is stable, which fulfills the need for a feminist policy of representation, and, at the same time, it does not end with women gaining new privileges and escaping oppression.

It seems to me, therefore, that motherhood as a basis for the formation of the female subject is a rather productive idea within feminist discourse: on the one hand, it resolves the movement’s internal contradictions and, on the other hand, makes it possible to fight for women’s rights regardless of what utopian feminist future one branch or another imagines.

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<sup>10</sup>In the sense in which it is used by second wave feminists such as Shulamith Firestone and Alison Jagger.



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АНАСТАСИЯ АДАМОВА

СТУДЕНТКА

НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ «ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ» (МОСКВА);

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## МАТЕРИНСТВО КАК СУБЪЕКТООБРАЗУЮЩИЙ ЭЛЕМЕНТ РЕПРЕЗЕНТАЦИИ ЖЕНСКОГО В ФЕМИНИЗМЕ

Получено: 23.09.2023. Рецензировано: 10.10.2023. Принято: 13.10.2023.

**Аннотация:** Работа посвящена постановке и решению проблемы субъекта в феминистском дискурсе через понятие материнского и того, как оно дано женщине. Проблема возникает из-за отсутствия в феминизме единого утопического будущего без угнетения, а значит, отсутствия полностью актуализированного субъекта. При этом нам необходим такой субъект, который бы был стабилен для репрезентативной политики и при этом вбирал бы в себя потенциально бесконечное количество субъектов, сохраняя при этом феминистскую направленность. В первой части работы показывается, что предыдущие попытки феминисток определить женщину не отвечали задачам феминизма, исключали определенный круг женщин и т. д. Анализ производится на основе обобщенного представления о феминистском субъекте эссенциалистского и антиэссенциалистского толка. Вторая часть работы посвящена конструированию нового объекта на основе материнства, которое рассматривается как субъектообразующий элемент. Далее предложенное основание соотносится с тем, как материнство дано женщине и почему оно, положенное в основу феминистского субъекта, позволяет нам сформировать субъекта нового типа. Так, предыдущие понимания женского и женскости критически рассматриваются как имплицитно имеющие в себе материнство, и на их место предлагается концепция субъекта, в котором которой материнство является выступает не одним из условий существования субъекта, но его основополагающим его элементом.

**Ключевые слова:** феминистский субъект, женщина, феминизм, материнство, эссенциализм, антиэссенциализм.

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## CADET LADIES\*\*

WOMEN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
AS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON

Submitted: Sept. 30, 2023. Reviewed: Oct. 10, 2023. Accepted: Oct. 13, 2023.

**Abstract:** The article is devoted to the phenomenon of women in the Constitutional Democratic Party from its very foundation up to the preparation of the organization for the elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1917. The author seeks to reconstruct a socio-cultural portrait of «cadet ladies», to find out the factors that could have influenced their entry into the party and to characterize their activities in the organization. Special attention is paid to the position in the party hierarchy that women could occupy, as well as to the opportunities for advancement in it. Cadet ladies were mainly responsible for maintaining the organization's welfare, housekeeping, logistics, events and charitable institutions, but at the same time were actively involved in key decision-making, although they did not have the same political rights as men. Moreover, women gained the right to vote after the February Revolution, the number of Cadet ladies in key party positions increased dramatically, which confirms their importance to constitutional democrats. Characteristic features of the socio-cultural portrait of the women of the People's Freedom Party are also highlighted. Cadet ladies grew up in post-reform Russia, when social and economic changes in the country and society had a huge impact on the process of women's emancipation. The opportunity to receive a quality education, acquire a profession and work, to choose a spouse out of mutual respect and similarity of views — all these served as factors for acquiring the subjectivity that later allowed the cadet ladies to become the political phenomenon discussed in this article.

**Keywords:** Cadet Ladies, Constitutional-Democratic Party, People's Freedom Party, Liberal Opposition, Russian Revolution of 1905–1907, February Revolution, Political Parties, Women's History.

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The Constitutional-Democratic party was one of the most influential organizations in the political life of the last days of the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, this rather well known and explored party had an under-represented, which was nevertheless important — the female members, who played a significant role in the whole cause of the liberal opposition. Women of the Constitutional-Democratic party or, as some might call them, cadet ladies

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are a subject that is quite misrepresented in the scientific field since some researchers tend to focus more attention on the female members of the radical — left organizations. This leaves a certain lacuna that needs to be filled for a better understanding of the Russian liberal movement and the political history of Russia in general.

There are a limited number of works focusing specifically on the women of the Constitutional Democratic Party. However, researchers have published studies examining individual cadet ladies such as A. V. Tyrkova-Williams and Countess S. V. Panina. N. I. Kanischeva has written an introductory article about A. V. Tyrkova-Williams in *Ariadna Vladimirovna Tyrkova's Legacy: Diaries. Letters* (Kanishcheva, ed., 2012: 3–13). I. V. Narsky and A. M. Karabanova have also analyzed her political career in their works *Russia and the Liberation Movement at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries. Through the Eyes of a Liberal Conservative* (Narskiy, 1992: 73–79) and *A. V. Tyrkova as a Woman Leader of the Cadet Party: Features of Socialisation and Political Career* (Karabanova, 2005: 1–11) respectively. The biography and activism of S. V. Panina have been considered in *Citizen Countess: Sofia Panina and the Fate of Revolutionary Russia* by A. Lindenmeyer (Lindenmeyr, 2019) and in standalone articles such as “*To Awaken Good Feelings*” (*Countess S. V. Panina*) by V. M. Shevyrin (Shevyrin, 2007: 218–239) and *Sofia Vladimirovna Panina: Czechoslovak period of life (1924–1938)* by E. P. Serapionova (Serapionova, 2019: 172–192). Additionally, certain articles have been dedicated to other cadet ladies' work such as N. A. Struve's participation in the liberal opposition in N. B. Haylova's study *Nina and Pyotr Struve: Formula of Happiness without Rivalry* (Khaylova, 2017) A. S. Milyukova's activities have been covered in a relevant article by N. A. Rodionova titled *Creating Good: A. S. Milyukova in the Family and Society* (Rodionova, 2013: 227–236).

“Cadet ladies” is a new term. The phenomenon investigated in this paper has yet to attain an official name in modern historiography. It is sometimes referred to as “women of the Constitutional Democratic Party/Party of People's Freedom” or by *kadetki*, which, poorly translates into other languages, or describe the group under study as

women of the Constitutional Democratic Party/Party of People's Freedom. The members of the studied group name themselves or the group they belonged to. However, in her memoirs, A. V. Tyrkova mentions their group, calling them “cadet ladies” (Tyrkova-Williams, 2007: 299).

Moreover, in many sources of personal origin (diaries, memoirs, correspondence) party members refer to them as “ladies.” The term “cadet ladies” emphasizes not only the political orientation of the group under study, but also the attitude of the male members of the party towards them. These women were comrades, but above all they were “ladies”, which had both positive and negative aspects.

In order to more fully comprehend the phenomenon of cadet ladies, two aspects must be analyzed—firstly, the social structure of the Constitutional-Democratic party and, secondly, the womens’ status in the late Russian Empire, since most of the cadet ladies grew up and developed in this exact period. Taking these into consideration will give more dimension to the portrait of the female half of the party.

It is not possible to trace the exact social composition of the People’s Freedom Party due to the absence of a clear and regulated system of registration of its members. According to the research made by professor V. V. Shelokhaev, the Constitutional-Democratic party was “a highly complex and changeable social organism” (Shelokhaev, 2015: 122). Nevertheless, some features that can be called characteristic for the members of the organization can be highlighted.

The Constitutional-Democratic Party based its support mainly on the literate urban population, primarily composed of individuals in their 30s and 40s. Its members would come from a variety of backgrounds, including aristocrats, educated professionals, and members of the middle class who were frustrated with the political system of the empire or the state of the country in general. The party was led by members of the elite and intelligentsia who had experience in public service, often through work in city councils, *zemstvos* or charitable organizations (ibid.: 124-129).

Additionally, the Constitutional Democratic Party also included members of the middle class who were drawn to the party because of their dissatisfaction with the general state of the country and the legal system in particular (ibid.: 124). Research by professor F. A. Seleznev suggests that the party had the least support from the bourgeoisie in industrial areas and was mostly supported in mining districts, where local activists were often representatives of basic sectors of the economy. The involvement of entrepreneurs in the Constitutional-Democratic Party would depend on their background, experience, education and connections with the intelligentsia (Seleznev, 2006: 108).

However, as stated before, the gender factor is of equal importance in this research. Researcher N. L. Pushkareva particularly emphasizes the role

of the “gender aspect” in the amount of power that could be allocated to an individual or a group (Pushkaryova, 2014: 6). Hence, it is important to pay attention to the general situation of women in post-reform Russia.

The future cadet ladies were in a sense a product of the new society that shaped in the aftermath of the reforms of Alexander II. The latter half of the nineteenth century was characterized by a profound upheaval in the system of social norms and values that had governed Russian society for centuries. This transition had a particular influence on the status and role of women, as the economic climate of the era resulted in a decline in the financial stability of aristocratic families. This left many young women in a precarious situation, unable to rely on the traditional mechanism of marriage to secure their future prospects. Consequently, women were increasingly compelled to enter the workforce in order to support themselves. The shift in economic circumstances thus had a profound impact on the traditionally prescribed gender roles of women in Russian society. Women were no longer restricted to the domestic sphere, under the protection and guidance of a male figure, be it a father or a husband. Instead, a younger generation, driven by the ideals of *nihilism*, began to reject the traditional way of life, and women in particular began to aspire to independence and education. As a result, the image of women in Russian society began to transform. Women were now perceived not merely as domestic creatures, mothers, and wives, but also as equals and companions in a more expansive sense. This paradigm shift represented a significant change in Russian society’s attitude towards women, which ultimately proved to have major ramifications for the political landscape of the empire.

An understanding of these two phenomena — liberal opposition and women’s emancipation, and their importance for the 19th century Russian Empire is crucial for the following study of cadet ladies. Another thing worth bearing in mind is that it is impossible to fully restore the lists of all the women of the People’s Freedom Party due to the absence of a clear record of the organization’s members. Nevertheless, based on the data collected from party’s documentation it is possible to compose a clear portrait of a female member of the People’s Freedom Party. This portrait includes several characteristics — age, ancestry, education, family status and the professional activities of the cadet ladies.

Female members of Constitutional Democratic Party may be categorized into two main age groups. The first, the notional “sixtiers,” were born during the reign of Emperor Alexander II and grew up alongside the early achievements of the Reform Era. At the time of joining the party, these

women ranged in age approximately from 35 to 45. A. V. Tyrkova was 36 years old, S. V. Panina — 46 years old, A. S. Petrunkevich — 55 years old, A. S. Milyukova and N. Ye. Vernadskaya — 44 and 45 years old respectively. The second group included younger ladies, most often female students and graduates of educational institutions, who were just starting their independent lives. E. M. Chelnokova, the daughter of a well-known member of the Constitutional Democratic Party, M. V. Chelnokov, was 21 years old when she joined the organization. The sisters of the poet Ilya Ehrenburg, Eugenia and Maria, were 23 and 26 years old respectively.

The social origins of cadet ladies do not stand out from the general picture of the party's composition described earlier. Most of them belonged to the intelligentsia and nobility or the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Most of these women would today be referred to as middle-class since their upbringing guaranteed them certain opportunities but could not provide a stable upper-class life.

In the ranks of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, there were notable women who hailed from the upper ranks of Russian nobility. A. S. Petrunkevich, nee Mal'tsova, belonged to the one of the wealthiest the most respected families in the empire. She was raised at the court of czar Alexander II and later married into another rich and noble family of Counts Panin. Her daughter from this marriage, countess S. V. Panina was an heiress to the vast fortune and the title of her family. Countess V. N. Bobrinskaya was born in the old noble house of L'vov and later married Count A. A. Bobrinsky. These women, endowed with great wealth and a strong position in society, were able to engage in charity without the necessity of seeking work to support themselves. A. S. Petrunkevich was involved in the organization and support of local peasant schools (Lecture Notes by N. Ye. Vernadskaya..., n. d.), meanwhile, her daughter S. V. Panina was a well-known philanthropist and a founder of the People House on Ligovskaya side in Saint Petersburg (Shevyrin, 2007: 221–223). Countess V. N. Bobrinskaya also was a prominent benefactor, supporting working-class women, common people's education and poverty alleviation in Moscow (Osorgin, 2009: 882).

In the records of the People's Freedom Party, no instances of female members originating from the peasantry can be found. This absence can be attributed to low levels of peasant participation in the Constitutional-Democratic Party overall, as well as the relative political "silence" of peasant women, who often lacked the necessary education and autonomy to partake in the political affairs of Russian society at a significant level.

Education was an essential factor in the recruitment of female members to the Constitutional-Democratic Party. This can be attributed in part to the growing trend in society towards providing girls with more practical knowledge that they could apply during their search for work. The establishment of women's gymnasiums throughout the Russian Empire during this time provided a new avenue for girls to receive secondary education. The curriculum at these institutions mirrored that of male gymnasiums, allowing students to qualify for positions on the labor market. This change in educational opportunities for women marked a significant societal shift away from traditional gender roles, as they were now seen not as solely dedicated wives, mothers, and housewives, but also independent individuals capable of sustaining themselves financially.

The advent of Higher Courses for Women functioned as a viable supplement to the academic education available to women at the time. Simultaneously, the idea that women should pursue studies in a structured and formalized fashion was gaining traction among society. Women were thereby given the opportunity to develop a range of skills and specializations through a comprehensive curriculum that rivaled university programs in quality (Khoroshilova & Ponomareva, 2011: 555). Not only did these courses serve as pathways for self-actualization, but they also facilitated the emergence of women as involved members of student communities, encouraging their participation in civic and political activities. Women's political involvement and activism during this period, in part facilitated by these courses, ultimately led them into taking part in politics on a larger scale, joining parties and pursuing careers as politicians. These courses, therefore, also functioned as a "preparatory school" for civic consciousness, allowing students to develop valuable perspectives on politics and social issues and, to acquire new knowledge and social connections. The involvement of female students in politics grew so widespread that many students feared the possibility of the government shutting down the courses (Stites, Shkol'nikov & Shnyrova, 2004: 241–244). It is also noteworthy that many cadet ladies met their future husbands precisely through various political groups and coteries. For example, N. Ye. Vernadskaya met her future husband V. I. Vernadsky in a group of "laurists," a revolutionary socialist circle aimed at educating the masses and studying traditional folk culture (Grevs, 1921: 150).

A significant number of women among the Constitutional-Democratic Party members were university students. Index cards of the party's members indicate that some women would state their association with the student body as occupation. The lifestyle of female university students was relatively



more independent compared to women in other settings, and this increased autonomy provided them with access to important political networks, namely the student body, which was highly politically engaged. This dynamic may have contributed to the incorporation of liberal opposition ideas amongst future cadet ladies to the extent that they eventually joined the party. I. G. Ehrenburg recalled the life of his family in 1905 as follows:

Students came to visit the sisters, but, in my opinion, they were false students<sup>1</sup> — they were peacefully drinking tea, talking about Ibsen’s plays, dancing; real students were supposed to throw Cossacks off their horses, and then throw the Tsar off the throne (Erenburg, 1990: 60).

Cadet ladies generally possessed a higher level of education or aspired to pursue it. A. S. Milyukova, a student of V. O. Klyuchevsky, conducted research on the social status of women before Peter the Great (Milyukov, 1991: 99–101). A. V. Tyrkova pursued higher mathematics courses (Kanishcheva, ed., 2012: 4–5), while A. S. Petrunkevich was in the midst of preparing to begin her studies despite already being a widow and mother (Petrunkevich, 1934: 159). N. Ye. Vernadskaya received her education in political economy and folk art (Lecture Notes by N. Ye. Vernadskaya..., n. d.).

In the post-reform Russian Empire women, increasingly forced to earn income, sought employment in a range of occupations, including jobs that permitted them to draw upon their level of education. The majority of cadet ladies were city-dwellers, which allowed them access to a variety of professions, some of which required niche skill sets or a more advanced education.

Teaching was the profession readily accessible to most women, particularly at the primary and secondary levels, and did not require advanced training beyond graduation from a grammar school (with one additional year of study). However, women were not allowed to teach at university levels until 1911 and, therefore, pursued their passion for pedagogy through other professions. These included teaching arts and crafts, being employed as governesses, functioning as private tutors, or managing educational institutions. It is worth noting that many women pursued careers in education not just for financial security, but also with the intention of benefitting society (Yusupova, 2021: 75).

<sup>1</sup>It is important to acknowledge that I. G. Ehrenburg himself held left-radical views, and therefore he could perceive the ideas of the constitutional democrats as a “fake” form of protest against the authorities.

It is unsurprising that a substantial number of the cadet ladies were associated with educational work. Women with teaching backgrounds, including classroom educators, home teachers, music tutors, and managers of educational institutions, joined the party. Before her marriage, N. A. Struve had built a reputation as an excellent teacher of natural sciences, having, worked in gymnasiums and given private lessons (Khaylova, 2017: 260–261). Similarly, A. S. Milyukova pursued part-time teaching, particularly in the field of music, prior to her marriage (Milyukov, 1991: 99–100). A. S. Alferova, founder and head of Alferova Women’s Gymnasium (List of Candidates for the Vowels..., n. d.), as well as the Gnesin sisters, founders of the prestigious music academy (Registration Cards of Members... with the Letter A to Ya, n. d.), must also be mentioned. Even A. N. Savin, husband of music teacher E. F. Gnesina, became a People’s Freedom Party member and closely followed its activities, though he is not recorded as an “official cadet” (Savin, 2015: 30). It is possible that E. F. Gnesina and her sister failed to consider their affiliation with the party as a fully committed membership. Furthermore, E. M. Tidebel, the first female music critics in Russia, is another example of the cadet ladies and their association with the musical field (Kubitskaya, ed., 2006: 539).

By the end of the 19th century, women were able to pursue careers previously unavailable to them, such as medicine. It is important to note that women were involved in health care as early as the second half of the 18th century, especially in obstetrics or physician’s assistance, which was practiced among all social groups. The demand for such medical professionals was especially high in the provinces, where female doctors could provide additional assistance in areas such as gynecology, childbirth, and children’s diseases, as well as basic care for the local population. Despite attempts by the state to limit the scope of medical practice for women doctors to gynecology, obstetrics, and pediatrics, the high demand in society led to the opening of the St. Petersburg Women’s Medical Institute in 1897, and women were granted the right to practice medicine in the public service in 1898 (Ponomareva, 2017: 223–229). In the Constitutional-Democratic Party, numerous doctors were women, including A. N. Shabanova, the first female pediatrician in Russia, and other medical professionals such as midwives, dentists, and masseuses.

The low representation of working women in the Constitutional Democratic Party was probably due to several factors, including their marital status and household responsibilities, as well as constraints on their ability to work and earn. Their role in the household required them to both manage the

home and care for children, which may have interfered with their ability to participate in party activities. In addition, many women in the party identified themselves through their husband's profession, simply filling in the appropriate column on their party ticket with the wording "wife of magister" or "wife of a doctor" or leaving the "occupation" section on their party ticket blank (Registration Cards of Members... with the Letter A to Ya, n. d.). However, the most important determinant of women's involvement in party activities were their social connections, as many of them entered the party through their spouses. Examples of these couples included P. N. Milyukov and A. S. Milyukova, A. A. Kizevetter and E. Ya. Kizevetter, and M. I. Rostovtsev and S. M. Rostovtseva, among others. This tendency was noted among both prominent figures and ordinary members of the party. It is not uncommon to find "pairs" in party documentation — a husband's index card and a wife's index card. For example, Moscow cook A. N. Voskresensky and his wife E. N. Voskresenskaya, doctor V. Ya. Gold and his wife L. V. Gold, accountant N. A. Yezhov and his wife N. A. Yezhova — joined the Party together. However, it is inaccurate to assume that they were solely guided by their spouses in this decision. In early 20th-century Russia, the prevailing attitudes toward marital hierarchy changed — marriages were no longer based solely on financial reasons, but instead centered on shared values and views. Each couple held similar ideals, which resulted in wives becoming their husbands' comrades and companions over time.

Among the women who later joined People's freedom party, plenty were interested in liberal ideas before they married. Moreover, the similarity of political views was considered the key to a happy married life. If the spouses did not agree on this issue, it could jeopardize the marriage. A. A. Borman, A. V. Tyrkova's son from her first marriage, analyzing his parents' divorce, suggests that it was largely caused by differences in views (Borman, 1964: 29–35). As party members, cadet ladies could express their own opinions, sometimes differing from those of their spouses. A. S. Milyukova even openly disagreed with her husband's views on the women's question at party conventions. A. V. Tyrkova recalled that in this matter, the Milyukovs often disagreed, and once "there was an open fight between them in Moscow, which ended in a draw" (Tyrkova-Williams, 2007: 225–226). Furthermore, before marrying, the cadet ladies were mature, educated women with jobs and political views. While married life may have imposed obligations on them to oversee the household, it is likely that many maintained their own identity and independence from their spouses. As such, while they and their

husbands may have sometimes operated as a single “political organism,” they were each distinct entities with unique perspectives and opinions.

Some women’s involvement in the Constitutional Democratic Party stemmed from their close relationships, independent of their marital status. Factors like family ties, friendships, and shared group affiliation all facilitated party membership. Examples of this include sisters E. G. and M. G. Ehrenburg, Eugenia and Elena Gnesina (along with Eugenia’s husband A. N. Savin), mother and daughter E. K. and E. M. Chelnokov, wife of a Moscow Justice of the Peace, O. I. Ternovets and her daughters, as well as the teachers A. N. and V. N. Ternovets. These familial and social bonds proved instrumental in promoting participation in the party, with women coming from diverse backgrounds and sharing various bonds.

In examining the makeup of the female membership of the Constitutional Democratic Party, one must take into account both the lack of complete information on all its members, as well as a certain “invisibility” of its ordinary women. We are aware of the likes of A. V. Tyrkova, N. A. Struve, A. S. Milyukova, and S. V. Panina for their political achievements. It is difficult to trace the everyday members of the party completely, though generalizations can be drawn from available data to construct a profile of the cadet lady.

A typical woman in the People’s Freedom Party received secondary education at a gymnasium, boarding school, or at home and aspired to higher education. Most women’s careers ended when they married, since their duties as wives, housewives, and mothers prevented them from working. Still, those that pursued a profession often chose one requiring mental labor, such as medicine, pedagogy, or cultural work. Charity remained accessible to women who did not need to earn their own living and sought to fulfill themselves.

Two categories of women in the People’s Freedom Party can be distinguished: married women who joined the liberal opposition alongside their husbands, and unmarried women.

Women of the first type were typically unemployed and had similar political views to their husbands, leading them to join the party. Despite this, they may have also had their own independent judgments as we can clearly see in the example of A. S. Milyukova and P. N. Milyukov.

The second “type” comprises unmarried women, widows and those who have gone through divorce. They either had financial resources or earned their own livings. They were also part of a collective, often joining the Constitutional-Democratic Party in association with family or social groups

Social activism was important for the cadet ladies — many of them joined the liberal opposition after their experience of working in charity organizations, social activism or participation in communities with a corresponding orientation. It can be assumed that contact with “ordinary” people or vulnerable groups was the deciding factor for women joining the People’s Freedom Party. N. A. Struve (Khaylova, 2017: 259–263) and S. V. Panina (Shevyrin, 2007: 218–239) were involved in the education of workers, A. V. Tyrkova grew up observing the life of peasants on her family estate in Vergezha and her relatives’ attempts to help them (Borman, 1964: 14–15); A. S. Petrunkevich grew up in the family of the famous philanthropist and patron of the arts S. I. Maltsov and was involved in the establishment of zemstvo schools (Agaeiev, 2017: 194–196); N. Ye. Vernadskaya was involved in public education (Materials on the Activities of N. Ye. Vernadskaya in Cultural..., 1886–1910).

The position of cadet ladies in the party hierarchy and the role they played in the organization itself would change with the political situation in the country and the position of women in it.

Until 1905, the liberals were in a semi-legal position — many future members of the Constitutional Democratic Party were forced to go abroad, while those who remained on the territory of the Russian Empire had to carry out their activities in secret, without openly expressing their views. This predicament of the liberal opposition opened up a wide range of opportunities for women to actively participate in its cause.

The journal *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation), published by P. B. Struve, played a significant role in uniting the Russian liberal opposition, leading to the formation of the Constitutional Democratic Party’s future program and contributing to the formation of a circle of like-minded people (Solov’ev, 2021: 155). A key role in *Osvobozhdenie* was played by future cadet ladies, including N. A. Struve, who was responsible for sending out announcements about the beginning of the journal’s publication and organizing its distribution, which was illegal in Russia. N. A. Struve also believed she shared responsibility for the success and functioning of the journal with her husband. Even before the publication of the first issue of the journal, she wrote to P. B. Struve:

Yesterday I had a long and very interesting conversation with Dmitri Ivanovich (prince D. I. Shakhovskoy — author’s remark) and deeply felt what a huge responsibility will fall on both of us (Shatsillo, 1985: 76–77)

The involvement of N. A. Struve in the work of the editorial board is notable as it was crucial to the success of *Osvobozhdenie*. The significance

of her roles is emphasized by the fact that she was reported to be followed by the renowned police officer E. Azef during her stay in Vienna (Shatsillo, 1985: 89). Without proper logistical organization, *Osvobozhdenie* would not have been able to fulfill its role in consolidating Russian liberalism. N. A. Struve was in charge of sending out announcements about the beginning of the journal's publication, organizing the process of sending and transporting the publication, which was illegal in Russia, liaising with correspondents and secondary addressees, and keeping the editorial office's accounts. At certain moments, she had to assume the role of chief editor of the main printed organ of the Russian liberal opposition (Khaylova, 2017: 259–263).

Yu. G. Toporkova (Gubareva) also played an important role in the work of the Liberation editorial board. Arrested in the case of the "People's Right Party," she was exiled to Vologda and fled abroad, where she was recommended by Prince P. D. Dolgorukov to the Struve family as an experienced and hard-working person. Yu. G. Toporkova became the secretary of the editorial board of the journal and helped the Struve family organize the publishing house (Solov'ev, 2021: 167).

It is important to note that, at the time, the liberal opposition actively recruited women to smuggle illegal literature. Several women, including A. V. Tyrkova, were arrested for attempting to import copies of *Osvobozhdenie* into the Russian Empire (Tyrkova-Williams, 2007: 167–168). The illegal nature of the activities of the liberal opposition was one of the mechanisms of political activism that women could afford.

The First Russian Revolution and the October Manifesto were a milestone in the history of Russian politics. In particular, numerous figures of the liberal opposition had the opportunity to consolidate and form their own party. The revolution brought new ideas, rights and opportunities - the very fact that the People's Freedom party was formed speaks for this. However, the emergence of Russian parliamentarism concerned only men. Women remained without voting rights.

Nevertheless, cadet ladies from the very foundation of the party began to play a substantial role in its life. They actively participated in the organization of the election campaign for the First Duma, agitated the population, were engaged in the arrangement of the economic part, supervised the work of charity canteens on behalf of the party. In this, invisible but no less important side of the party, the cadet ladies occupied high positions. In fact, it can be argued that this side was the women's side. As A. V. Tyrkova noted:

All the menial job in the elections was taken up mainly by women. They handed out and distributed party literature, collected money, went round the flats, organized rallies. They were full of the enthusiasm that gives political work beauty and political figures, especially the aspiring ones, strength (Tyrkova-Williams, 2007: 241)

However, it is erroneous to assume that the cadet ladies were exclusively engaged in such “menial jobs.” They also took part in the management of the party and in making the most crucial decisions. When the first Central Committee of the People’s Freedom Party was formed in 1906, E. D. Kuskova was elected into it, but later she refused to take up her post because of political disagreements with the party top. Subsequently, at the third congress, “in view of the strong growth of the party since the previous congress” the Central Committee was enlarged with ten more members, including A. V. Tyrkova, making her the first woman to be elected to the Central Committee of the party in history (Shelokhayeva, ed., 1997: Vol. 1, 354). After the February Revolution, Countess S. V. Panina was also elected to the Central Committee.

Although A. V. Tyrkova did not have the right to be elected as a Duma deputy, she attended the meetings as a listener and participated in the discussions of the issues raised between the main session as a member of the Central Committee. Thus, although she could not “visibly” influence the direction of the agenda discussed in the Duma, A. V. Tyrkova’s opinion still had weight in determining the party’s position (Tyrkova-Williams, 2007: 271–272).

The daily life of the party can be seen as characterized by the focus of prominent women on organization, logistics, charitable activities, publicity, and finances. L. I. Zhizhelenko, a member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party, was elected its treasurer in 1909 (Shelokhayeva, ed., 1997: Vol. 2, 614). In the same year, M. A. Krasnoselskaya was appointed secretary of the metropolitan Committee (ibid.: Vol. 2, 614).

An important aspect of the party’s activities was the creation and maintenance of charitable initiatives. Charity was traditionally considered the prerogative of women, and it is not surprising that cadet ladies were involved in this sphere. Even during the election campaign of 1906, the issue of public activities of the Party of People’s Freedom was considered equal to other spheres of political interaction. The St. Petersburg committee of the party established a separate Food Commission, which involved up “to 30 party members, mostly ladies” (ibid.: Vol. 1, 354). The Food Commission’s main

priority was to raise funds and open charitable canteens in the capital and its vicinity. According to a report by committee member D. S. Zernov, the Food Commission managed to collect 2500 rubles and open four canteens, each of which had the capacity to serve 250–300 people. The canteens were named after women of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Mrs. Schneider ran an establishment in the village of Murzinka, on the Shlisselburg road, while E. A. Lomshakova and Mrs. Gessen operated on the Vyborg side. E. V. Lavrova managed a canteen in the area of the Putilovsky factory, and S. A. Kareeva was responsible for a canteen in the area of Galernaya harbor (Shelokhayeva, ed., 1997: Vol. 1, 59).

The press was an important mechanism of interaction with society and political influence for the Constitutional Democratic Party, and the cadet ladies were also involved in its work. A. V. Tyrkova was responsible for the functioning of the party press and collaborated with publications such as “Rech,” “Rus,” “Birzhevye Vedomosti,” “Russkie Vedomosti,” and “Sbornik.” She also covered the meetings of the State Duma as a Duma correspondent. Indeed, she was the face of the party in the world of the press—A. V. Tyrkova was approached by the French publishers of the magazine “European” for help in financing, in return offering to assist in the publication of the magazine *Osvobzhdienie* (Letter from P. Sherna to A. V. Tyrkova..., n. d.). Countess V. N. Bobrinskaya was also involved in the affairs of the party press, working as a member of the Bureau of Foreign Press (*ibid.*: Vol. 1, 195).

Nevertheless, the women of the People’s Freedom Party often had to deal with the relatively dismissive attitude of their comrades to the issue of their rights. The inclusion of a clause on women’s suffrage in the party program became the subject of heated discussions in the midst of preparations for the elections to the First Duma. The main argument of the opponents of this introduction was the unpreparedness of Russian women for politics, as well as the possibility of losing votes among the population. Only thanks to the active and stiff resistance of A. S. Milyukova and A. V. Tyrkova, who refused to accept such judgements as valid, was the clause on women’s rights introduced (Tyrkova-Williams, 2007: 225–229).

The role of women in the People’s Freedom Party, while initially considered a pressing political issue, was later met with skepticism by some members. In 1912, for example, V. D. Nabokov spoke against the introduction of a bill on universal suffrage at a Central Committee meeting. In response, A. V. Tyrkova assembled several cadet ladies including A. S. Milyukova and L. I. Zhizhenko, as well as women’s rights activists. Together, they compiled a set of arguments in favor of women’s suffrage to be used in



future discussions (Kanishcheva, ed., 2012: 134–135). This incident displays the camaraderie among the female members of the People's Freedom Party and reinforces their independence in political decision-making.

Shortly after the February Revolution, when Russia adopted new electoral legislation, the women of the Constitutional Democratic Party had the opportunity to “master” new political frontiers. During this period when the People's Freedom Party was formed, several new members were admitted to the Central Committee of the party, including Countess S. V. Panina who had officially joined the Constitutional Democrats (Protocols of the Central Committee..., 1998: 370). Later, Yu. G. Toporkova (Gubareva) was noted among the lists of candidates for co-option to the Central Committee (*ibid.*: 361).

Countess S. V. Panina was also elected to the Petrograd City Duma and was later appointed to the second coalition government where she served as a comrade of the Minister of State Welfare. Moreover, after the collapse of this government and the establishment of the third coalition government in September 1917, Countess S. V. Panina held the position of comrade minister of public education (Serapionova, 2019: 176–177).

As the People's Freedom Party prepared for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the party leadership planned a campaign to agitate the population and attract the moods of the masses to the side of the constitutional democrats. For this purpose, special commissions were created, including the literary and agitation commissions. The literary commission was tasked with creating “popular-scientific and agitating party literature by ordering leaflets and small brochures,” while the agitation commission had the task of distributing “party literature in the peasantry, reading lectures, holding popular conversations, etc.” A. V. Tyrkova was a member of the literary commission, while M. A. Krasnosel'skaya was a member of the agitation commission. O. A. Zernova was also one of the secretaries of the All-Russian Agitation Commission (Protocols of the Central Committee..., 1998: 365–404).

During discussions of party candidates for the forthcoming Constituent Assembly, the possibility of including Countess S. V. Panina, who was not initially included in the list, was also considered. However, A. V. Tyrkova was included among the candidates of the Constitutional Democrats, which made her the only woman representing the People's Freedom Party (Shelohayeva, ed., 1997: Vol. 2, 727).

In addition to the Constituent Assembly, the Constitutional Democrats were active in running for city councils. From the spring of 1917, women

could also be elected as councilors and make decisions concerning city administration. The People's Freedom Party also had female candidates for city dumas in both Moscow and Petrograd (List of Candidates for the Vowels..., n. d.).

When examining the political activities of women in the Constitutional Democratic Party, it is important to consider the legal restrictions that regulated the activities of "cadet ladies." Prior to the February Revolution, women did not have the right to vote, which significantly limited their potential career opportunities. However, following the February Revolution, there was an increase in the involvement of women in the work of the highest party bodies and representative institutions, indicating the potential of the female half of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which remained untapped due to legal restraints. Despite these restraints, cadet ladies actively participated in party work and could even influence key decisions. This can be seen in the example of the discussions on the inclusion of the women's question in the party program in 1906.

In general, the cadet ladies undertook "invisible" aspects of party activity. Organizing committee work, negotiating between party members, securing meetings and events, managing charities and maintaining records comprised the responsibilities of the women of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Though often overlooked, their input which is an inseparable part of the life of the political entity.

Despite legal restrictions, cadet ladies occupied significant positions in the party hierarchy. O. A. Zernova served as the secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, M. A. Krasnosel'skaya served as the secretary of the St. Petersburg Committee, and O. N. Klirikova filled the same position in the Yaroslavl Committee. L. I. Zhizhilenko was the treasurer of the capital's party cell. In fact, the most important and largest committees of the Party of the People's Freedom were under the charge of the party's female half.

It is also important to note that not all cadet ladies' political activity was limited to the party work. Many women of the Constitutional Democratic Party were well known for their participation in the women's rights movement. A. S. Milyukova and A. V. Tyrkova represented their party in the Union of Equal Rights. O. N. Klirikova also participated in this organization, holding, and financing of the Union's congresses, gave speeches, and wrote articles on women's equality. A. N. Shabanova was much better known for her activists in the women's movement rather than in the Constitutional Democratic Party. However, she was also invited by

A. V. Tyrkova to discuss arguments in favor of women's suffrage in 1912 (Kanishcheva, ed., 2012: 134–135).

In conclusion, the role of the cadet ladies in the Constitutional Democratic Party was significant, despite the legal restrictions women faced at the time. The organization of party activities is a crucial factor in the success of any political entity and can be considered a contributing factor to the success of the People's Freedom Party. However, it is important to note that the cadet ladies were not simply auxiliary figures in the Constitutional Democratic Party but played a critical role in all aspects of political activity. Despite their limited opportunities, women in the People's Freedom Party exerted considerable influence in a variety of spheres. The women of the Constitutional Democratic Party were equal participants in the liberal opposition and their environment, which consisted primarily of family members and relatives, allowed them to maintain a high level of independence in their judgments and actions.

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ЕКАТЕРИНА КОШОЛАП

СТУДЕНТКА

НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ «ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ» (МОСКВА);

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## КАДЕТСКИЕ ДАМЫ

### ЖЕНЩИНЫ КОНСТИТУЦИОННО-ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ КАК ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЙ ФЕНОМЕН

Получено: 30.09.2023. Рецензировано: 10.10.2023. Принято: 13.10.2023.

**Аннотация:** Статья посвящена феномену женщин в Конституционно-демократической партии с момента ее основания и до подготовки организации к выборам в Учредительное собрание в 1917 году. Автор стремится воссоздать социокультурный портрет кадетских дам, выяснить факторы, которые могли повлиять на их вступление в партию, и охарактеризовать их деятельность в организации. Особое внимание уделяется тому, какое место в партийной иерархии могли занимать женщины, а также возможностям продвижения в ней. Кадетские дамы в основном отвечали за быт, хозяйственное обеспечение, материально-техническое снабжение, проведение мероприятий и благотворительных акций организации, но в то же время активно участвовали в принятии ключевых решений, хотя и не обладали теми же политическими правами, что и мужчины. Более того, с предоставлением этих прав женщинам после Февральской революции количество кадетских дам на ключевых партийных постах резко возросло, что подтверждает их

значимость для конституционных демократов. Также выделяются характерные черты социокультурного портрета женщин Партии народной свободы. Кадетские дамы росли в пореформенной России, когда социально-экономические изменения в стране и обществе оказали огромное влияние на процесс женской эмансипации. Возможность получить качественное образование, освоить профессию и работать, выбрать супруга на основе взаимного уважения и сходства взглядов послужила фактором обретения субъектности, которая, в свою очередь, впоследствии позволила кадетским дамам стать тем политическим феноменом, о котором идет речь в данной статье.

**Ключевые слова:** кадетские дамы, Конституционно-демократическая партия, Партия народной свободы, либеральная оппозиция, Русская революция 1905–1907 гг., Февральская революция, политические партии, женская история.

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LYUBOV BOGODELNIKOVA\*

## THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF MARIA VLADIMIROVNA BEZOBRAZOVA\*\*

IS A WOMAN PHILOSOPHER ALLOWED TO SPEAK?

Submitted: June 01, 2023. Reviewed: Aug. 30, 2023. Accepted: Nov. 01, 2023.

**Abstract:** The article presents an exploration into the history of Russian philosophy with the help of the genealogical approach, which, on the one hand, allows to take a fresh look at the texts of women philosophers and to approach them from new angles, and, on the other hand, actualizes the idea of alternative memory, an alternative history of philosophy, returning female thinkers to the field of historical research and finding a place for their ideas and theoretical achievements. The discourse-methodological analysis underlying genealogy allows to study utterances from the point of view of its social production, which leads to the problems of power and knowledge and shows that the latter is created not only through the discourse of affirmation, but also through that of exclusion. Consequently, it is not only necessary to deconstruct the dominant historical and philosophical discourse, but also to examine what this discourse excludes, and feminist genealogies set themselves such a task. This has led to a change in the status of philosophy itself, which can no longer be «high theorizing» about abstract principles, but becomes the practice of the political. This approach, applied to the analysis of the texts of the Russian thinker M. V. Bezobrazova, paints a clear picture of both the general philosophical significance of her ideas and the political meaning of the problems under study, and allows to trace the movement of thought from philosophy to politics. Of particular importance is the conclusion that the feminist analysis of the texts of women philosophers serves, first of all, to establish intergenerational dialogue and the manifestation of female solidarity.

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**Keywords:** M. V. Bezobrazova, History of Russian Philosophy, Feminist Genealogy, Discourse, Power, Women Philosophers, Foucault.

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#### INTRODUCTION OR WHO IS ALLOWED TO SPEAK?

The title of the article is a homage to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's work "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (Spivak, 1988), in which she asks whether a gradual emancipation of the subaltern is possible within the framework of the current imperialist project, and also suggests rethinking the colonial historiography of India from the point of view of the genealogical method, which, in her opinion, will allow to move away from "colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism" (ibid.: 38) and prove the idea that "the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous" (ibid.). Spivak begins her reasoning with a detailed analysis of the famous conversation between Deleuze and Foucault, which raises "the most essential for French post-structuralism themes of power/desire/interest" (ibid.) and ideology.

The ideology appears to be necessarily connected with the living conditions of the oppressed, governed by the current phase of development of imperialism and the economic conditions of the international division of labor. This, in turn, leads the author to the class theory presented in the text by the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Marx. The problem of epistemic violence turns to be one of the central issues raised by Spivak in the text, the main manifestation of which is the "far-flung and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as the Other" (ibid.: 35). In the final, fourth part of the article, Spivak says: "I tactically confronted the immense problem of the consciousness of the woman as subaltern" (ibid.: 48), forced to be in a state of unquestioning submission. Spivak writes:

Can the subaltern speak? What must the elite do to watch out to the continuing construction of the subaltern? The question of "woman" seems most problematic in this context (ibid.: 46).

These questions and the reasoning of Gayatri Spivak inspired my research into the place of women in the history of philosophy. Keeping in mind Spivak's warning not to "construct the monolithic third-world woman" (ibid.: 48), which I am changing into "not to construct the monolithic woman philosopher," I intend to focus on understanding the place of a woman philosopher in the history of Russian philosophy, having considered a number of works and referring to some aspects of the life of the first Russian female philosopher Maria Vladimirovna Bezobrazova. Therefore, for the purposes

of this paper, I have transformed the questions about the subaltern in the following way: Can or could Russian women philosophers speak? Can the voice of women be heard in the history of Russian philosophy? To answer these questions, the first thing to do is to look at the history of Russian philosophy through the optics of genealogical approach and feminist genealogy, which can highlight what the reality of Russian philosophy is with and without the female voice.

Prior to delving into the issues raised, I would like to focus on a purely linguistic problem. I did not want to leave the verb “can” in the title of this text, since this verb implies the presence of some ability to do something, to be able, to be capable. I found it more appropriate to replace the verb “can” with the verb “to allow”. In this version, “can Russian women philosophers speak?” transforms into “are women philosophers allowed to speak?” The questions of whether they were allowed to speak before and are they allowed to speak now? And with this, according to the tradition started by Foucault, the speech act becomes a political act, that of violating the integrity of the community, introducing conflict into a certain field of culture. Speaking, questioning and searching for the truth requires courage, destroys unity, creates dissensus. (Foucault, 2019: 9) This is the courage that resides in someone, speaking sincerely and frankly, that is, the parrhesiast. In my opinion, M. V. Bezobrazova, the first Russian woman who practiced philosophy and created her own unique system of “ethical idealism” (Kravchenko, 2016; Vanchugov, 2009; 2014; Kiejzik, 2019), was such a parrhesiast in the full sense of the word. She set up the first Russian Philosophical Society, and stood at the origins of the Russian Women’s Mutual Charitable Society and the Ethical Society. Lacking the opportunity to get a philosophical education in Russia, she did everything to practice philosophy enthusiastically, despite all odds and undeterred by society’s disapproval. She set an example of a woman who should have the right for professional fulfillment, self-improvement and independence.

FEMINIST GENEALOGY AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,  
FEMINIST GENEALOGY INSTEAD OF HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

What, then, is so perilous in the fact that people speak, and their discourse proliferates to infinity? Where is the danger in that? (Foucault, 1971: 8)

The use of a genealogical approach in studying the history of Russian philosophy is essential in order to perceive that the latter is rather a het-

erogeneous than a homogeneous formation, in which, if desired, different voices can be heard, and, primarily, the voices of women philosophers, whose marginal status in Russian philosophy can and should be changed.

The main idea underlying genealogy as an approach, is that history should be explored and recreated in all its diversity and uniqueness. Therefore no other method seems possible if the aim is to hear the voices of everyone, and not just the prevailing discourse.

Nietzsche, who is rightfully considered the founder of this approach, contrasted the methodological function of genealogy with classical historicism, whose functions, in his opinion, consisted in the transformation of diversity into universality, the identification of historical patterns and, at the same time, the loss of many “traces” of events and processes that took place.

A history whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history whose perspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development. The historian’s history finds its support outside of time and claims to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity. This is only possible, however, because of its belief in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself (Foucault, 1998: 379).

Foucault, following Nietzsche, applies genealogical approach to the studying the history of culture and fundamentally refuses to explore some predetermined essence, “something” that exists and varies with time. He claims that

genealogy retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history-in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy must define event those instances when they are absent, the moment when they remained unrealized (ibid.: 369).

To apply the genealogical approach, according to Foucault, means to consider any phenomenon as the result and effect of power. History, as the genealogist sees it, is a change of types of power, a chain of denotation of rules. And this history should be recreated in all its diversity and originality. The genealogy of power is Foucault’s main research issue. Power is impersonal and indifferent, but it is the will to power that establishes relations of domination and subordination, to which all others can be reduced to one degree or another. Power relies on knowledge and at the same time initiates

it. Power and knowledge form a single alloy, complementing and reinforcing one another.

Power, accordingly, is understood not as an instance that transforms some archetype, but as a force field that produces the studied phenomenon from the very beginning of its existence. The power that produces various historical phenomena functions in close connection with knowledge.

In placing present needs at the origin, the metaphysician would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises. Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations (Foucault, 1998: 376).

Thus, genealogy moves away from the search for foundation, and turns to the power that produces discourse. In accordance with the research practice of the French philosopher, discourse will be understood as a socially conditioned system of speech and action. In this understanding, culture acts as a set of discourses, a system of practices in which a person creates the space of their own existence (Komkov, 2019). And according to Foucault, the main problem of culture lies in what is said, when, and by whom, and I would also add “why” on my own behalf. This “why” turns out to be very important, since it is quite consistent with the discursive practice of control, which is a hallmark of the culture of our time: can everyone be allowed to speak if this creates multiple discourse, chaos, uncertainty (Foucault, 1998)?

In Foucault’s genealogical approach, I am most interested in two issues that are necessary for this study: (1) how Foucault’s genealogy has influenced feminist historiography and the formation of feminist genealogies (see Butler, 2002; Braidotti, 1994; Scott, 1996 and others); (2) the discourse of exclusion. I will now briefly address each of the points. As researchers (Pulkkinen, Gavryushkin, 1999; Samylov, 2013) note, Foucault did not literally stand at the origins of various areas of postmodern historical science, but his influence on feminist studies of history, on changing the understanding of the place of women in history in general, and in the history of philosophy in particular, is beyond doubt. Modern feminist genealogy is based on the discursive-methodological analysis he developed.

One of the important conclusions of the Foucault’s is that

genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of oblivion; its task is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes (Foucault, 1998: 374),

and, of course, the requirement to consider any historical events through the prism of power relations: power-submission. These ideas have found their continuation in feminist studies of history, as well as in feminist epistemology (Haraway, 1988), for which the problem of the relationship between power and knowledge becomes fundamental (Agalamova & Kostyleva, 2022: 238).

Of particular importance to my research is the idea of the discourse of exclusion. When asked why one system of knowledge should be preferred over another, Foucault replied that the way knowledge is coded and organized determines the way that the world is comprehended (Foucault, 1971). Discourse standardizes knowledge and thus rejects all alternative formulas for its codification. Therefore, it is not just the ideas that the discourse represents that are important, but also the ideas that it excludes. Speaking about the history of philosophy, it becomes obvious that the ideas that discourse excluded were often those that belonged to women. The latter seems possible to apply to the study of the history of Russian philosophy, with the aim of discovering “hidden figures” (Kiejzik, 2019), “silent voices” of women philosophers, hidden “traces” of women’s philosophical studies. It turns out that not only is the discourse itself important, but also what it excludes. Finally, the practices of exclusion require no less attention than what remains and actually constitutes discourse.

Perhaps it may easily be explained why there were no women philosophers or very few (see Nochlin, 1988). It is more difficult to give reasoning for why a feminist interpretation of history, in particular the history of philosophy, is needed. I propose to return to this issue at the end of this paragraph, after considering the positions of two philosophers: Joan Scott and Rosi Braidotti, who are not only trying to rethink the place and role of women in history and history of philosophy, but also to deconstruct the dominant discourse and reconstruct our understanding of the past, turning the process of deconstructing history into “a political act that does not represent the past, but creates its model based on current political and social processes” (Samylov, 2013: 28).

The approaches of these two feminist researchers show the place of Bezobrazova in the history of Russian philosophy in a new light, and help to define her achievements.

I will begin with Joan Scott and her feminist historiography, in which the main goal was to find out how to make the voices of female researchers heard.

Joan Scott in her text “Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis” attempts to substantiate a methodological approach that allows to rethink the role of women in history and build up a new feminist historiography

based on the concept of “gender.” An exploration of this concept leads Scott to conclude that “women’s scholarship would fundamentally transform disciplinary paradigms” (Scott, 1996: 1054), force a “critical reexamination of the premises and standards of existing scholarly work” (ibid.). Scott’s reasoning is of high interest for me, because behind the requirement to include women in history, she sees not only the possibility of including personal, subjective experience in the concept of historical significance, but, above all, the opportunity to build a new history.

It is not too much to suggest that however hesitant the actual beginnings, such a methodology implies not only a new history of women but a new history (ibid.).

Scott proposes a methodological framework for feminist history studies that would help create an alternative to classical historiographical traditions. In this task she sees a

synthesizing perspective that could explain continuities and discontinuities and account for persistent inequalities as well as radically different social experiences (ibid.: 1055).

The main challenge for feminist historiographies is to move away from the further marginalization of women’s historical studies. According to Scott, women’s studies should neither be included as an integral part of a larger field of research, nor create some kind of atomized, autonomous discipline, a kind of history of women, written by women researchers for women. In both cases, the voice of female researchers appears to be heard, but it is either still in the position of an oppressed, subordinate, as in the first case, or it sounds like the voice of a marginalized part of society, as in the second. This is where Scott’s demand to write not “a new history of women, but a new history in general” arises. These issues raise the problem to a fundamentally new level: it is necessary to reconstruct, or even better, deconstruct the dominant approach to research. And then such a task shifts the problem of feminist historiographies from a purely methodological to a political one, which brings us back to Foucault’s main research issue: the relationship between power and knowledge, the discourse of affirmation and the discourse of exclusion.

The history of women, according to Scott’s deep conviction, cannot be “dissolved in the historiographic coordinate system created by the history of the masculine gender” (Samylov, 2013: 28). The creation of such a history becomes a political act in which the past is not represented, but the present political and social is expressed. This challenge

requires analysis not only of the relationship between male and female experience in the past, but also of the relationship between past history and contemporary historical practice (Scott, 1996: 1055).

Moving on, in the consideration of the feminist genealogy by Rosi Braidotti, the central problem is seen as the relationship between women's studies and power, which finds its expression in the institutionalization of women's studies. According to Braidotti, only those feminist theories become real, which "open up possibilities of confronting the issue of power, subjectivity, and knowledge in all its complexity" (Braidotti, 1994: 205). The institutionalization of women's studies is important both politically and epistemologically, as it raises important questions concerning the extent to which women in institutions can discern how knowledge is codified, transmitted and recognized, the mechanisms specific to feminist practice for canonization and transmission of knowledge, the possibility of a direct link between institutionalization and the loss of radical views (*ibid.*). Braidotti admits that she, like a number of researchers, "has put a very heavy stake on the subversive, or transformative potential of female feminist bonding in postindustrial patriarchy" (*ibid.*: 207).

It is feminist genealogies that provide the basis for changing the masculine patterns of thinking and teaching of women (liberation from phallogocentric modes of thinking and learning).

Central to this project is the notion of feminist genealogies, that is, the process of thinking backwards through the work of other women. Genealogies are politically informed counter-memories, which keep us connected to the experiences and the speaking voices of some of the women whose resistance is for us a source of support and inspiration. In this respect, a feminist genealogy is a discursive and political exercise in cross-generational female bonding, which also highlights the aesthetic dimension of the thinking process, that is the fact that ideas are actually "beautiful events," capable of moving us across space and time (*ibid.*).

Braidotti addresses the idea of speaking, speaking of the feminist voice and feminist style, she defines them as "new spaces of speech, new different ways of speaking" (*ibid.*: 209).

Feminist ideas are the trajectories of thought, flight paths to impossible horizons; they seek to reunite those layers of experience that patriarchal power keeps in isolation from each other. Feminist ideas are constructs that bring to life new, alternative ways of constructing the female subject. [...] From the politics to the poetics of the feminist voices — new spaces of enunciation are opened to us new, different, and differing ways of speaking (*ibid.*: 208).

Emphasizing the transdisciplinary nature of feminist studies, she criticizes the discourse of “high theory” (Braidotti, 1994: 209) and especially philosophy, which supports the patriarchal habit of over-investment in the theoretical mode (*ibid.*: 210). Feminism, in her opinion, allows the coexistence of different representations and ways of understanding not only the subjectivity of women, but everything.

In line of Rosi Braidotti’s reasoning, I will allow myself to highlight two ideas that are of particular importance to me for further study of the place of women’s studies in the history of Russian philosophy. The first is that feminist genealogy contributes to establishing and strengthening ties, building a dialogue between women researchers of different generations (cross-generational female bonding), which ultimately will help to realize and finally use the “transformative potential of female solidarity.” The second idea expresses the need to overcome the male canon of thinking and teaching, which leads to a rather provocative conclusion: feminist texts and speaking require new ways of listening.

Once more, the question stands whether a feminist interpretation of history, and in particular of the history of philosophy, is needed. To answer it, I will repeat in a slightly modified form the idea of Joan Scott, who describes the need to write a new history of philosophy as opposed to creating a “new women’s history of philosophy.” Feminist genealogies are not about opposing male and female views of the past, and not about clarifying the differences between male and female experiences in the past. Feminist genealogies, in the case of the history of Russian philosophy, is an approach that can help manifest and make the voice of women-philosophers heard.

Whether the understanding of Russian philosophy will change from the knowledge that there were women philosophers in its history, is the kind of question that can only be answered by revising the theoretical framework of modern historical research, and recognizing that

the traditional divisions of intellectual inquiry are still adequate to deal with the meaningful questions of our time, rather than the merely convenient or self-generated ones (Nochlin, 1988: 146).

Can and should we reconstruct historical knowledge, remembering, in the wake of Foucault, that history is a representation not of the past, but of the present, or would it be more correct to say, a representation of the past through the prism of the present? My answers to all of these questions are definitely “yes.”



I repeat that the problem of women in the history of Russian philosophy is not a “female problem” about which some women, after reading texts written by women, must tell other women. This is an institutional and political problem. The question of women in the history of Russian philosophy should, in my opinion, lead to a change in the state of affairs in the present, when equality of achievement will not only become possible, but will also be actively encouraged by public institutions. And for this, women themselves

must conceive of themselves as potentially, if not actually, equal subjects, and must be willing to look at the facts of their situation full in the face, without self-pity, or cop-outs (Nochlin, 1988: 151).

RESTLESS PERSON — MARIA VLADIMIROVNA BEZOBRAZOVA:  
FROM ETHICS TO POLITICS

None shall enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not qualified to do so (Foucault, 1971: 16).

One of the interesting facts in the life of Maria Vladimirovna Bezobrazova is as follows: during her lifetime in 1912, in the book *Iz odnogo alboma* (*From one album*), she expressed a wish: “Please make an inscription on my grave: Here lies a restless person...” (Vanchugov, 2014: 13). By carefully reading her texts and following the twists and turns of her personal and professional destiny, one becomes convinced that the idea of restlessness can be an important characteristic, both for understanding her biography and her philosophical research. A few decades later, Judith Butler, an iconic figure in post-structuralism, political philosophy and ethics, who influenced the development of both philosophical and political feminism, would write in the introduction to their work “Gender Trouble” that

trouble became a scandal with a sudden intrusion, the anticipated agency, of a female “object,” who inexplicably returns the glance, reverses the gaze and contests the place and authority of the masculine position (Butler, 2002: vii).

The concept of trouble may be seen as quite the accurate characteristic of Bezobrazova, since she attracted the attention of coevals for venturing, despite not always wanting to admit it, into the masculine sphere of Russian philosophy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For context, the Russian philosophical community of the 19th century was monolithically male, which is directly connected with the fact that in Russia until the middle of the 19th century women were not allowed to enter the university.

In 1861, the year of the abolition of serfdom, the draft of the new statute for universities was discussed in the Russian Empire.

The results of the discussion (over 1000 pages of text) among professor-members of the senates were published in book form (“Замечания на проект Общего Устава императорских российских университетов”, 1861). At the end of the second part of the compilation was the chapter — Decision of university senates regarding the admission of female persons to participate in university lectures. In the preamble to the chapter it was explained that the Department of National Education proposed that university senates answer a few questions: (1) Can persons of the female gender be allowed to listen to lectures on an equal footing with students? (Note: “students” is used to refer only to men); (2) What conditions should be put in place in the case of positive decisions? (3) Can persons of the female gender be agents of scientific research (i. e., can they acquire academic degrees on a par with men) and what rights, in the case of positively completed procedures, are they entitled to? It is known that the senates of the universities of Kharkov, Kazansk, Kiev and Saint Petersburg expressed themselves positively. The situation was different at Moscow University. This, the oldest Russian university, which had great pride in its founder, Mikhail Lomonosov — answered the questions posed negatively, and in addition, rather laconically and abstractly. The protocols recorded 23 votes against, 2 for: it was decided not to allow students and female persons to jointly participate in lectures, under any circumstances. At the same time, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, Western universities opened their auditoriums to women seeing nothing wrong in doing so. Thus, in the history of the “woman question” in Russia, a unique period of mass trips to foreign universities, especially to Switzerland and Germany, began. Russian women studied there primarily medical or philological sciences, including pedagogy, less often the exact sciences. But there were also those who chose philosophy. When they returned with the scientific degrees they had gained, they could not be ignored (Kiejzik, 2019: 199).

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the negligible small number of women philosophers in the history of Russian philosophy is the result of the institutional structure of science and education of that time.

And yet, to understand why philosophy in Russia in the 19th century was a purely male occupation, it is essential, in my opinion, not only to analyze the socio-political context, it is also important to answer questions about *who a philosopher is* and *what it means to practice philosophy professionally*. Taking into account the fact that philosophy can be considered as “a part of the social structure, mediated and determined by specific social institutions” (Nochlin, 1988: 152), does it follow from this that being a philosopher in the late 19th century meant being included in an official academy and having access to education and teaching at the university? Positive answers to

the above questions lead back to the idea that “any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers they carry” (Foucault, 1971: 164). The discourse of power and subordination manifested itself in the fact that a woman who decided to study philosophy in Russia, despite the circumstances, had neither the opportunity to get an education, nor the opportunity to teach at the university, nor the opportunity to be published on equal bases. Thus, in writing philosophical texts, giving public lectures, publishing at her own expense, supporting other women in their pursuit of education, knowledge, profession, a woman philosopher, such as Maria Vladimirovna Bezobrazova, becomes a “nightmare” (Kiejzik, 2019), an exception that disrupts the dominant discourse, disturbs society, as it “contests the place and authority of the masculine position” (Butler, 2002: VII).

Females philosophical studies in Russia before the Soviets represent a discourse of exclusion, the voices of women philosophers, if they were sounded, were not heard. Of course, it must be remembered that philosophy as an academic discipline in Russia began to develop only in the 19th century, which is associated with the name of Vladimir Sergeevich Soloviev. It is significant that Soloviev in all his considerations of femininity

could have done a lot to include women in the philosophical community in Russia, but he did not. Probably not for lack of good intention, but the fact itself must arouse astonishment, given that he was a lecturer at the university and on the Higher education courses for women. He did not even try to help with recommendations for Bezobrazova (related to him by his sister’s husband) a philosophy graduate and with a scientific degree bestowed by the University of Bern (Kiejzik, 2019: 196).

Another side of the question of what it means to practice philosophy professionally concerns the “quality” of the ideas produced. Can it be considered a sufficient condition for the professional realization of a philosopher that their ideas are not only heard in the professional community, but are also in demand? How is it possible to assess the relevance of the theory? Does this always mean creating a unique philosophical “system?” Does this mean that only a systematic presentation of ideas, and not a single statement or discourse, deserves attention?

The difficulty of perceiving Bezobrazova’s ideas was associated with the style of her writing, which she herself described as “aphoristic” (Vanchugov, 2014: 8). Many commented on her writing style as epigrammatical and

rhetorical, so unusual for the accepted style of academic writing. Bezobrazova's style was in many ways similar to the writing style of Nikolai Berdyaev, which can be described as the style of philosophical journalism and philosophical autobiography, which, in the case of Berdyaev, was accepted and supported by readers, followers and colleagues, while Bezobrazova remained largely misunderstood.

Vasily Vasilyevich Rozanov offered his own understanding of the reasons for the obscureness of Bezobrazova. Describing current state of affairs in Russian philosophy, Bezobrazova once said: "There are so many keeping chew of Comte and Kant, and you don't know which of them is more." Rozanov commented on it like this: "our university philosophy is chews Kant, our magazine philosophy chews Comte, showing in both its branches something lazy, dull and hopeless. Both in their lifelessness [...] in the absence of any connection with their native soil [...] resembles the darkest times of scholasticism [...] Bezobrazova was too serious, simple and gifted to be successful in a society that, in philosophy, runs after the 'idol of the theatre' [...] She did not want to 'chew Comte and Kant again'—and certainly she was not invited and was not even let in their 'chewing' magazines [...] She did not have a common gloss, a common shade—she was 'not like everyone else,' and for the one hundred first time the Russian story 'wit works woe' happened to her" (cited in Vanchugov, 2014: 25).

Perhaps, as Braidotti suggests, women's voices and speech require new ways of listening, as well as a rethinking of what philosophy is, what it should do and how it should do it. One can only assume that in the 19th century, the emerging Russian academic philosophy could not and was not ready to develop new methods of research that would give value to the affective, emotional foundations of philosophy, and not just its rationalistic structure. The dominant discourse did not allow a different way of speaking, a different way of understanding, a different style of writing, did not allow the existence of various representations, did not allow a change of position in which different voices could be heard, including women's voices.

Bezobrazova herself explicitly or indirectly addressed the question of what philosophy is in her various texts (Bezobrazova, 1892; 1894; 1911a,b; 1912). In *A Brief Review of the Significant Moments in the History of Philosophy*, starting with discussions about the impossibility of maintaining objectivity in expounding the history of philosophy, she writes that

any history of philosophy is always a theory, and as a theory it is always one-sided, always subjective. There has never been and never will be an objective history

of philosophy even less, perhaps, than an objective history of culture, than an objective philosophy of history (Bezobrazova, 1894: 3).

Bezobrazova identifies three possible takes on the history of philosophy: first, where a single theory is recognized, from the standpoint of a certain worldview, as the only true one; second, one where there is no single truth, and in each of the theories there exists a certain rational grain of truth; and the third, in which the study of the history of philosophy proceeds from the recognition of the original fallacy of all philosophical systems that have ever existed. She then comes to the paradoxical conclusion that “the entire history of philosophy is nothing but the history of delusions,” and concludes: “it is wonderful that philosophy itself can be denied, but not its history” (ibid.). And even more than that, “through which epochs philosophy will not pass, in what new forms it will not manifest itself, its essence will remain the same, the same ignorance” (ibid.: 7). What then follows is a passage about continuity in philosophy as a process of inheriting the mistakes and errors of predecessors, and the conclusion that this is the only way to get closer to the truth.

And only by working you make mistakes, and every mistake is instructive for those who go further, who continue the work, to make mistakes in their turn, in order to most often leave to the descendants one huge mistake, and sometimes a grain of truth in it—a spark of that very Promethean fire, which alone helps to put up with life and illuminates the path (ibid.).

Having defined philosophy as a spiritual science and highlighted its three key parts: psychology, ethics and logic, Bezobrazova proposes an answer to the question of who a philosopher is:

Who wants ready-made answers and wants to calm down with them is not a philosopher [...] if whoever thinks of finding an unshakable truth in some philosophical system requires exact and categorical answers, which means that a person has not yet gained an insight into philosophy (ibid.).

Doubt, open questioning, readiness to rethink the established canon of philosophical research—these are the essential features of her original style, a unique philosophical “voice” that can be heard by the attentive audience, if they wish to listen.

“The duty of a philosopher is not to be afraid to speak,” writes Bezobrazova, who understood philosophy as a way of life. What should a philosopher not be afraid to talk about? For herself, this has been expressed in the study of ethical issues. Under the influence of Immanuel Kant, interpreting

his categorical imperative in a peculiar way, she created her own “ethical idealism,” a system of “pure morality” (Kravchenko, 2016: 37). In her work *On Immorality*, she reformulates one of the three Kantian questions, instead of: “What ought I to do?” Bezobrazova will look for answers to the question: “What ought I NOT to do?”

One of the important features of Russian philosophy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was its ethical orientation. V. S. Soloviev, S. N. Trubetskoy, S. N. Bulgakov, S. L. Frank, L. I. Shestov, N. A. Berdyaev are representatives of idealistic thought in its religious and mystical form, for them ethics was the center of research interests. Russian idealistic ethics were based on the belief in the need for divine sanctification of morality, and for this reason all ethical problems were considered by them in a religious key. The work of Maria Vladimirovna “On immorality” is fundamentally different from the works of Russian religious philosophers of that time. She called this “the book of the linings and the seamy side of life,” in which Bezobrazova names and explores the main social problems of Russia at that time. This is reminiscent of the activity of a doctor who is trying to diagnose a patient, but the diagnosis, as known, is needed in order to restore a person to health. Approximately the same applies to Bezobrazova, revealing the vices of Russian society, she shows the way to recovery.

She begins this text with an examination of the problem of suicide, especially childhood suicides:

in school suicides, they forget that they are much more connected with disorder and rudeness of family life and with pornographic literature than with a harsh school (Bezobrazova, 1911b: 10).

In her opinion, the person committing suicide is not always sinful, “not allowing others to commit suicide is the task of morality” (ibid.: 8), someone suicidal is always a “victim of society” (ibid.), since in Russian society there is an ostentatious, hypocritical and fake humanity.

Behind every example of immorality, Bezobrazova sees a social reason, raises the question of collective responsibility for what is happening. “Russian life is far from true mercy, true love and true justice” (ibid.: 6). Russian pseudo-humanity and Russian negligence, immorality come from the fact, that Russians work too little.

Work has become the scorn of Russians, all life is now adapted to the tastes of those who enjoy and revel—everything for such people is now in Russia, nothing for a modest family life, for working people who want quiet joys, and not the tinsel of popular entertainment [...] There is money for carousing, but not for the

construction of roads necessary for work, which leads to the weakening of the working population of the country (Bezobrazova, 1911b: 16).

For Russian religious philosophers, the ethical is connected with the tasks of saving the soul, and not with the real change in the practices of social action. But such an understanding of the problem does not suit Bezobrazova, because a person may save themselves, but the vices of society can only be eradicated in unison. “It is high time to overcome evil and perk up by uniting in common task” (ibid.: 28). Bezobrazova understood that the “god-manhood” concept of goodness, justice, virtue, and freedom would remain in the field of “abstract principles,” if they did not find a way out into real political action, help fight current social problems, and raise the question of moral responsibility for the state of affairs in society for everyone.

And as it often happens at a doctor’s appointment, it can be very unpleasant to learn and listen to the diagnosis. “This is our modern Russian life, it is an immoral life that, like an ostrich, hides its head from its own shame” (ibid.: 1). And further,

modern Russia lives in discord, there is a deep discord between the government and society. There can be no steps forward, the prosperity of the state is not conceivable until the strife between society and the government ends (ibid.: 18). [...] The only way for salvation is the establishment of peace in Russia, but not external, not ostentatious, of course, but real, from the realization that it is necessary to improve the moral atmosphere. This must be done together to finally give the country a breath (ibid.: 27).

Reading this text, one can realize that the formula Bezobrazova proposed “Russian life—immoral life” comes into conflict with the familiar and often used concept of “Russian spirituality.” To formulate a problem, to name a diagnosis is already half of the way to healing. The work *On Immorality*, in my opinion, should be considered a manifesto which declares the need to restructure Russian society, minimize injustice and cruelty, eradicate vices and social evil. Pointing out how the current state of affairs does not correspond to ideas of goodness and justice, Bezobrazova appears as a parrhesiast who destroys consensus for the sake of asserting the truth. “The duty of a philosopher is not to be afraid to say,” and with this text Bezobrazova proves that she was not afraid to speak even about what the others did not want or were not ready to hear.

Having analyzed the theoretical works and life path of Maria Vladimirovna Bezobrazova, I am absolutely convinced that we need to rewrite the history of Russian philosophy, to be able to hear, albeit rarely, albeit incomparable

in strength with male voices, the female voices. These, in turn, should not be individual monographs devoted to women in Russian philosophy (see, for example, Vanchugov, 2009), without any detraction of the author merits, but the most common public textbooks, manuals, papers on the history of Russian philosophy, which should be the basis of lecture courses taught at schools and universities. The task of such changes is not to oppose male and female studies, and not to replace male philosophers with female ones, but to return female thinkers to the field of historical research, to find a place for their ideas and theoretical developments, actualize the memory of them, and then to inherit the research experience of the first Russian women philosophers. The possible and indeed necessary deconstruction of the history of Russian philosophy can and must become a political act. The genealogical approach and the feminist critique of the Russian history of philosophy are aimed at discovering, researching and removing cultural and ideological restrictions that did not allow female researchers to be a part of discourse. It is my deep conviction that only such a careful and precise approach to the history of Russian philosophy will make it possible to avoid replication of institutional errors in the present and future development of Russian philosophy.

CONCLUSION. IS SPEAKING ALLOWED OR IS IT POSSIBLE TO BE HEARD?

And even if the doctor's role were only that of landing an ear that is free at last, he still does this listening in the context of the same division [...] If the silence of reason is required for the curing of monsters, it is enough for that silence to be on the alert, and it is in this that the division remains (Foucault, 1971: 9).

I would like to organize the conclusion of the text in the form of questions. I decided to use this technique at the end of my paper, as an author to invite a potential reader to reflection and an indirect discussion of sorts.

So, the question remains, is a woman philosopher allowed to speak?

There is no doubt that women philosophers in Russia today have the opportunity to speak, publish and research. It is hard to imagine that one could not be published or admitted to a university, not be allowed to do academic research, simply because of one's biological sex. At first glance, it seems that the question of whether women philosophers are allowed to speak is a question directed to the past. But in order to understand what has changed in the status of a woman philosopher in Russia since



the time of Maria Vladimirovna Bezobrazova, I propose to try to answer the following questions:

- ◊ Do we have the opportunity to write and explore not only a new history of women, but a new history in general?
- ◊ Do women in the history of Russia in general, and in the history of Russian philosophy in particular, continue to be invisible as historical subjects? Despite the fact that we know that they participated and continue to participate in great and small historical events?
- ◊ Is the number of publications of female philosophers an indicator, on the one hand, of the quality of research being carried out, and, on the other hand, of the inclusion of the female voice in the modern agenda of philosophical research?
- ◊ What are the research issues of modern Russian women philosophers?
- ◊ Is it fair to say that feminist studies in philosophy are studies by women philosophers of texts written by women philosophers? And if so, do women philosophers continue to be a marginalized community?
- ◊ Are women's studies becoming the basis for women's solidarity, communication and memory formation?

All these issues require attention and broad free public discussion outside the academy. But the most important question for me is not about the opportunity to speak, but the opportunity to be heard and listened to. Hence, the question that seems the most important to me is as follows:

- ◊ Are they ready to hear female philosophers in Russia, are they ready to listen to us?

Or do we continue to bear witness to a situation where the listener does not take the speaker seriously, as it was in the days of Maria Vladimirovna Bezobrazova?

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ЛЮВОВЬ БОГОДЕЛЬНИКОВА

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## ТВОРЧЕСТВО И СУДЬБА М. В. БЕЗОБРАЗОВОЙ

### ПОЗВОЛЕНО ЛИ ГОВОРИТЬ ЖЕНЩИНЕ-ФИЛОСОФУ?

Получено: 01.06.2023. Рецензировано: 30.08.2023. Принято: 01.11.2023.

**Аннотация:** В статье предлагается исследовать историю отечественной философии с помощью генеалогического подхода, что, с одной стороны, позволяет по-новому посмотреть на тексты женщин-философов, переосмыслить их, а с другой, актуализирует идею альтернативной памяти, альтернативной истории философии, возвращая мыслительниц в поле историко-исследовательского рассмотрения, находя место их идеям и теоретическим разработкам. Дискурсивно-методологический анализ, лежащий в основе генеалогии, позволяет анализировать речевые высказывания с точки зрения их социального производства, чем обращает нас к проблеме власти и знания, показывает, что знание создается посредством как дискурса утверждения, так и дискурса исключения. Как следствие, возникает не только необходимость деконструкции господствующего историко-философского дискурса, но и необходимость исследований того, что этот дискурс исключает. Такого рода задачи ставит себе феминистская генеалогия. Будучи примененной к истории философии, она подрывает целостность академического дискурса, разрушая господство теоретического модуса мышления, переходя к открытому вопрошанию, а впоследствии и к изменению статуса и характера самой философии, которая более не может быть высоким теоретизированием об отвлеченных началах, а становится практикой политического. Такой подход, примененный к анализу текстов русской мыслительницы М. В. Безобразовой, позволяет увидеть не только общеполитическое значение ее идей, но и политический смысл исследуемых проблем, проследить движение мысли от философии к политике. Особую важность представляет вывод о том, что феминистский анализ текстов женщин-философов прежде всего служит установлению межпоколенческого диалога и проявлению женской солидарности.

**Ключевые слова:** М. В. Безобразова, история русской философии, феминистская генеалогия, дискурс, власть, женщины-философы, Фуко.

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SOFYA NIKIFOROVA, YEKATERINA MIKHEYEVA\*

## SHE-MARXIST RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA\*\*

FORGOTTEN COMRADE OF LEFT-WING INTELLECTUALS

Submitted: June 04, 2023. Reviewed: Nov. 22, 2023. Accepted: Nov. 30, 2023.

**Abstract:** The article presents an attempt to answer the following question: why was Raya Dunayevskaya, a prominent Marxist humanist philosopher, forgotten in terms of the general academic landscape of the analysis of Marxism in relation to the USSR? Dunayevskaya corresponded and worked with influential left-wing intellectuals, such as Leo Trotsky and Erich Fromm, she wrote an extensive number of articles and books regarding Marxist humanism and was an activist herself; however, she was not remembered as either philosopher or activist in the same way her colleagues were. In the article, it will be shown that Dunayevskaya's background as an Eastern European woman who criticized the USSR, as well as the peculiarity of the topic she chose to write about — Marxist humanism — prevented her from becoming a well-known left-wing philosopher, despite deserving this status. This is going to be demonstrated via outlining her path, accounting for her intellectual interactions with left-wing activists and philosophers; analyzing her philosophical ideas regarding Marxist humanism; and tracing her influence on contemporary post-colonial and feminist research. In doing so, Dunayevskaya's legacy as a Marxist humanist philosopher might be restored and reexamined, highlighting women's influence over the academic landscape of the twentieth century.

**Keywords:** Marxism, Humanism, Dunayevskaya, Capitalism, Feminism, Althusser, Trotsky, Lenin.

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In 1928 she began to question the Communist Party's policies and actions after the expulsion of Trotsky. When she suggested that her comrades hear Trotsky's response to his expulsion, she was literally thrown down a flight of stairs and kicked out of the Young Workers League (Dunayevskaya, Dmitryev, 2017: 2).

### INTRODUCTION

What is known about the pioneer of Marxist Humanism in the United States and Althusser's passionate opponent? Raya Dunayevskaya (née

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Spiegel), a Lithuanian-Jewish descendant, was born in 1910 in the Russian Empire, but spent most of her life in the USA. Dunayevskaya's path as an academic and a revolutionary is full of turns and disappointments, but this is exactly what brings to light her tireless enthusiasm and remarkable dedication to figuring out the nature of the authentic Marxist approach and the characteristics of the genuine Marxist follower. The researchers of Dunayevskaya's legacy distinguish 5 waves of her oeuvre and activism in their work *Raya Dunayevskaya's Intersectional Marxism: Race, Class, Gender, and the Dialectics of Liberation*. The first wave is tied to her involvement with Trotskyism and the establishment of the Johnson-Forest tendency, the second wave is connected to the publication of the monograph *Marxism and Freedom*, which led to an intellectual recognition of Dunayevskaya, the third wave, tied to the publication of *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao*, put her in the range of the leading Marxist thinkers, however the timing was not perfect.

Her second monograph was published at the same time as Theodor Adorno and Gyorgy Lukacz were translated to English, and this resulted in her being overshadowed by these contributions (Anderson, Durkin & Brown, eds., 2021: 127). Success and wide recognition did not reach her even after the fourth wave, when she published the work *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*, (1982) which was a highly original work as it was "the first widely disseminated analysis of gender in Marx's late Ethnological Notebooks, and a hard-hitting discussion of feminism, race, and revolution...". She was again extremely unlucky, as the shift from Marxism to post structuralism had already begun and this, expectedly, affected the amount of attention she received. The last wave is a recent one — starting in 2010 — which is tied to the fact that the problems of gender, race and class, which were certainly central for Dunayevskaya, have gained popularity, and her contribution to the field makes her a valuable and relevant thinker nowadays.

On a deeper level, Dunayevskaya's ideas have never garnered wide recognition for several reasons. Firstly, her and her comrades' ideas were heavily criticized both within and outside the Marxist movement. To illustrate this, one can refer to the fact that many were even calling the Marxist humanist movement "para-Marxism" (Jay, 1972). From one point, it is exactly her background as an *Eastern European* woman that helped her to produce such detailed accounts of Lenin and Marx and to develop her theory of state capitalism based on the example of Russia. She indeed had a unique perspective owing to the fact that she spoke Russian, was able to work

closely with Trotsky and exchange ideas with the Russian-speaking Marxist community. In the end, there were two dominant Marxist movements—“orthodox” Marxism, which was dominant in USSR, and Western Marxism.

However, to be accepted within orthodox Marxism one has to believe that alienated labor has to end, and that, in one form or another, will lead to communism. Within nearly all of Dunayevskaya’s works this seems to be the red line: she does not believe in the sustainability of this scenario. And it is not only the fact she knew what USSR was like (like many orthodox Marxists), but also the fact that she could compare it to the actual situation and conditions of a capitalist state—the United States.

At first, she joined the American Communist youth organization, but she left shortly after joining due to her passionate disagreement with Trotsky’s exile from USSR. She went to Mexico in order to become his Russian language secretary in 1937, and worked closely with him until 1938. However, she writes that her real development began after she left the Trotskyists: she did not agree with Trotsky’s recognition of the USSR as a workers’ state after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. It would hugely influence her views, and later, in her work *The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a Capitalist Society* (1941), she would also attack Stalin’s approach, which was defended by Trotsky. For her, Stalin had nothing to do with the ideals of Marxism:

The Red Army march on Poland, the bloody conquest of part of Finland and the peaceful conquest of the Baltic states proved that the Stalinized Red Army had no more connection with the spirit, purpose and content of October than the Stalinist state did, whose armed might it is. What an abhorrent relapse from the conquests of October are the Stalinist conquests!

As this is the main reason orthodox Marxists would not be the audience for Dunayevskaya’s popularity, but what about Western Marxists?

It is not rare for Western Marxists to be placed within the Marxist humanism cohort (Jay, 1972: 290). In the end, they usually rejected the economic aspect of Marx’s thought. However, there is a strong disagreement—as Marcuse skeptically wrote in 1965, the solution is not to make socialism more humanistic by adding humanistic values to it (Marcuse, 1965: 2). A very important role for the final disruption of Western Marxism and Marxist humanism was played by their relation to psychoanalysis. Fromm was the one to draw a very distinctive line between the two movements in *The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx’s Theory*. On the one hand, he fully agreed with Dunayevskaya that the Marxism of totalitarian states is state capitalism and that it was not beneficial for Marxism as

a whole to be associated with this particular movement, as it always led to comparisons with the USSR or China. However, the Marxist humanism followers were worrying him in another way. He felt there was big potential in making Marxism about the “psychological nature of a man,” but what happened was that Marxism became filled with “empty phrases stating that ‘good is that which serves the revolution’” (the worker’s state, historical evolution, etc.) (Marcuse, 1965: 2).

Whilst Marxist humanism tried to focus on the such questions as life purpose and man’s nature, it had a big flaw: trying to answer these questions through a paradigm in which (in Fromm’s opinion) the main goal was to liberate man from economic concerns, in order to bring him to his natural state. Marxist humanism either unconvincingly stirred up the principles of basic morals with economic criticism of Marxist theory, or became a model which tried to replace the psychoanalytical frame —

the societal character is dictated by the ideology, that tends to be reinforced, but what a Marxist humanist does not see is that there is a more nuanced situation, as the social character is the intermediary between the socioeconomic structure and the ideas and ideals prevalent in a society (ibid.: 5).

To summarize, it felt like Dunayevskaya did not have the chance to actually be *seen*. She was foreign to any context because of her background, which, in return, gave her a unique perspective — as a Russian speaker and as a woman. Moreover, she was either too late with some of her works, overshadowed by the western Marxists’ wave of popularity, or too early, when talking about her stances on gender, feminism and race. It seems only fair to pay tribute to Dunayevskaya’s work with the luxury of the retrospective analysis, and to consider the factors that caused her to be remembered and popular at least within undeservedly small Marxist circles.

#### RAYA AS A. F. FOREST, THE FOUNDER OF JOHNSON-FOREST TENDENCY

Stalin’s critique brought Dumayevskaya into contact with C. L. R. James, a West Indian-born cultural historian and passionate leftist activist, whom Edward Said would define as an “anti-Stalinist dialectician”. They worked under pseudonyms J. R. Johnson and Freddie Forest respectively, criticizing and arguing several aspects of Marxism, and were later joined by Grace Lee Boggs’s. Their ideas evolving around the Trotskyists, however they have tried to come up with their own vision of the way the USSR should have been functioning. All of them played an important role in spreading Marxist ideas and making them a question of public debate: it was possible as Raya

Dunayevskaya was focused on translating the necessary texts from Lenin, Trotsky and other Russian-speaking thinkers, Grace Lee Boggs was focused on the German texts and C.L.R James had the “world-view and literary skills” (James et al., 1969: 8).

Dunayevskaya and C.L.R James had a lot in common, among their main shared experience was obviously the fact that they both saw USSR in a special condition, when it was neither a workers’ state (Trotsky’s position), nor bureaucratic-collectivist (the way it was perceived from Third Camp’s perspective): USSR was seen as “state capitalist.” Raya’s contemporaries tried to analyze Marxism from the economic point of view, but what they dismissed was the fact that the USSR’s economy was corrupted by the capitalist approach. Even though Raya herself did not seem to think that emphasizing the role of economics was crucial for a Marxist, she addressed the blind spots of other researchers. She wrote in *An Analysis of Russian Economy*:

But so extravagant has been the publicity which the proponents of the Soviet have given these data that the view is widely held that the allegedly phenomenal rate of industrial growth in Russia is the criterion of a unique form of economy.

She reminded others that this phenomenal rate was orchestrated by many factors, such as the perseverance of the ruble’s rate in the closed economy and, most importantly, she pointed out that the Soviet government was obviously interested in proving that their economic system was performing better than others which, expectedly, led to playing with numbers and statistics.

Two main concepts of C.L.R James’ ideas have derived from this close collaboration with Raya Dunayevskaya: first, from the perspective of the Johnson-Forest tendency and second, from the point of view of Marxist humanism which was developed by her. C.L.R James has unfortunately (and expectedly) shared Raya’s fate within the Marxist movement as his position on the inevitability of socialism was perceived at least unpopular or — how some researchers viewed it — as “weakness, aberration or even embarrassment” (Nissim-Sabat, 2001: 74). James also attacked those who got lost in trying to figure out the precise course of the future society, alluding to Marx’s position, who warned that one should not try to hold on to the dogmatic way of how that society would look like, but should learn from the mistakes and experience of the past (ibid.: 75). This is the misuse of Marx’s legacy: reshaping his ideas into a theoretical platform for sociology and economics leads to dialectical mistakes. Even though Dunayevskaya and James did agree on many aspects, there was still a slight distinction between



the two thinkers, as James had developed a different approach to Hegel. James believed that the “first negation would be the negation of negation” (Nissim-Sabat, 2001: 90): when it happens, this is the end of history.

The inevitability of socialism was undoubted by Dunayevskaya, yet in her understanding of Hegel the negation would make no sense if it did not lead to a new beginning. When we overthrow capitalism, we should stay focused on creating something that would not just substitute the previous societal state, we need to think what we will replace it with and what is the most important for us—both in terms of Marxism and human relations in general. Future is something that we should take into consideration—and freedom is what should be at the very heart of our project.

The thorough analyses she carried out of revolutions from all over the world led to the observation that the first negation should not be aimed at negating capitalism, as it creates a trap: state-capitalism (ibid.: 91).

RAYA AND THE CRITIQUE OF USSR:  
SOVIET COMMUNISM AS STATE CAPITALISM

Leaders are not classless creatures floating between heaven and earth. They are very much earth men. When they lose close connection with the working class, they begin to represent the only other fundamental class in society—the capitalist class.

*R. Dunayevskaya*  
*“The Trade Union Debate and Lenin’s Will”*

For Dunayevskaya, Lenin’s words about leadership were “prophetic,” as he believed that in a case when a leader of the state shows class differences, the situation is headed in one only direction; state capitalism is unavoidable. It all ended with Lenin too; she gives him credit that he was the last leader whose intention was to make sure that the masses were encouraged to solve production problems, rather than having them solved for them with the help of the state. She attacks Trotsky, who was one of the closest colleagues of Lenin at the time, who writes that “the role of factory committees remains important, of course, but in the sphere of the management of industry it has no longer a leading but an auxiliary position.” State capitalism, Trotsky contended, did not exist in Russia since the ownership of the means of production by the state occurred in history by the proletariat with the method of social revolution and not by the capitalist with the method of state trustification.

Dunayevskaya highlights that it was a well-weighted and intentional thought, Trotsky betraying Lenin's ideas just like anyone else because they are "a rhetorical addition to the great economic theories." She had no choice not to be critical about it, as she was an adept of Marxist humanism. What would be left of Marxism if humanism was left out? The reduction of Marxist ideas to an economic theory is what a true Marxist cannot afford. In Trotsky's eyes, Lenin's dedication to the theoretical grounds was just a great way to produce propaganda which did not address the "real problems." It was important for Raya to show that state capitalism corrupted not only the Russian Communist Party, but also the Third International. So, was the aim of the Revolution achieved at all? Dunayevskaya thinks that it was a failure.

Thinking about socio-economic forces operating in Stalinist and post-Stalinist USSR, Dunayevskaya revealed the state capitalism of the regime in the country. Her ideas in relation to capitalism and communism were closely tied with her Marxist humanist lens: she saw communism's aim in ameliorating the lives of the people, and considered Marx's writings to be so-called guidance to follow in fulfilling this goal. According to her, the USSR did not pursue this aim, and therefore it transformed into state capitalism. In what ways does the USSR mimic capitalist relationships? The analysis that is conveyed by her is not very complex, but the simplicity of her arguments seems to be a beneficial way to show how the fact of all the deeply rooted capitalist practices implemented in the worker-state relationship are blindly ignored. First of all, Dunayevskaya attacks one of the most important parts of a Soviet worker's life—socialist working norms. If the state's strategy of taking care of the workers is true, what does Stakhanovism have to do with it, if its main purpose is to make people work more for the same amount of money? Second, Dunayevskaya highlights the huge wage gap between a simple worker's state salary and the director of the plant: it is as disproportionate as it would be in any capitalist state. Third, she asks whether one becomes more liberated by the ability to gain free education and to obtain a guaranteed job if he gets captured in this structure? Consequently, later Raya considered uprisings and upheavals in GDR and Hungary as attempts to come back to the value foundations and ideas of Marx's humanism.

Dunayevskaya stopped her activist and academic partnership with Trotsky due to the fact that he continued to insist on the USSR being a workers' state even after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Raya, in turn, claimed that Soviet communism took the shape of state capitalism, and therefore Soviet workers did not have any responsibility for defending the USSR in the war,

especially after the alleged alliance with the Nazi forces. State capitalism, importantly, is an economic system in which means of production are nationalized as state enterprises, and capitalism merges with state control. The government, therefore, becomes a large oppressive corporation, which is not aimed at benefiting the workers. Stalin-era USSR is the result of the unsuccessful negation: when there is no proper substitute for capitalism, the overthrowing of the latter becomes aimless.

Her earlier works provide an answer to how the USSR situation became possible and contain some points that other thinkers were unable to notice. For Dunayevskaya, Marx did something that Hegel was too theoretical to achieve: the latter's thought was not brave enough to address the actual social existence the way it was done by Marx.

Marx's precise analysis of the actual labor process under capitalism is more concrete, alive, shattering — and, of course, revolutionary — than any stage of alienation in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* (Dunayevskaya, 1965: 65).

At the same time, Lenin is a figure who takes Hegel's legacy to an extreme when announcing that everything begins with putting theory into practice (Dunayevskaya, 1967). Even C. L. R. James seems lost somewhere in between, thinking that revolution might be the answer to capitalism-related problems, but not taking the extra step in conceptualizing what will take its place. The Soviet ideology helped to hide the exploitation of workers, and when the other thinkers were trying to work on the problems of private and nationalized capital ownership, Raya was there to recall the most important question: that of freedom. Communism was yet another form of "opium of the people," that provided another possibility to hide the fact of exploitation. And one of the profound proofs of it are "Marxists" who claim that the Marxist terms (referring to exploitation) have to be applicable only in the case of describing capitalist relations. This is where Raya gets her inspiration for the development of Marxist humanism ideas. The main focus of a true Marxist is, as mentioned before, freedom. The oversimplified idea of giving the freedom to individuals by property abolition is a distraction.

#### RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA INTERPRETING MARX: ALTHUSSER'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL BREAK OR THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TOTALITY?

A plethora of Marxist philosophers considered Marx's thought as having multiple ideological and conceptual frameworks, meaning that his writings differed significantly in terms of inner purpose and outlined ideas. Generally, numerous scholars interpreted Marx's works as having two periods, one with

a clear and coherent idealistic element, another concentrated more on materialism rather than on the moral side of economic theory. For instance, Louis Althusser's central claim in relation to Marxism was the following: rather than attempting to understand Marx's writings as a coherent and homogeneous body of works which contain cognate ideas, it is more appropriate to consider his thought as divided into two periods by an epistemological break.

This idea of epistemological break was taken by Althusser from the works of Bachelard (Balibar, 1978: 208). For him,

this leap involves a radical break with the whole pattern and frame of reference of the prescientific (ideological) notions, and the construction of a new pattern (problematic) (Althusser et al., Brewster & Fernbach, 1996: 403).

Bachelard's theorizing was rooted in the idea of epistemological nonlinearity, with multiple epistemological acts occurring within any philosophical endeavor. This idea is closely related to Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, with one scientific paradigm substituting the other. This abrupt, nonlinear epistemological movement was a source of genuine progress as opposed to "myths of empiricism about the progressive continuity of knowledge" (Balibar, 1978: 208).

Althusser developed these epistemological ideas of Bachelard and Kuhn, applying them to the study of Marx in an attempt to recover Marxist thinking and to challenge different modes of interpretation — historicist, economist, or idealist. His main point was in Marx's alleged rejection of Hegel and Feuerbach (Althusser et al., Brewster & Fernbach, 1996: 403). He suggested that in *The German Ideology* (1845) Marx radically transformed his theoretical framework and adopted an alternative problematic: while Marx's early works were more ideological and rooted in the philosophical anthropology of Hegel and in humanist philosophy, his later writings were more scientific and concerned with the establishment of historical and dialectical materialism as coherent theories. This distinction between two periods seemed essential to Althusser; he considered the epistemological break to be a pillar of Marx's philosophy. According to Althusser, only after the elimination of humanist ideology was Marx able to produce a theory of social change, which was revolutionary literally and metaphorically.

Despite the fact that Hegelian philosophy was to a large extent rooted in history, Althusser was convinced that Marx managed to fully grasp the powers of history in constructing a science of philosophy and a new epistemology only after the break, when he abandoned humanist and historicist thinking closely related to Hegelianism. The theory of structure and superstructure,

upon which Marx's political economy was built, was an expression of Marx's historical materialism. This materialism was scientific, and had a coherent epistemology and an unprecedented explanatory power.

There was always a debate regarding the struggle between the idealism and materialism of Marx's works, and Althusser resolves this issue by claiming that Marx's writings were indeed divided by an epistemological break which occurred when he eliminated the humanist element of his theorizing. Therefore, there was no contradiction in Marxist thought; the philosopher simply changed the epistemological paradigm over time. The break between Marx's works is embodied by the concept of "modes of production" which separated all his works from philosophy of history and set his earlier works apart from later ones. This concept

is absolutely incompatible with the principles of idealism, whether dogmatic or empiricist, and it progressively revolutionises the whole problematic of society and history (Althusser et al., Brewster & Fernbach, 1996: 267).

Consequently, the element of ethics and moral underpinnings of political ideology and/or theory is absent from late Marx works, and this is the viewpoint which was refuted by Raya Dunayevskaya.

Dunayevskaya was writing during approximately the same period as Althusser. As a Marxist who believed in Marx's continuous humanist appeal, she produced a number of works which stood in opposition to Althusser and other Marxists who followed the idea of epistemological break. She defended Marx's earlier works and traced the continuity of his thought which, according to her, was evident in the profound humanism of all his writings. Lilia D. Monzó stated:

Marxist-Humanism, as developed by Raya Dunayevskaya, considers the totality of Marx's works, recognizing that his early work in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844" was profoundly humanist and led to and embeds his later works, including "Capital" (Monzó, 2019).

Therefore, Dunayevskaya thought that the element of ideology and ethics never left Marxist works, continuing to be his primary concern whilst he developed historical and dialectical materialism. This opinion of hers, along with her other ideas, laid the foundation of Marxist Humanism.

Dunayevskaya's Marxist Humanism was built upon a belief that Marx's works cannot and should not be considered an ideology-free attempt to criticize capitalism from an economic standpoint. Instead, she was convinced that Marx aimed at creating New Humanism, the agenda of which was the

following: to create a philosophy of revolution which would lead to a non-alienated society, a morally incorrupt and thriving one. Therefore, it is simply impossible to separate Marx's works from humanism. Such a society could be created under the conditions of elimination of the distinction between the "thinkers" and the "doers," (Dunayevskaya, 1964: 275). For this, a new labor is necessary, which would not separate thinking from doing. The new worker represented "the unity of theory and practice;" as Dunayevskaya puts it, "Marx was right when he said the workers were ... inheritors of Hegelian philosophy" (ibid.: 276). A crucial element of her thinking was automation of labor, which could contribute to the establishment of a new kind of labor—one that did not alienate the worker, but instead developed his or her "natural and acquired talents" (ibid.).

According to Dunayevskaya's interpretation of Marx, he was, from the beginning and to the end of his writing, concerned with the liberation and freedom of humanity, and this humanistic element was always present in his works. She calls him a profound *revolutionary* many times throughout her writings, highlighting that in both his earlier works and in "Capital" Marx was preoccupied with the necessity to find a solution for real life problems of oppressed people. He found this solution in the principle of "the negation of the negation," meaning "the revolutionary overcoming of real contradictions, that is to say, opposing class forces" (ibid.: 57). The abolition of private property was a prerequisite for Marx's free society, and the construction of such a society was the main expression of his humanism, according to Dunayevskaya.

The proponents of the viewpoint that Marx's earlier and later works were divided by an epistemological break claimed that Marx's writings were profoundly idealistic in the beginning, while later he gave up idealist thinking in favor of materialism, and the humanist element of his thought was lost along the same lines. However, Dunayevskaya plausibly demonstrated that this was not the case. In her interpretation, Marx simply was never an idealist. He did apply Hegelian language when he was elaborating on the topic of human's natural and acquired talents as well as when he criticized the division between "thought and being" (ibid.: 58); however, he disagreed with Hegel regarding the realization of theoretical deliberations.

Marx was not convinced that real problems could be resolved via philosophical thinking. Although Hegel did develop the idea of practice as being important, it was not enough for Marx; he was a proponent of a much more reactionary and proactive treatment of real life problems that humanity faced. According to Dunayevskaya, he considered revolutionary activity

a requirement of both liberation of society and resolution of philosophical problems. Marx could not be an idealist since he did not believe that philosophical ideas could solve the issues of reality, which makes him not only a materialist, but also a revolutionary humanist, since he was concerned with the emancipation of people and the creation of a communist humanist society.

Alongside her disagreement with Althusser, Dunayevskaya also debated with Herbert Marcuse: in the letters the two exchanged, the former argued in favor of practice being an important element of theory both for Hegel and Marx. She defended the idea of Marx being a revolutionary and reactionary philosopher, while Marcuse followed Heideggerian logic in thinking about 'concrete philosophy' of Marxism instead of analyzing the practical aspect of it (Marcuse, 2005: 49). A German, Marcuse studied in Berlin and Freiburg, later becoming a prominent member of the Frankfurt School; Althusser was born in France and spent his life studying and working at the *École normale supérieure*. Raya Dunayevskaya, instead, was a female political emigrant who had to participate in different niche left-wing activist movements to become noticed in the academia. Obviously, she could not enjoy the same academic success both Marcuse or Althusser experienced, being neither immigrants, nor women. By disagreeing with such prominent philosophical figures as Marcuse and Althusser who influenced the academia of the mid-twentieth century, Dunayevskaya alienated herself from popular spotlight, being a niche critical theorist rather than a well-known philosopher. She did not follow the scientific and discursive paradigms of the time she was writing in, being instead constantly critical and questioning the existing philosophical narratives regarding both Marxism and Hegelianism. Her background thus impacted her legacy and her popularity; however, she still managed to lay the foundation of American Marxist Humanism by writing about Marx's theoretical totality and by challenging such philosophers as Marcuse and Althusser.

THE NOVELTY OF DUNAYEVSKAYA'S APPROACH  
TO READING LENIN'S HEGEL NOTEBOOKS

Not only did Dunayevskaya defend Marx (as being consistent in terms of his humanism) and lay the foundation of the Marxist Humanist theoretical branch; she was also extremely influential in terms of relaunching the discussion of Lenin's Hegel Notebooks. She was among those Marxists of 1950-60s (Althusser, Lefebvre, Garaudy, Colletti, Merleau-Ponty) who

rediscovered the interest in Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* and tried to trace the influence of Aristotle, Feuerbach, Hegel, Marx and Deborin on Lenin.

Merleau-Ponty famously criticized Lenin and his account of Hegel in *Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955) and was himself subject to severe criticism by the members of the Communist Party, namely Lefebvre and Garaudy. They claimed that Lenin's works were "real Marxism" and the "last word on dialectical materialism" (Anderson, 1995: 211). Garaudy wrote an article containing a discussion of Lenin's Hegel Notebooks, in which he placed Hegel and Lenin in an alleged strict philosophical opposition, claiming that Hegel's reliance on theory and Lenin's preoccupation with practice made them entirely incompatible (Garaudy, 1956: 131). However, he obviously did not mention that "the concept of practice appears directly in Hegel's text" (Anderson, 1995: 212). He was eager to highlight the importance of such revolutionary proactive people as Lenin, Mao or Stalin, and he ignored the fact that although Hegel was indeed an idealist, he still acknowledged the importance of certain real-life action.

Lefebvre, in turn, eventually admitted that Hegel's idealism somehow came to resemble materialism, and therefore was essential for understanding both Marx and Lenin (Lefebvre, 1939). According to Anderson,

Lefebvre ends his discussion of Lenin and Hegel by coming very close to describing the Marxist dialectic as the unity of idealism and materialism (Anderson, 1995: 215).

This is a highly important statement in relation to the question of the (dis)continuity of Marx's ideas. The advocates of epistemological break as outlined by Althusser looked for different inconsistencies in Marx's works in order to divide them into two periods, reflected in a certain paradigm shift of his theorizing. However, Lefebvre was in this regard more closely related to Raya Dunayevskaya who, in contrast, defended the continuity and coherence of Marx's thought. The unity of idealism and materialism was also something she drew attention to: writing that Marx applied idealistic Hegelian language whilst dealing with the problems of the liberation of humanity; however, he placed more emphasis on practice. Here, a close and interdependent relationship between idealism and materialism is evident: according to Dunayevskaya, Marxism comprised both, and therefore was a humanist theory in its essence.

While highlighting continuity in Marx, Lefebvre simultaneously pointed to epistemological break in Lenin and his relationship to Hegelian dialectics: there was



a great difference in tone and content between the *Cahiers sur la dialectique* and *Materialisme et Empirio Criticisme*. Lenin's thought becomes supple, alive [...] in a word, dialectical. Lenin did not truly understand the dialectic until 1914, after the collapse of the International (Lefebvre, 1939: 85).

By writing this, Lefebvre highlighted the profound importance that Hegelian dialectics had on Lenin; this was an important contribution to the general discussion. However, the true groundbreaker was none other than Raya Dunayevskaya.

Dunayevskaya was the first scholar to discuss Lenin's Hegel Notebooks extensively and in detail; moreover, she published the first translation of this work into English. The preface to "Marxism and Freedom" was written by Marcuse who praised Dunayevskaya for rediscovering "unity of Marxian theory at its very foundation: in the humanistic philosophy" (Dunayevskaya, 1964: 8). However, Marcuse disagreed with Dunayevskaya's reading of Lenin, which is of importance for this particular part of the article. Dunayevskaya's opinion on Lenin and his reliance on Hegel coincided with Lefebvre's: she also noticed an epistemological break in Lenin's thought, caused by his turn to Hegelian dialectics. However, she engaged in this discussion in a far deeper and more detailed way than Lefebvre, making Dunayevskaya a pioneer in tracing Hegel's idealism in Lenin in a philosophical elaboration. However, her tremendous impact was once again forgotten for some time, before being rediscovered by other New Left intellectuals.

According to Dunayevskaya, Lenin initially was critical of Hegelian idealism, and his single interpretation of it was materialist. However, after he rediscovered and reread Hegel, Lenin started to endorse the idea of "intelligent idealism" (ibid.: 169). Anderson writes:

For Dunayevskaya, Lenin's concepts of monopoly, imperialism, and the aristocracy of labour form a dialectical whole, a whole that Lenin conceptualised in strict relationship to his study of Hegel's *Science of Logic* (Anderson, 1995: 219).

Therefore, even Lenin's materialist understandings of political economy were considerably affected by Hegelian idealism, and Dunayevskaya was the first to highlight it in detail. Although in the United States Dunayevskaya's book did not receive significant attention due to a considerable lack of interest of fellow Marxists in Lenin at the time, in the United Kingdom it opened an important discussion of the degree of Hegel's influence on Lenin.

Dunayevskaya traced the influence of Hegel's idealism in both Marx and Lenin, laying the foundation for Marxist Humanism. However, such

a viewpoint was difficult to sustain, because despite the fact that the discussion of Hegel's influence on Lenin was widespread, a plethora of scholars were critical of Dunayevskaya's opinions. For example, Althusser asserted that like it was necessary to separate Marx and idealism, it was similarly necessary to treat Lenin separately from Hegelian dialectics. According to Althusser, for Lenin philosophy was a contiguous struggle between idealism and materialism, therefore, there was no place for Hegelian dialectics in Lenin's revolutionary theory and practice (Althusser, Brewster, 2001). However, despite this viewpoint being quite popular, Dunayevskaya retained her position and continued to examine Lenin's writings and his attitude towards Hegel. Here, once again it is evident that Dunayevskaya was constantly in opposition to the dominant Marxist narratives and philosophers, which contributed to her being relatively *forgotten*.

In her next book, *Philosophy and Revolution*, Dunayevskaya continued to highlight Hegelian influence on Lenin, writing that Lenin experienced "the shock of recognition that the Hegelian dialectic was revolutionary" (Dunayevskaya, 2003: 97) and ever since appropriated idealistic discourse for his revolutionary endeavors. She criticized Lenin for never making Hegel's Notebook public, which, according to her, was a sign of "philosophic ambivalence" (Anderson, 1995: 241). However, she still managed to defend idealism and dialectics against materialist criticisms and to emphasize the idea of the unity of idealism and materialism, which was taken by Lenin from Hegel. Nevertheless, this philosophic ambivalence bothered her, and in *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* she continued to attack Lenin for keeping *Philosophical Notebooks* "to himself". According to her, this failure to make Hegel's Notebooks public was the reason why generations of Marxists after Marx himself had fallen into "the depth of economist mire," making materialism and economics overshadow idealism and philosophy.

Her criticism of Lenin was based on the assumption that his public reliance on practice rather than theory confused and perplexed other Marxists, making revolutionary activity not humanist and not idealist. Therefore, she continued to endorse the viewpoint that Lenin was profoundly influenced by Hegel, simultaneously regretting that this influence was not made public for others to see the importance of dialectics and idealism. Furthermore, Dunayevskaya later accused Lenin of relying too much on the idea of the unity of idealism and materialism, at the same time privileging practice over philosophy, which was a mistake.

Dunayevskaya's extensive writing of forty years on Lenin and Hegel "constitutes the most serious body of work to date on these notebooks" (Anderson, 1995: 248). She was an indispensable participant of the debates regarding the influence of Hegel on Lenin, with Lefebvre and Fetscher occupying her side, while Althusser and Colletti rejecting Hegelian impact over Lenin. She was the only one who used Lenin's Hegel Notebooks as her main source for discussion of Lenin's theory and revolutionary practice, and she was the first person to translate this work into English. Therefore, despite being relatively overshadowed by fellow Marxists during her lifetime, Dunayevskaya began to gain a deserved reputation of a specialist in Lenin's and Marx's thought due to reappreciation coming from the New Left scholars.

#### DUNAYEVSKAYA'S RELEVANCE

##### FOR CONTEMPORARY ACTIVIST AND PHILOSOPHIC AGENDAS: INTERSECTIONALITY, DECOLONIZATION, RACE, AND FEMINISM

The Marxist Humanism of Dunayevskaya was rooted in her interpretation of Marx as being aimed at building a non-alienated society, classless and anti-imperialist. According to Dunayevskaya, such a society could only be possible if class, gender and race discrimination were eliminated. Strong belief in idealistic agendas, namely in the idea of constructing a free and equal society based on solidarity and social responsibility made Dunayevskaya exceptionally relevant for contemporary activism and left-wing philosophy. Marxist Humanism is currently generally associated with decolonial approaches to studying and eliminating discrimination; both branches of thought value the socialist agenda of Marxism.

To start with, class consciousness or any other group consciousness is necessary for the liberation of people who identify themselves as belonging to this class, race, gender, or sex. Obviously, discrimination and exploitation of particular social groups prevent them from developing group consciousness. However, any movement of self-determination, even an unsuccessful or small one, not to mention widespread and winning ones, is worthy of attention, and Marx also thought the same way (Anderson, 2020). To take a case in point, he condemned American slavery, accusing Confederates of collecting capital and profiting from it via exploiting black people. According to Marx, slavery and racism were used by people with power and resources to exploit and divide the working class and to prevent it from uniting and resisting oppression. Obviously, from a Marxist *and* decolonial standpoint, it is necessary to assist oppressed groups in developing their shared identity (consciousness) and in opposing their colonizers.

Lilia D. Monzó applied Dunayevskaya's Marxist Humanist framework to the discussion of the role of women of color in revolutionary activity and their potential for liberation. Monzó argued that Dunayevskaya's Marxist Humanism is a philosophy "for and of the oppressed and thus also for and of Women of Color" (Monzó, 2019). Importantly, Marx himself was concerned with women's liberation; for him, a patriarchal family embodied the capitalist world system. In families, there were the oppressors—men, and the oppressed—women. Accordingly, for Marx it was possible to measure the societal humanist progress of the world's population by examining the extent to which the relationship between men and women had started to resemble the relationship between human and human rather than oppressor and oppressed. Marx wrote:

The direct, natural, necessary relationship of human being [Mensch] to human being is the *relationship of man [Mann] to woman [Weib]*. [...] Therefore, on the basis of this relationship, we can judge the whole stage of development of the human being (Marx, Plaut & Anderson, 1999: 6).

By bringing together Marx's interest in women's emancipation and Dunayevskaya's "assertion of the important role to be played by the black masses in contemporary social movements," Monzó highlighted the importance of women of color and indigenous women in revolutionary dynamics (Monzó, 2019). Dunayevskaya indeed placed an emphasis on the potential of the Black liberation movement. She considered that it could become a driving force behind world revolution and a total change of paradigm of historical development. She also considered women the "force and reason" of the class struggle (Anderson, Durkin & Brown, eds., 2021: 104). Therefore, her Marxist Humanist theory was highly relevant for decolonial and Black feminist studies.

For Dunayevskaya, the achievements of the Second Wave Feminist movement were not nearly enough:

today we must face those degrading TV commercials that try to sell us the idea that the hard-fought battle for equality has been met by our right to wear mini-skirts (at least until fashion dictators tell us otherwise) and having "our own" brand of cigarettes! (Dunayevskaya, 1996: 22).

Such changes in women's lives were seen by Dunayevskaya as expressions of "commodified forms of femininity" which were aimed at strengthening the value of the commodity itself, but not of the individuals who consumed it—women (Anderson, Durkin & Brown, eds., 2021: 107). Dunayevskaya saw

the real emancipation and liberation of women not in capitalist and fetishist embodiments of womanhood, but in a revolutionary struggle. She believed that women were capable of developing such a strong joint consciousness that they could become a driving force behind world revolution.

Dunayevskaya's analysis comprised the topics of race, sex, class, ethnicity, colonialism and gender, making her a truly intersectional philosopher. Precisely because her Marxist Humanism was built upon widespread equality, Dunayevskaya's thinking could be considered as part of the tradition of intersectionality — she was concerned with the elimination of *all* kinds of oppression and placed an emphasis on the most oppressed groups as being in need of help. However, her preoccupation with Marxism and not with cultural theory alienated Dunayevskaya from the public discourse of feminism and post-colonialism, once again resulting in her being a niche left-wing intellectual rather than a popular philosopher. Moreover, her background as a Russian emigrant and her discussions of the USSR and Lenin also made her distant from the developing feminist thought, which was centered around the experiences of either Western European women or women of color. Dunayevskaya did not fit into either of these categories, being always a part of some kind of a *third* movement, group, or mode of thinking.

#### CONCLUSION: WHY DID RAYA NOT GET ACKNOWLEDGEMENT?

Undoubtedly, Raya Dunayevskaya wore more than one hat. She has many accomplishments in all the fields of her broad activity: she was the leader of the American branch of thought of Marxist Humanism, the first to translate Lenin's Hegel Notebooks, a key writer who developed the state capitalism theory. In the end, *Marxism and Freedom* was the first work to present humanism as the central question of Marx's thought (Anderson, 1986: 23). What influenced the way she was remembered (or, it might be said, forgotten) within the framework of the Marxist movement? There are several aspects to why Raya Dunayevskaya was an outsider.

Dunayevskaya's oeuvre, however, has managed to attract attention of a few most valuable Marxist philosophers of the 20th century, such as Louis Althusser, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. Nonetheless, this does not (and should not) state that they shared her point of view, rather, her vision and approach were worthy of such attention.

One of her enemies was time. *The rise of Marxist Humanism did not last long*. In the end it was never popular enough to take leading positions within any significant Marxist movement.

Despite being largely neglected by the masses, Dunayevskaya accomplished a number of scholarly tasks which should have made her a famous thinker — she made translations, challenged existing arguments, and proposed new and unprecedented opinions. However, she did not achieve the popularity rates of Merleau-Ponty or Althusser. Different versions have been put forward. For instance, her sex might have been the reason — back in the 1960s it was much more difficult for a woman to build an academic career and to establish herself as a prominent and influential scholar. Women in academia of the 1960s — Natalie Zemon Davis, Louise Tilly, Joan Scott are much more well-known compared to Dunayevskaya. They were developing a field of women's studies back then, and their gender and feminist theory coincided with Second Wave Feminism. Activist endeavors popularized their academic work. However, for women like Raya Dunayevskaya everything was different. She tried to establish herself as a thinker outside the domain of feminist thought; she was writing about Marxism, Hegelianism and Leninism, and these subjects were mostly male dominated in academia. So, it was harder for her to achieve recognition and fame.

Raya was also an immigrant, a woman coming from communist Eastern Europe. Being from this part of the world allowed her to genuinely feel and trace the development of Marxist ideas in communist states. Moreover, her being a woman helped her discover the humanist element of Marxist works. While male intellectuals mostly saw Marxism as an economic critique of capitalism, Raya saw what her colleagues could not. She revealed Marx's humanism, placed an emphasis on his ideas regarding the construction of a free and non-alienated society and launched the discussion of Marxist Humanism, while simultaneously keeping in mind his excellent economic critiques, which were important for state capitalism theory. As a woman, Dunayevskaya could feel the need to eliminate oppression and discrimination based on sex, gender and race. That is how her background helped her to create such a diverse and interesting body of work which continues to be relevant today, as can be seen in the rising popularity of her ideas within decolonial and feminist branches of thought.

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НИКИФОРОВА СОФЬЯ АЛЕКСЕВНА

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МИХЕЕВА ЕКАТЕРИНА АЛЕКСАНДРОВНА

МА (ФИЛОСОФИЯ)

МАРКСИСТКА РАЯ ДУНАЕВСКАЯ

ЗАБЫТЫЙ ТОВАРИЩ ЛЕВЫХ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛОВ

Получено: 04.06.2023. Рецензировано: 22.11.2023. Принято: 30.11.2023.

**Аннотация:** В статье представлена попытка ответить на следующий вопрос: почему Рая Дунаевская, видный философ — марксист-гуманист, была забыта в общенаучном ландшафте анализа марксизма применительно к СССР? Дунаевская переписывалась и работала с влиятельными левыми интеллектуалами, такими как Лев Троцкий и Эрих Фромм, она написала большое количество статей и книг о марксистском гуманизме и сама была активисткой, однако ее не запомнили ни как философа, ни как активистку в отличие от ее коллег по цеху. В статье будет показано, что бэкграунд Дунаевской, как восточноевропейской женщины, критиковавшей СССР, а также особенность избранной ей темы марксистского гуманизма, помешали ей стать известным левым философом, хотя она определенно заслужила этот статус. Авторы доказывают это, рассматривая ее интеллектуальное взаимодействие с левыми активистами и философами, анализируя ее философские идеи относительно марксистского гуманизма и выявляя ее влияние на современные постколониальные и феминистские исследования. Посредством такого анализа можно восстановить наследие Дунаевской как философа — марксиста-гуманиста и переосмыслить его, подчеркивая влияние женщин на академический ландшафт XX века.

**Ключевые слова:** марксизм, гуманизм, Дунаевская, капитализм, феминизм, Альтюссер, Троцкий, Ленин.

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TIMUR SAYEV, OLGA LEVINA\*

## THE LAW OF REASON AND BEYOND\*\*

DAMARIS CUDWORTH MASHAM AS A NATURAL LAW SCHOLAR

Submitted: Sept. 06, 2023. Reviewed: Nov. 01, 2023. Accepted: Nov. 13, 2023.

**Abstract:** Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham, an English philosopher and theologian, holds a distinctive place in the intellectual discourse of late seventeenth century England. As the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, a prominent Cambridge Platonist, and a close friend and student of John Locke, Damaris Masham participated in a number of discussions at once, related in one way or another to the basic tenets of Christian theology and moral philosophy. The first of these is a dispute with the English Malebranchians, primarily John Norris and his intellectual companion Mary Astell, regarding the concept of the love of God. The second important debate concerned the defence of John Locke's rational Christianity against attacks from deists and enthusiasts. In addition to the defence of moderate conformist theology against radical non-conformism, Masham's writings also offer a special vision of Christian moral life, in which there is room for pleasures, the precepts of natural law and the commandments of Christian Revelation. Natural law occupies an important, but underexplored place in Masham's moral philosophy and theology. This paper is intended to fill said gap and is devoted to the reconstruction of Masham's approach to natural law and its connection with other crucial concepts of her moral theology: pleasures, sociability, reason, Revelation. In order to accomplish this goal, we interpret Masham's writings in light of relevant contexts and consider them as polemical arguments in which natural law plays an important, but limited role.

**Keywords:** Damaris Cudworth Masham, Natural Law, the Law of Reason, Revelation, Deism, Enthusiasm.

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### INTRODUCTION

Lady Damaris Masham is now seen as one of the most notable women philosophers of the seventeenth century. A daughter of Ralph Cudworth and a close friend of John Locke, she was an active participator of many philosophical and theological quarrels closer to the end of the century: amongst her adversaries were such prominent authors as Nicolas Malebranche, John

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Norris, Mary Astell and even Leibniz, with whom she carried out an extensive correspondence.<sup>1</sup> Today, Masham is considered by many commentators a prominent moral theologian, whose works were of great importance in the context of the changing face of the Church of England, especially in the period when its tenets were questioned by various unorthodox groups.

Due to the fact that Masham has been for a long time considered an author of secondary importance and was brought to light relatively recently, contemporary scholarship dedicated to her works is immense. One of its central themes is Masham's moral theology, and research in this field consists of four topics of research; all of them, in one respect or another, describe Masham as a polemic figure that was heavily engaged in several debates and discussions. First of these themes is a relation between Masham and Locke, her friend and mentor. Locke's influence on Masham is colossal, as she in fact used his vocabulary in both her works and openly praised her teacher's theological work, adopting his basic propositions as a foundation for her own moral philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

Two other themes are closely connected: Masham's critique and polemical exchange with John Norris and Mary Astell, two prominent English authors, in the context of moral theology. Masham's first work, *A Discourse Concerning the Love of God*, was intended as a critique of Norris' doctrine of the love of God, which had occasionalist roots (Norris was the first of English Malebranchians), and she returned to this theme for a short time in her second work, *Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life*. Mary Astell, whom Masham also noticed in *A Discourse*, was in correspondence with Norris, and their exchange was later published as *Letters Concerning the Love of God*.

However, Astell's polemic with Masham was not limited by their discussion on the nature of love towards God and creature. In fact, Astell's feminist works are now considered one of Masham's sources of influence and inspiration. But the full extent of this influence and their hostility to each other is not entirely clear and remains a point of disagreement. Several commentators have argued that in her later work Masham implicitly

<sup>1</sup>Masham's polemic with Norris, Malebranche and Astell is contained in her major works: *A Discourse Concerning the Love of God* and *Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life* (Masham, 1696; 1705). As for her exchange with Leibniz, it survived and is published in *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz. Vol. 1: Briefwechsel 1663–1716* (Leibniz, 1875). See also (Lodge, ed., 2007; Phemister & Smith, 2007; Widmaier, 1986).

<sup>2</sup>On Masham and Locke see (Broad, 2006; Goldie, 2004; Hammou, 2008; Woolhouse, 2003).

responded to Astell's critique of *A Discourse* (Perry, 1986; Di Biase, 2019), whereas other authors see their exchange mostly in terms of influence of Astell's feminism on Masham's idea of moral and religious education (Broad, 2003). In this paper we have taken the first interpretation; in later sections we shall show that Masham's arguments in *Occasional Thoughts* may indeed be seen as a partial answer to Astell's *Christian Religion*.

This paper is intended as an attempt to bring light to a theme in Masham's work that has not been much discussed yet. In her writings she appeals to the idea of natural law in a sense that is close to the most prominent authors in natural law tradition — Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke. An appeal to the law of nature shapes Masham's arguments both in *A Discourse* and in *Occasional Thoughts* in such a way that makes it possible for her to connect Lockean empiricism and moderate latitudinarian (and later, Lockean) theology in order to vindicate human social life as a moral ideal for Christians. This is even more important when taking into consideration the context in which Masham lived and worked, namely — the struggle between different unorthodox religious doctrines and attempts on the part of the Church of England to defend its authority from the attacks — real or imaginary — of Catholics, dissenters, free-thinkers and atheists.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to explicate Masham's account of natural law and, moreover, to set limits to her use of it. As we shall demonstrate, Masham appeals to natural law in two different contexts in her *Discourse* and *Occasional Thoughts*: the former is determined by her polemic with Norris, while the latter is much wider and includes debates around deism and Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity*. Furthermore, Masham not only employs natural law as a polemic instrument, but also criticises it at length, trying to establish a moderate account of Christian moral life, which would be rooted not only in the natural light of nature, but also — *pace* deism and following Locke — in Revelation.

#### LIFE AND INFLUENCES

Lady Damaris Cudworth Masham (1659–1708) was born in Cambridge into the family of Ralph Cudworth, distinguished philosopher, Cambridge Platonist. Although she never received any formal education, her father was her primary tutor in her early years (Ballard, 1752: 379). At the age of 26, Damaris Cudworth married Sir Francis Masham, a widower with eight children. There is very limited information about the nature of their marriage, yet the union certainly provided financial security and status, so she could continue her studies in philosophy and theology.

When Damaris Masham was about 22 years old, even before her marriage, she was introduced to John Locke by their mutual friend Edward Clarke. They quickly developed a strong relationship and remained intellectual companions for over twenty years. Locke moved to the Masham household in Oates, and lived there as a tenant until his death in 1704. Damaris' association with Locke facilitated her entry into a group of prominent intellectual contemporaries, for example, Lord Shaftesbury, Isaac Newton, and many others. She also corresponded with several philosophers during her life, including Leibniz, with whom she discussed different topics, such as his own philosophical ideas.

Masham was influenced by a lot of thinkers, but most of all she gravitated to Locke, and during the twenty years of their friendship they profoundly influenced each other's ideas. Masham is often called a "Lockean feminist" and presented as a direct adherent of Locke's ideas; it is noteworthy that she is not attributed to any specific philosophical tradition, at least there is no general consensus besides her being seen as a Lockean thinker in many ways. Masham might also be associated with Cambridge Platonism, since her father was a notable representative and a leader of the philosophical group. As Jacqueline Broad states, although Masham was heavily influenced by Locke's empiric views, she never fully abandoned Platonism (Broad, 2002: 117). However, to speak of Masham as a member of some definite tradition would be to oversimplify her stance.

#### A DISCOURSE OF THE LOVE OF GOD: THE CONTEXT OF PUBLICATION

Masham lived and worked within the context of rivalries between various philosophical and theological traditions, and her works must be understood as participating in moral-theological debates of the period. In the second half of the seventeenth century, many English theologians and divines were concerned with numerous groups that were considered dangerous for the doctrine and institution of the Church of England. Among these groups the most important were Catholics, deists and enthusiasts, and Masham aspired to defend Christianity from all of them.

While there is nothing special about Masham's use of the terms "deism" and "Catholicism," however, this is not the case with *enthusiasm*. Enthusiasm is not a name of a religious doctrine — in the seventeenth century the term was used to describe a set of religious dispositions which were usually associated with radical Protestantism (Heyd, 1995: 15) and consisted of ecstatic attitudes towards God and faith. Enthusiasm was frequently

defined as a false divine inspiration (More, 1656: 2; Evans, 1757: 5); it was a pejorative term and generally used by moderate theologians and divines in order to discredit certain religious stances with little to no definite referents. Robert Burton, English medical and theological writer, united Catholics, puritans and sectarians under this term. Other important authors, such as More and Locke, did not specify whom they meant by enthusiasts, considering the term as an indication of specific mental disposition or even illness (Locke, 1706: 587–588); finally, Masham's enthusiasts are, first and foremost, English Malebranchians.

The main target of *A Discourse* is John Norris, one of the first Malebranchians in England and the most influential at the time. In his third volume of *Practical Discourses Upon several Divine Subjects* Norris outlined a theory of the love of God, according to which all our love must be directed at God. Initially this theory emerges as a commentary on Mat. 22:37: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind," where Norris argues against traditional interpretation:

all that was signified by loving God with all the heart, with all the soul, and with all the mind, that we love him chiefly principally, *best* and *most* (Norris, 1693: 5);

however, in the same discourse Norris turns to Malebranche and his occasionalism in order to prove "i. That God is the only Author or Cause of our Love. ii. That he is also the only proper object of it" (ibid.: 9). The former conclusion stems from the fact that God is the only cause of all our sensations, including the sense of pleasure. And for only that what causes pleasure is our good, and for we ought to love only what is our good, we may make the latter conclusion: that God is the only proper object of our love.

Two years after publication of *Practical Discourses* Norris engaged in a correspondence with Mary Astell (Locke, 1695), who by this time was a writer, relatively recognised for her *Proposal to the Ladies*. Astell participated in an exchange initially as a critic, but in the end she was convinced by Norris' doctrine. In her later *Christian Religion* she returned to advocating it against Masham, but before we look into it in detail, it is necessary to reconstruct Masham's own account.

In *A Discourse* Masham accuses Norris and his French teacher, as well as Astell, of writing their accounts of the Love of God as unsuitable for human nature, impracticable for Christians and unreflective of the process by which we discover the idea of God. Here we are interested in the unfolding of Masham's account of human nature that leads her to the specific version of the idea of sociability, central to her and many other natural law theories. As

was noted by Regan Penaluna, the main thing that concerns Masham about Calvinism and Catholicism is the fact that both these doctrines undermine the importance of social life; thus, *Discourse* may be seen as an attempt to root Christian conduct in a specific set of social dispositions that are necessary for Christians to live a good life. In the next sections we argue that this attempt is made by using the language of natural law.

#### NATURAL LAW IN

#### “A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE LOVE OF GOD”

Masham’s use of natural law in *Discourse* is very limited thematically: it is rather a polemical instrument against Norris and Malebranche than a full account. Nevertheless, it contains many important features and plays a prominent role in Masham’s argumentation against Norris. Here we shall focus on three main aspects of her account: pleasure, desire and sociability.

Pleasure is the central idea in Norris’ account of the love of God, and it plays a similar role in Masham’ conception of the love of a creature. Masham agrees with Norris on the definitions of good and love through pleasure: “we necessarily loving whatever is accompanied with pleasure” (Masham, 1696: 88). The difference between them lies in what each of them sees as a cause of pleasure and, therefore, as a proper object of love.

Masham employs Mat. 22:39 as a ground for her conception of pleasure and desire. Whereas for Norris the only permissible kind of love of the creature is the love as benevolence, for Masham all desire is a necessary middle term between pleasure and love: all we desire pleases us, and all we love, we desire:

When I say that I love my self, I likewise mean by it that my Being is dear, and pleasing to me. [...] When we say we love our selves: Have we then only a simple perception of pleasure... Or is any thing else annex’d to that Pleasure as a necessary Concomitant... of it? [Mr. N] expressly tells us, that *There is no desire without Benevolence, and no Benevolence without desire*. But he does not in this oppose himself only, but Truth also, since the desire of the continuation of our Being is truly a Desire of our Selves (ibid.: 18, 20–21).

Thus, we genuinely desire ourselves, and, as it follows from Mat. 22:39, we ought to desire our neighbour as ourselves, i. e. to desire the continuation and improvement of his being, as well as his presence with us. Here, however, it is not the conclusion itself that is important, but rather the language that is used by Masham in formulating it. While for Norris the desire of created things is sinful, for Masham it is a necessary and lawful feature

of human nature, the only means by which we are able to reach the idea of God. The idea that our social ties are necessary for us to achieve the ultimate happiness was well-known and used by natural law theorists under the name of sociability, or sociality (*socialitas*) (Myers, 2013).

Sociability in *Discourse* is, first of all, an epistemic feature of human nature. Norris' account of the love of God is inadequate, because it neglects all the process of acquiring the idea of God. Masham takes the Lockean stance:

God is an invisible Being: And it is by his Works, that we are led both to know, and to love him. They lead us to their invisible Author (Masham, 1696: 62).

At first, it is a creature that we know and deal with, and only then we discover God. Thus, we are put in a position of a necessity of social life in order to reach the idea of God, even more so to love him.

However, sociability is also a moral condition, i. e. it is a feature that imposes obligations on us. Namely, if we ought to love God, we ought to love his creation:

Pompous Rhapsodies of the Soul's debasing her self when she descends to set the least part of her Affections upon any thing but her Creator... are plainly but a complementing God with the contempt of his Works, by which we are the most effectually led to Know Love and Adore him. An such kind of Expressions as carry not a Relative, but Absolute Abhorrence (ibid.: 27).

Thus, the duty to love thy neighbour is a natural duty that stems from our status as rational creatures. For we possess reason that leads us to God and consequently to the duty to him; and as we cannot love him without loving his creation, we naturally ought to love it. If we try to analyse this argument from the perspective of natural law, it appears that the idea of the intertwining of different classes of natural duties (i. e. to God, to others and to self) is to be found in every notable work on natural law in this period. The closest to Masham's variation of this connection between duties belongs to Richard Cumberland, who derived our duty to others from our duty to venerate God (Cumberland, 1672: 186). Of course, Masham herself was not primarily a natural law theorist, however her argument against Norris bears similar motivations with that of, say, Pufendorf, Cumberland or Locke: she aspires to naturally root ourselves in social relations in order for our ends as human beings—and, what is more, Christians—to be achievable.

In the end, sociability in *Discourse* is a necessary instrument in a theological argument that seeks to refute dangerous religious beliefs as unsuitable for humans and impracticable for Christians that seek salvation. It unites

other concepts employed by Masham, primarily *desire* and *pleasure*, with the purpose of vindication of Christian social life. One of the last passages in the treatise excellently concludes:

There is nothing more evident than that Mankind is design'd for a Sociable Life. To say that Religion unfits us for it, is to reproach the Wisdom of God as highly as it is possible; And to represent Religion as the most mischievous thing in the World, dissolving Societies. And there could not be a greater Artifice of the Devil, or Wicked Men to bring Christianity into contempt than this (Masham, 1696: 123).

#### CONTEXT OF "OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS"

The roots of English deism in seventeenth century might be traced to the publication of *De Veritate, prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili, et a falso* by Lord Herbert of Cherbury in 1624. In the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth century deism was among British intellectuals. In *Occasional Thoughts* Masham states that

to reconcile Men to, or establish them in the belief of Divine Revelation, nothing was more requisite to make this appear... in an Age wherein the prevalency of Deism has been so much and so justly complained of (Masham, 1705: 110).

Closer to the end of the seventeenth century, the most influential deist authors were Charles Blount and his circle. In 1693 he published a collection of essays and letters *The Oracles of Reason* (Blount, 1693), one of the authors of which was Charles Gilden, another prominent deist, whose work will be briefly examined later.

Deism was often regarded as another extreme on the same spectrum as enthusiasm: while the latter was a mistaken experience of revelation, the former presupposed a rejection of any revelation whatsoever. At the same time, both were considered to be high ways to atheism: William Popple wrote to Locke in 1696:

I dispute not how little they [Deists] deserve that Title. The men I mean are such as deny all Immaterial Beings, though that does not hinder them from talking of a God upon all occasions... I see plainly the Youth of this Age build all upon that Foundation. We are running from one Extream to another. Atheism, or... even Irreligion is a sad Sanctuary from the Mischiefs of Superstition (Locke, 1980: 519),

meaning by this exactly that deism, as well as enthusiasm, are in fact two extremes that are hostile to Christian religion.

Locke himself was a dedicated critic of deism, and it is important to examine, in short, his account of reason and revelation in *The Reasonableness*



of *Christianity*. His argument in favour of the necessity of revelation is founded on a distinction between the law of works (i. e. law of Moses) and the law of faith (i. e. law of Christ). The law of works is such that it requires perfect obedience, as it is the foundation of *righteousness*. However, Christians also abide by the law of faith, that is to the law “whereby God justifies a man for believing, though by his works he be not just or righteous” (Locke, 1695: 22). The law of faith states “for every one to believe what God requires him to believe” (ibid.: 24–25). And as God requires to believe in the revelation of the gospel, every Christian ought to do that.

As was noted by Giuliana di Biase, *The Reasonableness of Christianity* was intended as an attempt “to bridge the gap between the deists and the Christians” (Di Biase, 2019: 111). It, however, did not succeed. In the letter cited above, Popple points out with disappointment that this book did not have effect on deists. In reality, however, the situation was much more ironic: not only was deism not shaken by Locke’s arguments, but it was also inspired by his own epistemology. Irish deist John Tolland, whose *Christianity not Mysterious* was infamous amongst English Christians, leaned both on Lockean empiricism and his treatment of reason in *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (Tolland, 1696). What is more, orthodox divines and intellectuals attempted to accuse Locke of Socinianism (see (Edwards, 1696), and that led to an entirely different debate, in which Locke tried to restate his defence of reasonable Christianity and distance himself from dissenters at the same time.

Locke was of course not the only critic of deist attempts to rationalise Christian religion. Mary Astell was another one. In 1705 her *Christian Religion, as Profess’d by a Daughter of the Church of England* was published: it was a systematic treatment of Christian theology, starting with natural religion, moving to the necessity of Revelation and then — to the moral theology, based on a standard for natural jurisprudence classification of duties. Astell’s critique of deism differed immensely from that of Locke. While the aim of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* was to show that Revelation is necessary and that it is in conformity with our reason, Astell stated that Revelation is necessary, because it consists of truth that cannot be attained by natural reason:

For certainly the Sun of Knowledge, the Light that enlightens every Man, the Supreme and Universal Reason, must make greater discoveries than my seeble Taper can pretend to (Astell, 1705: 13).

It is impossible for human reason to be “the standard of Truth and Knowledge” (Astell, 1705: 48), and only divine reason can be a measure of truth (ibid.: 49). The Christian religion is not as puzzling as it may appear, since its revelations are very clear in that human nature has its weaknesses and the cause of it is the original sin, and Christ was sent to people, so they could reconcile unto God. In this worldview, people now have a knowledge of the divine nature only because of the revelation, and no one should question its truth.

Astell explicitly states that she does not “understand the Philosophy of the Union between Divine and Human Nature” (ibid.: 51). Jesus, as a son of God and son of Virgin Mary, had a divine and human nature, and is a part of Holy Trinity, and one must not worship anyone or anything else: “...to pay Divine Worship to any but GOD is gross Idolatry” (ibid.: 52).

Astell criticised not only the *Reasonableness* but also *A Discourse* to which she responded with *The Christian Religion* nine years later. It may have taken that long to write since it is a comprehensive, four hundred page text, however, it is also important that the writing was published after Locke’s passing. In fact, like many other contemporaries, Astell believed that *A Discourse* was written by Locke and not by Masham.

As a response, Astell demonstrates that equating love with pleasure is wrong and references Locke in a rather ironic manner without using his name — “...Law of Self-Preservation, as *some* call it...” (ibid.: 133). This specific paragraph is devoted to illustrating the fallacy of the belief that one must love thy enemy, and in it she mentions the Lockean concept of self-preservation: when the persecutor invades the stated law of self-preservation, one simply cannot desire their well-being. If the definition of love presented by Masham is right, then one ought to be pleased by their Enemies, and vice versa, it is not possible to love thy Enemy, if no pleasure is derived from them.

Another argument against the notion of love as pleasure is that it is “no more in our power than the motion of our Pulse” (ibid.: 136), hence, it is beyond human control. However, if the “act or disposition of Mind” indicates a “voluntary Motion of the Mind toward that pleases” (ibid.), then it represents an inclination and aspiration to the good in general, and one cannot gravitate towards the evil.

## NATURAL LAW IN "OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS".

## (1) REASON, CUSTOM AND SUPERSTITION

The most striking difference between Masham's use of natural law in *A Discourse* and *Occasional Thoughts* is that, in the latter work, we may for the first time find that she appeals to the notion of reason in the moral sense. In *Discourse*, as we have seen, the ground for natural law is human nature and its inherent and necessary desires: the need to desire one's neighbour and inability to not desire the self before growing into the desire of God. Reason plays an important role in the ordering of desires: in the end, Masham defends a traditional conception of the love of God — that he ought to be loved, if not exclusively, above everything else. However, these remarks appear only closer to the end of *A Discourse*, and, in general, reason is treated as a necessary *epistemic* capacity of a human being.

It is also worth mentioning that the notion of "the Law of Reason" appears for the first time in one of the latest passages:

It is evident also, that by virtue of our being such [i. e. reasonable creatures]; we are obliged to Live by the Law of Reason; which whenever we transgress, we must necessarily offend against God... And that we are so prone... to offend against this Law of Reason, is from the Unruliness of our Affections (Masham, 1705: 104–105).

This passage comes right before Masham's final attacks on Malebranche and Norris, in which she once again stresses that their conclusions are un- and anti-Scriptural, as well as disruptive for social life. Compared to that, Masham's use of natural law in *Occasional Thoughts* is much more apparent and systematic. While in *Discourse* the Law of Reason appears only in the last twenty pages, in *Occasional Thoughts* we may find it already in the first half of the treatise.

In order to properly assess Masham's account of the law of nature in *Occasional Thoughts*, it is important to make the following distinction between her treatment of natural law as a source of moral obligations and her account of our epistemological relation to it. It is striking how much these aspects of Masham's discussion differ, as from the first point of view she acts as a proponent of natural law against traditional and local customs, but from the second — she is a fierce critic of natural law thinking.

First of all, let us review how Masham treats the law of nature in itself. It is notable that she uses *Law of Reason, or Nature* as a general expression to indicate the law of nature. The law that God imposes on people is the law of Reason, i. e. it is formulated in accordance with their capacity of understanding. The text implies that, potentially, we may discover it by

ourselves, using our natural light; here Masham appeals to the notion of the state of nature as a state in which

Men must be considered... as having no extrinsick Law to direct them, but indu'd only with a faculty of comparing their distant Ideas by intermediate Ones (Masham, 1705: 60–61).

Here a Lockean conception of understanding (which is equated with the light of nature) coincides with the idea of the state of nature that is closer to Pufendorf than to Locke himself or anyone else.

Masham defines the light of nature as

a faculty of comparing their distant ideas by intermediate Ones, and Thence of deducing, or inferring one thing from another; whereby our Knowledge immediately received from Sense, or Reflection, is enlarged to a view of Truths remote... (ibid.: 61).

At some length she explicates the idea that we already saw in *Discourse*—namely, that God may be discovered by reason and senses. And again, as in *Discourse*, this way of discovery is twofold: first, as Attributes of God are invisible in themselves, we acquire ideas of them by seeing them in “the Works of the Creation,” from where the existence of the Creator becomes obvious. Second, the reason we possess is also a regulator of our conduct and inclinations: similarly to “brutes” that “appear... intended to be subjected to Men,” our inferior faculties are to be subjected to reason, by virtue of which we differ from other animals (ibid.: 66–67).

By knowing that God made reason our superior ability over our inferior inclinations, we come to know that not to obey reason is to be an inconsistent creature. By transgressing God’s will we transgress the nature of things, according to which we have been made. And because we are not only rational, but also willing creatures, we may choose whether to follow this order of things or transgress it. In both scenarios, still, we abide by the dictates of reason, which are, ultimately, commands of God’s will. It is noteworthy that for Masham human duty and human happiness are not only compatible, but necessary for each other. For we acquire the greatest pleasure when we live by our own nature, but we live by it only when we follow the Law of Reason. That is why her subsequent attack on enthusiasm and deism is formulated as a moral, rather than purely theological, objection.

Masham asserts that religion and morality are very often seen as distinctive. Virtue is viewed as a conformity to a certain rule of action that has moral force in a given society, and Masham acknowledges that these

rules may and in fact do vary between “different Times and Places.” The problem is that

Man is a Creature that has variable, and disagreeing Inclinations, as having passions very changeable, and oftentimes contradictory (Masham, 1705: 86).

As for religion, it is on the one hand presupposes that there is a “Superior Invisible Power that made them” and that the rule of action is unchangeable and universal, but on the other hand it is often viewed as “some Expedient, or other, found out to satisfy Men that God was satisfied with them” (ibid.: 90).

These notions of virtue and religion lead in fact to a transgression of the law of nature. For so-called “Men of Vertue” are in fact just those who follow the law of their society, notwithstanding their cruelty, and so-called “Religious Men” pretend to have had or are just mistaken for having a personal revelation that has given them the knowledge concerning the best way to please God. It leads men to the rejection of their own lawful pleasures and happiness:

as are denying them selves the lawfullest Enjoyments of Life; Macerating their Bodies; Prostituting their Wives; and exposing their Offspring and Themselves to cruel Torments, and even Death it self (ibid.: 91).

It is not clear whom Masham means by the first of these groups, but the second one are, apparently, enthusiasts, and above all others — Astell. We have already shown that in *Discourse* enthusiasm appeared as a source of moral corruption that would turn one against creature and, therefore, against God himself; besides, it would make human life miserable and impractical, as its precepts are not compatible with human natural desires. Here Masham also shows that enthusiasm is not compatible with human reason, as she contraposes enthusiasts to “Men... who are virtuous in a Rational and Christian estimation,” i. e. to those, whose knowledge of the rule of action is based not on superstitions or false revelation, but on the light of nature and the force of true revelation.

As we have seen, Astell’s *Christian Religion* contained a version of the critique of deism that divorced reason and revelation almost altogether. However it was definitely not how Masham saw the proper alternative to deist natural theology: in *Occasional Thoughts* she stresses the “Union between Divine and Human Nature,” i. e. the substantial agreement between natural reason and divine revelation that Astell rejected. There is one particular passage in the text that suggests that it was an attack on Astell:

Christians, perhaps, need not the consideration of this to in force their obedience to the Will of their Maker; but as it is a great recommendation of the Precepts of the Gospel to find that they have an exact correspondence with, and conformity to the Nature of Things: So also those who are not influenc'd by, as not being yet thorowly perswaded of this Divine Revelation, will fooner be induc'd to imbrace Vertue, and contemn the allurements of Vice,' when they see These to have the very same reality in Nature as their Happiness and Misery have; than when (tho' ever so pompously set out) Vertue appears founded only upon nice, or subtle Speculations (Masham, 1705: 81–82).

Here Masham takes a moderate stance between enthusiasts on one hand and deists — on the other. Astell's "practical theism," as Jacqueline Broad called it, presupposes that our natural reason is of no use or aid in practical, or moral, matters (Broad, 2015: 56). A genuine purpose of natural reason is to convince itself that revelation is true, but in any substantial matter "the Scriptures are our Rule of Faith and Manners, and for our better direction in both we have no more to do but to study them" (ibid.: 34).

However, from the passage cited above it is already clear that Masham does not want to argue that the light of reason is to be preferred to revelation. Despite emphasising its role in a moral education and being overall optimistic about its abilities — *pace* Astell, she is also convinced that natural reason needs to be supported by revelation, as it cannot operate alone in matters that concern our future life. Thus, from the appeal to the law of nature she turns to the critique of it. In the next section we shall explicate this critique and draw a connection between the two parts of her argument.

However, one more remark needs to be made: we have seen that in *Christian Religion* Astell argued against *A Discourse Concerning the Love of God*. Several recent commentators see it as a factor that influenced Masham's delay with publication (Di Biase, 2019: 110; Hutton, 2020; Perry, 1986: 96): *Occasional Thoughts* came out right after *Christian Religion*, and Masham, as it has been argued, probably took some time to answer to Astell's objections. In the beginning of the paper we posited that our stance is similar — and the above reasons for that were given — but concerning this particular question our views differ. It is striking that Masham does not mention almost any important idea from *A Discourse* and does not refer to it as a source or a support for her present discussion; on the contrary, she in fact rejects some of *Discourse's* core tenets, and first and foremost the claim that love as desire is a basis of human sociability and, therefore, of a great part of human morality. In *Occasional Thoughts* desires are seen as something that needs to be regulated by a higher instance, not embraced.

## NATURAL LAW IN "OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS".

## (II) REVELATION AND THE LIMITS OF NATURAL LIGHT

As has been said, Masham's account of natural law in *Occasional Thoughts* differs seriously from that in *A Discourse*, focusing much more on human reason than on desires and pleasures. In *Occasional Thoughts* the idea that we have desires and want to attain happiness is the reason why Masham turns to the critique of natural law right after she explicated the general idea of it. However, it is much more accurate to say that Masham's critique is pointed not at the law of nature itself—she is very consistent with her treating it as a set of genuine ultimate duties. Rather, she is not satisfied with how moral epistemology of natural law is perceived by those who "prefer their Natural Reason as a surer Teacher than the Revelation."

One of the most important examples that Masham uses in order to show limits of natural light is the example of *Peruvian* religion, i. e. the religion of Incas. It is noteworthy that Masham treats it favourably, calling it "Idolatry... the most specious that was possible" (Masham, 1705: 100), however, she makes a reservation on how Peruvians acquired such a knowledge. It is not possible for many people to come to understanding of these truths by their own light of reason: it needs to be imposed on them by "a few Instances of Persons of more than ordinarily inquisitive Minds" (ibid.: 101). Thus, natural light is not a universal source of knowledge of the law of nature; in order for this to properly guide us towards divine commands, we need to be "exempted by a happy privilege of Nature from the servitude of sensual, and sordid Passions" (ibid.).

In other words, Masham tries to point out that light of reason has its natural limits: perhaps, it is ultimately capable to achieve knowledge of the law of reason, as she has shown using the metaphor of the state of nature. However, this way is not practical. Thus, the first limit of reason is that it is intertwined with passions and desires that often lead in the contrary direction.

The second limit of reason is that it is not able to explicitly deduce rewards and punishments that God imposes on those who transgress the law (ibid.: 104). It is only Revelation of the Gospel that makes such knowledge possible: without it we can only think about present life, the future life is not intelligible to the light of reason. And, because in this view it is the future life that matters most, by using natural reason only, we are simply unable to attain the greatest happiness.

The objective that Masham's arguments pursue against natural law is to be understood in the context of English deism. Deist use of the natural law was common: Matthew Tindal, one of the most influential deists in the beginning of the eighteenth century, was a natural law theorist and political pamphleteer for Whigs; another deist author, Charles Gilden, whose *Deist's Manual* was published in the same year as Masham's *Occasional Thoughts*, dedicated a separate section in the book to the discussion of man's duties according to natural religion.

Gilden's deduction of natural law is not of much originality. Following many other natural law theorists of the seventeenth century, he derives moral duties from the natural condition of a man, namely from the self-love or self-preservation (Gildon, 1705: 210–211). This conception of the natural law was widely used throughout the century, and among its proponents were Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Locke. Masham, whose appeal to the state of nature was clearly of Lockean influence, nevertheless objected to the use of the law of nature in a way that was proposed by deists. Again, it was not the idea of natural law itself that she attacked; rather, it was rejection of Revelation that often followed from natural law accounts and that Masham considered dangerous for Christian salvation.

#### CONCLUSION

In this paper we aspired to reconstruct Masham's account of natural law in the context of debates in which she had participated throughout her philosophical career. Despite the fact that she was definitely not a natural law theorist per se, her work contains an extensive appeal to natural law intuitions and arguments: first, to the idea of natural sociability in *A Discourse Concerning the Love of God*, then—in *Occasional Thoughts*—to the doctrine of the natural light of reason that unveils fundamental duties in regard of God and our own happiness. Natural law is an important tool that Masham uses in order to refute rival theological and philosophical doctrines in several contexts that are ultimately linked by a common ground, namely—a vindication of Christian religion.

Another important conclusion that we tried to demonstrate is that, for Masham, the law of nature was a theological notion that must be seen as a part of moral theology; here we tried to explicate the limitations that she sets in order to support a moderate Lockean approach to Christianity and to argue in favour of revelation as an indispensable source of moral obligations.

Overall, we consider Masham's work on natural law to be sufficiently important to be investigated further. Some aspects of her natural law



account were inevitably left out in the current paper in order to maintain a more or less consistent and thematically straight narrative: one of the most important of these aspects is a relation between natural law, virtue and happiness in *Occasional Thoughts*, as it was a standard problem in the period when traditional structures of English moral philosophy were being gradually replaced and merged with modern natural law. In the case of Damaris Masham, this question is especially important due to the fact that we find similar arguments and ideas in Locke and Astell, two of Masham's most important intellectual partners — in one way or another. Furthermore, if we are to look into the relations between Masham and Astell even closer, we need to locate the place of natural law and virtue in their respective feminist doctrines, the analysis of which presupposes an entirely different context.

The final point that ought to be made is that Masham as an independent philosopher is a relatively recent discovery in the historiography of British philosophy. In our work we tried to treat her as one; however, when an author is put into a wide context that determines her framing of arguments and conclusions, it is easy to neglect the agency of the author. But this is certainly not the case with Masham, who, being a philosopher with a legacy of many traditions — from her father's Platonism to Lockean empiricism to Latitudinarian common sense theology — still presented a highly original body of work that occupies an important place among other female philosophers of early modern Britain — and reads as an outstanding philosophic heritage as a whole.

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САЕВ ТИМУР АЛЕКСЕЕВИЧ

СТУДЕНТ

НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ «ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ» (МОСКВА);  
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## ЗАКОН РАЗУМА И ЕГО ПРЕДЕЛЫ

ДАМАРИС КЭВОРТ МЭШЕМ КАК ТЕОРЕТИК ЕСТЕСТВЕННОГО ПРАВА

Получено: 06.09.2023. Рецензировано: 01.11.2023. Принято: 13.11.2023.

**Аннотация:** Леди Дамарис Кэворт Мэшем, английский философ и теолог, занимает особое место в интеллектуальном дискурсе Англии конца семнадцатого века. Будучи дочерью кембриджского платоника Ральфа Кэворта, а также близкой подругой и ученицей Джона Локка, Дамарис Мэшем принимала участие сразу в ряде дискуссий, так или иначе связанных с основными положениями христианской теологии и моральной философии. Первая из них — это спор с английскими мальбраншианцами, в первую очередь с Джоном Норрисом и его интеллектуальной компаньонкой Мэри Эстелл, относительно понятия любви к Богу. Вторая важная дискуссия связана с защитой разумного

христианства Джона Локка от нападок со стороны деистов и энтузиастов. В работах Мэшем отстаивает умеренную конформистскую теологию, противостоящую радикальному неконформизму, но также предлагает особое видение христианской моральной жизни, в которой есть место удовольствиям, предписаниям естественного закона и заповедям христианского Откровения. Естественный закон занимает важное, однако не до конца исследованное место в моральной философии и теологии Мэшем. В этой статье производится реконструкция ее подхода к естественному закону и его связи с другими центральными понятиями моральной теологии Мэшем: удовольствием, социальностью, разумом и Откровением. Для достижения этой цели сочинения Мэшем интерпретируются исходя из соответствующих контекстов и рассматриваются как полемические аргументы, в которых естественное право играет важную, однако ограниченную роль.

**Ключевые слова:** Дамарис Кэдворт Мэшем, естественное право, закон разума, откровение, деизм, энтузиазм.

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DIANA GASPARYAN\*

## UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPRETATION OF BAKHTIN'S IDEAS IN FEMINIST THEORY\*\*

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**Abstract:** In recent years, M. Bakhtin's concepts have garnered increasing recognition in Western academic circles, finding applications in diverse fields ranging from linguistics to psychiatry. This belated recognition might appear peculiar without an appreciation for the particular historical context in which Bakhtin's ideas were introduced to the West. Their initial introduction was deeply intertwined with the evolution of feminist theory, feminist criticism, and discussions surrounding gender identity. Notably, the first English rendition of some of Bakhtin's thoughts appeared in Julia Kristeva's «Word, Dialogue and Novel» in 1966, a seminal work in feminist theory. Subsequent to this introduction, for over two decades, Bakhtinian concepts such as «voice», «dialogism», «hybrid construction», «heteroglossia», and «carnival» were predominantly employed in feminist interpretations by renowned feminist theorists, including J. Kristeva, W. Booth, and D. Bauer. This persisted even after direct translations of Bakhtin's works emerged in the 1980s. For many, this association might appear unexpected and even counterintuitive, given that Bakhtin himself did not address feminist concerns or gender topics directly, nor did he reference female authors in his literary critiques. In this article, I will examine the feminist appropriation of central Bakhtinian notions and explore how Bakhtin's theory offers a fertile ground for feminist interpretive strategies. I further contend that while this feminist embrace significantly propelled the spread of Bakhtinian concepts in the West, it simultaneously restricted their broader adoption by employing them as a «Bakhtinian toolkit» to address theoretical deficiencies and circumvent challenges in feminist theory. Often, this led to a simplistic and reductive understanding of Bakhtinian ideas. Additionally, I posit that this issue stems from a core challenge illuminated by Bakhtin's own work: translations and interpretations of the same ideas across languages are not equivalent, as they are influenced by distinct dialogic systems.

**Keywords:** Bakhtin, Feminist Theory, Gender Identity, Dialogic, Monoglossia, Heteroglossia, Carnival.

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## INTRODUCTION

Bakhtin's ideas were introduced to the Western academic sphere with a notable delay. Their initial presentation is closely linked to J. Kristeva and her essay *Word, Dialogue and Novel*. In this work, Kristeva synergized Bakhtin's concepts of "dialogism" and "carnival" with semiotics, forging a theory of intertextuality. It was largely due to her influence that Bakhtin's work gained attention and became subject to scholarly exploration in the West (Gasparyan, 2021).

Kristeva, leveraging Bakhtin's notions of dialogue and ambivalence, spatially situates them along horizontal and vertical axes. The horizontal dimension (dialogue) elucidates how words within a text establish a connection between the subject (author) and the addressee (reader). Meanwhile, the vertical dimension (ambivalence) links the text to other extant writings, which serve as reference points for the present text (Kristeva, 1986).

This perspective encapsulates the concept of intertextuality, suggesting that no text exists within an isolated, immutable bubble of the author's conception. Instead, every text is perpetually interlinked with others. Kristeva articulated it as follows:

Bakhtinian dialogism identifies writing as both subjectivity and communication, or better, as intertextuality. Confronted with this dialogism, the notion of a "person-subject of writing" becomes blurred, yielding to that of "ambivalence of writing" (*ibid.*: 39).

Kristeva's elucidation of Bakhtin's concept of ambivalence delves into the operational nature of words within a text. When a word, previously employed by another author, is reused in a new text, it concurrently sustains its prior meaning while assimilating an additional one. Consequently, the word becomes ambivalent, bearing dual significance.

This notion would play a pivotal role in the subsequent evolution of gender identity theory, especially concerning the discourse on gender pronouns. Therefore, the manner in which Bakhtin's concepts were introduced into the Western academic arena significantly influenced the avenues through which his ideas were later employed, extending beyond the confines of literary theory.

From Kristeva's interpretation of Bakhtin, his theory proves to be a particularly apt framework for addressing various feminist methodological and theoretical challenges. This compatibility with feminist analysis is especially pronounced in Bakhtinian concepts like dialogism, polyphony, heteroglossia,

and carnival. Intriguingly, this alignment might be deemed almost too fitting, especially when considering that Bakhtin does not explicitly address gender in his deliberations on linguistic theory.

While Kristeva doesn't overtly label Bakhtin as a "feminist", her writings suggest that she perceives his ideas as conducive to feminist topics such as power dynamics, sociocultural marginalization, and political subversion. Specifically, Kristeva hints that the Bakhtinian concept of "carnival"—encompassing essential rebellion and subversion—resonates with a feminist objective of societal, linguistic, and political insurrection. By adapting Bakhtin's concepts for feminist purposes, she aligns feminism with carnivalistic and subversive linguistic movements. Though this alignment might appear innocuous on the surface, it fundamentally associates dominant, hegemonic structures with patriarchy and contrasts marginalized dialogic discourse with feminism. This leads to a simplified interpretation of Bakhtin's idea of carnival, which is understood as the "absolute overthrow of established hierarchy in society, politics, and domestic spheres" (Bakhtin, Iswolsky, 1984b: 237).

This constrained interpretation of Bakhtinian ideas was highlighted by subsequent feminists, such as Kay Halasek. She contended,

It is easy to create a biological male/female dichotomy (as Kristeva appears to do) when addressing ... such pairs of constructs. However, I propose that the real dichotomy is more about empowerment versus disempowerment across various spectrums, be it race, class, gender, or ethnicity (Halasek, 2020: 55).

#### INTERPRETATION OF BAKHTINIAN CONCEPTS IN FEMINIST THEORY

Despite the active incorporation of Bakhtin's ideas within feminist theory, there is a conspicuous absence of references to feminist thought in Bakhtin's own works. He seldom acknowledges women in roles as speakers, writers, or intellectuals, and does not engage with gender-centric issues in his compositions. His discourse on dialogue omits the inclusion of women, and he fails to represent female perspectives within dialogic exchanges. While Bakhtin's theoretical constructs do make room for marginalized voices, as seen in the concept of carnival, many Western scholars hold the view that women and their voices are excluded both from Bakhtin's discussions and his overarching theoretical framework (Cobb, 2019).

This presents a compelling dichotomy: while some feminists posit that by overlooking gender, Bakhtin fosters a monologic male discourse that fails to recognize linguistic diversity stemming from gender differences (Schweickart,

2014). Furthermore, the observation that Bakhtin acknowledges “worlds” and “verbal-ideological systems” encompassing race, profession, class, age, academic institutions, and even family — but glaringly omits gender (Bakhtin, Emerson & Holquist, 1981: 288–291) — has led to the perception that there exists “a woman, a reader absent from Bakhtin’s text, a disempowered, silenced subject” (Halasek, 2020: 53).

This revelation, for some feminists, aligns with expectations of a male author, as articulated by W. Booth on the subject:

Bakhtin, otherwise a subtle critic of ideologies and pleader for a dialogic imagination, has largely excluded women from the dialogue. Nothing in that is either surprising or new. According to Bakhtin’s own analysis all language is not only tainted with ideology — it actually exists as ideology. Every statement, every work of art, will be ridden with ideologies — which means that even the most polyphonic work must exclude, simply by its existence, some languages in order to do justice to others (Booth, 1982: 166).

Despite the critiques, Bakhtin’s ideas are deemed too invaluable to be constricted by the nuances of feminist hermeneutics. Consequently, they were reformulated to better align with methodological needs. An early instance of Bakhtin’s appropriation in feminist discourse was the rationale for the adaptability of his theory to accommodate marginalized, or “other” voices, inclusive of women, as well as ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities. As Schweickart suggested, Bakhtin’s writings are among those “demonstrably sexist texts [that] remain appealing even after they have been subjected to thorough feminist critique” (Schweickart, 2014: 42).

One method for such interpretation is through a feminist lens, reintroducing women’s voices within the framework of Bakhtin’s dialogic community. Drawing upon the premise that diverse voices are essential in Bakhtinian dialogism due to their equal participation in dialogue, Bauer terms the retrospective incorporation of female voices as “empowering” (Bauer, 1988). Consequently, by integrating female voices, the feminist critique aids Bakhtin’s endeavor to dismantle hierarchical and patriarchal frameworks. This transforms Bakhtin’s dialogism into an inclusive domain, welcoming continuous engagement from individuals irrespective of race or gender (Bauer & McKinstry, 1991).

Bakhtinian concepts of dialogism and unfinalizability were later incorporated into postcolonial feminist frameworks, bolstering the potency of postcolonial feminist perspectives. The intersection of Bakhtin’s principles of dialogism and non-finalizability with postcolonial feminist thought lies



in valuing the voices of the culturally distinct “Other” without reducing them to oversimplified cultural stereotypes about caring for individuals from diverse ethno-cultural backgrounds (Frank, 2005).

In examining the spectrum of research employing these concepts, it's clear that they are interpreted in a diverse array of ways. For instance, numerous studies exploring the intersection of Bakhtinian thought and feminism utilize the concept of “dialogue” in its traditional sense, denoting human engagement and the resolution of conflicts. This concept is then contextualized in diverse settings, predominantly as a critique of relations rooted in power dynamics and dependency. This trend underscores a prevailing inclination to equate Bakhtin's idea of “dialogic” with “dialogue”—that is, an egalitarian and open interaction or connection.

Utilizing “dialogue” in its conventional sense tends to dilute Bakhtin's concepts of “dialogic” and “voice.” While Bakhtin's usage of these terms (among others) is not always consistent, neither does it typically pertain to individual subjects. As a result, Bakhtin differentiates between a standard dialogue involving individuals and dialogic relationships between “voices.” The latter refers to varied facets of heteroglossia, which might overlap but typically do not align precisely with specific subject positions.

Thus, for Bakhtin, “dialogue” represents merely one potential outcome of dialogical relations and hinges on the willingness of both parties to communicate. In contrast, Bakhtin's concept of the enquotedialogic encompasses a conflict between opposing “voices,” considering voices that opt out of the dialogue and those that are sidelined from participating in it.

This intrinsic comprehension of “voice” and “dialogic” facilitates the exploration of marginalized and deviant narratives within prevailing discourse. Bakhtin's approach encourages to conduct a contextual discourse analysis that transcends mere plot interactions and individual character dialogues. It correlates the linguistic and discursive characteristics of a literary text to its distinct historical and societal backdrop. Therefore, Bakhtin's theory already furnishes linguistic categories that further the examination and recognition of the multifaceted subject positions of women. Thus, although the expansive application and reinterpretation of theoretical concepts might be beneficial for feminist critique, Bakhtin's notions are most robust and persuasive in their original context and meaning.

#### BAKHTINIAN IDEAS IN GENDER STUDIES

Contemporary gender studies, in spite of its burgeoning prominence and influence in academia, remained somewhat of a “nomological outlier” for

an extended period, given its ambiguous disciplinary standing. Gender-related issues were perceived as facets of political philosophy, postmodern philosophy, sociology, psychoanalysis, cultural psychology, and so forth. Given its unmistakably interdisciplinary nature, the precise niche of this field remained elusive for some time before it eventually established itself as an independent discipline. A notable twist in this evolutionary trajectory was the integration of Bakhtin's methodology, which played a significant role in fostering the growth and autonomy of gender studies tools and anchoring them within a defined disciplinary framework.

While Bakhtin's concepts have been extensively employed in feminist theory, such studies have increasingly grappled with issues related to categorization. Second-wave feminists initially emphasized gender distinctions, categorizing subjects as either male or female, and employing a dominant, dualistic perspective grounded in biological distinctions (Stoller, 1968). As noted by Becky Francis and Carrie Paechter, there exists considerable potential within Bakhtin's writings for reconceptualizing the notion of gender; it would indeed be a missed opportunity not to harness this potential (Francis & Paechter, 2015). This is especially relevant when seeking methods to navigate the binary of individual agency versus the determinism inherent in the social milieu, and when addressing the shortcomings of strictly discursive analyses that may overlook the impacts of tangible and bodily factors. As suggested by these scholars and several others, Bakhtin's thought processes and methodology appear to be the most compelling and empirically fruitful for analytical inquiries in the social domain.

Bakhtin's methodological advancements appeared pertinent for probing the essence of gender. In his diverse treatises on literature and culture, he illustrates how the subjective self, conventionally perceived as largely unchanging in traditional discourse, is influenced externally, either through a collective framework or through dialogues externalized by others. The "subject" defines itself in relation to its own essence, engaging more with the Other than with itself. In this context, as Bakhtin envisions through the concepts of polyphony and dialogue, the discourse in which individuals comprehend their identities unfolds not under the aegis of a transcendent authority, but through the autonomous volition of each participant (Paechter, 2003).

Conversely, deconstructing gender binarism presents an inherent challenge to feminist theory. Once this binarism is deconstructed, categorization becomes disrupted, leading to an ambiguous research subject. Without the avenue for such deconstruction, feminist and gender studies grapple with

a methodological shortcoming that is nearly insurmountable—the societal framework of binary roles.

Becky Francis underscores this when she notes that behaviors demonstrated by boys/men are typically labelled as manifesting a form of masculinity, while behaviors shown by girls are perceived as expressing facets of femininity (Francis & Paechter, 2015). The constructs of gender binarism permeate language and cultural artifacts, embedding them within sequences of descriptors so deeply ingrained and lasting that they form the very essence of existence, aspiration, solace, and imagination. As a result, while gender studies cannot overlook the impact of binary gender structures, it also faces the dilemma of being unable to envision a society devoid of them.

Bakhtin acknowledges the impact of politics (that is, external contexts) on linguistic expressions and emphasizes that monoglossia inherently conveys the ideological convictions of the prevailing societal group. Through a feminist lens, male-centric “patriarchal” societal epistemologies can be interpreted as monoglossic. However, in line with Bakhtin’s perspective, any endeavor to rigidly define discourse is ultimately futile. Such efforts contradict the inherent adaptability and dynamism of language. Consequently, language perennially embodies a dialogic heteroglossia.

In dissecting the binary gender through Bakhtin’s lens, Francis posits that she envisions the monoglossic narrative as a representation of an overarching worldview (ibid.). This viewpoint prioritizes specific sociopolitical interpretations and cultural expressions, striving to eliminate alternate perspectives in its quest for an unchallenged dominance of the monoglossic narrative. When extrapolating the ideas of monoglossia and heteroglossia to the realm of gender, I contend that elements of both are mirrored in gender behaviors and the construct of gender itself. A salient feature of the monoglossic portrayal of gender is its apparent straightforwardness. This monoglossic perspective on gender can present itself as cohesive, skillfully obscuring inconsistencies and tensions, even when they stand out conspicuously.

Furthermore, Bakhtin’s assertion that

truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born *between people* collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction (Bakhtin, Emerson, 1984a: 110)

can be employed to theorize the use of gendered pronouns. This model suggests truth is malleable, subject to interpretation. It does not originate within the confines of an individual’s cognition but is dialogically shaped through genuine social interactions. Consequently, every individual’s inner psyche or

consciousness — encompassing their thoughts, language, and expressions — is sculpted through their interactions with others. Each person, therefore, grasps only a fragmentary viewpoint, one that is inherently mutable.

This perspective stands in contrast to the monological concept of consciousness, which champions the notion of truth as being objective and rooted in authority. Our expressions or manifestations of gender cannot emerge from isolated spontaneity: they are crafted within historical frameworks and mirrored in both historical and contemporary expressions and the reactions of others.

Given that our existences are imbued with symbols and norms, it is evident that Bakhtin also perceives a concrete and intrinsic opposition to these norms and their dismantling, an opposition embodied in heteroglossia. His emphasis on the significance of context, encompassing the physical realm (thereby alluding to embodiment), counters discursive interpretations that neglect to sufficiently acknowledge the intertwined roles of social infrastructures and the human body in gender construction. Further, by focusing on “targeting,” gender theorists accentuate the deep-seated mutual nature of gender formation; dissecting the intricate dynamics of these interactions, and their ties to the particular socio-historical environment in which they emerge, counters narratives that perceive gender solely within a societal framework or, in contrast, merely as an individual decision.

Through this lens, Bakhtin’s contributions can tackle prevailing theoretical dilemmas associated with gender identity by recognizing the intertwined roles of the individual and societal structures, and by simultaneously pinpointing the heteroglossic nuances. Melding the concepts of monoglossia and heteroglossia furnishes a layered and persuasive portrayal of concurrent gender “norms” and deviations. As a result, an extended utilization of Bakhtin’s insights promises to be beneficial for gender theory and the empirical examination within the realm of gender identity.

Thus, by perceiving individual portrayals and interpretations of gender in the manner Bakhtin envisages utterances — as merely a singular link amidst a continuum of gender expressions — one can achieve a recognition of their inherent subjectivity, all while embedded within the pervasive framework of gender.

#### SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE POLYVALENT SUBJECT

In various gender-related studies, Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism is deemed exceptionally fruitful, primarily because it eschews any hierarchical framework within which communication might occur. His work illustrates how

an individual can define themselves through a collective lens rather than through solitary introspection. This perspective aids in framing a communal identity as opposed to an insular, self-focused one. Consequently, gender scholars highlight that dialogue, being intrinsically egalitarian, offers a more apt description of processes tied to the voluntary exploration of gender compared to other forms of social interaction—such as directives, mandates, or impositions, even those within hierarchical educational systems where the educator's authority is paramount.

For instance, T. Lillis (2003), in her educational research, draws upon M. Bakhtin's writings as a foundational theory to advocate for a transition from a monological method that emphasizes the singular, authoritative voice of the educator, to a dialogical method that accommodates a plethora of discourses and perspectives. A tangible representation of this method is the notion of "two-way communication," contrasting the traditional "feedback" mechanism on students' written assignments. Such an approach makes the subject matter more permeable to a wider array of external interests and influences. This shift represents a crucial step in transitioning the approach to academic literacy from merely theoretical to practical pedagogical underpinnings.

Dialogism and polyphony align seamlessly with the exploration of identity, especially at the juncture where dialogue unfolds. In this space, one is not restricted to mere prescriptions but possesses the agency to choose. The "selector" can rebuff the presented options, offering counterarguments to such refusals, mirroring the dynamics seen in intellectual or worldly debates. In her work, Jessica N. Ellis (2020) delves into how language and cognition shape human gender, contending that her proposed psyche model, which deviates from the conventional, encourages a shift from an individualistic perspective to viewing gender identity as a more collective or plural entity. While Bakhtin and his dialogism theory are not the focal points of the study, he serves as a pivotal reference in bolstering the paper's central argument. Bakhtinian concepts vividly illuminate what the psyche, envisioned as a decentralized multiplicity, could resemble. Primarily, Ellis's argument counters the "misconception of a static gender identity category" (Ellis, 2020: 82).

Gender, as previously noted, pertains to an identity or collection of characteristics that an individual assigns to oneself and uses as a point of self-identification. Thus, gender, in terms of gender identity, is intrinsically linked to the structure of the psyche itself. In this context, prior to dissecting the notion of gender, it becomes imperative to classify the concept of psyche

under the umbrella of either individualism or collectivism. Specifically, Ellis (Ellis, 2020), as previously mentioned, perceives the psyche as inherently self-referential and self-identifying, a trait characteristic of the capitalist subject. Such an atomized perspective inherently infers a binary approach to gender and is restricted by these demarcations. This provides a framework to question the essence of “self” and “selfhood” from an objective standpoint: the very act of possessing an identity is likened to owning an object. To further explore this narrative, the author delves into topics such as the capitalist subject, the concept of women as private property, and the notion of “self” as an object, drawing upon Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage theory.

Furthermore, the exploration of the psyche as a multifaceted entity is crucial. Several scholars propose a counterpoint to the notion that the soul or the psychic apparatus is singular and atomized. The phenomenon of the transgender individual, for example, can act as a manifestation of this plurality. Thus, there appears to be a need to identify a model of the psyche that acknowledges its multi-constitutive nature.

Such theorizations underscore that the foundation of gender is not rooted in the individual subject perceived as an immediate, autonomous entity, but rather in the multiplicity that arises through interactions with the Other in language. Hence, Bakhtin’s dialogism is pivotal in understanding gender identity because it is invoked by researchers to merge consciousness, language, and cognition into a model of the psyche that represents itself as diverse and multifaceted. Identity, in this context, becomes contingent upon interactions with others, cultural norms, and societal structures.

#### MONOGLOSSIC DISCOURSES IN DIFFERENT SOCIETAL CONTEXTS

This circles back to the issue of a reductionist interpretation of Bakhtinian concepts within feminist theory and the oversimplification of equating monoglossy with patriarchy. Monoglossic discourses act as overarching, encompassing “worldviews.” Intrinsically, they do not hardly aim for a harmonious, conflict-free communication landscape. Rather, they seek to permeate all facets of ideological existence, prioritizing certain sociopolitical interpretations and cultural expressions with the intention of suppressing and eliminating alternative viewpoints, in the quest for an unchallenged dominance of monoglossic discourse. However, beneath this seemingly impenetrable veneer of monoglossia lies a heteroglossic undercurrent, which inherently ensures that resistance is not just feasible, but often an inevitable outcome.

Heteroglossia represents the inherent disorderly coexistence of diverse languages in the world, while dialogism describes the structured interplay

among them. This interaction unfolds between opposing or contrasting languages — where one underpins the prevailing ideology and the other develops the counter-narrative. Bakhtin labels these ideological stances as centripetal and centrifugal social and linguistic forces. Collectively, they offer a framework through which knowledge is both challenged and constructed.

Bakhtin introduces the concept of a prevailing, hegemonic, monologic, centripetal discourse being challenged by a subordinate, heterologic, dialogic, centrifugal discourse. These dual inclinations — towards unification and dispersion — are in perpetual dialogue and conflict with each other. This dynamic encapsulates Bakhtin's theory, which highlights the interplay between centripetal and centrifugal societal forces as manifested in language.

Centripetal forces, be they political, linguistic, or social, advocate for uniformity and adherence to traditional values. Authoritative texts similarly sustain the existing order. In Bakhtin's terminology, these centripetal discourses are "monologic." They elevate themselves, purporting to be the final or "ultimate word" (Bakhtin, Emerson, 1984a: 293). Such discourse demands unwavering commitment. The veneration that authoritative discourse receives from its audience is undeniable. The power of these discourses does not arise from their intrinsic merit but from established cultural, religious, or generic conventions. In essence, it represents accepted or canonical knowledge and belief.

Therefore, Bakhtin's dialectical approach, which juxtaposes centripetal forces against centrifugal ones, offers feminist critics a tool to further their analyses. They can identify their stance as centrifugal and counteractive, contrasting the dominant and centripetal male perspective. The language used by centripetal forces can be termed as "authoritative." In Bakhtin's framework, "authoritative" denotes a discourse so compelling and dominant that it elicits only reverence and allegiance, thereby perpetuating the prevailing norms. Such discourse, in its delivery and reception, often appears sacrosanct, aloof, and its compelling authority seems beyond dispute. Centripetal, traditionalist, and hegemonic languages aim to suppress centrifugal voices by negating their legitimacy.

The crux of the matter is that an authoritative text asserts a singular reality — its own. Feminists contend that this is perilous for women, given that authoritative texts are predominantly crafted by men, for men, and align with "patriarchal ideology." Such texts are so revered that they are perceived as beyond reproach; they communicate their male-centric "truths" with such conviction that their underlying presumptions often go unchallenged. From

this perspective, even Bakhtin's writings are seen as reinforcing patriarchal ideology and thus require empowerment or reevaluation.

In different historical and social contexts, it is imperative to recognize that feminist theory and its applications are largely concentrated in the more privileged parts of the world. Countries in the global "North"—those that are developed, liberal, and socially progressive—have largely addressed fundamental issues of social discrimination, like access to education or freedom of speech. Presently, these nations are delving into subtler facets of persisting inequalities. This backdrop is essential to bear in mind when discussing the utilization of Bakhtin's ideas in exploring gender identity.

This perspective is deemed credible by some feminists, although they may view it as superfluous. This is because Bakhtin envisioned dialogism not merely as a literary construct but as a principle deeply rooted in societal structures, cultural norms, and interpersonal dynamics. This sentiment is echoed by scholars such as Kay Halesek, who articulates:

At the same time, I believe Bakhtin's theory needs to be transformed into a 'more inclusive' one. It is already inclusive at its core, but one must take into account the social context in which Bakhtin's ideas were formed and in which they are now applied (Halasek, 2020: 61).

This perspective not only contrasts with an earlier statement by the same author (cited above in the text), in which she emphasized the need to perceive Bakhtinian hierarchy not merely as a male/female binary but as broader oppressor/oppressed categories spanning various dimensions, but it also stands in opposition to the fundamental tenets of Bakhtinian theory.

Kay Halesek's assertion that, due to their historical disenfranchisement, authoritative discourse is a women's issue, tends to overlook a crucial perspective. It fails to recognize that, in a broader socio-historical context, "patriarchy" may not be the most oppressive hierarchical structure. Taking into account the specific socio-historical contexts mentioned, it is essential to note that feminist theory and practice largely originate from and address issues pertinent to more privileged parts of the globe. Nations in the global "North"—characterized as developed, liberal, and socially progressive—have largely addressed basic social disparities, such as access to education or freedom of speech. Consequently, their focus has shifted to more nuanced persisting inequalities. As discussions delve into the application of Bakhtin's concepts in the exploration of feminism or gender identity, this context should remain at the forefront.



In countries where equal access to education for both genders is denied, or where gender-based violence is institutionalized within societal structures, there is a pressing need for tangible, actionable solutions, rather than purely theoretical discussions (Petersen et al., 2005). This underscores the importance of acknowledging gender differences, which the global North seeks to minimize, as these differences play a vital role in implementing targeted reforms in the global South. Concurrently, it is crucial to recognize that several non-Western cultures have historically embraced a more diverse spectrum of gender identities. This presents an intriguing aspect of Bakhtin's theories: despite the socio-historical contexts of their inception (in places like the global South with more binary gender systems), these contexts do not compromise the integrity and clarity of Bakhtin's categorical framework.

In numerous countries and regions globally, authoritative hierarchies extend beyond gender, oppressing individuals — both male and female — based on racial, ethnic, or class distinctions. Within this landscape, Bakhtin's concept of the carnival shines in its essence, representing a temporary suspension of *all* hierarchical structures.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Feminist theorists, in their endeavors to fortify their theoretical constructs, often employ Bakhtinian concepts as tools for bridging gaps or for maneuvering through intricate realms of feminist hermeneutics. I argue that instead of absorbing Bakhtin's ideas in their entirety, they deploy a Bakhtin "toolkit," selectively appropriating his concepts. There is a prevailing notion among some theorists that Bakhtin's works, by virtue of being authored by a male, inadvertently perpetuate patriarchal paradigms. This stance serves as a convenient justification for contorting Bakhtinian categories to better fit the feminist theoretical mold.

While certain feminist critiques strive to make Bakhtin more inclusive or seek to amplify female voices within his discourse, they inadvertently foster a reductive understanding of Bakhtin's work. These critiques mistakenly equate Bakhtin's notion of authoritative discourse with patriarchy and disempowered voices with female narratives.

Bakhtin postulated that a monologic discourse is primarily concerned with the perpetuation of stable norms associated with certain identities within consistent social contexts, with these norms only being contested over extended durations. He often characterizes monologic discourse as the domain of societal elites. However, he refrains from exclusively branding this elite as patriarchal.

Bakhtin's idea of the carnivalesque encapsulates the spirit of radical democracy—an equality fashioned by the masses, distinct from and in opposition to established socio-economic and political structures. It celebrates collective triumphs: the bounty of material abundance, the essence of freedom, and the ethos of equality and fraternity. Carnavalesque democracy emphasizes genuine equality, transcending socio-economic disparities. Bakhtin's vision is one of an unwavering democracy that critiques the capitalist dichotomy of economic and political democracies and emphasizes profound participatory inclusivity in both economic and political spheres.

This brand of democracy, rooted in Bakhtin's philosophy, inherently champions greater inclusivity than one constructed on a mere gender binary. It possesses the flexibility to adapt to varied cultural and social contexts and is applicable to any community characterized by hierarchical dynamics. Therefore, for feminist scholars and theorists to truly harness the potential of Bakhtin's ideas, there is an imperative to engage with them holistically, rather than limiting themselves to cherry-picked, diluted versions.

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ДИАНА ГАСПАРЯН

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## ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ ИДЕЙ БАХТИНА В ФЕМИНИСТСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ

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**Аннотация:** В последние годы концепции М. М. Бахтина получают все большее признание в западных научных кругах, находя применение в самых разных областях — от лингвистики до психиатрии. Такое запоздалое признание может показаться необычным, если не учитывать конкретный исторический контекст, в котором идеи Бахтина были представлены на Западе. Их первоначальное появление было тесно связано с развитием феминистской теории, феминистской критики и дискуссий о гендерной идентичности.

Примечательно, что первое англоязычное изложение некоторых мыслей Бахтина появилось в 1966 г. в работе Юлии Кристевой «Слово, диалог и роман», ставшей основополагающим трудом в феминистской теории. После этого в течение более двух десятилетий такие бахтинские понятия, как «голос», «диалогизм», «гибридная конструкция», «гетероглоссия» и «карнавал», преимущественно использовались в феминистских интерпретациях известными теоретиками феминизма, в том числе Ю. Кристевой, В. Бутом и Д. Вауэром. Это сохранялось даже после появления в 1980-х годах прямых переводов работ Бахтина. Для многих эта связь может показаться неожиданной и даже контринтуитивной, учитывая, что сам Бахтин не обращался напрямую к феминистским проблемам или гендерным темам, не ссылался на авторов-женщин в своей литературной критике. В этой статье я рассмотрю присвоение феминистками центральных бахтинских понятий и выясню, насколько теория Бахтина плодородна для феминистских интерпретационных стратегий. Далее я утверждаю, что, хотя это феминистское принятие в значительной степени способствовало распространению бахтинских концепций на Западе, оно одновременно ограничило их более широкое распространение, используя их в качестве «бахтинского инструментария» для устранения теоретических недостатков и обхода проблем в феминистской теории. Зачастую это приводило к упрощенному и редуکتивному пониманию бахтинских идей. Кроме того, я полагаю, что эта проблема связана с основной проблемой, освещенной в работах самого Бахтина: переводы и интерпретации одних и тех же идей на разных языках неэквивалентны, поскольку на них влияют различные диалогические системы.

**Ключевые слова:** Бахтин, феминистская теория, гендерная идентичность, диалогичность, моноглоссия, гетероглоссия, карнавал.

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AESTHETICS, ETHICS, LOGIC, ONTOLOGY

STUDIES. PART 2

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ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ. ЧАСТЬ ВТОРАЯ

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MAIIA-SOFIIA ZHUMATINA\*

## CENTAUR AT THE EDGE OF THE FOREST\*\*

HEGELIAN ART HISTORY AND TEMPORAL DISCURSIVE VIOLENCE

Submitted: Oct. 16, 2023. Reviewed: Nov. 24, 2023. Accepted: Dec. 04, 2022.

**Abstract:** The study is devoted to one of the most relevant topics in art theory and philosophy of art—the search for principles for constructing a world history of art that would not be Western-centric. Since the very emergence of a general history of art as a discipline was influenced by Hegel's philosophical system, attempts to develop a new history of art from its beginnings in the 1960s to contemporary decolonial initiatives, have focused on deconstructing various aspects of its Hegelian foundations. In its most radical form, Hegel can be seen as the cause of the "white colonist" view of the art history of "Other" cultures, which are attributed traits such as "primitiveness," "backwardness," or are completely denied a place in history. This paper examines three ideas that underlie traditional art history (linearity, the principle of significance, and monochrony), as well as three philosophical questions that create any such history (what concept of history is chosen, how the principle of movement through history is understood, and what the principle selection of art history records is). These ideas and questions will be examined in relation to Hegel's philosophy, along with how their many practical interpretations deviate to varying degrees from the original. All of them are connected by the fact that they presuppose a certain philosophy of history and time. To reconsider the critique of Hegelianism, this study proposes to examine it through the concept of *temporal discursive violence*, which is constructed by applying the anthropological concept of the denial of *coevalness* to the Other to the context of temporal relations in the history of art. It will be shown that the rejection of Hegelian principles may lead to a large number of paradoxical situations, in which the history of art turns into a meaningless catalog or even into *big data*. Next there will be an attempt to prove that (a) the problem with Hegelianism in the history of art can be translated into the problem of temporal discursive violence, however, (b) this problem is not solved by relativization, the rejection of Hegel, or the selective preservation of his principles.

**Keywords:** History of Arts, Philosophy of Time, Hegel, Discursive Violence, Timeline, Monochrony, Coevalness, Postcolonial Studies.

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A chronology of important events, navigating through the order of artistic styles and many series of works arranged in a linear timeline are what we

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are accustomed to seeing in most traditional books that claim to be guides to the general (worldwide or universal) history of art.<sup>1</sup> One can identify three ideas that lie behind this practice:

- (1) The idea that art, in the course of its development, successively passes in time through different epochs and styles<sup>2</sup> (linearity<sup>3</sup>);
- (2) The idea that in this development one can identify important key events, great works and their creators<sup>4</sup> (principle of significance<sup>5</sup>);

<sup>1</sup>Kubler, in his revolutionary attempt to rethink the writing of art history, argues that the “history of things” (in which “history of art treats of the least useful and most expressive products”) began only in the Italian Renaissance (Kubler, 2008: 1). In an attempt to describe the history of art history, Ch. Wood chose the Middle Ages as the first significant period to talk about (Wood, 2019: 9–10). For this research, however, it is accepted that the position according to which the first full-fledged history of art should be considered is one in which (a) its historicity is consciously reflected and set forth as a principle, and which (b) strives for universality. In this case, the first history of art may be found in the works of J. J. Winckelmann (*History of Ancient Art*, 1764) and G. W. F. Hegel (*Lectures on Aesthetics*, 1820–1829); cf. Gombrich, 1984: 51; Elkins, 1988: 354; Karlholm & Moxey, 2018: 1–2. Gombrich, however, gives primacy to Hegel, since only the latter fully complies with the two criteria we have noted. It should be noted that the phrase “history of art” is used by Hegel in his “Aesthetics” in the context of criticism against “scientific ways” of treating of art “from the outside”: “...we see the Science of art only busying itself with actual works of art from the outside, arranging them into a history of art, setting up discussions about existing works or outlining theories which are to yield general considerations for both criticizing and producing works of art” (Hegel, Knox, 1988: Vol 1. 14). The phrase is rarely used in the context of Hegel’s own endeavor (cf. e.g. *ibid.*: Vol 2. 787).

<sup>2</sup>As noted by Karlholm & Moxey, 2018: 1, “the unquestioned assumption of the discipline of the history of art since its creation in the late nineteenth century is that time unfolds chronologically, in an orderly manner leading somewhere. The chronological shape of historical writing has its ancient roots in natural metaphors of birth, maturity, and decay, as much as in the purposive direction ascribed to the passage of time by Christianity”. The fact that “schools and styles” are an invention of the 19th century (and thereby of what we will call traditional art history) was noted by Kubler, 2008: 2.

<sup>3</sup>In a large study on the cartography of time there is an interesting case, stating that a type of line that is not straight, but clumsy, is no longer linear — there, linearity means “straightness,” but we understand linearity in a more general sense (Rosenberg, 2018: 20).

<sup>4</sup>For a description of this possibility of highlighting the most important works as fundamental to the creation of art history, see e.g. in Kubler, 2008: 1–2.

<sup>5</sup>“Principle of significance” is my concept, in which I cover and generalize different approaches to assessing the significance of events in some of the areas of Hegel’s “histories of the Spirit” (world history, art, religion, philosophy), owing to which it can be classified as *important*. For example, in view of the principle of significance, Hegel can, within the framework of his philosophy of world history, talk about “world-historical importance and significance”, “world-historical nations”, “world-historical events”, and “world-historical individuals”, etc. Hegel considers the question of significance in “Aesthetics” as well, and says that the “significance of a work of art” is that it “disclose[s] an inner life”, i. e. that it should not be “exhausted” by what can be seen (Hegel, Knox, 1988: Vol 1. 20).



- (3) The idea that all embodiments of art, from prehistoric “beginnings” up to the 20th and 21st centuries, somehow belong to the same timeline and one history<sup>6</sup> (monochrony).

All these points are united, consciously or not, by a certain vision of history as a temporal phenomenon, and thereby by certain prerequisites from the fields of philosophy of history and philosophy of time.

In works on the theory of art, one can find statements that posit, with minor variation, that the father of art history as a meaningful presentation of the entire artistic heritage of humankind is Hegel (see note 1). In this connection, numerous other characteristics of traditional art history, including variations of the aforementioned linearity and monochrony, are called “Hegelian,”<sup>7</sup> along with the related idea of development. In accordance with these vague characteristics, traditional art histories—textbooks, monographs, etc.—are often called “Hegelian.” In the first part of our study this attribution practice will be reconsidered.

<sup>6</sup>In this study, it is essential to separate “linearity” and “monochrony.” Despite the fact that passing through different styles may seem “ornate,” a path full of “regressions” and “dead ends,” it will always be linear if it “ends,” for example, with what is commonly called “contemporary art.” In other words, monochrony and the idea of progress practically guarantee linear development. As will be shown below in this text, traditional art histories are criticized precisely for this way of understanding monochrony. Even if art itself is not attributed with “linearity” in the temporal sense, it is implicit in histories of art: for example, Wood says that in the period after 1800, “art history protects art as one of the few places in modern life where disparate ways of thinking about time are protected: eternity, flow, reversals, and switchbacks. All around art is linear time, directed and convergent, the time of mere experience that governs modernist progressivism. This is realist time—time as just what it seems to be. Classic art history with its discontinuous, anachronic story lines was in this respect antirealist [...]” (Wood, 2019: 392).

<sup>7</sup>Of course, this does not mean that in practice all these books are a correct reflection of Hegel’s ideas. In this article a terminological distinction will be made between (a) what refers to Hegel himself (English “Hegel’s,” Russian “гегелевское”), (b) what consciously reflects the ideas of Hegel (English “Hegelian,” Russian “гегельянское”) and (c) what belongs to the tradition formed under the influence of Hegel, and which bears traces, often distorted, of his ideas (English also “Hegelian,” Russian also “гегельянское”). The meanings (a), (b) and (c) in Russian and English are often confused. In the literature attempts to separate the meanings (b) and (c) can be found: for example, in Elkins, 1988 they are designated as Hegelian and “Hegelian” (with quotation marks—*ibid.*: 359–360); moreover, “Hegelian” refers to a specific understanding of Hegel’s influence in Gombrich’s prominent book (Gombrich, 1984). The author believes that using quotation marks is not the best solution, because quotation marks can create the impression that Hegel’s ideas are being used incorrectly in the indicated cases, that this is false Hegelianism. I therefore propose to use the triad of concepts Hegel’s—Hegelian—Hegel-inspired. A similar but slightly different division is proposed in Gombrich, 1979.

The traditional, Hegelian and Hegel-influenced way of conceptualizing art history has been the subject of one branch of criticism and revision of traditional art historiography for more than half a century. This criticism often intersects with the contemporary tendency to liberate the study of culture in all its manifestations from the traditional Western-centric approach—which, in turn, is seen as a legacy of colonialism.<sup>8</sup> The above-mentioned characteristics of traditional art history are seen as a consequence of colonial thinking: the conceptualization of history as linear and monochronic,<sup>9</sup> as well as the principle of recording important events, impose on the whole world a single, Western vision of history and the very passage of time. Consequently, and expectedly, Hegel is often seen as the source of colonialist discourse.

Based on the Hegelian and Hegel-inspired aspects of traditional art history and their criticism, discussed in the first part of the study, the second part of the study will be devoted to considering the criticism of such Hegelianism as that which generates *temporal discursive violence*<sup>10</sup> in general history of art towards anything that does not belong to it, remains on its outskirts, is traumatized by it. In this discussion, the key focus are the following questions:

- (a) Is the “Hegelianism” of art history the cause of the production of temporal discursive violence?
- (b) How can this violent practice be prevented in order to make art history non-colonial and non-violent?
- (c) What problematic places have possible “anti-/non-Hegelian” solutions?
- (d) What will happen to the history of art if it is dismantled from the Hegel-related principles discussed in the first part of the study?

I introduce the concept of temporal discursive violence as a special type of discursive violence in relation to artistic practices that do not fit into the

<sup>8</sup>One of the first fundamental works to challenge this attitude is certainly Kubler’s “The Shape of Time” (Kubler, 2008). Postcolonial discourse entered the academic world in the 1970s. Postcolonial discourse and decolonial thought differ in that “for decolonial thinkers, writers, artists, activists, postcolonial discourse is not radical and critical enough.” The “decolonial turn” emerged approximately a decade and a half later than the entry into the arena of postcolonial studies. Decolonial thought is characterized by the rejection of claims to a single truth. Cf. Tlostanova, 2020. Within the framework of our study, we can say that the discussion Hegel’s role was part of the postcolonial “condition,” and calls for liberation from Hegel were an attempt at a decolonial choice.

<sup>9</sup>Monochrony as an important characteristic of the traditional description of art history was introduced (in order to be criticized) relatively recently: Karlholm & Moxey, 2018: 2).

<sup>10</sup>The concept of *discursive violence* (regardless of art) was introduced in the anthropological work “Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object” (Fabian, 1983).

Western-centric concept and timeline of the general history of art, because in the matter of writing art history, as stated at the beginning of the study, it is the temporal aspects that are fundamentally important.

In the conclusion I will try to show that the struggle with the “Hegelian” history of art, perhaps unintentionally, has turned into a struggle with the Hegelian concept of world history.

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The traditional understanding of universal history in the history of art is connected in contemporary theory with the origins of the discipline itself, which stem from the end of the 18th century, when, influenced by the events of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, philosophers developed concepts of history that implied the idea of progress. Among these philosophers, the brightest figure was Hegel with his philosophical concept of world history: it was under its inspiration that the history of art as a discipline was formed.<sup>11</sup> However, the very link of art history to Hegel is often a set of rather vague ideas, called Hegelian very loosely: for a long time in the theory of art, Hegel as a mythical “centaur” lived “at the edge of its forest” of history and theory of art,<sup>12</sup> and it seems that he still resides there.

In order to examine in more detail how Hegel can be considered the inspiration for the formation of classical art history, an analysis will be conducted, consisting of three philosophical questions, without the answers to which it is impossible to create a universal history of art:

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Karlholm & Moxey, 2018: 1–2. According to the authors, “the use of Hegelian ideas by the first generations of art historians therefore served to consolidate a developmental form of chronology as the model of temporality on which the discipline unfolded.”

<sup>12</sup>Elkins, 1988: 354, 356. In his article on the problem of a frivolous attitude towards “rigorous theory” in art theory, Elkins cites Burckhardt (Burckhardt, Nichols, 1943: 80) and his thesis about the uselessness of theory as the inspiration for such practices: “We shall, further, make no attempt at system, nor lay any claim to ‘historical principles.’ On the contrary, we shall confine ourselves to observation. ... Above all, we have nothing to do with the philosophy of history.” Elkins comments on the consequences as follows: “When Jacob Burckhardt made this assertion he was thinking of Hegel, whom he described with the image of a centaur ‘at the edge of the forest of history?’ Today we might hesitate to claim that the centaur does not trespass on our domain or that he could be repelled by such a warning. Instead what is often called ‘Hegelian’ theory — but is, more precisely, a set of vague propositions loosely referred to as ‘Hegelian’ has become a central concern in several disciplines.” Elkins believes that “sustained theoretical arguments in the body of art historical texts have become uncommon [...], and theoretical issues are taken up instead at the close of articles — as envois — in prefaces, and in introductions to books. [...] It [theory. — *M.-S. Zh.*] seems to live at the edge of the forest of our texts” (Elkins, 1988: 355–356).

- (1) What concept of history is taken as the basis for the world history of art?
- (2) How does the historical movement of world art history occur?
- (3) According to what principle is the history of art recorded, i. e. How are events selected as worthy of being part of the world history of art?

(1) *Concepts of history and general history of art.* The idea of “linear time” (and therefore of linear history) was created against the background of the contrast between Christian teaching and Pagan traditions, in which ideas of “cyclic” time are often found.<sup>13</sup> It is therefore not by chance that the idea of the linearity of time and history and the teachings of Hegel turned out to be connected: the theory often places Hegel’s philosophy of history in the vast range of secularized historical concepts of the West.<sup>14</sup> It is no coincidence that the period of formation of traditional art history as a discipline (which is thought of here as influenced by Hegel’s ideas) coincides with the formation of historical thinking in a linear time paradigm,<sup>15</sup> where the Gregorian calendar is used as a unified time calculation system.<sup>16</sup> In traditional art history, no deep elaboration of Hegel’s authentic philosophy of time can be

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Raju, 2003: 45–46. As can be seen later, the old opposition between Christian and Pagan has acquired a new dimension in the context of decolonial studies, where any concept of time that does not belong to the white colonizer turns out to be “Pagan,” in the sense of inferior by value.

<sup>14</sup>Hegel preserves the most important moments of the “beginning” and “end” of history, but gives them a completely different meaning. In Hegelian history, instead of Christian eschatology as the collapse of “untrue” history, the movement of Spirit in history is understood as its breakthrough to its own Being; the end of history is not the beginning of “true Being,” but the ending through Spirit’s realization of all its tasks; instead of a personal Christian god — a philosophical god. Cf. Perov & Sergeyev, 1997: 25–27.

<sup>15</sup>As Karlholm put it, “when history emerged as a collective singular around 1800, as a new conceptual formation — ‘history itself’ — corresponding to a ‘new time’ (Neuzeit) a. k. a. modernity, the past was artificially separated from the progressing present, with which Western modernity identified, not least to distance itself from nature and the cultures of the world” (Karlholm, 2018: 15).

<sup>16</sup>The Western-centricity of the Gregorian calendar is primarily visible in the fact that it counts from the birth of Christ; it claims to be universal through the fact that it counts the revolutions of the Earth around the Sun. The Western-centricity of time calculation does not end there. As Brett Kelly-Chalmers writes: “While the 24-hour timescale and the seven-day week derive from the Babylonian sexagesimal system and Gregorian calendar, the global time standard is a relatively recent temporal convention. At the International Meridian Conference of 1884, a quorum of world powers agreed to measure time at the point at which the sun passed the Prime Meridian marker in Greenwich, England, thereby establishing a global standard that united a variety of independent and local timekeeping systems.” (Brett Kelly-Chalmers, 2019: 21).

found, rather the borrowing of some key ideas from his philosophy of history and art, which will be “pasted” onto simple linear time and the Gregorian calendar. This is evidenced by the favorite way of visualizing the chronology of history in traditional art history books—the timeline—in the form of a single line (no matter how “ornate” and complex), going from past to future and from left to right, on which marks have been made.<sup>17</sup>

As Walter Kaufmann neatly put it,

Hegel, like Augustine, Lessing, and Kant before him, and Comte, Marx, Spengler, and Toynbee after him, believed that history has a pattern and made bold to reveal it (Kaufmann, 1951: 473).

One of the basic principles of Hegel’s general philosophy of history, which the history of art borrows, is that

...universal history exhibits the stepwise progression in the development of that principle the content of which is the consciousness of freedom (Hegel, Alvarado, 2011: 51).

In traditional art history, this principle can be seen as connected with the chronological linear calculation of time, a timeline, which resembles a “thread” on which art history strings its “beads”: art history unfolds as a chain or a set of parallel chains within one timeline, where each link is somehow connected with the previous and subsequent ones. The evidence of this idea is also present in the idea of the continuity of styles, in tracing the influence of artists from the past and of their works on younger creators. Even technically, in books on the history of art, a single series of works appears as a series of illustrations arranged in a certain order—Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3—which visually supports the concept of a linearly successive history of art.<sup>18</sup> In its most radical form, the “collapse” of the history of art

<sup>17</sup>As has already been said, linearity can be understood in a narrower sense, for example, that a line always implies the moments “to” and “from,” and thus the goal. Compare, for example, Žižek’s interpretation of the Hegelian historical movement: “...progress is never a linear approximation to some pre-existing goal since every step forward that deserves the name ‘progress’ implies a radical redefinition of the very universal notion of progress” (Žižek, 2023). In other words, Hegel’s visualization of history is more like a spiral of spirals that unfold. Nevertheless, in our interpretation, even such a spiral, which does not have a given goal but constantly grows it from its inner self, is also a line, a self-revealing line.

<sup>18</sup>For such an example of a timeline, see Gombrich, 2006: 656–663. Even if parallel “threads” with their own “beads” appear somewhere (as if we simultaneously trace the events of the art world in different parts of the world, e.g. *ibid.*: 656–657), they either eventually merge into a single whole, or all together are actually organized as one big thread (because, for example, in the case of Egypt, we are only interested in its ancient art). Kubler objected

into a single chain unites the historical horizon of various arts, which leads to the fact that the history of art of all countries, peoples and cultures is seen as located in the same temporal dimension of world history — linear and monochronic.

Contemporary art theory criticizes this understanding of universal, unified time and history. The first serious challenge to this vision of time in art history was made in the 1960s by Kubler and Gombrich. Kubler, in his *The Shape of Time*, instead of a single time chain, proposes a chaotic internal structure, which in its visualization resembles what in mathematics is called “networks or directed graphs” (Kubler, 2008: 123–124n3); the points of this polychronic structure have many alternative “predecessors” and “successors.” Kubler believed that the task of the historian is “to portray time” (“the shapes of time are the prey we want to capture”; *ibid.*: 29), and that the simplified “portrait of time” that traditional art history painted was a consequence of the use of biological metaphors of development and growth (*ibid.*: 11), which are inappropriate in the world of things. Instead, he proposed manifold shapes of time, a new portrait of art history, in which the analysis of the “meaning” of art objects (a legacy he attributed to Kassirer; *ibid.*: IX) is abandoned, and replaced by looking on the art object as a “historical event” and a hard-won “solution to a certain problem” (*ibid.*: 30). As K. Wood described it,

The “fallen,” like Gombrich and Kubler, are realists about art. The fallen are those who have decided that they were not interested in art in the first place; that their real object of study is image, object, thing, matter, power, flow. Fallen art history accepts that the base, material world is all there is, which does not rule out entertaining the fancy that base material things are alive, or “want” something. [...] Today that unbelief [in the traditional vision of art. — *M.-S. Zh.*] is commonplace, especially among non-modernists, and so no longer radical (Wood, 2019: 400).

Nowadays, the greatest stream of criticism of linear and monochronic art history comes from postcolonial and decolonial studies, which, in our opinion, is the logical conclusion of Kubler’s project and the fight against

to this approach to non-Western cultures, according to which they are treated as one-time, randomly picked “beads” on some part of a monochronic thread. He introduced the concepts of “open sequence” and “arrested sequence” instead of the concept of “important” works of art. For example, he attributed the artistic practices of Australian and African aborigines to the first type of sequences (it doesn’t matter whether they are ancient or modern — the distinction is not made in principle), because “their possibilities are still being expanded by living artists”; The second group includes, for example, ancient Greek vases — images of the Hellenic world did not receive a revival in new artistic practices (Kubler, 2008: 31, 99).

the “idol of the timeline”<sup>19</sup>—replicated and hegemonic, becoming more than just a tool, something that determines thinking. Monochrony is criticized as a standardized system for conceptualizing the history of the white male colonizer. Linear time in such a system is Christian time, which is to cover the whole world<sup>20</sup> (Mark 16:15–16). The position of postcolonial and decolonial researchers will be discussed in detail in the second part.

From the perspective of contemporary theories, the imposition of the concept of linear time goes along with a certain axiologization of temporal concepts: linear time served to consolidate the superiority of a Western man, the Christian, over Others and their ways of conceptualizing time and history. It is no coincidence that it was medieval Christian thought that made an important contribution to the development of the concept of synchronizing the histories of different countries and peoples,<sup>21</sup> holding Western European history as a model for this synchronization. This universal history itself was seen as part of a larger divine history— from the creation of the world to the Last Judgment— in the context of which the imposition of Christian time on the Other was seen as the concern of the “big brother-colonizer” about salvation of the Other (which will be discussed in the second part).

The new proposed optics of viewing the temporality of the historical process, which attack the linearity of the historical narrative dominating in recent centuries, can, in the author’s opinion, be summarized as *heterochronic* theories and strategies. They draw attention to the problem of repressed “local temporalities” and alternative understandings of history. From the perspective of postcolonial theorists, this problem is ignored in the colonial optics of history— the time and history of the colonialist coincides with

<sup>19</sup>Rosenberg, 2018: 60. The concept of an “idol of the timeline” is introduced by D. Rosenberg. He also reconstructs the origins of the visual timeline, noting that in the mid-18th century the timeline was not yet widely understood and required explanation, until Joseph Priestley popularized it in 1765, when he “published a chart representing the lives of famous men by means of lines arrayed chronologically against a scale of 2950 years.”

<sup>20</sup>In this sense, the idea of monochrony can be considered as embedded in the missionary imperative of Christianity: “Go into all the world and preach the gospel to all creation. Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned.”

<sup>21</sup>The history of the timeline begins in the ancient world, but in a form familiar to us it appears in the “Chronicle” of Eusebius of Caesarea (4th century), in which one can discern the first attempt to establish the place of Christianity in world history: “He also planned to synchronize with this central narrative the histories of several other nations that had maintained their own records and had their own conventions of chronology, and that had figured prominently in the history of ancient Israel or the modern church”: Rosenberg & Grafton, 2010: 26. A detailed examination of the timeline visualization itself is beyond the scope of this study.

universal history, while in non-Western cultures such monochronic linear time comes into conflict with local tradition and therefore leads, for example, to the fact that in such countries two parallel systems exist: global Western European and local.<sup>22</sup> In addition, contemporary theories also criticize the visualization of linear monochrony as *timeline*: Serres and Latour, for example, propose a “more intuitive” visualization through “a kind of crumpling,” a multiple, foldable diversity.<sup>23</sup>

(2) *Universal art history movement*. Hegel’s philosophy of history implies “that time is self-motivated and that its passage coincides with the workings of the ‘Spirit’ as it wends its way through the ages” (Karlholm & Moxey, 2018: 1). Hegel’s historical concept is *teleological*, the history has a goal: the movement of the Spirit is the same as its development. Hegel considers the goal of the Spirit its knowledge of itself, which it accumulates in the course of the movement of history:

World history is progress in the consciousness of freedom, a progress which we must recognize in its necessity. [...] the purpose of the spiritual world, and [...] if the final goal of the world, the consciousness of spirit of its own freedom and thereby the reality of its freedom in general, is given. [...]. At the same time, it is freedom in itself which includes within itself the infinite necessity to bring itself to consciousness (for it is, in terms of its concept, knowledge of itself) and thereby to reality: it is itself the goal which it executes, and the only goal of spirit (Hegel, Alvarado, 2011: 17–18; italics — *M.-S.Zh.*).

Hegel emphasizes that development (and therefore the history) is inherent only to the Spirit, but not to the unspirited or physical world:

The abstract changes which history presents have been long characterized in a general manner, as an advance to something better, more perfect. The changes that take place in nature—how infinitely manifold soever they may be—exhibit only a perpetual cycle; in nature, there occurs “nothing new under the sun,” and in this respect the multiform play of its phenomena induces a feeling of

<sup>22</sup>So, for example, the chronology of India was built following the model of the West: scientists “turned to the standard European historical schema of the ancient, medieval, and modern periods, but with added cultural refinements: Buddhist and Early Hindu (ancient); later Hindu and Islamic (medieval); colonial (modern)” (Mitter, 2018: 67).

<sup>23</sup>Serres & Latour, Lapidus, 1995: 164. The favorite philosophical proponents of new historical-temporal paradigms, which cannot be discussed in detail within the framework of this article, are the philosophical opponents of linear time—Bergson, Heidegger, Deleuze. Increasingly, the attention of the theory is turning to what has been taken out of the timeline: the stratification of historical time and the time of art history is being comprehended, as well as the geographical stratification of temporalities, thanks to which such phenomena as the “Northern Renaissance” or “Asian Art Nouveau” exist.



boredom. Only in those changes which take place on a spiritual foundation does anything new arise. This phenomenon in spirit brought to the fore an entirely different purpose in man than in merely natural things, in which we find always one and the same stable character, to which all change reverts; namely, a real capacity for change, and that for the better — an inclination of perfectibility (Hegel, Alvarado, 2011: 49).

[...] It must be observed at the outset that the phenomenon we investigate, world history, occurs in the domain of spirit. The term “world” includes both physical and psychical nature. Physical nature also meshes with world history, and from the start attention will have to be paid to the fundamental natural relations thus involved. But the spirit, and the course of its development, is what is substantial (ibid.: 15).

The principle of development and progress in the history of art is reflected in the idea of development and change of artistic styles,<sup>24</sup> where each is marked by a certain innovation. For Hegel, innovation involves an increase in “consciousness.” As Gombrich described it,

What precedes the art of Antiquity is a less conscious stage: Oriental art. Hegel calls this pre-art (*Vorkunst*) and, following the Neoplatonist Creuzer, he attributes to it a particular form of symbolism which is not yet adequate to the spirit (Gombrich, 1984: 56).

One of the most important consequences of this approach is that the old is in a sense devalued, while “the great masters must be ahead of their time, for if they were not they would not be great masters” (ibid.: 67), and that public opinion “will eventually accept it, recognize it, and make it one of its own prejudices” (Kaufmann, 1951: 479).

The “myth of the future,” based on the concept of “progress,” reached its apogee at the end of the 19th - the first half of the 20th century;<sup>25</sup> this myth, inspired by the ideas of Hegel and Marx, implied that the future could only appear after the present had been rejected (“negate to create”: Cuevas-Hewitt, 2021: 178). Artistic theory and artists of the second half of the 20th century sought to free themselves from the paradigm of “killing” their ancestors: as A. Groom described,

<sup>24</sup>Karlholm & Moxey, 2018: 1: “The founders of art history similarly sketched a developmental history of art, where each period contained the seeds of that which was to come.”

<sup>25</sup>As F. Berardi notes, this myth became “more than an implicit belief: it was a true faith, based on the concept of ‘progress’” (Berardi, Bove, 2021: 167–168).

once the twentieth century's fetishization of teleological progress is abandoned, history's time reveals itself as a concoction of chance encounters, arbitrary inclusions, systematic exclusions, parenthetical digressions, abrupt U-turns, inherited anecdotes, half-remembered facts, glossed-over uncertainties and forgotten backstories (Groom, 2021: 12–13).

However, in the second half of the 20th century, Hegel's ideas appeared in a different context — in the concepts of the “end of art” and “art after philosophy.” At the same time, curiously, the ideas of “art after philosophy” are based on the same idea of progress and a kind of “increasing in consciousness”: as J. Kosuth argues, art should each time question the nature of art and thereby expand that what art is; the criterion of true art is to be its own *not-yet*.<sup>26</sup> A feature of Hegelian teleology that is important to emphasize is the idea of progress as a single impersonal historical process (cf. Mitter, 2018: 68). The active force of the Hegelian system was no one living in time, but the historical process itself. Also, despite the impersonality of Hegelian progress, it manifests itself as *total axiologization of temporal narratives*: what seemed progressive, innovative, and modern at a certain point in history was more valuable than what was “lagging behind” at the same point in time.

As with the question of the concept of history in the context of the general history of art, the issue of the method of historical movement naturally faced postcolonial and decolonial studies: some new art “knocked on the door” of the world history of art, and it did not fit into the Western-centric “movement of the Spirit” and into a single monochronic timeline of coherent art development. Through the prism of a single and universal teleological paradigm, colonized culture has traditionally been defined by the colonizer as *backward*:

post-colonial scholarship diagnosed belatedness as one of the most pervasive forms of discursive violence of colonial contact in the modern period (Roberts, 2018: 82).

For current research, two types of “backwardness” of colonized cultures are of interest:

- (a) Their conceptions of time are “backward” in regard to the Western European understanding of chronology and history;

<sup>26</sup>According to Kosuth's radical conceptualism, “the ‘value’ of particular artists after Duchamp can be weighed according to how much they questioned the nature of art; which is another way of saying ‘what they added to the conception of art’ or what wasn't there before they started” (Kosuth, 1991: 18, 25–26). That is, borrowing Heidegger's vocabulary, we can say that conceptual art is its own *not-yet*.

(b) The “backwardness” of art in relation to Western European art history.<sup>27</sup>

The critique of Hegelian art history thus turns into an accusation of the cult of progress and the hegemonization of the understanding of contemporaneity.<sup>28</sup>

(3) *The principle of selection and recording of world art history.* According to Hegel, not all events are equally important parts of world history. Therefore, there is a certain principle of selection of what should be captured in world history as its significant part. Only “world-historic” episodes and “world-historical individuals” fall under Hegel’s criterion of significance. According to him, in great historic relations

(in this sphere) are presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which are opposed to this system, which injure and even destroy its foundations and existence; which at the same time have content which might seem good, largely advantageous, essential, and necessary. These contingencies become historical; they involve a general principle of a different order than that on which the existence of a people or a state depends. This general principle is a moment of the producing idea, of truth striving and urging towards itself (Hegel, Alvarado, 2011: 27).

The same feature of universality, according to Hegel, should be inherent in historic world personalities—they are those “in whose aims such a general principle lie” (ibid.).

This method of selecting important events and personalities is characteristic of the traditional form of general art history: the classical theoretical model represents art world events as points on a timeline of linear history, placing on it only what is considered significant and consistent with the idea of some important contribution and qualitative novelty of the artistic work or event. It included what had innovative significance for the development of art history according to the colonialist writing it, which is another

<sup>27</sup>Mitter, 2018: 63: “Time lag and delayed growth are the two complaints frequently leveled by western art historians and critics against modernisms from outside the West.”

<sup>28</sup>Probably the most popular strategy in criticizing the teleological concept of history is that it is always in opposition to a huge number of facts and events that remain outside the brackets of this scheme. Elkins (Elkins, 1988: 356) refers to Derrida and his concept of “theoretical fragility” as a feature inherent in texts in which the theoretical apparatus is presented in a very compressed form and abbreviated settings. As Derrida writes, such books “are composed along the same lines: a philosophical and teleological classification exhausts the critical problems in a few pages; one passes next to an exposition of facts. We have a contrast between the theoretical fragility of the reconstructions and the historical, archaeological, ethnological, philosophical wealth of information” (Derrida, Spivak, 1974: 28).

subject of criticism of postcolonial and decolonial theory. A special type of axiologization of temporal narrative, associated with the idea of progress, was embodied in connection with religious aspects: for classical colonial logic, “‘linear’ time represents progress, human freedom, and so on, while ‘cyclic’ time represents stagnant societies, fatalism, etc.” (Raju, 2003: 45–46). Thus, the Other’s alternative idea of time received the image of inability to progress as such, and, consequently, the impossibility of being part of a progressive contemporaneity.

However, this “progressive” monochronic narrative can also be seen within one state, including the state of the colonizer himself: one can observe examples of a “time lag” in moving from its center to the periphery, which imposes similar (self)repressive processes more strongly the further one moves away from the center:

Modernism, as well as more recent global contemporary art, carry this legacy so that art from the periphery is always viewed as trying to “catch up” with the innovations of the metropolitan center (ibid.: 63–64).<sup>29</sup>

From all the above, it is clear that the principle of selecting important events and recording the traditional world history of art is predetermined by its linearity and monochrony. As Kubler wrote, the word “style” has become a metaphoric *ligne des hauteurs*, “the Himalayan range composed of the greatest monuments of all time, the touchstone and standard of artistic value” (Kubler, 2008: 3–4); in other words, in the linear history of art, “peaks” are selected, which, in turn, also compose a line.

As in the previous paragraphs, it is easy to see why the struggle with the traditional way of choosing what to include in the history of art and what not to can easily turn into a direct struggle with Hegel.

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To summarize the three questions addressed to traditional art history, the Hegelian and Hegel-inspired answers to them and their criticism, it can be noticed that a common motif everywhere is an accusation of the implementation of discursive violence concerning temporal and historical aspects towards what is not included in the values system of the world

<sup>29</sup>The author notes that this idea can be traced back to the works of Giorgio Vasari (16th century), where he “raised the issue of temporality when he defined the relationship between center and periphery as dependent not only on spatial but also on temporal factors,” right up to the Nobel lecture of the Mexican poet Octavio Paz (1990), in which he said that he “suffers from a case of delayed time” and that Mexicans “have been expelled from the present.”

history concept. This can be generalized as a manifestation of *temporal discursive violence*.

Temporal aspects of discursive violence first became the subject of analysis in works of Fabian in 1983, in the context of anthropological research (Fabian, 1983: 16),<sup>30</sup> where he analyzed ways of conceptualizing *the Other*. Fabian described the attitude typical of most anthropological research of the 18th-19th, and even 20th century (ibid.: 21), as a situation in which the anthropologist-colonialist relates himself to the Other being studied as the “modern, advanced” to the “belated and primitive.” Fabian noted this situation as “schizogenic use of Time” (ibid.)<sup>31</sup>: for example, a field researcher, despite being face to face with the object of the study, classifies him/her as belonging to a primitive communal system or using Bronze Age tools. The use of such classifications defining the “development level” of the Other, inevitably places them in the column of the table<sup>32</sup>, which is the “past” for Western European history. Thus, the explorer-colonizer seems to deny the Other the right to be “peer” or “coeval” in the sense of time (“coevalness sharing the present Time”: ibid.: 32), to be part of a common present with the researcher, separating the “contemporaneity” of the Other from the “contemporaneity” of the researcher, which is taken as the standard of “universal contemporaneity.” As a result, the Other enters into the “past” due to someone’s privileged power to produce narratives, often under the pretext of seemingly neutral classifications (ibid.: 16–17).

Taking the refusal of temporal coevalness and the associated “schizochrony” as a starting point for talking about the discursive violence in the context of time in Hegel-inspired art histories, I will try to consider these situations of

<sup>30</sup>“In other words, the socio-cultural evolutionists accomplished a major feat of scientific conservatism by saving an older paradigm from what M. Foucault called ‘the irruptive violence of time’. [...] the temporal discourse of anthropology as it was formed decisively under the paradigm of evolutionism rested on a conception of Time that was not only secularized and naturalized but also thoroughly spatialized.” (Foucault, 1973: 132) Ever since, Fabian argues “anthropology’s efforts to construct relations with its Other by means of temporal devices implied affirmation of difference as distance.”

<sup>31</sup>Fabian calls the use of time “schizogenic” if a study uses a concept of time different from those that underlie reports of his discoveries.

<sup>32</sup>The visibility of the line is disrupted and changes to the visibility of the table when we need to include the Other in the narrative of the general history of art — this is “what M. Foucault calls ‘tabular’ space, i. e., the kind of taxonomic space that must be postulated if cultural differences are to be conceived as a system of semiological constructs, organized by a logic of oppositions” (Fabian, 1983: 54).

intersection between the critique of Hegelianism in art history and temporal discursive violence.

The first intersection of the critique of Hegelian art history with the manifestation of temporal discursive violence arises in connection with the issue of contemporaneity of the colonizer and the colonized—most obviously and directly related to the original meaning of the Fabian's concept. Here the place of the colonizer is taken by the white man creating the narrative, and the Other is represented by the Fabian's Other and his/her artistic practices. The table in which the colonizer determines the place of the Other is the linear, monochronic and teleological history of art. As a rule, this is a schizochronic situation in which the art of the Other in this table of the world history of art is given a very modest place (if any at all), because he/she does not fall under the Hegelian criteria of "historic events" and "historic personalities."

If, in the case of the refusal of temporal coevalness in Fabian's understanding, one talks about the "belatedness" of the colonized countries in relation to world history, then in relation to the history of art, many artistic practices of the colonized countries do not at all have the status of art for most of Western historiography, and would rather be recognized as works of decorative art or cultural practices in a more diffuse sense. Since the concept of art for a Western researcher implies certain forms, their hierarchy (for example, fine arts and applied arts) and includes the artist's intention to produce art, the artistic practices of the Other can enter traditional world history only as art in the Western sense and more often according to *formal* characteristics that happen to coincide with the Western idea of art. Traditionally, the art of the Other fell into the column with the designation "primitive," being measured by a Hegelian-type value scale: ideas about style are determined by the chronological position of the author.<sup>33</sup>

Due to all this, Hegel's philosophy of history, whose influence is being considered, is routinely accused of a colonial, repressive approach to the Other. In the most radical version, Hegel is accused of the concept of "anti-historic peoples" and for the creation of a philosophical method based on

<sup>33</sup>Cf. Elkins, 1988: 369. A similar case of distribution is found in "an example from art historical practice — the study of Chinese bronzes. [...] When bronzes first attracted the attention of the West in the 1930s, archaeologists and art historians were faced with a radical absence of normal [...] data: [...] their origins were usually unknown; and practically nothing more remains of the civilization that produced them. [...] Therefore, the first researchers proposed a chronology in accordance with their own ideas about the style."

the exclusion of peoples, cultures and races from history;<sup>34</sup> therefore, the progress of the World Spirit is seen as “the history of the exclusion of the East by the West” (Boubia, 1997: 417–32). Such practice of “exclusion” correlates with “politics of invisibility” in postcolonial theory. Its manifestation in traditional art history is the practice of excluding the art of many cultures and countries as insignificant. Postcolonial theory in this regard

was concerned to make visible areas, nations, cultures of the world which were notionally acknowledged, technically there, but which in significant other senses were not there, rather like the large letters on a map (Young, 2012: 23).

“Invisibility” is seen as having a certain connection with the homogeneity that colonial thinking strives for. These ideas correspond to the approach of working with history, where the homogeneous is seen as violent. To overcome this type of violence for the general history of art means solving a difficult problem — to be inhomogeneous: universal, but not uniform. Naturally, this solution will be non-monochronous and non-linear, and an alternative principle of significance to the traditional one will be applied.

If one of the strategies of traditional art history in working with the artistic practices of the Other is radical exclusion, then another frequent practice is the refusal of modernity through placement in the “belated” classification section.<sup>35</sup> Calling art “primitive,” “late” and saying it has “lost its relevance” or not yet “matured,” often implies that its viewer has “not matured” for some progressive innovative practices — thus setting them in the position of a child: it is this view of the Other that Fabian characterized as colonial and violent (Fabian, 1983: 61–62). If the denial of the art of the Other is recognized in coevalness as temporal discursive violence, what remains to be found is a means to prevent it.

The most important question here is value criterion — to recognize the coevalness of the Other for the history of art means to recognize their value system, and the “contemporaneity” of their art as relevant to the practice of the Other. The history of art could leave it to other cultures, countries and peoples to determine for themselves what is valuable to them, and thereby make a choice.

<sup>34</sup>Boubia, 1997: 417–418. The author straightforwardly accuses Hegel of denying Africans any “ethical customs” (Sittlichkeit); moreover, Hegel not only places Africans at the bottom of the hierarchy of human beings, he completely excludes them from the sphere of humanity.

<sup>35</sup>For example, Gombrich presents in the same context a prehistoric drawing from the Lascaux cave, ritual artifacts from the 3–5th and 14–19th century (Gombrich, 2006: 41–52).

However, in accepting this way of writing history, one might encounter the risk of creating a lot of Hegelian “bubbles” (“bubbles” are value systems within which a principle of significance similar to the traditional Western one is applied, as well as Hegelian criteria of a historical event and the idea of progress). This problem was noted by Elkins, among others, — he argued that Hegelianism will not be overcome by reducing or splitting the single great into heterogeneous small parts. The “Hegelian wheel” remains in action, even if it is small:

In studies whose subject is not a progression or period but an individual or a particular work, the “Hegelian” wheel may not be dismantled or avoided, but merely shrunk to a tiny version of itself. Instead of large spokes with labels “art,” “religion,” “customs,” there are small spokes, with idiosyncratic labels “beginnings of oil technique,” “Catholicism,” “fifteenth-century Burgundian courts” (Elkins, 1988: 364).

Another strategy suggested by postcolonial theory for equalizing the Other, understanding them as coeval in the matter of forming a universal history of art and for abolishing the “humiliating act of alienation on the part of the dominant group” is radical elimination of Others as such.<sup>36</sup> This means removing this very concept: not just learning to comprehend the Other, but deconstructing the “Othering” (Young, 2012: 36). This need is justified by the fact that

the term “the other” has come to designate both the individual and the group whose unknown, exotic being remains the object of postcolonial desire [...] The concept of the other, in short, simply comprises the modern form of the category of the primitive (ibid.: 38).

Instead, it is proposed to consider only “other people” but not as the colonial Others. However, in my opinion, the same question arises here, tied to the danger of falling into the trap of homogenization again, just on a new level — the risk of destroying the Other’s authenticity by denying them their difference.

Regardless of the solution to this dilemma, for an inhomogeneous universal history of art there will need to emerge a new, non-violent type of unity in order to avoid the existence of many unrelated art histories, whose temporal

<sup>36</sup>R. Young reminds us that the Other that postcolonial studies speak of should not be confused with the “other” from Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness, in which “the other is essentially not the other, but the very means through which the individual becomes aware of himself” (Young, 2012: 37).



concepts and principles of significance will be mutually untranslatable; in other words, to avoid a radical, anarchic polychrony. To paraphrase, in order to assemble a single history of art from different temporalities, it is necessary to provide them with some kind of translation system (which is actually the intuition of a single timeline): as Fabian said, “somehow we must be able to share each other’s past in order to be knowingly in each other’s present.” The problem may also be that

Not all people exist in the same Now. They do so only externally, through the fact that they can be seen today. But they are thereby not yet living at the same time as the others (Bloch, Plaice & Plaice, 1991: 75).

This can be viewed as the Procrustean bed of the new theory. Contemporary theory is quite skeptical about all-encompassing historical concepts or *systems*: any system is seen as colonialist and as producing temporal discursive violence, so the rejection of Hegel and Hegelianism is seen as a solution to the problem.

However, in my opinion,— and this is the key idea here — it is Hegel’s system that offers a huge variety of types of unity, within which the differences of what is united are preserved. In other words, the idea of a universal Hegelian historical dimension can be considered not only as a repressive instrument of homogenization, but also as a solution to the problem. Hegelian universal history can offer the idea of a common temporal dimension *as an adjustment of communication*: in this perspective it can be seen as including the right goal, but it is actually criticized for the exact realization of constructing this single dimension of communication. Its very existence seems to be a necessity for the general history of art.

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At this point in our analysis it becomes clear that the rejection of Hegelian ideas in the construction of a universal history of art is fraught with several problems, or even paradoxes. Some of them arise if postcolonial theory tries to apply its anti-Hegelian arguments to itself, and some arise from the idea of completely abandoning the Hegelian foundations of art history. Developing the argument from the previous paragraph, I will try to present them according to their growing paradox-generating potential.

(1) *The paradox of the “primitive”: violence through definition.* If, in the spirit of Hegelianism, “primitive forms of art” are not introduced into the world history of art, this is, unambiguously, violence. However, their inclusion in the new general history of art may also be seen as violent,

because the very concept of art is Western. In the most radical version, the rejection of a single temporality should lead to the rejection of a single concept of art. And if “primitive” peoples have no such concept as art at all, and their way of conceptualizing their practices does not translate into Western concepts, there is a risk of making a violent reverse move<sup>37</sup> in trying to insert their cultural practices into the supposedly advanced and postcolonial history of art?

(II) *The paradox of the “beginning” of art.* A similar problem, arising from the previous one, appears in relation to representatives of the “beginning of the history of art,” primeval people. To what extent do modern-day people have the right to consider them the “ancestors” of art history? When referring to the past art of all civilizations, cultures and peoples (including our own) as “childhood” or “cradle”—is this not another form of discursive temporal violence which operates within the same Hegelian idea of progress?<sup>38</sup> It is obvious that the earliest art was created by people who had no concept of art.<sup>39</sup> There arises a paradox: how can one talk about such ancient practices as the “childhood” of art history, if the status of the historical phenomenon of the first work of art calls into question the status of subsequent works of art?<sup>40</sup> It turns out that at the very beginning of the traditional theory of

<sup>37</sup>What is meant here is precisely the untranslatability of practices, not implying that the absence of the concept of art is bad. The problem of untranslatability is not identical to the problem of “epistemic violence”—a form of violence in which the knowledge of a certain society is erased because mutual communication is disrupted due to ignorance. G. Ch. Spivak noted that “to ignore or invade the subaltern today is, willy-nilly, to continue the imperialist project; in the name of modernization, in the interest of globalization [...]. All speaking [subalterns], even seemingly the most immediate, entails a distanced decipherment by another, which is, at best, an interception” (Spivak, 1988: 51).

<sup>38</sup>Cf. Davies, 1993: 328–329. Since the construction of an art history timeline always comes from the “now” of the researcher, it tends to construct its beginning and end. In the concept of linear-successive history of art, the phenomenon of the first work of art—what lies under the “fig. 1” in almost any illustrated book on art history. On the one hand, “Fig. 1” also implies “2,” “3,” etc., which confirms the idea of art as a series of continuity, repetition and variation. However, on the other hand, the presence of “Fig. 1” also speaks of the presence of a first work of art that is irreducibly primary, original or emergent.

<sup>39</sup>For an argument in favor of this thesis, see Davies, 2015: 375. About the ancients the author writes that they “almost certainly did not possess the concept. In one sense they did not know what they were making. They could not bring their activities and artifacts under the relevant concept.” Also, the author notes that in the works “ethologists, paleoarchaeologists, evolutionary psychologists, and the like” he found “only one person who claims we cannot know if these paintings are art, namely, Whitney Davis (1986).” Such statements confirm that the problem of the “first work” is problematic and undeveloped by researchers.

<sup>40</sup>The so-called problem of “recursive definitions of art” (when something is recognized as art in relation to previous art) is also noted by researchers: *ibid.*: 376.

art, something directly contradicting it breaks through — the anti-historical.

(III) *The paradox of “other people” from the “small periphery.”* In an attempt to completely reject the other as the Fabian’s Other, and to assume that there are only other people (in the sense suggested at Young, 2012: 38), research falls into a rather strange situation as far as art is concerned. If the denial of temporal coevalness to the Other as a representative of the “big” periphery is recognized as temporal discursive violence, then the next place of attention will be the “small” periphery. It should be noted that the general history of art for the most part is concentrated not just on the art history of the colonial countries (these consist of the history of art from the Middle Ages to the 19th century, before which primarily the “great” ancient, Mesopotamian, Egyptian artistic achievements are included), but on the artistic achievements taking place in the largest cultural centers, capital cities, locations of iconic art schools, etc. Weaker art schools often existed on the periphery of states; trends reached them later, and they had the status of imitators rather than innovators. Thus, the general history of art is just as ruthless in refusing a place in history to “lagging” works of art of its own periphery.

This situation is almost identical to the one Fabian described. Artists of the “small periphery” are considered “belated,” “lagging behind” the actual art of their time. For example, despite the timeline of art styles, workshops of obsolete styles keep working for a long time, but are usually considered third-rate — these names are not included in condensed art history books. If working within the terminological framework outlined in the first part of this study, then research is dealing with another form of temporal discursive violence, along the center-periphery axis.

The problem of including local schools and artistic practices in the general narrative of art history faces a principle of significance, which, as has already been noted, traditionally has a Hegelian form (whether talking about the general history of art, or some kind of “bubble”— for example, the art of Native Australians will still be forced to somehow choose the “best and the most meaningful” of what they have). If, in order to avoid temporal discursive violence, one abandons the principle of significance altogether, they may fall into the problem of value relativism.<sup>41</sup> Any mechanism for preventing such

<sup>41</sup>Wood, 2019: 11. “Since 1800 [...] the modern paradigm of art history: intercontinental, ecumenical, nonpartisan. Relativism expanded the canon, revealing that great art has been made in all times and places. [...] For a long time, to prefer or even grudgingly admire the art of little-understood cultures, such as India or Africa, was for the European (as for the Chinese, for that matter) unthinkable. But those obstacles fell away, and relativism of historical form—

total relativism (majority opinion, expert opinion, traditions...) can easily be considered a covert version of the well-known colonialist arrogance.

If in the previous paragraph we could include the works of “primitive” cultures in the general history of art, then we could still focus on the local value system and include something significant. If we recognize the very scale of values as a form of temporal discursive violence—even within one culture, explaining what is actual and advanced and what is backward and secondary—then the question arises about *values as such*: whether it is possible to apply a value hierarchy to at least some group of works or artists? Without it, all the ideas of “genius,” “innovator,” “good art,” “kitsch,” etc. will disappear into the colonial past.

Thierry de Duve writes about a possible solution to this problem, introducing the concept of “glocality,” similar to the Hegel-style “suspending” of the opposition of the local and the global. This is the idea of finding a compromise—not to lose the local, but not to be cut off from the global:

We have a responsibility in drawing a line between the things we judge as deserving the name of art and the things sheltering under the name of art as if under an umbrella. This entails that it is our aesthetic judgement, expressed liminally by the sentence “this is art,” that draws the line and makes the difference (I am not saying accounts for the difference) between works of art and mere cultural goods. Works of art are the outcome of aesthetic judgements—the artist’s, in the first place, then ours, members of the art community—whereas cultural goods are not, or not necessarily. Granted that glocal citizenship can be construed as the present-day version of cosmopolitanism, the question, then, where the art community is concerned, is how to conceive of aesthetic cosmopolitanism (De Duve, 2007: 684).

This interesting idea leads to a point that will be elaborated on in the conclusion: that the possible source of solutions to problems lies within Hegel’s philosophy itself.

(iv) *The catalog paradox: big data instead of art history.* If any hierarchization of creative practices is considered on the basis of their “contemporaneity,” “relevance,” “outdatedness,” and “primitiveness” as discursive violence, and for this reason different artistic and creative practices are seen as equal in their representation in universal history, then in this way any unified

though not relativism of artistic value itself—became the principle of the Musée du Louvre and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Under the modern, relativist paradigm of art history, artworks of lesser quality are not discarded. But they are segregated.” The author claims that the differences between paintings in one museum and applied arts items in another lie in their “artistic quality.” But if they are simply in different museums, we still need to choose which of them to contribute to the history of art.

hierarchy of art forms, styles, genres, production methods can be cancelled. If the axiology of the concept of “traditional creativity” is removed from the art of colonizing countries, and this “traditionality” is not considered as something inherent in the “past,” but included as an equally important part of the contemporaneity of the art world, then the big question arises: will this be the denial of coevalness to practices of colonialist countries whose characteristics coincide with those of decorative and applied art of the natives, but are not included in the narrative of art? If two objects of the same type produced at the same or different times in different parts of the world — a pair of outwardly similar works of art by a colonialist and a colonized creator — are classified in the world history of art as art and non-art, is this a denial of coevalness, i. e. discursive violence? In my opinion, from the point of view of the concept of discursive violence, this can be calculated as a denial of recognition from its “contemporaneity.” Should a line even be drawn between art and what is called creativity, creative arts, and other cultural practices?<sup>42</sup>

In all such cases, history will be replaced by a *catalog*, “a list with an unnamed purpose.” Elkins gives an interesting example of what art history might look like without “Hegelianism”: the list “of Chinese bronzes in the possession of the Emperor Hui Tsung,” whose “catalog, completed in 1111 A. D., each represents a vessel by a line drawing and records its dimensions, capacity, weight, and description” (Elkins, 1988: 374–375). In his words, in this catalog we observe a complete absence of not only the principles of hierarchization and systematization, but a complete absence of a synthetic.

In its most radical form, the difference between collections of objects made by man and the history of art disappears (cf. Kubler, 2008: 1). And in the 21st century, we could call Elkins’ “catalog without a goal and a principle of synthesis” — *big data*. This is an extreme case of the absence of theory and a grotesque example of the absolute realm of temporal discursive nonviolence.

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A general history of art must be different from *big data*, and this cannot be done unless something is taken away from the totality of what all the people in the world have done. Some type of reduction is needed.

<sup>42</sup>Cf. Wood, 2019: 16–18. Local ideas of art also imply local criteria of value. In this case, the art historian can only accept them, and not evaluate them himself. Wood refers to this as all attempts “to attribute timelessness to art, even unsuccessful ones.”

One can agree with Wood that modern theory has adopted simple relativism as the only viable strategy against all the problems that Hegelian art history brings (Wood, 2019: 42–44). In practice, this means less and less “blame” and an expansion of the sphere of “praise” (which was previously limited to the classical ancient world and the resulting history of Western art, but now easily covers the Bronze Age, Africa and everything else that was previously ignored). On a philosophical plane, this relativism manifests itself as a rejection of the central significance of form; the history of art has ceased to be a “biography of forms” (ibid.: 380). Because of this, there are calls to preserve one or another element of Hegelianism or Hegel-inspired tradition. Kubler proposed retaining the category of meaning (cf. ibid.: 397). Elkins believed that “Hegelianism” should be preserved, because without it there would be no art history at all, but some other discipline; without Hegelianism, art history would collapse under the weight of the inconsistency of its own presuppositions (Elkins, 1988: 377–378). Gombrich proposed to retain the “religious element” from Hegel’s philosophy, since almost all great art was religious:

The historian of the art of our century has to study Hegel much as a student of the ecclesiastical art of the Middle Ages must get to know the Bible (Gombrich, 1984: 68).

In contrast to all these approaches, I believe—and I have tried to show this throughout the study—that (a) the problem with Hegelianism in the history of art translates into the problem of temporal discursive violence, however, (b) this problem is not solved neither by relativization, nor by rejection of Hegel, nor by selective preservation of his principles. As research has shown, without the three principles that underlie traditional art history and which were listed at the beginning of the text (linearity, the principle of significance and monochrony), there is no universal history of art.

In my opinion, criticism of these principles as Hegelian confuses Hegel’s means and ends. Hegel’s means were crude, but his goal was quite different: to direct minds to the universality of the human Spirit and the history of its self-creation through human creativity. Therefore, the three underlying principles should be modified, turning them into *means of communication*, through their careful purification of what has been designated as temporal discursive violence. A new linearity, a new principle of significance and a new monochrony should become a means of mutual translation of the unique languages of art of different civilizations throughout history, without

artificial and humiliating relativization, both external and internal, and without isolating them into their own “bubbles.”

In other words, the conclusion serves to point out the reasons why the discourse of art history and its philosophical foundations should reconsider the role of Hegel in its own self-formation, and that the problems that post- and decolonial scholars rightly point out will not be solved by completely abandoning Hegel. The points of this analysis can be summarized as follows:

- ◇ Three characteristics of traditional art history (linearity, the principle of significance and monochrony) are of Hegelian origin, but in practice they have become simply Hegel-inspired and have “forgotten” important features of their original, and this has given rise to much notional and conceptual confusion. Hegel has turned into a “centaur at the edge of the forest”: “linearity” is interpreted as the opposition to “cyclicality,” opponents of “linearity” are everyone whose philosophy of time is not Hegelian and are considered “opponents of linear time,” etc., according to the increasing number of misunderstandings.
- ◇ Through critique of the Hegel-inspired features of traditional art history, Hegel personally came to be seen as the originator of the white colonialist attitude that placed vast swathes of non-Western creativity outside the general history of art.
- ◇ The proposed non-Hegelian solutions often retain the fundamental features of Hegelian art history.
- ◇ This paper’s proposed idea is to look for the connection between the Hegelian roots of traditional art history and the idea of discursive violence, which gave rise to the concept of *temporal discursive violence*, through which the Other is denied coevalness and considered backward. A detailed analysis of temporal discursive violence showed that the origin of its problems go far beyond those depicted by post- and decolonial studies, and that, at the very end, it faces the much broader question of the very axiology of art.
- ◇ The rejection of Hegel leads to a paradox and the rejection of any axiology.
- ◇ The principle of significance I have proposed may be seen as the most fundamental Hegelian feature of traditional art history (despite being often overlooked). It is this feature of Hegel’s and Hegelian general history of art that can save a new, non-collateral history of art from the 4 paradoxes that have been described.

- ◊ The answer to the question “why is something included in traditional art history” was Hegel-inspired (these were different ideas of *ligne des hauteurs*, described above<sup>43</sup>), but not Hegelian. The practice found in the literature of treating any principle of importance as bad leads to the transformation of art history into *big data*.
- ◊ The best solution to this problem is to return to Hegel himself. What is new in this work is that I find his “Lectures on the Philosophy of History” to be even more important for this task than his “Lectures on Aesthetics”—as was demonstrated in my research.

To have such a founder (or father of the discipline, as Gombrich called him) like Hegel is an honor and a kind of luck for the general history of art. Today, when civilizational and artistic horizons have expanded, one can return to the origins of the discipline and find a way to look for ideas for creating “one, but not homogeneous,” “glocal but not Western-centric” in the huge diversity of thought structures of the founding father. Hegel is a philosopher of expanding horizons, seeing all the spiritual efforts of humanity as a single whole.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to the fact that Hegel’s philosophy has enormous potential to expand the methodology of the traditional general history of art in its eventual liberation from the legacies of colonialism and Western-centrism without sacrificing the idea of “great” and “good” art, it has a huge and as yet little explored potential to serve as a starting point to expand another horizon—the analysis of new forms of art that appeared in the 20th century. The very ideas of abstract and conceptual art, for example, combine surprisingly well with Hegel’s ideas that art should “depart” from “objectivity” and be a manifestation of the Idea (through the work of the Spirit), in which its material “carrier” is only a moment along the way to new forms of life of the Spirit.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup>These *hauteurs* were themselves sometimes focused on formal qualities (novelty, “consciousness,” etc.), and sometimes were a disguised form of arrogance on the part of the white colonizer.

<sup>44</sup>It is just as pointless to criticize, for example, Aristotle, for a calm attitude towards slavery because for our civilization he comprehended the idea of freedom, which ultimately became the reason for the rejection of slavery. We find similar ideas even among Hegel’s critics: “Hegel was not a prisoner of the limits of understanding of his time, of the less-evolved mental capacities associated with that epoch, as some of his admirers, who want to defend his World Spirit, thought him to be” (Boubia, 1997: 430).

<sup>45</sup>The idea of Hegel as the herald of the “end” of (traditional) art has been discussed a lot (cf. e.g. the landmark study Danto, 2004 and consequent discussion in Houlgate, 2013), but



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МАЙЯ-СОФИЯ ЖУМАТИНА

СТАЖЕР-ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬ

НАУЧНО-УЧЕБНАЯ ЛАБОРАТОРИЯ ТРАНСЦЕНДЕНТАЛЬНОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ

СТУДЕНТКА МАГИСТРАТУРЫ

ФАКУЛЬТЕТ ГУМАНИТАРНЫХ НАУК, НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ

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## КЕНТАВР НА ОПУШКЕ ЛЕСА

ГЕГЕЛЬЯНСКАЯ ИСТОРИЯ ИСКУССТВА

И ТЕМПОРАЛЬНОЕ ДИСКУРСИВНОЕ НАСИЛИЕ

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**Аннотация:** Исследование посвящено одной из самых актуальных тем искусствоведческой теории и философии искусства — поиску принципов построения всемирной истории искусства, которая не была бы западоцентричной. Поскольку на возникновение всеобщей истории искусства как дисциплины повлияла философская система Гегеля, попытки построить новую историю искусства — от первых трудов в 1960-х до современных деколонизальных исследований — сосредоточены на деконструкции разных аспектов ее гегельянских основ. В самом радикальном виде Гегель видится причиной формирования взгляда «белого колониста» на историю искусства «Других» культур, которым приписывается примитивность, отсталость или вовсе отказывается в месте в истории. В этом исследовании анализируются три идеи, лежащие в основе традиционной истории искусства (линейность, принцип значимости и монохрония), а также три философских вопроса, определяющих вид такой истории (какая концепция истории выбирается, как понимается принцип движения через историю и по какому принципу отбираются записи истории искусства). Мы рассмотрим, как эти идеи и вопросы связаны с философией Гегеля и как

множество их практических интерпретаций в разной степени отходят от первоисточника. Все они связаны тем, что предполагают определенную философию истории и времени. Чтобы пересмотреть критику гегельянства, мы предлагаем проанализировать ее через понятие темпорального дискурсивного насилия. Последнее мы конструируем через применение антропологической концепции отказа Другому в «ровесности» (coevalness) на контекст временных отношений в истории искусства. Будет показано, что отказ от гегельянских принципов приводит к большому ряду парадоксальных ситуаций, в которых история искусства превращается в бессодержательный каталог или даже в big data. Мы попробуем показать, что (а) проблема с гегельянством в истории искусства переводима на проблему темпорального дискурсивного насилия, но что, однако, (б) эту проблему не решают ни релятивизация, ни отказ от Гегеля, ни выборочное сохранение его принципов.

**Ключевые слова:** история искусства, философия времени, Гегель, дискурсивное насилие, таймлайн, монохрония, ровесность, постколониальные исследования.

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## VISCERAL LIFE\*\*

TOWARDS CONCORPOREAL BIOETHICS

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**Abstract:** This paper explores the relations between embodiment, environment, and affectivity in the context of posthumanist theories of the body, mainly the immune, cardiovascular, and nervous systems, bridging the visceral with the existential. Centering on the philosophy of auto-hetero-affection, the paper challenges traditional notions of selfhood, advocating for an understanding of the self as fluid, continuously reshaped through interactions with alterity. A critical tension arises when juxtaposing the empirical methodologies employed in healthcare, which often reduce the body to mere biomedical mechanics, against the rich phenomenological experiences of the lived body. Through the narrative from Malin Kivelä and the theories of Francisco Varela, Natalie Depraz, and Catherine Malabou, the paper underscores the body's inherent vulnerabilities, urging a shift from biomedical discourses to a more holistic appreciation of human experiences. This exploration further interweaves themes from phenomenology, biomedicine, and bioethics to prompt discussions on human existence, emphasizing the need to appreciate biological mechanisms and the narratives and vulnerabilities shaping our shared reality. The conclusion draws upon the sentiment of fragility during the global pandemic, encapsulating the balance of our understanding and innate vulnerabilities. The discourse thus calls for a reimagined perspective on embodiment, health, and the human experience, foregrounding the intertwining of cognitive and affective domains.

**Keywords:** Embodiment, Auto-hetero-affection, Cardiophenomenology, Epigenesis, Ecosoma, Vulnerability, Bioethics, Viscerality.

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The great contradictions which man discovers in himself – freedom and necessity, autonomy and dependence, self and world, relation and isolation, creativity and mortality – have their rudimentary traces in even the most primitive forms of life, each precariously balanced between being and not-being, and each already endowed with an internal horizon of “transcendence.”

Jonas, 2001: XXIII

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Indeed, the paradigmatic activity of the body-in-action is not observation, but metabolization. [...] One of the crucial steps in acquiring self-awareness is the ability to differentiate between self and other, between who one is from the inside and what, because it is outside, one is not. However, for the metabolic body, inside and outside are not so stable. Metabolism, after all, is about eating, drinking and breathing; about defecating, urinating and sweating. For a metabolic body incorporation and excorporation are essential.

Mol & Law, 2004: 53–54

Each respective *referent-we* draws attention to the ways in which subjective experience is *extrahumanly mandated* yet experienced, reflexly, as though it is *normally human*. This is how both the Pygmy and the French bourgeois subjects would, individually, have reflexly subjectively experienced their differential *normalcy of being human*.

Wynter & McKittrick, 2015: 57

In literature, the human body often emerges as a metaphorical surface, reflecting deeper existential, emotional, and sociological concerns, a place for locations, peaks, hollows, and contours: places of special significance and intensity. Malin Kivelä's work, *The Heart*, explores into this relationship between the corporeal and the emotional, weaving reflections on the physicality of the body with deep themes of motherhood, loss, fragility, and the ephemerality of life (Kivelä, Starodubtseva, 2021).

Published in 2019, *The Heart* takes readers on a journey set six years prior as Kivelä recounts the events surrounding the birth of her third son. With the diagnosis of a congenital heart defect known as aortic coarctation, Kivelä navigates intensive care, heart surgery, and emotions accompanying the reality of a life hanging in the balance. However, the narrative is not merely a chronicle of events but a deep introspection into the porous boundaries of the body and the mind. Kivelä's text is punctuated by an intense awareness of the body, not as a fortified entity but as a permeable structure susceptible to wounds, aches, and the relentless procession of time. Her affinity for sores and bruises underscores an intense realization of the self — these markings affirm her existence in their pain and temporality. This existential affirmation becomes complicated with the birth of a child. His diagnosis triggers in her an intense feeling of detachment, as if a part of her own being, once so integrally connected, now stands estranged and vulnerable. This sense of vulnerability is heightened by her inability to recall

the exact medical term for her son's condition, symbolizing a dissonance and a grappling with the overwhelming weight of the diagnosis.

Central to Kivelä's narrative are the reflections on mortality. In its fragility, the human body becomes a reminder of the inevitable—the presence of death in life. "One day, a new wound will appear, and it will not heal," Kivelä reflects, evoking the inescapable truth that death is woven into the very essence of our existence. The realization of one's blood flowing through the veins, as depicted in *The Heart*, is emblematic of life's fleeting nature and its vulnerability. *The Heart* emerges as a narrative of maternal love, the trials of illness, and a meditation on the fragile boundaries of the body and the psyche. It is a testament to the interconnectedness of life and its other and the revelations that arise when one confronts one's vulnerability.

The intertwining of human existence is woven with embodiment and identity, bound by biomedical norms "rigidity and lived experiences" fluidity. As the contemporary discourse on embodiment and biomedicine evolves, so do our conceptions of the self and its interactions with internal and external environments. This paper investigates the complexities of the 4EA approach, which emphasizes human existence's embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and affective nature. We confront the biomedical paradigms that often attempt to circumscribe this dynamic. Drawing from various theories, I engage with the conceptual complexities surrounding extended cognition, enactive incorporation, and the challenges of technological and biomedical interventions. Central to our exploration is the tension between the lived experience of embodiment and the norms of biomedicine, a *dialectic* illuminated through recent global events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and the subsequent discourses on herd immunity and vaccination.

Upon surveying the vast area of embodiment and biomedicine, it becomes evident that the human experience is far from a static construct. Instead, it is a dynamic juncture between biological, social, cultural, and technological forces. The 4EA approach underscores the interconnectedness and interdependence that characterizes human existence, challenging reductive biomedical paradigms often prioritizing symptom control over holistic understanding.

#### THE CLEAN AND PROPER BODY: A CRITIQUE

The living individual is considered metabolically for the 4EA approach (Froese & Di Paolo, 2011; Khachouf et al., 2013; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Varela et al., 1991). This means that the enaction of autonomous self-monitoring, control of internal regulation, and external exchanges maintain

the vitality of an individual. They eat, drink, breathe, and rid waste, incorporating and excorporating resources and processes beyond their biological body through its semi-permeable boundaries. The living individual is compositionally plastic, which means they can constitutively include resources and processes beyond what their body can generate. The lived body, then, is never self-complete or secured against the elements of the environment—whether molecular, corporeal, technological, or social-institutional. The body tends to *incorporate*—to take into itself—processes, tools, and resources intimately connected with its vital functions (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009).

Here, it is important to stress two versions of this idea. The first version is entitled extended cognition. It states that the functional extension of the physiological body only matters in evaluating the blurred boundaries of biomedical hybrids (Clark, 2007) and is based on the functionalist understanding of cognitive agency, reducing it to the unconscious operations within the objectively considered body. In the idea of enactive incorporation, the lived body is at stake. The autonomy of the living individual is predetermined by its openness towards otherness and incorporation within the body schema. Hence, the references “lived technologies,” “living media,” new organs, prostheses, and bodily extensions (Froese, 2014).

Both extension and incorporation question the notion of individuality as a self-enclosed originary body. Their difference is that, while extended cognition stresses the objectivist view of the body similar to the scientific image of the human in modern biomedicine, the enactive incorporation emphasizes the lived, phenomenological dimension of this openness of the body.

One of the exciting features of this approach is its emphasis on the graduality of norms of vitality: health, sickness, stress, and fatigue. However, this position still needs both theoretical and empirical validation, especially in the context of biomedicine. One can even claim that enactivism misses life’s pathological and destructive aspects, paying much more attention to growth, animation, development, aging, and vigor as the marks of living beings. To use Kristin Zeiler’s term, enactivism stresses the “eu-appearance” of the embodiment, which refers to the good, strong and automatic functioning of a healthy body (Zeiler, 2010). Incorporation instantiates this vitality and empowerment of the living. In various medical conditions, though, one can consider the impossibility of completing or restoring a healthy, able, and normative body. The re-establishment of habitual activities is unattainable due to the dependence on caregivers, pharmaceutical drugs, regular procedures, life-supporting technologies, and permanent monitoring of the organism’s internal states.



In the current discourse on embodiment, a crucial concern arises regarding the ontological implications of bodily incorporation. This concern gains relevance when we explore the modalities through which technological interventions, particularly those derived from biomedicine, challenge our traditional conceptions of a unified, healthful, and untainted physical existence. I assert that the analytical tools afforded by theories can deliver crucial insights into this matter (Aristarkhova, Zhayvoronok, 2017; Alaimo, 2010; Grosz, 1994; Haraway, 1991; Shildrick, 2023). Their intrinsic separation from conventional norms surrounding human existence propels these theories to dissect the plethora of technologies, practices, and processes that obscure the established peripheries of corporeality.

Central to this interrogation is a critique of compulsive normalcy. Here, the norm does not just signify the absence of deviation but embodies a thriving, vibrant, and, most crucially, predictable corporeal existence. This predictability attaches to trajectories set by phylogenetic history, delineating a foreseeable arc from birth to death as an inevitable process of biology. However, this notion of an untouched, cohesive corporeality is arguably an illusion. From the very onset, each body is extended, augmented, and intertwined in many ways—a reality illuminated by cultural narratives, bioscientific studies, and social practices.

Drawing from recent global events, the culmination of the COVID-19 pandemic, as declared by the WHO, serves as an appropriate model. Following this pandemic, the rhetoric of herd immunity emerged as a critical biopolitical conduit, guiding healthcare directions. Conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the discourse surrounding mandatory vaccination and its portrayal as chipping illuminates a profound ontological difficulty. In receiving a vaccine, one arguably welcomes the foreign, the other, into one's corporeal domain. This dynamic reverberates with the ontological ethics propounded by Levinas, encapsulated in his assertion that the radical alterity (*Autre*) is the Other (*Autrui*) (Levinas, Lingis, 1969). To truly comprehend oneself, an openness to the alterity, the non-self becomes urgent. Such an embracing of radical alterity, even if it culminates in one's dissolution, highlights the ultimate act of hospitality towards the other.

Within the purview of evidence-based medicine, the experience of illness requires seeking medical consultation and surrendering one's dysfunctional body to the medical professional's expertise. This paradigm largely sidelines the patient's engagement and neglects the subjective and axiological drives that underpin one's individual experience of illness. Instead, it contextualizes

the illness within broad social frameworks, largely devoid of the patient's unique narrative.

This transfer of trust and control to medicine primarily affirms what George Engel, the forerunner of the *biopsychosocial* model of health and illness, termed biomedicine (Engel, 1977). As delineated by Engel, biomedicine is constructed upon three foundational tenets: the dualism of body and mind, materialistic reductionism, and objectivism. Within this framework, aspects that cannot be elucidated through physiological correlations and processes are irrelevant to medical inquiry. Such an orientation tends to encourage paternalistic conduct toward patients. For biomedicine, the human body is perceived as a universal entity, mainly impenetrable to socio-cultural nuances, warranting standardized therapeutic interventions. Consequently, this institutionalized narrative of evidence-based medicine often starkly contrasts the subjective experiences of patients, especially those in painful and distressing conditions. This sketch brings an inherent and irreconcilable dualism endemic to biomedicine. On one hand, the patient's body is envisioned as a mere object for therapeutic manipulation. Conversely, the body also emerges as a sentient subject, a locus of pain and emotions ranging from hope and anxiety to an array of speculative considerations, particularly in medical uncertainty.

Biomedicine, for all its progress, often manifests a constrained view that places a premium on controlling symptoms through modern scientific and technological avenues. However, this view risks sidelining the patient's experiences, the nuanced backgrounds of diseases, and the contextual history that underscores every condition. Paternalistic bioethics, which emphasizes autonomy and individuality, simplistically models the doctor-patient relationship as an interaction. In doing so, it inadvertently smoothes over critical elements like the socio-cultural dynamics and the diverse biological specificities inherent in individuals, such as the vast range of microorganisms that populate our bodies or the varying patterns of neuroplasticity influenced by different environments.

Whether rooted in deontological or consequentialist principles, normative bioethical frameworks promote an oversimplified notion of interaction between two pure, autonomous entities. Within this model, both entities are presumed to possess the capability for rational thought and decision-making. This defensive posture, which views the body as a vulnerable citadel requiring defense from hostile external invasions, tends to elicit militaristic metaphors. There is an underlying assertion that the sanctity of the body's boundaries can only be upheld through aggression. Such a view, conjoined

to ableist understanding of bodymind, displays negative ramifications at broader levels (Shildrick, 2023). From a conflict with our internal microbiome to the rising global resistance of pathogens to antibiotics, this narrow lens affects the individual and has cascading implications. It enables an aggressive posture toward both our internal and external environments, culminating in the erosion of diverse ecological habitats around the globe.

The narrative surrounding the human body and its inherent incorporations provides fertile ground for philosophical contemplation. We can follow Elizabeth Grosz's notion of "detachable, separable parts of the body — urine, faeces, saliva, sperm, blood, vomit, hair, nails, skin" (Grosz, 1994: 81). Through this paper, I analyze three specific physiological systems — immune, cardiovascular, and nervous — as frameworks that enable a deeper understanding of Kivelä's discourse on the heart and elucidate the broader existential inquiries related to the inhuman constituents of the human body.

Francisco Varela, Natalie Depraz, and Catherine Malabou have tackled this intersection of natural science and philosophy, undertaking multi-layered deconstructions of our embodiment. These methodologies, aptly described by David Roden as *naturalized deconstruction* (Roden, 2005),<sup>1</sup> present convincing arguments against the traditional notion of an isolated body. Instead, they highlight the symbiotic relationship between the body and its environment. The human body is intrinsically tied to entities it is seemingly unrelated to. Whether the molecular guests engaged by immune system, the unexpected affective events that punctuate the cardiovascular narrative, or the contingent traumas that reshape the brain, the constant connection between the self and the Other becomes evident.

Such dynamism disrupts conventional understandings of ontogenesis and individuation, questioning the concept of a predetermined developmental trajectory in organic life. Life, as we understand it, is not a mere linear progression or an unceasing proliferation of forms and functions. Instead, it is a continuum fraught with interruptions, lapses, and disruptions (Malabou,

<sup>1</sup>It is important to note that in this paper, I do not aim to follow any predetermined methodology; instead, I allow the conceptions I analyze to lay their own theoretical path in reflecting on viscosity's various dimensions. In this sense, my point of departure is the phenomenology of reflexive and pre-reflexive embodiment. However, I do not enforce interpretations of the analyzed texts that would fit them into unambiguously defined traditions. This dictates my choice of authors and fragments of their conceptions to the extent that they touch upon the problem of viscosity. That is why I started with Kivelä's work to show the inevitable emotional-affective involvement in this topic. We can never stay away from our incarnation and the possibilities it opens for us.

2009a). Every phase of life encapsulates its core, from illnesses and traumas to the inevitable aging and death. In facing sickness, one confronts the inherent vulnerability of existence. It underscores the ontological fragility of life, reminding us that, regardless of the body's distinctive self-sustaining mechanisms, there exists an ever-present potential for system breakdowns leading to disintegration.

The praxis of medicine is often embedded in the foundational belief of patient safety. However, the reality of illness challenges this perception, ushering the patient into uncontrollable events and processes. Such a state evokes what is phenomenologically termed the *pathic* experience (Maldiney, 2007). It denotes an intimate experience of auto-affection, where the individual continually steers and redefines the boundaries between the self and the other.

In this context, the conventional understanding of the body as an intact entity, confined within the boundaries of the skin and protected from external threats such as injuries, viruses, or harmful habits, proves overly simplistic. This notion, commonly emphasized in the Global North's healthcare paradigms, prioritizing health and quality of life, misconceives the body's functioning as an ontological singularity.

Instead, life is characterized by its inherent plasticity, implying a potential for constructive and destructive metamorphoses. Life continually evolves, transforming into arrangements starkly different from its previous state. For instance, an individual grappling with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) emerges altered from their pre-trauma self. Such transformations reiterate the need for medicine to broaden its perspective, recognizing the fluidity of the human condition and the relations between the self and the external forces it continually interacts with.

The modern bioethical notion of the body as an intact, autonomous entity envisions it as a cohesive unit, always geared towards self-preservation, resisting alien influences, and remaining impermeable to external vulnerabilities. However, the reality of trauma, as highlighted by Catherine Malabou, challenges this paradigm. Her concept of *destructive plasticity* draws attention to the inherent fluidity of life, underscoring its capacity to evolve and devolve or lose form (Malabou, 2009a,b). This transformative capacity of life, as seen in the shifts experienced by Alzheimer's patients, underscores the presence of otherness in personality and its transformative potential.

The overarching argument is not to view life's modifications, especially the traumatic ones, as mere disintegrations or decompositions. Instead, it

is vital to recognize that life's trajectory accommodates mutations, transfigurations, and shifts in form between birth and death. These processes, often anonymous and beyond the complete grasp of the psychosocial self, challenge traditional philosophical positions that tether the body and mind as a harmonious unit adaptive to its environment.

The fundamental task is to propose a shift in bioethics. Instead of placing primacy on individualism and the ideal of an untainted body, it is crucial to champion *bio-ethics* that celebrates life in its multifarious forms (Thacker, 2004: 189; Zylinska, 2009). This unexplored bio-ethics should not just focus on human life, but also embrace non-human forms, stepping away from a necropolitical stance that threatens life in its entirety. Such an approach celebrates vulnerability not as a defect but as an inherent aspect of existence, embracing the notion of applied deconstruction or posthumanism.

Living diffuses and deviates from norms, mutating and transforming according to unique logic. This view sees life as a pursuit to fill the void. Life's vitality is rooted in what it is not: its deviations and vulnerabilities. Contrary to the extension, which assumes an underlying bodily wholeness, this perspective identifies a foundational lacuna that catalyzes vital organic processes of incorporation and metabolization.

#### THE VULNERABLE ECOSOMA

Within the outlines of contemporary philosophical inquiry, it is necessary to articulate the interrelation of the self with the other. In this context, three frameworks merit attention: Francisco Varela's immunological theory, Natalie Depraz's cardiophenomenology, and Catherine Malabou's exposition on brain plasticity. Each scholar postulates that the self, far from isolation, is inextricably bound to its non-self-component. The core of self's activity carries an inherent passivity — not equivalent to inactivity, but delineating an inner receptivity. Such receptivity articulates the embodiment of organic life, emphasizing its symbiotic interrelation with both external and internal milieus.

Depraz identifies the archaic affective bond between an infant and maternal figure, a biological and intersubjective connection. For her, this connection delineates several instances of intersubjective reciprocity: the intimacy of sexual union, epitomized by mutual submission; the tonglen practice in Tibetan Buddhism, symbolizing a transformative exchange of places; the theological representation of the triune god in Christian doctrine, illuminating the model of reciprocal relationality. Such exemplars disclose

the constitution of the self, shaped in its dialectic with otherness. This otherness emerges as a contingent catalyst in ontogenesis.

Affectivity further accentuates this discussion. It motivates beings in their fundamental instincts to either approach something or to avoid it. It embodies what can be termed “responsivity,” a defining characteristic of life itself. Coupled with this is the micro-bodily generation of intersubjectivity, particularly evident within our most archaic bodily domains: the subpersonal neuro-vegetative system. Governed by primal, involuntary attractions and repulsions, this system offers a glimpse into the primal instincts that drive us.

The overarching narrative is that the self is perpetually in communication with the other, with the latter serving as a catalyst for ontogenesis. This realization challenges the existing convention, suggesting that our sense of self, rather than being an isolated construct, is shaped by subpersonal processes. It thus becomes a call for phenomenological studies to redirect their focus, delving into the knotty material-discursive dynamics that shape our being.

#### THE IMMUNE ENCOUNTERS

We begin with the immune system. It has traditionally been conceptualized as the body’s defense, protecting it against external threats. As famously proposed by the immunologist Frank MacFarlane Burnet, this system operates based on suspicion, where everything alien or unfamiliar is perceived as an inherent threat and is promptly dealt with. Burnet’s perspective suggests that the immune system is ever-watchful, ready to discharge its defensive arsenal even when confronted with elements resembling the body’s own. This stance views the body as a sovereign entity with established boundaries that must be protected.

A significant counterpoint to this conventional belief is the unexplainable and remarkable phenomenon of maternal-fetal tolerance during pregnancy. Why does the mother’s immune system, typically aggressive against foreign entities, refrain from attacking the fetus – a distinct organism with a unique genetic identity? The fetoplacental barrier prevents mixing maternal and fetal blood, but this suggests a more nuanced role for the immune system, encompassing acceptance and cooperation. As Irina Aristarkhova compellingly posits, this exception indicates that immunity may have capabilities for negotiation and even the formation of beneficial alliances with foreign entities (Aristarkhova, Zhayvoronok, 2017: 136).

Niels Jerne, a Nobel prize laureate, introduced a departure from the traditional militaristic imagery of immunity. Rather than viewing the immune system as a linear mechanistic defender, Jerne likens it to the brain—dynamic, interconnected, and capable of information processing. In his perspective, the immune system is a vast network of cells that can interact, adapt, and evolve. According to Jerne, this adaptability is fueled by the endogenous activity of the system. He hypothesizes that the immune system perceives foreign agents through various internal images.

These images, formed during ontogeny, produce many antibodies, each tailored to distinct antigenic forms. Rather than being strictly reactionary, these antibodies suggest a proactive readiness—an anticipatory stance poised for engagement with the environment. These emerging perspectives urge a paradigm shift in conceptualizing immunity—from a rigid defense mechanism to a dynamic, adaptive, and engaging system. This new view recognizes the immune system's capability beyond rejection and defense and for discernment, adaptation, and collaboration.

Within the annals of immunological research, Élie Metchnikoff stands out not merely for discovering phagocytes, often construed as attentive defenders of somatic integrity, but for his stance on immunity's role in maintaining an internal symbiotic harmony. A shift in perspective emerges, necessitating a departure from the typically aggressive portrayal of the immune system. Instead, there is a necessity to recognize the philosophical and scientific paradigms that champion a pacifist interpretation of immunity, where the body's defenses are not merely warriors but ambassadors inclined towards negotiations, alliances, and strategic compromises with their molecular interlocutors.

The Chilean biologist and philosopher Francisco Varela is pivotal in this reconceptualization. At the heart of enactivism lies a principle underscoring the manifold pathways of cognition and action. This transforms the immune system not as an uncompromising citadel but as an adaptive, interactive entity capable of balanced coexistence. In exploring immunological dogma, Francisco Varela's introduction of *ecosomatics* emerges as a framework (Varela et al., 1988). Grounded in the symbiotic relationship between the immune system and the somatic milieu, Varela hypothesizes the body as both a product and an interactive milieu for leukocytes. This ecosomatic network, capable of mutating and generating novel antibodies, lymphocytes, and cellular molecules, opens the conviviality between genetic predispositions and the body's epigenetic history. This dialectical interaction accentuates the significance of actualizing the virtual. How this actualization unfolds hinges

upon an organism's genesis and epigenesis, accentuated by the integration of ingrained qualities and individual experiential acquisition. As elucidated by Catherine Malabou, epigenetic trajectory deviates from deterministic pathways, embracing an element of contingency (Malabou, 2016: 172). This is reminiscent of the enactivist outlook:

The molecular world we inhabit, thus, is not pre-given, and then inhabited *post facto* by our immune systems through some optimal adaptation. It is rather laid down as we walk in it, it is a world brought forth (Varela et al., 1988: 373).

A departure from traditional immunological concepts is evident in Varela's rejection of the immune system as a mere reactive entity to external intrusions. For Varela, the immune system's interactions are mostly self-derived, collapsing the duality of organism and environment. This self-referential system sets novel encounters, such as viruses, against its ontogenetic archives. The entanglement of the lymphatic system, represented through markers in the thymus and lymph nodes, offers measures for such evaluations.

A critical discourse emerges regarding the distinction between "noise"—the unintegrated and hence insignificant—and "signal"—the relevant triggers for immune activities. It echoes ideas in Cecile Malaspina's cybernetic communications (Malaspina, 2018) and Quentin Maillassoux's conceptualization of virtual hyper-chaos (Maillassoux, 2011). The domain of internal imagery occupies an abstract, multidimensional space for an existence shaped by morphogenetic fluctuations within the attractor-repeller landscape (Depraz, 2008: 241–242). Varela's arguments hinge upon the immune system's enclosed nature. As evidenced by the cyclical and autopoietic production of antibodies against both antigens and themselves, the immune system operates recursively, emphasizing interactions within its ecosomatic domain and affecting itself via its own internal agency—or, as Karen Barad would say, *intra-activities*. *Intra-agency* is an action devoid of an actor, that creates one during the interaction process. It generates micro-movements of the system or the shift that informs the initial self-other fold, the coupling of the organism and its environment. Barad emphasizes the interconnect-edness of creatures and their environments. Instead of viewing entities as pre-existing and then interacting, Barad introduces the term *intra-action* to exemplify the mutual constitution of entangled agencies. There are no separate entities before they *intra-act*; differences emerge through continual *intra-active* processes. Knowledge is seen as a direct material engagement with the world, stressing that knowing and being are intertwined material practices. As Barad states, the world is not merely an idea, and the mind



is a specific material configuration of the world, not necessarily coincident with a brain (Barad, 2014).

Such a perspective necessitates a re-evaluation of immunological terminology. Antigens, defined in this framework, can infiltrate and recalibrate the network, contingent on their resemblance to the system's molecular determinants. The system's internal activities, producing these guiding images, define the parameters of what is deemed an antigen and what remains relegated as noise. In the philosophical thinking of Emmanuel Levinas, as highlighted by Aristarkhova, the inherent nature of hospitality antecedes all forms of hostility. In this perspective, immunity is an active player in generating alliances and ecological coexistence. As Aristarkhova delineates, the environment and organisms are symbiotic; the former molds the latter, reshaping them and enabling a sense of self-awareness and tolerance. This relationship resembles developmental psychological theories that posit the emergence of a child's individuality as co-dependent on an "evoked companion," to use David Sterne's term. A psychological "self" takes root and flourishes through this relational other. Aristarkhova's analogy of the hematoplacental barrier during pregnancy is a poignant illustration. While ensuring the fetus's blood remains distinct from the mother's, the placenta also inhibits specific maternal immune reactions to fetal components. Such a scenario foregrounds the concept of self-affection as a primordial passivity, transcending intentionality. This is not mere inactivity but a nuanced receptivity — openness to the alterity, laying the groundwork for self-recognition distinct from the overarching environment. The lexicon of immunology introduces self as the symbolic landscape demarcated by macromolecular profiles that reside on cellular surfaces, underscoring tissue specificity during developmental phases. We each bear an exclusive ecological signature — ecosomatic markers that differentiate us. The dialogue between the immune system and bodily tissues shapes this embodied selfhood, challenging our conventional understanding of bodily boundaries. Far transcending the limitations of our skin, this self-defining molecular matrix outlines our corporeal borders. The body's boundaries are a perpetually shifting shield of self-generation, anchored not in spatial consciousness but in relentless molecular engagements. As Varela put it, based on his experience of liver transplantation:

The boundaries of the self undulate, extend and contract, and reach sometimes far into the environment, into the presence of multiple others, sharing a self-defining boundary with bacteria and parasites. Such fluid boundaries are a constitutive habit we share with all forms of life: microorganisms exchange body parts so

often and so fast that trying to establish body boundaries is not only absurd, but runs counter to the very phenomenon of that form of life (Varela, 2001: 263).

It is not the body-technology that introduces the alterity in my lived body as a radical innovation. That technology widens and slips into what is always already there. The alien and the foreign of the transplantation gesture is not a sharp boundary marker for how my body holds its place as the locus of intimacy (ibid.: 266).

This elusive embodiment rearticulates itself through reflections of shifting centers, each echoing a self, an experiencing subject. This entity undergoes a blending of intimacy and estrangement. The selfhood, which the organism perceives as a continually evolving somatic home, feels dislocated, invoking archaic mechanisms rooted in the primal milieu of its cellular surroundings. An abrupt introduction of a completely new organ proves overwhelmingly rapid. Such a process initiates extensive tagging of alien-marked cells, which are then obliterated by T lymphocytes, leading to the gradual dematerialization of the new organ.

#### THE HEART OF THE HEART

Cardiophenomenology, as conceptualized by Depraz, transcends the heart's conventional knowledge as merely an organ responsible for blood circulation. Drawing inspiration from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological perspective of the body as flesh — the palpable embodiment of consciousness in the world — Depraz presents the heart as the symbolic center of an alternative model of consciousness (Depraz, 2008; Depraz, Desmidt, 2019).

In cardiophenomenology, the heart becomes a junction of intersubjectivity, exemplifying *generative concorporeality*. This concept embodies the interconnectedness of beings, the shared rhythms and pulsations that bind entities together. As the heart simultaneously encompasses non-intentional domains of consciousness and cultural sedimentations, it occupies a dual role: it is neither a biological pump nor solely a spiritual or mythological metaphor but a convergence of both.

Depraz's vision of the heart, integrating the biological and phenomenological, echoes with its remarkable capacity for *self-transcendence*. This is the heart's inherent ability to renew, risk into the unknown, and encounter contingency and alterity. Affective states, emotions, and feelings are intertwined with the heart's rhythms, with each beat a tangible articulation of our internal emotional landscapes. Such a conceptualization suggests an

intimate connection between affective states and cardiac rhythms, indicating that the heart's alterations in rhythm — its palpitations, accelerations, and decelerations — signify a corporeal anticipation of experiences yet to come — literally, experiences of the virtual. Furthermore, the heart's unique temporality elucidates its anticipatory nature. Even before an anticipated event occurs, the heart might already hasten its pace or leap from the chest, anchoring and expressing a bodily foreshadowing of imminent experiences. From a cardiophenomenological perspective, affect is thereby reconsidered as a modulation of heart rhythm and an openness to the virtual — the realm of possibilities, the threshold of what might occur. Drawing on Eastern Christian thought, Depraz recognizes the heart as the “innermost body.” This insight affirms that one's experience of having a heart — the essential core of one's being — underpins our existence as animate, breathing creatures. This breathing existence entrenches us in an expansive world overflowing with other beings, other rhythms, and shared pulses:

According to this line of thought, self-transcendence corresponds to the dynamic of the bodily self as a self that contains the inherent ability to create new events from itself. We contend that, more than the brain, which only materially rules the body and its immediate context and supports a formal-functionalist approach of cognition, the heart, as the “body of the body,” gives us the most basic and global experience of ourselves as embodied self-present subjects, that is, as subjects enacting cognition. By attending to the physiology of the heart, we aim to undo the remnant dichotomy between mind and brain, that is, the residual discontinuity between the phenomenal and the biological levels (Depraz, 2008: 243).

The idea that neuro-reflex regulation guides blood circulation outside of conscious volition has important implications. These autonomic processes, while automatic, play a decisive role in shaping our lived experiences. We might not be actively controlling these processes, but we certainly experience their consequences. Depraz's insights are particularly notable when she draws parallels between the physiological manifestations of the heart and the subsequent feelings and emotions these evoke. Just as we recognize two modes of body access, *Leib* (lived experience of the body) and *Körper* (the physical, objective body), Depraz proposes a dual approach to understanding affectivity through *Herz* and *Gemüt*. While *Herz* signifies the objective, physical heart, *Gemüt* symbolizes the personal, innermost domain of emotional and affective experiences. This duality offers a more affluent, layered understanding of emotional lives.

A considerable advantage of the heart, as highlighted by Depraz, is its innate dual accessibility. In contrast to the brain and nervous system —

which remain elusive and intangible — the heart provides direct feedback. We might not *feel* our brain, but the heart's rhythm resonates vividly with our emotional experiences. Whether it is the pulses we feel during moments of excitement or the slowed beats in moments of calm, our heart offers an immediate, tangible link to our inner emotional world:

The pendular physiology of the heart, as a ruler of bodily vitality, attests to a specific phenomenality: the lived rhythm we are able to capture when we sensorially feel the beats of our heart with pressure of our hand being placed either on our chest or on the chest of our child or of our beloved. We sense its growing quickness after a long run or when we are stressed or emotionally moved; we sense the way our face blushes when we feel shame, pleasure or jealousy, or the way it pales when we feel fear or anxiety. In short, there is a strong continuity between the physiological appearance of the heart — its holistic bodily function as an integrated, circular blood network — and its lived manifestation with respect to concretely expressed feelings, emotions, and affects. What is indicated in the dictionary as (so it seems) a sheer metaphor — i. e. “the heart is the seat of the emotions” — exists in direct continuity with the physiological dynamic between the heart and the body as a whole (Depraz, 2008: 243).

While the brain, often anointed as the command center, determines a vast display of our experiences, our direct engagement with it remains intangible. We are often mere recipients of its outcomes, such as the resultant feelings of a dopamine deficit, rather than being in touch with its ongoing processes. The brain, therefore, remains an object — distant, though intimately tied to our conscious experiences.

In juxtaposition, the heart offers a more immediate experience. This is where Depraz's recourse to Husserl's concept of *Triebintentionalität* becomes illuminating. Drive intentionality, or instinctive intentionality, as it may be translated, vibrates with the heart's unique way of being in the world. Unlike the traditional forms of intentionality that aim at an external object, the heart's intentionality is devoid of such an external orientation. It is not geared towards an external object, but is instead a reflection of an inward, self-enclosed, autopoietic existence. This coincides with the principles of Michel Henry's material phenomenology. For Henry, life itself is the agent, and its only action is self-living, a kind of auto-affection, an immanent self-movement that is self-contained and not directed outward. Similarly, for Depraz, the heart's rhythmic beating and its correlation with emotional experiences exemplify this inward intentionality — a consciousness of oneself without being directed at an external object.

Depraz formulates an alternative framework for understanding the mind-body relationship by positioning the heart as such. It starkly contrasts traditional psychophysical models that often struggle with the dualism of mind and body. Instead of dissecting consciousness and body into separate entities, Depra's cardiophenomenology offers a dynamic, intertwined model. The heart becomes emblematic of this unity, integrating the temporal and affective dimensions into the very structure of our being. The heart is not just a mere organ in this framework; it becomes the epicenter of lived experiences. It transcends its biological functionality, bridging the physiological and the phenomenal. Its rhythm embodies emotional states, anticipations, anxieties, and joys:

The pre-consciously lived, recurrent regularity of the organic beating of the heart intrinsically includes an emotional component that contributes to the way it is subjectively thrown in relief as lived. The heart quickens while one is expecting news, it slows down when one gets bored, it flutters when one experiences strong emotions (such as those related to trauma). Indeed, through its rhythms, the heart functions as an organic, pre-conscious recorder of every emotional fluctuation of my inner psychic life. The temporal fluctuations of the heart-rhythm range from "normal" speeding or slowing; to pathological arrhythmia, bradycardia, tachycardia, tachyarrhythmia (seizures); to the liminal rhythms of fainting, cardiac arrest, or heart attack. The notion of a non-precarious, absolutely regular heartbeat — though sometimes considered "normal" — is completely idealistic; it is as abstract and fictive as the idea of an un-affected self. As lived temporality is intrinsically valence-laden, so the heart is immanently permeated with an always potentially self-altered rhythm. In that respect, the temporal rhythm of the heart is immanently "self-previous": it is open to the possibility of alteration due to unexpected (i. e., surprising) emotional events, while basically remaining within a temporality composed of awaited regular recurrences (Depraz, 2008: 253–254).

The temporality of the heart produces a cardio-subject as an effect of the physiological processes of cardiac homeostasis. Just as an ecosomatic self arises through molecular intra-action in immunity, in the cardiovascular system, the constitution of the subject occurs through a dynamic processual distinction between the self and the environment. Outside of cardiac activity — self-previousness and self-transcendence — the self does not arise; it exists as an effect of an unexpected event — surprise, as Depraz calls it, or contingency. An unforeseen event triggers an emotional response, causing the heart to beat faster. The actual comes to reality from the virtual, following the unpredictable logic of surprise. Self-previousness means that

the heart works as an open system, ready for affection and aware of itself as a whole and integral only in such events.

This account attempts at the deep integration of the physiological and experiential dimensions, emphasizing the heart's centrality in mediating and reflecting our emotional and affective states. Cardiophenomenology explores how the heart's uncontrollable, rhythmic physiological processes shape our connection with the world. These processes, which we can term *visceral*, pertain to preconscious bodily functions. While seemingly unrelated to high-level cognitive abilities typically associated with the brain, recent studies suggest a significant role in shaping psyche and social self (Shildrick, 2023). Viscerality has two connotations: unconscious processes in our body perform vital organic functions like digestion and respiration, maintaining our body's equilibrium, or the regressive states patients enter during certain illnesses or deep comas, especially around the diagnosis of brain death. These states lack mental self-awareness and are viewed as regressions from standard brain activity. The first interpretation connects with the second, suggesting that these inherent bodily processes can surpass consciousness and advanced neural functions during severe illnesses. Potential events and emotions it has not yet experienced guide the heart's rhythm. The deconstructed subjectivity, represented through cardiovascular activities, shows that the self relies on external factors and the potentialities of the future manifesting in the present.

#### THE AUTO-HETERO-AFFECTIVE BRAIN

Homeostatic functions can be performed by the immune system or blood circulation and the brain at a higher level of the organism's emotional self-regulation. Depraz introduces a specific map of affects, which she calls the rainbow of emotions (Depraz, 2008). This map distributes the various states in the spectrum as a scheme of possible states of the organism. However, it is still unclear how the heart and emotions relate and what role the central and peripheral nervous system plays here. The human brain's operation, characterized by its distinct temporal, spatial, and energetic principles, fundamentally differs from our regular sensorimotor experiences. For Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, the neuronal activity dynamics starkly contrast with any motion we can comprehend or perform. This difference emerges more distinctly when considering the inherent challenges in envisioning the motion of neural firing. Our attempts to visualize this are limited by our bodily experiences, conflating visual images with kinesthetic experiences. Furthermore, the very essence of life is imbued with affectivity, driving

organisms towards attraction or repulsion. This foundational responsiveness aligns affectivity with movement, a relationship that Sheets-Johnstone has explored (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011).

Affect, while rooted in the heart, also finds a significant place in the brain. The cerebral domain plays a crucial role in affects, transcending the traditionally assumed boundaries. Drawing from the theories of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, Catherine Malabou advances the notion that liaison exists between neuronal metabolism and emotional dynamics (Malabou, 2009b: 4). These dynamics encompass not merely the mechanisms integral to internal regulation and the homeostasis of the embodied system, but also incorporate an underlying unconscious drive. This drive, rich in affective features, functions at the juncture of cerebral and corporeal dimensions, constituting a psychosomatic unity.

Instead of proposing a substantial vision of subjectivity, current neurobiology is exploring the absence of the self to itself. There could be no power of acting, no feeling of existence, no temporality without this originary delusion of the first person. such a position might help in radicalizing the notions of heteroaffection, the nonhuman, or the death drive, which remain, in their actual state, remnants of the metaphysical tradition because of the contempt that both philosophy and psychoanalysis have expressed with regard to the biological in general and the brain and the neurosciences in particular (Johnston & Malabou, 2013: 72).

Within this framework, affects emerge as foundational elements in a living system's homeostasis, potentially displacing the roles played by the cognitive unconscious processes, thereby producing a unique *affective economy*.

This position implies that cerebral dynamics undergird cognition and consciousness and influence the affective, sensual, and erotic aspects of conscious existence. The brain, conceptualized as an auto-affective system, navigates with internal and external stimuli, establishing a "cerebral economy of emotions." As Damasio elucidates with his somatic markers, these interactions inform the brain of the body's states, thus regulating the feedback loop encompassing the brain, body, and environment. It is noteworthy that while Malabou's perspective resonates with certain aspects of traditional cognitivism, it also aligns with an enactivist perspective, particularly when cognition is viewed as an embodied action. Malabou's endeavors to knot intersubjectivity into this cerebral model present a compelling vision of consciousness's affective, intersubjective dimensions, harmonizing with core 4EA tenets.

Malabou delineates affect as a modification or perturbation that infuses dynamicity into subjective existence. This encompasses transformative events that mark an individual's life trajectory indelibly. Drawing upon Henri Maldiney's work, affect can be perceived as pathic immanent experiencing activity, which consists of revealing one's own area of receptivity, placing a spotlight on the experiential over the merely reactive. This orientation suggests that a pre-existing *pathos* is essential for meaningful interpersonal engagement. Contrasting with Michel Henry's position on affectivity as a conduit for life's self-revelation, Malabou, taking cues from Jacques Derrida, postulates that the self lacks an inherent substantiality. Instead, it discerns its existence predominantly through its inner affective sensations or *auto-affection*:

The very structure of subjectivity, within the metaphysical tradition, was one and the same with the structure of autoaffection, that is, as this kind of *self-touching* through which the subject is feeling its singular presence (Johnston & Malabou, 2013: 6).

An exploration of Malabou's interpretation of Derrida reveals that pure auto-affection remains an elusive construct. The phenomenological consciousness is not merely a product of selfless processes; it exists as a persistent presence that invariably punctuates every act of cognition, ubiquitously influencing a meshwork of cognitive acts unified under a singular, holistic subjectivity:

The subject can only represent itself as affected — altered — by itself. The self has access to itself through its *own* otherness or alterity. The self-representation of the subject is thus always an *autoaffection* (ibid.).

The activity of the neurovegetative system that lays the basis for cognition and consciousness is itself based on the affective, sensational and sexual drives. These drives constitute the neuronal system as the auto-affective system interacting with the exogenous and endogenous processes and events, which, including the initial encounter with the other, can trigger the system's affective reactions, predetermining its further behavior. Thus, affection is always an auto-affection, informing the neurovegetative system about the interaction dynamics between the brain, body and environment. Hence, the originary relationality here is the dynamic interrelation between the self and the events which modify it.

The topography of phenomenology, traditionally embedded in the perspective that affectivity is a foundational condition for life's self-disclosure,



encounters a substantial reconfiguration in Malabou's works. Taking cues from Derrida, Malabou challenges the deeply held belief of the self's capacity for self-cognition, possessing a substantial, static essence. Instead, Malabou advances the view that the self's knowledge is intrinsically bound to its capacity to affect its inner sense. Through Derrida's critique of Husserlian phenomenology, Malabou emphasizes the impossibility of pure auto-affection. Consider a canonical phenomenological example of one's left hand touching the right to elucidate. While phenomenology might perceive this as an epitome of auto-affection, Malabou, echoing Derrida, discerns this act as underpinned by an inherent self-modification, even a form of estrangement. Thus, it is not the unity or seamless self-contact that facilitates this touch; instead, the very dynamics of self-differentiation and subtle alienation render auto-affection possible:

Cerebral auto-affection is the biological, logical, and affective process by which finitude is constituted within the living core of subjectivity without ever being able to become the knowledge of a subject. The cerebral self represents itself without presenting itself (Malabou, 2009b: 44).

Against this background, Malabou introduces *hetero-affection*. She conceptualizes it bifurcately as the affect of the other with two implications. At its core, the notion of being affected intrinsically posits the other as an integral aspect of one's internal constitution, distinguishing it from the conventional self. Drawing parallels with enactivism, the self, as socially discernible, emerges as a sophisticated, chemically mediated constellation of sub-systems. This synthesis of multifarious somatic processes — the others — results in the emergence of the self as a distinctive byproduct. A balanced amalgamation of "low-level" somatic and high-level socio-cultural cognitive processes underpin the evolution of a distinct, recognizable subject. Crucially, these selves culminate in intersecting somatic and cognitive trajectories rooted in pre-reflective, selfless events. As Malabou points out, a pivotal distinction exists between the other residing within and the external other affecting one (Malabou, 2009a: 113–114). Affectivity, thus, manifests as an internal event, positioning the self as the other to oneself. This complex interaction between the *affected* other and the *affecting* other signifies the coupling of two distinct living systems. This primary axis of affectivity, stemming from the conjunction of self and other, highlights an elemental reliance on the latter, excavating an inherent alterity within. Such a discovery prompts a reconceptualization of the self as an evolving trajectory of *auto-hetero-affection*, where the affective self is characterized

by fluctuations between internal vulnerabilities (auto-affectation) and external impulses (hetero-affectation). Consequently, the subjectivity of the living system emerges as a domain brimming with potential transformations, reactive to the lifeworld occurrences. The foundational event in this odyssey is the engagement with the other, a revelation that emphasizes the interrelational composition of the inter- and concorporeal plastic self:

We must all of us recognize that we might, one day, become someone else, an absolute other, someone who will never be reconciled with themselves again, someone who will be this form of us without redemption or atonement, without last wishes, this damned form, outside of time. These modes of being without genealogy have nothing to do with the wholly other found in the mystical ethics of the twentieth century. The Wholly Other I'm talking about remains always and forever a stranger to the Other (Malabou, 2009a: 1–2).

The brain's dynamics, particularly the intertwining of auto-hetero-affectation, offer the brain not merely as an organ of cognition but as a nexus of self-touch. Drawing inspiration from Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of chiasm, the brain, through its plastic epigenetic development, embodies this intertwining, marking the convergence of self and otherness at the very juncture of their encounter.

Such an approach can be likened to the hand's act of touching itself. In this act, both the touching and the touched are simultaneously embodied, articulating a dialectical knot hidden in the uncertainties of micro-movements. This self-affectation introduces a nuanced depth to the brain's functionality; it now emerges as a reservoir of affects and drives. This transformation is primarily engendered by its entanglement with the "other," an encounter fraught with contingencies and unpredictabilities. This inherent openness of the brain — its susceptibility to pressures, traumas, and contingencies — accentuate its vulnerability. Nevertheless, it is precisely this vulnerability that demarcates its ontological core. In the auto-hetero-affectation paradigm, this porousness, or capacity to be affected and affect, delineates the brain's ontology.

#### CONCLUSION

I conclude with a fragment from Natalie Depraz's narrative about her mental state during the coronavirus pandemic and lockdown:

I will speak here of fragility. You may have other words to name this feeling of absolute distress, of immersion in a situation where the unpredictable disorients all control. You may prefer to speak of "vulnerability," "precariousness," or even "submission." In all these terms resonates something of our extreme passivity, of

our being-affected, of a form of undergoing. I prefer the term “fragility” because it reflects the fundamentally friable nature of my being (Depraz, 2021: 249).

In recent discourses on embodiment, health, and the human experience, there arises a deep tension between the complications of the lived body and the empirical methodologies that aim to understand it. The body, a nexus of experience, often gets reduced to mere biomedical mechanics in healthcare discourse. While such reductions have their worth—offering clarity, precision, and insights—they also invariably eclipse the phenomenological richness that characterizes human life. A pivotal question stands at the heart of this connection between objective medical understanding and subjective lived experiences.

In *The Heart*, Malin Kivelä’s portrayal of her porous body offers a reflection on this tension:

I love when there are wounds in my mouth. Tiny, aching sores: on the gums, sometimes on the inside of the cheek. I love bubbles on the skin, bruises. They probably let me know that I am me. I know how my wounds sting, exactly like this, exactly on me. They’ve been with me all my life (Kivelä, Starodubtseva, 2021).

Her depictions, steeped in the realities of childbirth, motherhood, and the anxiety surrounding her son’s ailment, are a powerful testament to the body’s inherent vulnerability, permeability, and openness. Deviating starkly from fortress-like, militaristic, and aggressive metaphors often employed in medical discourse, her narrative prompts us to reconceive our perceptions of physical boundaries and internal defenses. By emphasizing the body’s inherent vulnerability and permeability, Kivelä’s narrative becomes a critique of traditional biomedical frameworks, urging a move towards a more holistic, integrated understanding of the human experience.

The approaches I have interpreted in this article offer a non-aggressive picture of the processes that generate both sides of the interaction. At the same time, the appearance of the perceiver and the perceived, the touching and the touched, the knowing and the known, is triggered by an extraneous phenomenon—the other, or alterity—that brings to life subjectivity, which directly allies with its counterparts, whether molecular, emotional, or social-institutional. The themes tackled in this paper, drawing from diverse fields such as phenomenology, biomedicine, and bioethics, intend to foster a dialogue on the nature of human existence. Navigating the terrain of embodiment, disease, technology, and ethics, we undertake an exploration that interweaves the cerebral with the visceral, the empirical with the existential, and the objective with the subjective. A central premise

guides this paper, leading our exploration of three theories of viscerality: in understanding the human condition, we must not just consider the biological mechanisms, but also embrace the narratives, vulnerabilities, and interconnections that shape our shared reality.

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## ВИСЦЕРАЛЬНАЯ ЖИЗНЬ

### К СОТЕЛЕСНОЙ БИОЭТИКЕ

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**Аннотация:** В этой статье рассматривается взаимодействие между воплощением, средой и аффективностью в контексте постгуманистических теорий тела, главным образом иммунной, сердечно-сосудистой и нервной систем, соединяющих висцеральное с экзистенциальным. Сосредоточившись на понятии автогетероаффективности, автор статьи бросает вызов традиционным представлениям о самости, выступая за понимание «я» как текучего, постоянно изменяющегося в результате взаимодействия с инаковостью. Критическое напряжение возникает при сопоставлении эмпирических методологий, используемых в здравоохранении и часто сводящих тело к простой биомедицинской механике, с богатым феноменологическим опытом живого тела. С помощью художественного повествования Малин Кивели и теорий Франсиско Варелы, Натали Девра и Катрин Малабу в статье подчеркивается присущая организму уязвимость и формулируется призыв к переходу от маскулинизированных медицинских дискурсов к более целостному восприятию человеческого опыта. Это исследование переплетает темы феноменологии, биомедицины и биоэтики, побуждая к многогранным дискуссиям о человеческом существовании, подчеркивая необходимость оценить биологические механизмы, а также нарративы и уязвимости, формирующие нашу общую реальность. Идеи статьи основаны на общем чувстве хрупкости во время пандемии, отражающем шаткий баланс нашего познания себя и своей уязвимости. Таким образом, дискурс призывает к переосмысленному взгляду на воплощение, здоровье и человеческий опыт, выдвигая на первый план переплетение когнитивной и аффективной сфер.

**Ключевые слова:** воплощение, автогетероаффектация, кардиофеноменология, эпигенез, экосома, уязвимость, биоэтика, висцеральность.

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MAXIM GORBACHEV\*

## ON THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION MADE BY ILLUSIONISM AND REALISM\*\*

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**Abstract:** This article is about the discussion between realists and illusionists on phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal properties or qualia. The author considers what he calls the epistemological-ontological transition—the transition from epistemologically significant statements to ontologically significant ones. The option to avoid such a transition is tested in order to overcome some obstacles that it can bring to the discussion. The paper provides examples of the transition made by both camps as well as some advantages and disadvantages of rejecting it. The author comes to the conclusion that there are meaningful arguments for both options. On one hand, rejection of the transition to ontology may be beneficial for the following reasons. First, it tends to puzzle the opponents and to slow the discussion. Second, the very reason for the transition is poorly justified. Third, the core of the discussion between illusionists and realists—or at least its argumentative part—is rather epistemological, hence, moving to ontology might blur key arguments. On the other hand, one might aspire to save the transition due to the ontological roots of the discussion which must lead its argumentative part. The author then points out that eliminating the transition does not assume denying the ontological significance of the present discussion and that the problem of the nature of consciousness is definitely worth considering—but, perhaps, after the epistemological part of the problem is carefully analyzed.

**Keywords:** Illusionism, Realism, Phenomenal Consciousness, Epistemology, Ontology.

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### AN OBSTACLE TO THE DISCUSSION

There are many particular problems that arise within the discussion on illusionism (the theory of consciousness) between illusionists and realists about phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal properties. Illusionists state that there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness and that

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people are merely disposed to assuming its existence. Realists argue that phenomenal properties exist and differ from physical ones in some way. As I see it, the problems and disagreements between these sides may be divided into the following groups: explicit conceptual, implicit conceptual, explicit meta-conceptual and implicit meta-conceptual. Explicit disagreements are most obvious and easy to separate from other problems. They are the central parts of the discussion and serve as its fulcrums. For explicit conceptual, one can mention such points of the realists-illusionists discussion as the status of the zombie argument (Frankish, 2016), the existence and the nature of “what-it-is-likeness” or qualia, the acquaintance problem (Dennett, 2019), role of debunking argument (Chalmers, 2020) and the coincidence problem (ibid.: 7), among others, which the theory of consciousness needs to address and at which most of the arguments are aimed.

Explicit meta-conceptual problems often become part of the conceptual group as the reason for the clash of intuitions. They are rooted in methodological features which, at least partly explicitly, determine how arguments are built and how they work. The zombie argument is a good example of such problems’ role in the discussion. While realists can move from the possibility of imagining zombies to the claim that explanation in physical terms will be not sufficient for consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), such a shift is quite problematic from the illusionist perspective (Zhong, 2021). However, they are more likely to deny the zombie argument than give up some physicalist points to let it be significant, like Zhong suggests. As Frankish puts it, people are akin to zombies if the only thing the latter lack is phenomenality; or zombies cannot coherently be imagined if enough is known about the role of physical mechanisms in terms of consciousness or what seems to be phenomenal experience (Frankish, 2016). Another example is illusionists’ claim about ontological economy: they suggest making no considerable shifts in the scientific worldview because it is itself valuable for its proved consistence (ibid.). Such problems are also discussed and refer to the nature of conceptual claims on both sides, as they are often the very reason for differences in conceptual schemes.

While explicit problems lead the discussion and encourage developing arguments, implicit ones are, rather, obstacles to it. For this reason, they are often omitted and cannot be discussed or solved. Implicit conceptual problems emerge when arguments are determined or inspired by some ontological or worldview intuitions, making those arguments hard to beat due to the fact that the explicit argument is referred to as the premise. But one



will most likely fail in convincing an opponent if they introduce counterarguments to a statement while that opponent is protecting another statement, one that has not even been articulated. In most cases, such an obstacle arises when both sides strongly believe in different ontological judgements. It makes productive discussion almost impossible, as these judgements are often poorly and indirectly justified. In the context of illusionism-realism debates, the implicit conceptual problem resides with physicalist (Frankish, 2021) and anti-physicalist (Goff, 2016; Lipus & Bregant, 2022) intuitions, for instance. Although this implicitness is sometimes explicated, as in the papers mentioned above (however, they also do so in passing), this is rather an exception. The way I see it, even when the explication occurs, both sides might hesitate to engage with it, because most possible arguments support a picture of the world preferred before. That is why the omitting strategy can be more productive, in this case, than explication. It might force to concentrate on solvable parts of the discussion, constituted by the explicit problems described above. The influence of the unarticulated remains, but it becomes less destructive. It likely is not a coincidence that implicit problems remain unspoken, for hidden obstacles might not lessen the productivity of dialogue.

The situation with implicit meta-conceptual problems is quite different. Explicit ones contribute to the discussion and can be regarded as problems that need to be solved. Implicit conceptual disagreements become an obstacle, but they are also less influential. Implicit meta-conceptual problems contribute to the puzzlement of the illusionist-realist discussion and to the methodology used by both sides. The problem of defining phenomenal consciousness (Niikawa, 2021; Schwitzgebel, 2016) would be a prime example. I think it is clear enough that the answer to the question of whether phenomenal consciousness (PC) is illusory strongly depends on the very notion of PC.

However, in this paper I want to pay attention to another implicit meta-conceptual problem, which is the *epistemological-ontological transition* (EOT) being made by illusionism and realism. By this transition I mean one of methodological instruments used by both sides of the discussion, which justifies the possibility of a move from epistemological or epistemologically significant statements to ontological or ontologically significant ones. In this case, any statement about knowledge itself or the knowledge of particular things (not the things themselves) is referred to as epistemological—the possibilities, features and limitations of this knowledge. The term ontological is used to describe things themselves, their nature. Such

a transition presents a problem in the shape of an obstacle to the discussion, because it is not obvious that knowledge of the nature of what is called phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal property can be deduced from the understanding of what is called phenomenality. For example, a grasp on how introspection works does not inherently entail a comprehension of the (non)physical nature of introspective mechanisms, especially that of the nature of consciousness. At least, not without some articulated and justified steps that are often skipped by both realists and illusionists (I will consider this in more detail in the next sections). This is the first reason for the mentioned transition being problematic. However, I would like to note that its explication will not address the this issue because of the second problematic aspect: the transition cannot be made sufficiently at all — even explicitly. It will, nevertheless, continue to puzzle both sides because of the difference in their fundamental ontological intuitions that bring them to contrasting ontological conclusions from the same (at least in part) epistemological data. That is why I will consider that it is possible to reject the move from epistemological statements to ontological ones or to make it on the next level of the discussion, after the epistemological problem of phenomenal consciousness is solved.

#### REALIST CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION

First, I want to draw attention to the realist case of EOT. It must be mentioned that at least two types of realism can be found: conservative and radical (Frankish, 2016). The former tries to maintain physicalism, arguing that at least some of the specific characteristics of phenomenal properties are real but their nature remains physical (*ibid.*). The latter suggests radical shifts in our picture of the world as phenomenal consciousness seems to be too anomalous and cannot be explained within the current science without postulating special qualitative properties different from physical ones (*ibid.*) In terms of the present paper, I will accept Frankish's claim that conservative realism collapses in illusionism (*ibid.*). Consequently, I will concentrate on radical realism comparing its EOT with that of the illusionists. This comparison includes observation of some arguments or statements which demonstrate the EOT made by both sides under discussion. Here I will not discuss whether the EOT is worth avoiding, as in this part I just want to show that the EOT actually occurs.

One of the most common examples of the transition is made from the statement about the existence of a unique acquaintance with what is called phenomenal properties. As they are given directly and are, in terms of

the direct acquaintance, themselves subjective, ineffable and intrinsic, they have to be nonphysical in some sense, as people are not acquainted with physical properties in the same way (Chalmers, 1996: 192). While there is a significant gap between being aware of something as having a physical property and it actually having it (scientific knowledge can be mistaken), there is no such gap in the case of awareness of experiential properties, hence to be aware of something having  $X$  and to have  $X$  means the same (Nida-Rümelin, 2016). On the first step, some epistemological statements about how phenomenal consciousness became apparent are given; on the second step, the EOT transition is made, and, as Goff puts it — if phenomenal properties obtain all those unique characteristics, they require ontological commitments (Goff, 2016). The present argument works due to the premise that this transition is possible — if there is an epistemological situation  $q$  then it has to have particular ontological consequences. This very premise I will consider further. Leaving behind the reasons for the EOT occurring, mentioned examples demonstrate its presence. This is how the discussion might progress, but this would be begging the question against the option of changing the way it evolves, as there is no guarantee of it going in the best way. Back to the structure of the mentioned example, Goff insists on the principal compatibility of such a view with third-person science — especially if radical realism adopts Russelian monism (*ibid.*). However, such compatibility can be seen as an opportunity to not broaden ontology and instead admit that there is still much to discover about the physical world.

Nevertheless, commonly anomalous phenomenal properties present the epistemic and explanatory gap, which results in explanatory problems for the scientific view. Realists, unlike illusionists, can claim that these problems prove the inconsistency of scientist ontology, as it is more obvious that there are phenomenal experiences than that every truth should be explicable from the fundamental physical truth about the world (Balog, 2016). Although I share some of Balog intuitions, I think it cannot be concluded that physicalists cannot address these problems without saving their current ontology and the assumption mentioned above

Realists can also introduce Moorean arguments for the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness (Kammerer, 2022). However, illusionists would easily avoid them because of the EOT they also make. Moorean arguments are aimed at the demonstration of the existence of one's experiences; but illusionists do not deny this existence — they deny the particular ontological status of existing and therefore some of the features treated as essential which are epistemologically — not ontologically — significant.

Another realist camp EOT example is one made for saving the current discussion field without considerable changes. It is often thought that the distinction between hard and easy problems is a key feature of the modern philosophy of mind. Whilst this is reasonable, it helps to be aware of some ontological baggage this distinction often brings. In cases when the hard problem is considered not as a mark of the epistemological gap, but as an ontological statement (I mean when the difference between these types of problems is automatically taken as the argument for the existence of unique non-physical properties), one is faced with the fact that the EOT would have a huge impact on the discussion. I believe that one of the reasons for illusionists to replace the hard problem with the illusion problem is that ontological baggage does not necessarily come up alongside the hard-easy problems distinction. As Frankish puts it, the notion of phenomenal consciousness introduced by Chalmers leads naturally to the appearance of the hard problem and panpsychism (Frankish, 2021). Some approaches are even ready to adopt one of the central illusionist ideas about the principal fallibility of introspective knowledge in order to save the concept of the hard problem (Prinz, 2016; Schriner, 2018).

The last, but nonetheless important example of realist EOT I will mention is one made because of intuitiveness. It is counterintuitive to think that phenomenal consciousness is illusion (epistemological statement); that is why — realists would claim — there are phenomenal properties which are both epistemologically and ontologically unique. The problem of counter-intuitiveness is one to be solved by illusionists (Kammerer, 2016), but this again begs to claim that this feature of illusionist theory is the argument for its inconsistency and for the postulating of some ontological characteristics of phenomenal properties. In addition, it needs to be taken into account that the statement about the counter-intuitiveness of a thought concerned with the features of awareness of one's states of consciousness is radically different from one about the nature of these states. The transition which is made here is even more notable than the one in the case of direct acquaintance, although it is often mediated by supporting arguments for counter-intuitiveness being a sign of the unique epistemological situation which is then treated as a trampoline to the EOT mentioned in the first example.

#### ILLUSIONIST CASE FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION

To stress possible puzzling effects of the EOT, I will concentrate on those cases of it from the illusionist camp which are quite similar to realist one. To begin with, here is EOT made from the statement about the lack of the

unique acquaintance with what is called phenomenal properties. If there is a chance to be mistaken about one's own phenomenal properties, the knowledge about these properties can be totally mistaken; therefore, they lack all those unique features realists attribute to them (Frankish, 2016). However, phenomenality still seems to have those properties and illusionists are ready to introduce quasi-phenomenal properties that just seem to be non-physical (because of EOT by realists) but due to the aforementioned possibility of being mistaken (Dennett, 2020) about phenomenal consciousness, this seemingly is the evidence of a real mistake for illusionists (epistemological statement) and they claim these properties are physical (ontological statement). I see this as a good demonstration of an EOT clash which may be described in the following way: for realists, phenomenal properties seem to have unique features that make them different from physical properties and they are non-physical; for illusionists, phenomenal properties only seem to have unique features and they are physical properties. I am not quite sure whether both sides can reasonably move from the features of phenomenality and statements about the knowledge of these features to the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness. Moreover, realists are even ready to agree with a part of the illusionist epistemological program — e. g. the possibility of a mistake about the external world based on the introspective access to the experiences. That is why Humphrey, as I see it, calls himself a surrealist (Humphrey, 2016). It can be said that we are mistaken when we think that there is something beautiful, funny or that the people in the theater scene actually fight and suffer, but this mistake creates real mental events: red color, being actually a wave of a particular length, is really experienced as red and this experience is real. Such presence of the contrary ontological implications based on the similar epistemological situation again demonstrates the EOT from one type of statements to another which is a distinct one.

The anomalous character of phenomenal properties is also the reason for illusionist EOT. As those properties seem anomalous and resistant to third person perspective and scientific analysis (epistemological statement), these properties do not exist and are some physical processes (ontological statement) that are shown to us as non-physical because of distortion by introspective mechanisms, within which we get our knowledge about phenomenality (Frankish, 2016). It looks puzzling when the same background leads to controversial conclusions. Possibly, the EOT made by both sides is a consequence of the existence of an implicit meta-conceptual problem concerning the ontology. This problem becomes even more of an obstacle

when both camps make the EOT in terms of the anomalous character of that which is called phenomenal consciousness.

A similar situation occurs with the hard/illusion problem transition. While hard problem discourse is perceived by realists as essential within the current philosophy of mind and especially within the discussion on phenomenal consciousness, the illusionists consider it too mysterious (epistemological statement), comprising undesirable ontological baggage that one should eliminate to progress (Frankish, 2021; Frankish & Sklutová, 2022). However, such passage implies posing a similar type of question as the one asked by realists when they deem illusionists unable of solving the illusion problem, which replaces the hard one. If the hard problem is genuinely complex, this does not render it unsolvable or mean that its existence should be denied. Still, illusionists do not agree and are ready to argue the statement that there is no third-person scientific solution to the hard problem, making EOT inspired by the denial of the epistemological status of phenomenal consciousness (PC) defended by realists. If the PC notion introduced by realists contributes to mysterious discourse (Frankish, ed., 2017) (epistemological statement), PC should also be eliminated (ontological statement).

Counter-intuitiveness is also significant for illusionists. It is counterintuitive for them that we should adopt a picture of the world which is different from one offered by natural sciences, with its proven consistence and effectivity (Dennett, 2016; Frankish, 2016). There are some papers that are aimed at justifying the compatibility of scientific achievements with the reality of phenomenal properties (Goff, 2016; Schwitzgebel, 2016), but illusionists remain unsatisfied with these arguments because of the EOT made by them affecting their intuition about the principal explicability of the world in physical terms. It is counterintuitive to think that the world cannot be explained within physical terms (epistemological statement)—so, there are no phenomenal properties that seem to be resistant to this type of explanation (ontological statement). This particular case of the EOT is remarkable as it is made in different ways because both camps find the alternative counterintuitive: realists do not see anomalous character as reason enough for rejecting anomaly; illusionists do.

Here it is suitable to mention another example of EM transition made within the problem of the PC explanation; debunking arguments for illusionism. If something can be explained without appealing to it, there is reason to believe that it does not exist (Chalmers, 2020). So, if PC can be explained in physical and functional terms, belief in it ought to be rejected (Dennett, 2020) as can be done with UFOs. It is an interesting example of

EOT, as such an explanation possibility does not entail debunking. That is why realizationists emerge, who claim that although we can introduce debunking explanation, the phenomenon explained and the content of the explanation is realized by real phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 2020). This realizationism demonstrates how one can doubt at least one type of the EOT: if our beliefs about  $x$  can be explained without  $x$  (epistemological statement) it does not automatically mean that  $x$  does not exist (ontological statement). There seems to be some sense in this if one can be imaginative enough to introduce debunking arguments to almost everything, but how imaginative one is can hardly affect (non)existence in some cases.

#### IS REJECTING EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL TRANSITION AN OPTION?

Considering the mentioned examples of the EOT made by both sides of the discussion, one could notice some puzzling consequences of its application connected with opposite interpretations of the same input data or with the lack of methodological agreement on its mechanisms. However, such puzzlement does not necessarily have to result in accepting the rejection of the EOT by both realists and illusionists. In the following part I will consider some arguments for and against the option of eliminating the EOT in terms of the present discussion.

First I will appeal to the reasons why it could be relevant to stop making the epistemological-ontological transition in the discussion on phenomenality between realists and illusionists. I would say the EOT, to some extent, often moves us away from key points of the discussion, which are epistemological. On the one hand, one can claim that the debate on phenomenal consciousness is actually concerned with the ontological status of PC—whether it is physical or nonphysical (or whether it exists at all). There is some sense here, as the very EOT is made precisely because both sides want to come to the conclusion on the ontology of PC within the discussion. On the other hand, however, this shift to ontology is made on the basis of the assumption about the possibility of the transition from the arguments and implications about the epistemological side of the PC problem (features of access, fallibility etc.) to conclusions on the PC ontology. But the fact is that both sides preliminarily disagree on these conclusions and the core of the discussion is epistemological. By the “core” here I mean that most (if not all) illusionist and realist arguments are not aimed at the confirmation or refutation of the ontologically significant statements about PC. They are actually aimed at describing the features of PC as an epistemological situation (to which extent it is unique compared to other epistemological situations, e.g.

external perception). Recently Frankish stated,<sup>1</sup> if my interpretation is correct, that, despite the move to ontological statements about the nature of what is called PC, it is done not from the argumentative part of the illusionism-realism discussion, but from the implications of this part, that are indeed concerned with the epistemological features of the introspective properties or qualia. That is why the discussion is not actually about the hard problem of consciousness, but about whether such a problem exists at all. It depends, I would say, on whether there is a unique epistemological situation of qualia with their special features (Lewis, 1999) or what-it-is-likeness (Nagel, 1974) revealed via introspection. In addition, the very illusionist and realist approaches are epistemological by nature, as the former is built on attacking the unique epistemological access to phenomenal properties (or their unique epistemological status) (Dennett, 1988; Frankish, 2016) and the latter defends specific forms of acquaintance with them, which makes them, first of all, epistemologically unique (Chalmers, 2013; Kammerer, 2022; Nida-Rümelin, 2016). All the above leads to the thought that the EOT is not essential for the present argument as its core is not connected with ontology, but with the epistemological status of what is called PC. But if it is not essential—meaning that a huge part of the discussion will remain the same without it—it can probably be avoided with the aim of making the debate more focused and less puzzling for the opponents. As it can be clearly seen, a lot of existing arguments between illusionists and realists occur because of the different direction of their ontological steps made after making epistemologically significant statements. However, these steps are not required for the statements themselves and, rather, place obstacles to productive discussion, as there are no observable opportunities to overcome appropriate disagreements because of their implicit and meta-conceptual nature. There appears to be no place for the discussion on the fundamental dualism or physicalism in terms of phenomenal consciousness discourse (probably, it is even useful for the very discourse). But if so, there should also be no place for the influence of this discussion as it is doubtful that we should include the ontology in the notion of phenomenal consciousness (Niikawa, 2021).

Nevertheless, the reason for the option being discussed based on the idea that the EOT is not the essential core of the discussion does not require its full and ultimate elimination. I do not think we cannot make ontologically significant statements about the PC. The suggestion is rather to follow

<sup>1</sup>In personal conversation



a particular order within the discussion between realists and illusionists. It is possible to begin with only one side of the question, if the side itself becomes the ground for the EOT and for implications on the ontology of PC. If these steps are logically disparate, they likely can be separated methodologically without any considerable damage. This would even help to find out the specific features of PC as an epistemological situation in a more effective way as they will be not under the shadow of ontological baggage, which both camps often try to avoid before appropriate conclusions are drawn.

The mentioned baggage refers to another possible argument for avoiding EOT at the present level of the realist-illusionist discussion. Although illusionists would claim that the epistemologically significant statements made by realists require special ontological implications (e.g. if we have a direct access to PC, PC is nonphysical), these implications are rather required by the premise that there can be something nonphysical and some unique features of PC in an epistemological situation have to bring about a unique ontology. The same is for illusionists who think that there cannot be anything nonphysical and the lack of those unique features means that there is no special ontology. But the case is that the ontological premises often become the arguments for the epistemological views of the camps. Precisely illusionists can claim a) that there are no nonphysical properties — therefore b) it only seems that the introspection provides a unique epistemological situation (as physical properties do not provide such situations) and this means c) PC is physical. However, it sometimes seems that c) is equivalent to a). Therefore makes the premises replace the arguments. Realists can do the same: a) there can be nonphysical properties — therefore b) it does not just seem that the introspection provides a unique epistemological situation (as nonphysical properties do provide such situation), and this means c) PC is nonphysical. Keeping in mind that the argumentative part of the discussion is about the existence of a special epistemological situation, it seems that this existence should be confirmed or refuted by the arguments concerned with the features of this epistemological situation — not by any premises or consequences of this existence. If it is not possible to discuss PC without bringing ontological baggage, then we should probably start the discussion from the basic ontological question “can something (non)physical exist?” However, neither illusionists nor realists want to discuss this (at least this is how the discussion is currently presented). Hence, it could be relevant to leave ontological baggage behind and focus on the features of epistemological situation of what is called PC. Again this does not mean that there will be no returning to the question on what ontological consequences

epistemological situation  $x$  has, where  $x$  is the result of the realist-illusionist discussion. It will simply be made on the second step.

The last possible reason for avoiding EOT is doubtfulness of the very possibility of such a transition on any step of the discussion leaving behind some positive methodological contribution. One can claim there are no sufficient reasons to choose one of the EOT strategies — the realist or illusionist one. It can be demonstrated both in terms of overall relation between epistemology and ontology (see Rorty, 2009), and within the actual discussion, where the two camps have to take each other's dismissal of the opponent's EOT seriously. What is important here is that the problem lies not with who is actually right about the nature of PC — one of the two is, and it is no reason to reject both ontological conclusions just for lack of knowing who is wrong. The case is that there are probably no sufficient grounds to make the transition from, whether we face a unique epistemological situation in case of PC to the claim about its (non)physical nature. As illusionists would argue, it is economically justified not to broaden our ontology if we have no reason to broaden our epistemology as PC provides no radically different epistemological situation. And economically it is (however, physicalist ontology will face other difficulties — especially if it is specifically illusionist — as the its epistemological grounds casts a shadow on the possibility to justify any ontology; see Brown, 2022). But if we have no conceptual reasons to broaden ontology it does not mean our current ontology corresponds to reality (for illusionists the correspondence is no less important (Frankish, 2016)). Still, PC can be either physical or non-physical even in case of illusionism (see Tartaglia, 2016). This very diversity also proves that there is no need to make a particular type of EOT in the illusionist case as well as in the realist (remember the conservative realists who are proponents of physical nature of real phenomenal properties). Even if we do have such conceptual reasons (particularly if realists are right about the features of epistemological situation), it hardly means that reality is not purely physical as (and illusionists could agree) there is still much to know about it. There are indeed papers suggesting the possibility to stay physicalist without making any EOTs or concerning the incoherence of the illusionism coming with the EOT (Lipus & Bregant, 2022; Zhong, 2021). A familiar strategy of avoiding making ontological conclusions on the nature of consciousness, based on the statements about its epistemological features, was proposed, for example, by Husserl (Welton, ed., 1999). This strategy's suitability for the realist-illusionist discussion is not excluded, taking into account that this appeal to a phenomenologist hardly begs the question

against illusionism as previously concentrated on the subjective experience and the latter does not reject its existence (Frankish, 2022).

Nevertheless, one can find some reasons against rejecting the EOT. To show them more clearly I will focus on the reverse side of the arguments mentioned above. First, one can say that despite the core argumentative part of the discussion being about epistemology, this part is still secondary, as the arguments are aimed at the intuitions about the nature of what is called PC—whether it actually exists and therefore whether the hard problem of consciousness is cause for concern. That is why we cannot separate these parts to discuss epistemology and ontology step by step without making the EOT, as we can just miss the reason for the whole discussion. However, I believe both parts can be treated as significant even without moving from one to another in terms of the current level of the realist-illusionist discussion, where disagreements about the PC as an epistemological situation prevail. Here I also want to stress that rejecting the EOT is rather a methodological option which will hardly affect the roots and aims of the discussion, as they seem to be independent from the way we lead it.

Second, one can claim the premises which influence the EOT and which are to be set aside in case of adopting the option, are the main content for both the realist and illusionist approach. If the EOT is so ubiquitous, then we can deny some ideas that are crucial for both realist and illusionist approach. This depends on what is called the main content: it can be the answer to the question of the PC nature and existence or the reasons for why we should think of PC nature and existence in a particular way. In the first case, we have to admit that without the EOT both camps will lose their “main content.” However, in the second, they will not.

The final reason against rejecting the EOT is that the transition is necessary for the discussion despite the possibility of its grounds being questionable. The EOT is kind of a common place within the philosophy of the mind and the illusionist-realist argument, which not only made it possible, but also leads it due to the points mentioned before. Moreover, there are ways to approve the transition. The present paper is not the place to discuss these ways, but they definitely exist, just as ways to doubt the possibility of the EOT do, as shown above.

#### CONCLUSION

Summing up the analysis of the EOT rejection option, I would point out again that it is actually hard to say whether it must be done or not, as it is rather a methodological feature leading to conceptual postulates than

a conceptual postulate itself. Therefore, it can hardly be asserted whether the EOT is a mistake and should be rejected. Indeed, all arguments but the last one are aimed at some positive impact on how the discussion is ongoing and still there is no guarantee that it will become less puzzling and more productive. However, taking into account all the mentioned arguments, I think there is a chance for it. It will not become a silver bullet, but at least this can eliminate some obstacles and would not tie one's hands in terms of argumentation because all the epistemological statements about the phenomenality made by illusionists and realists are significant without ontological conclusions. They would probably become even clearer due to the focus on the epistemological part of the discussion. While illusionism is worth considering because it can be true (Frankish, 2016), the option of avoiding the EOT is also worth considering because it can be useful even if we are too interested in the content of the discussion to contribute to more productive ways to lead it.

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*Gorbachev M. D. [Горбачев М. Д.] On the Epistemological-Ontological Transition Made by Illusionism and Realism [Об эпистемологическо-онтологическом переходе, совершаемом иллюзионистами и реалистами] // Философия. Журнал Высшей школы экономики. — 2023. — Т. 7, № 4. — Р. 199–214.*

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МАКСИМ ГОРБАЧЕВ

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## ОБ ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЧЕСКО-ОНТОЛОГИЧЕСКОМ ПЕРЕХОДЕ, СОВЕРШАЕМОМ ИЛЛЮЗИОНИСТАМИ И РЕАЛИСТАМИ

Получено: 04.05.2023. Рецензировано: 26.10.2023. Принято: 30.10.2023.

**Аннотация:** Статья посвящена дискуссии между реалистами и иллюзионистами о феноменальном сознании, феноменальных свойствах, или квалиа. Автор рассматривает эпистемологическо-онтологический переход, совершаемый обеими сторонами, — переход от эпистемологически значимых утверждений к онтологически значимым. Оценивается возможность избежать такого перехода, для того чтобы преодолеть некоторые препятствия, которые он может принести в обсуждение. В статье приводятся примеры перехода, осуществляемого как реалистами, так и иллюзионистами, а также некоторые аргументы за и против его совершения. Автор приходит к выводу, что есть значимые аргументы в пользу обоих вариантов. С одной стороны, мы можем отказаться от перехода к онтологии на текущем этапе дискуссии. Во-первых, это ставит в тупик оппонентов и тем самым замедляет продуктивное взаимодействие. Во-вторых, сама причина перехода недостаточно обоснована. В-третьих, суть дискуссии — по крайней мере ее аргументативной части — между иллюзионистами и реалистами скорее эпистемологическая и переход к онтологии размывает ключевые моменты спора. С другой стороны, мы можем сохранить переход, обращаясь к онтологическим корням дискуссии. Затем автор указывает, что устранение эпистемологическо-онтологического перехода не предполагает отрицания онтологической значимости настоящего обсуждения и проблема природы сознания определено заслуживает внимания, но, возможно, после того как будет тщательно рассмотрена эпистемологическая сторона проблемы.

**Ключевые слова:** иллюзионизм, реализм, феноменальное сознание, эпистемология, онтология.

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VASILY SHANGIN\*

## A SUPRACLASSICAL PROBABILISTIC ENTAILMENT RELATION\*\*

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**Abstract:** The paper presents an original supraclassical nontrivial plausible entailment relation  $\approx$  that employs Kolmogorov's probability theory. Its crucial feature is the primitiveness of a conditional probability, which one calculates with the help of the method of truth tables for classical propositional logic. I study the properties of the entailment relation in question. In particular, I show that while being supraclassical, i. e., all classical entailments and valid formulas are  $\approx$ -valid, but not vice versa, it is not trivial and enjoys the same form of inconsistency as classical entailment  $\models$  does. I specify the place of the proposed probability entailment relation in certain classifications of nonclassical entailment relations. In particular, I use Douven's analysis of some probabilistic entailment relations that contains dozens of properties that are crucial for any probabilistic entailment relation, as well as Hlobil's *choosing your nonmonotonic logic: shopper's guide*, due to the fact that  $\approx$  is not monotonic, and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, van Rooij's entailment relations for tolerant reasoning. At last, I perform a comparative analysis of classical, the proposed, and some other entailment relations closely related to the latter: those introduced by Bocharov, Markin, Voishvillo, Degtyarev, Ivlev, where the last two entailment relations are based on the so-called principle of reverse deduction, which is an intuitively acceptable way to connect classical and probabilistic entailment relations.

**Keywords:** Classical Logic, Probabilistic Logic, Bayes, Evidence, Entailment, Reverse Deduction.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The key motivation of the present paper is to propose some other original plausible entailment relation that employs conditional probability as a primitive and is a nontrivial generalization of the classical entailment relation. Due to the fact that each plausible entailment discussed in this paper employs probability theory, I use the terms of “plausible entailment” and “probabilistic entailment” as synonyms. I want my probabilistic entailment relation to be defined simply as classical entailment relation is. Hence, the proof-theoretic method of truth tables allows me to propose a variant of the Bayesian account which defines a rational probability measure of a propositional formula  $A$  via its truth table within the framework of **CPL**.<sup>1</sup> While choosing between a conditional (binary) or an unconditional (unary) probability as a primitive, I prefer the former due to certain relevant shortcomings of the latter.

Binary probability functions, also known as *conditional probability functions*, are often defined in terms of singulary ones. For example, in (Carnap, 1950, Kolmogorov, 1956), etc.,  $P(A/B)$  is set at  $P(A \wedge B)/P(B)$  when  $P(B) \neq 0$ , but otherwise is left without a value. [...] Partial functions, however, are unwieldy and—perforce—of limited service. An alternative approach, favoured by Keynes as early as 1921 and, hence, antedating Kolmogorov’s, has now gained wide currency, thanks to such diverse writers as Reichenbach, Jeffreys, Von Wright, Renyi, Carnap (in post-1950 publications), Popper, etc. Handling binary probability functions as you would singulary ones, you adopt constraints suiting your understanding of  $P(A/B)$  and then own as your binary probability functions all functions meeting these constraints.

This representative list of writers lacks Wittgenstein, whose *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, published in 1922, defines a binary probability as follows (a truth-ground is his term for an entry of a truth table, where a formula is true; the notation is original):

If  $T_r$  is the number of the truth-grounds of the proposition “ $r$ ”,  $T_{rs}$  the number of those truth-grounds of the proposition “ $s$ ” which are at the same time truth-grounds of “ $r$ ”, then I call the ratio  $T_{rs} : T_r$  the measure of the *probability* which the proposition “ $r$ ” gives to the proposition “ $s$ ” (Wittgenstein, 1922: 5.15).

I refer to von Wright’s exposition of the evolution of Wittgenstein’s accounts of probability and note that the exposition contains a list of

<sup>1</sup>**CPL** stands for classical propositional logic.



19th-century thinkers, including Bolzano, who favor the primitiveness of conditional probability (von Wright, 1969: 263–265).

At last, while studying *the question of extending propositional logic to a logic of plausible reasoning* and positing *four requirements that any such extension should satisfy*, van Horn proposes the following argument pro conditional probability (*the italic is mine*) (Horn, 2017: 313):

We see therefore that, although it is the conditional probabilities  $c(h, e)$  that most interest Carnap, unconditional probabilities are for him more fundamental. *In contrast, we take conditional plausibilities as the fundamental concept* and, rather than imposing the laws of probability, seek to derive them.

As a result, I obtain a supraclassical probabilistic entailment  $\approx$  relation, where all classical tautologies and entailments are valid, too, whilst the opposite is wrong. The obtained probabilistic entailment is anticipated to lack certain properties in order to avoid the textbook triviality argument that any supraclassical consequence relation holds. A variant of it is Exercise 1.50 in Mendelson’s classic textbook (Mendelson, 1997: 43). Roughly speaking, it could be shown that the argument is not  $\approx$ -valid, due to its lack of transitivity.

The price that is paid in order to preserve the nontrivial supraclassicality is an indefinite position of  $\approx$  in terms of the properties that it has. To clarify the position, I use some nomenclatures of nonclassical entailment relations as well as some analysis of their properties. Due to its monotonicity-free, Hlobil’s *shopper’s guide* is of invaluable help (Hlobil, 2018). In Section 3.2, I use his classification in order to specify the position of  $\approx$  with the help of Douven’s extensive analysis of dozens of properties, which he finds in the literature devoted to probabilistic entailments (see Section 3.1). Speaking briefly, it turns out that  $\approx$  is not Hlobil’s favorite nonmonotonic logic, whilst the number of properties that  $\approx$  holds, according to the Douven analysis, is quite standard, which makes it a rather weak logic.

In the end, let me address the following referee’s suggestion (the translation from Russian is mine).

The paper leaves an ambivalent impression. On the one hand, in studying the properties of plausible (probabilistic) entailment, the author bases his conclusions on quite important logical results [...], i. e., the methodology he employs is well-grounded. On the other hand, the author chooses the probabilistic entailment as the object of his analysis, which is based on the method of calculating logical probability with the help of truth tables that Wittgenstein proposed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. And though Wittgenstein’s idea is attractive with its

simplicity and clarity, it is commonplace that one cannot formulate an adequate probabilistic logic on the basis of this idea because I face some difficulties here. [...] it is not occasionally, therefore, that the method in question is employed in pedagogy as a rule. However, in the conclusive part of his paper, the author himself provides a comparative analysis of the original probabilistic entailment and its alternatives, which belong to certain textbooks on logic rather than scientific literature. One comes to the conclusion that, speaking metaphorically, the author *uses a sledgehammer to crack a nut*.

I express my consent to the essence of the quote above. It was one of my motivations to write this paper to find out whether the scientific literature contains any explanation of the textbook approaches mentioned here. It was a real surprise for me to find out that teaching logical introductory courses and doing the science of logic do not go hand in hand in this aspect. Hence, the problem of searching for the well-foundedness of pedagogical approaches arises. And its solution certainly needs employing modern logical methods from the scientific literature, i. e., it needs *using a sledgehammer to crack a nut*. As a result, as the readers find out below, it is not the case that each pedagogical approach under discussion is well-founded, i. e., it was not completely worthless to crack the pedagogical nut with the scientific sledgehammer. On the other hand, while solving the problem, I came up with the idea to extend this impractical pedagogical approach as much as possible. By not straying far from the standard propositional language, I want to go beyond classical logic without falling into inconsistency. To this end, the main result of this paper — some supraclassical probabilistic entailment relation — is proposed.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I expose a supraclassical probabilistic entailment relation, where a conditional probability is a primitive. In Section 3, this relation is classified on certain nomenclatures found in the literature. Section 4 discusses some closely related alternatives to my approach. Section 5 summarizes the paper and outlines future research.

## 2. A SUPRACLASSICAL PROBABILISTIC ENTAILMENT RELATION

In this section, I first list Leblanc's probability axiomatization (Leblanc, 1983) and then define an original probabilistic entailment relation  $\approx$ , where a primitive is a binary probability and a unary probability is therefore definable via the former. To this effect, I employ a mechanical method of truth tables and an approach to plausible reasoning that relies upon Kolmogorov's probability theory (Keynes, 1921; Kolmogorov, 1956; Lorenz et al., 2019, Carnap, 1962).

Unless specified otherwise, henceforth I fix some standard language  $\mathcal{L}$  of **CPL** over the standard alphabet with the conventional connectives and the notion of a formula. The letters  $A, B, C$  run over formulae and  $\Gamma$  runs over sets of formulae as usual. **CPL** is defined with Tarski's  $T, F$ -semantics, the standard definitions of satisfiable, valid, contradictory formulae and entailment relation  $\models$ . By default,  $\top$  ( $\perp$ ) denotes a fixed valid (contradictory) formula rather than the “verum” (“falsum”) constant, as usual. What is unusual is the following

**Definition 2.1.**  $A$  is said to be *plausible* iff it is satisfiable and invalid.

In what follows, I employ propositional parts of certain axiomatizations of the unary and binary probability measures  $P$  whose provisions are based on (Popper, 1955) and thoroughly discussed in (Leblanc, 1983: 87–88, 107–109, accordingly).

**Definition 2.2.** (Popper-Leblanc's unary probability) The probability measure of  $B$  (denoted by  $P(B)$ ) is a one-place total function which satisfies the following provisions:

1.  $0 \leq P(B)$ ,
2.  $P(\neg(B \wedge \neg B)) = 1$ ,
3.  $P(B) = P(B \wedge A) + P(B \wedge \neg A)$ ,
4.  $P(B) \leq P(B \wedge B)$ ,
5.  $P(B \wedge A) \leq P(A \wedge B)$ ,
6.  $P(B \wedge (A \wedge C)) \leq P((B \wedge A) \wedge C)$ .

Textbook knowledge has the following

*Remark 2.3.*  $P(\neg B) = 1 - P(B)$  follows from the axioms in Definition 2.2.

**Definition 2.4.** (Leblanc's binary probability) The probability measure of  $B$  given  $A$  (denoted by  $P(B/A)$ ) is a total two-place function which satisfies the following provisions:

1. There are a statement  $B$  and a statement  $A$  such that  $P(B/A) \neq 1$ ,
2.  $0 \leq P(B/A)$ ,
3.  $P(B/B) = 1$ ,
4. If there is a statement  $C$  such that  $P(C/A) \neq 1$ , then  $P(\neg B/A) = 1 - P(B/A)$ ,
5.  $P(B \wedge A/C) = P(B/A \wedge C) \cdot P(A/C)$ ,
6.  $P(B \wedge A/C) = P(A \wedge B/C)$ ,
7.  $P(B/A \wedge C) = P(B/C \wedge A)$ .

Throughout the paper, I employ  $\Gamma$  to be  $\{A_1, \dots, A_k\}$ ,  $k \neq 0$ . Hence,  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i$  denotes any conjunction consisting of  $A_1, \dots, A_k$ , where the conjuncts are ordered and associated arbitrarily.

**Definition 2.5.** A binary probability of  $B$  given  $A_1, \dots, A_k$ ,  $k \neq 0$ , is determined via a *joint* truth table of  $A_1, \dots, A_k, B$  as follows, where  $n$  is the number of its rows simultaneously containing  $T$ , for each  $A_1, \dots, A_k$ , and  $m$ ,  $m \leq n$ , is the number of its rows simultaneously containing  $T$ , for each  $A_1, \dots, A_k$  and  $B$ :

- ◇  $P(B / \bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = 1$ , if  $n = 0$ ;
- ◇  $P(B / \bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = \frac{m}{n}$ , otherwise.

The readers easily determine that  $P(p/q) = \frac{1}{2} = P(p/\top)$  and  $P(p/\perp) = 1$ . Note that  $P(\perp/\perp) = 1$ .

*Remark 2.6.* The readers might not have found the first clause in Definition 2.5 anticipated because it leads straightforwardly to an informal and counter-intuitive fact that an impossible event makes any event certain. I refer the readers to (the discussion about) Definition 2.12 below: in short, I purportedly want to have a probability measure of this kind because it could serve as the basis of a supraclassical nontrivial probabilistic entailment, i. e., an entailment that generalizes **CPL**-entailment at any triviality-free cost.

The following lemma justifies Definition 2.5.

**Lemma 2.7.** Definition 2.5 meets the provisions of Definition 2.4.

*Proof.* Let me employ the notation  $r(A)$  meaning that in a truth table for  $A$ ,  $r$  is a number of rows containing  $T$  for  $A$ .

$P(p/q) = \frac{1}{2}$  proves Provision 1. Provision 2 follows from  $P(\perp/\top) = 0$ , the totality of  $P$  and the non-negativity of the numerator and denominator in the respective fraction.  $P(p/p) = P(\top/\top) = P(\perp/\perp) = 1$  proves Provision 3. Under the *if*-clause in Provision 4,  $A$  is not  $\perp$ .<sup>2</sup> Hence,  $\frac{r(\neg B, A)}{r(A)} + \frac{r(B, A)}{r(A)} = \frac{r(\neg B, A) + r(B, A)}{r(A)}$ . Note that for any row in a truth table, where  $A$  is true, either  $\neg B$ , or  $B$  is true. Hence,  $r(\neg B, A) + r(B, A) = r(A)$ . In order to prove Proposition 5, note that  $\frac{r(A \wedge C, B)}{r(A \wedge C)} \cdot \frac{r(A, C)}{r(C)} = \frac{r(A \wedge C, B)}{r(C)}$  because  $r(A \wedge C) = r(A, C)$ . Hence,  $\frac{r(A \wedge C, B)}{r(C)} = \frac{r(B \wedge A, C)}{r(C)}$  because  $r(A \wedge C, B) = r(B \wedge A, C)$ . Provisions 6 and 7 are provable because  $r(B \wedge A) = r(A \wedge B)$  and  $r(C \wedge A) = r(A \wedge C)$ , accordingly.  $\square$

<sup>2</sup>In this case,  $P(B/\perp) = P(\neg B/\perp) = 1$ .

A unary probability is traditionally defined via the binary probability.

**Definition 2.8.** A unary probability is as follows:

$$P(B) = P(B/\top).$$

*Remark 2.9.* A shortcoming of Definition 2.8 is that the underlying language must be able to express a tautology, which is not the case for some languages ( $\{\wedge\}$ , for example).

It is easy to see that

**Lemma 2.10.** Definition 2.8 meets the provisions of Definition 2.2.

Definition 2.5 could be equivalently reformulated in the traditional “unary probability” way now. It is worth noting that it lacks the usual problem connected with division by zero.

**Definition 2.11.** (An “unary-probability-style” formulation of Definition 2.5) Following Definition 2.8, a binary probability of  $B$  given  $A_1, \dots, A_k$ ,  $k \neq 0$ , is determined via a *joint* truth table of  $A_1, \dots, A_k, B$  as follows, where  $n$  is the number of its rows simultaneously containing  $T$ , for each  $A_1, \dots, A_k$ , and  $m$ ,  $m \leq n$ , is the number of its rows simultaneously containing  $T$ , for each  $A_1, \dots, A_k$  and  $B$ :

- ◇  $P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = 1$ , if  $n = P(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = 0$ ;
- ◇  $P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = \frac{m}{n} = \frac{P((\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \wedge B)}{P(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)}$ , otherwise.

The readers can easily determine that  $P(p) = P(p/\top) = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $P(\perp) = P(\perp/\top) = 0$ , and  $P(p \rightarrow p/\top) = 1$ .

A probabilistic entailment relation between  $\Gamma$  and  $B$  (denoted by  $\Gamma \approx B$ ) as well as  $\approx$ -validity is defined as follows.

**Definition 2.12.**  $\Gamma \approx B$  iff  $\frac{1}{2} < P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \leq 1$ .<sup>3</sup> In particular,  $\approx B$  iff  $P(B/\top) = 1$ .

The readers can easily determine that  $P(p) = P(p/\top) = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $P(\perp) = P(\perp/\top) = 0$ , and  $P(p \rightarrow p/\top) = 1$ . that  $p, q \approx p \rightarrow q$ ,  $\approx p \rightarrow p$ , and  $\not\approx p \rightarrow q$ . Notice that  $p \not\approx q$  and  $p \approx q \vee r$ .

Before investigating the properties of  $\approx$ , let me consider some arguments contra the criterion  $\frac{1}{2} < P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \leq 1$ . According to Douven, (I slightly unify the original notation; the *italic* is not mine):

Formally, the intuition that if  $E$  is to qualify as evidence for  $H$ ,  $E$  should make  $H$  probable, or very probable, would come down to imposing the requirement

<sup>3</sup>The notation  $P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$  is employed, too.

that  $P(H/E)$  be above some specified threshold value  $\mathbf{t}$ , which one might take to be .5 or even .9 or still higher (though it would be wrong to require that  $\mathbf{t} = 1$ , as surely I do not pretheoretically consider  $E$  to be evidence for  $H$  only if  $E$  makes  $H$  *certain*) (Douven, 2011: 487–488).

In a later paper, the thesis that the target criterion is wrong, gets the *consensus gentium* flavor (I slightly unify the original notation; the *italic* is not mine; the **boldface** is mine):<sup>4</sup>

Some have said that the Bayesian notion of evidence fails to completely capture my intuitive notion of evidence. What I mean when I say that  $A$  is evidence for  $B$  is—according to these authors—not just that  $A$  makes  $B$  *more* probable, but also that  $A$  makes  $B$  *highly* probable. Formally,  $A$  is evidence in this strengthened sense iff (i)  $P(B/A) > P(B)$  and (ii)  $Pr(B/A) > \theta$ , for some value  $\theta$  close, but unequal, to 1. (Different authors hold different views about what the threshold value should be; but **all agree** [...] that  $0,5 \leq \theta < 1$ ) (Douven, 2014: 264).

As seen from the quotes above, the criterion  $\frac{1}{2} < P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \leq 1$  in Definition 2.12 contains two “abnormalities”:  $\frac{1}{2} < P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)$  rather than  $\frac{1}{2} \leq P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)$  and  $P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \leq 1$  rather than  $P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) < 1$ . With regard to the latter, it is in line with my approach to generalize **CPL** in terms of its entailment relation *as nontrivially as possible* (see Remark 2.6 above).

Hence, I purportedly consider an event which makes another event *certain* as a kind of evidence. On the other hand, probability theory allows for events whose probability measures equal to 1: hence, classical valid formulae turn out to be natural analogs of such events. The former “abnormality” has a purely formal justification: if  $\frac{1}{2} \leq P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)$  were the criterion, then it would be the case that  $p \approx q$ , due to  $P(p/q) = \frac{1}{2}$ . And this is an entailment one would certainly try to avoid: any event follows from any other event.<sup>5</sup>

Let me investigate the properties of  $\approx$ . As purportedly intended,  $\approx$  is a generalization of  $\models$ :

**Lemma 2.13.** If  $\Gamma \models B$ , then  $\Gamma \approx B$ . In particular, if  $\models B$ , then  $\approx B$ .

<sup>4</sup>A detailed analysis of this passage is in subsection 3.1 below.

<sup>5</sup>I notice that this entailment does not hold for the two probabilistic entailment relations that Douven analyzes thoroughly: one could easily assign the respective probabilities to different rows in a truth table for the target entailment. In my approach—let me stress it again—the probabilities of all the rows are equal. For example, in the case of 3 variables, a probability of each row is  $\frac{1}{8}$ .

*Proof.* By the definition of  $\models$ , if  $\Gamma \models B$ , then  $P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = 1$ . Hence,  $\Gamma \approx B$ . In order to prove that if  $\models B$ , then  $\approx B$ , one employs the fact that by the definition of  $\models$ ,  $A \models B$  iff  $\models B$ , given  $P(A) = 1$ .  $\square$

**Corollary 2.14.** There are  $\Gamma, B$  such that  $\Gamma \approx B$  and  $\Gamma \not\models B$ .

*Proof.*  $p \vee q \approx q$  and  $p \vee q \not\models q$ .<sup>6</sup>  $\square$

Here some basic properties of  $\approx$  are explored. A more detailed study that classifies  $\approx$  on the other probabilistic entailments is in Chapter 3 below. It is crucial to remember the notation  $r(A, B)$ : in a joint truth table for  $A$  and  $B$ ,  $r$  is the number of rows containing  $T$  simultaneously for  $A$  and  $B$ .

**Lemma 2.15.**  $\approx$  is reflexive, contractive, permutative, and neither symmetrical nor transitive nor monotonic.

*Proof.*  $A \approx A$  follows from  $P(A/A) = 1$ .

$A, A \approx C$  iff  $A \approx C$  follows from  $r(A) = r(A, A)$ .

$A, B \approx C$  iff  $B, A \approx C$  follows from  $r(A, B) = r(B, A)$ .

It is not symmetrical due to  $p \approx \top$  and  $\top \not\approx p$ .<sup>7</sup>

It is not transitive due to both  $p \approx p \vee q$  and  $p \vee q \approx q$ , but  $p \not\approx q$ .<sup>8</sup>

It is not monotonic due to  $p \vee q \approx p$ , but  $\neg p, p \vee q \not\approx p$ .<sup>9</sup>  $\square$

It is only a weak form of inconsistency called (CNC) and considered on page 225 below that holds for  $\approx$ . In this aspect,  $\approx$  behaves the same as  $\models$ .

The nontriviality of  $\approx$  comes from Milne's argument (Milne, 2000: 311), too:

As is well known, the following two principles are incompatible:

1. if  $h$  entails  $e$  then  $e$  confirms  $h$ , at least when  $h$  is not logically false and  $e$  is not logically true;
2. if  $e$  confirms  $h$  and  $h$  entails  $h'$  then  $e$  confirms  $h'$ , at least when  $h'$  is not logically true.

Since  $e \& e'$  entails both  $e$  and  $e'$ , it follows from (1) and (2) that any logically contingent statement confirms any other with which it is logically compatible.

$p \wedge q \models p$ , but  $p \not\approx p \wedge q$ , due to  $P(p \wedge q/p) = \frac{1}{2}$ . Hence, (1) fails. To show the failure of (2), let me notice that  $h \models h'$  implies  $h \approx h'$ , by Lemma 2.13. In order to derive  $e \approx h'$  from  $e \approx h$  and  $h \approx h'$ , one needs  $\approx$  to be transitive, which is not the case by Lemma 2.15.

<sup>6</sup> $P(q/p \vee q) = \frac{2}{3}$ .

<sup>7</sup> $P(\top/p) = 1$  and  $P(p/\top) = \frac{1}{2}$ .

<sup>8</sup> $P(p \vee q) = \frac{3}{4}$ ,  $P((p \vee q)/p) = 1$ , and  $P(q) = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $P(q/(p \vee q)) = \frac{2}{3}$ , but  $P(q/p) = \frac{1}{2}$ .

<sup>9</sup> $P(p) = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $P(p/p \vee q) = \frac{2}{3}$ , but  $P(p/(\neg p \wedge (p \vee q))) = 0$ .

3. CLASSIFYING  $\approx$ 

The purpose of this chapter is to deepen the present investigation of  $\approx$  by two means. On the one hand, I am to find out more properties than the Gentzenian ones from Lemma 2.15 and, on the other hand, to classify the place of  $\approx$  among the nonmonotonic and/or nontransitive logics. I believe that such semantic analysis would allow me to come up with another paper devoted to an adequate syntactic axiomatization of  $\approx$ . For this purpose, I employ Douven's analysis of a *similar* probabilistic entailment (Douven, 2014) as well as the *shopper's guide* by Hlobil to *choosing your nonmonotonic logic* (Hlobil, 2018) and Cobreros et al.'s entailments for tolerant reasoning (Cobreros & Egré & Ripley, 2021).

## 3.1. THE DOUVEN PROPERTIES

In (Douven, 2014), Douven provides a detailed analysis of two notions of evidential support, the Bayesian  $A \rightarrow_B C$  and its Strengthen case  $A \rightarrow_S C$ . Note that both  $\rightarrow_B$  and  $\rightarrow_S$  do not belong to the object-language, i.e., neither  $A \rightarrow_B C$ , nor  $A \rightarrow_S C$  are *conditionals*.<sup>10</sup> The former is short for  $P(C|A) > P(C)$ , where (I unify Douven's notation) " $C \rightarrow_B A$  means that  $A$  is evidence in the Bayesian sense for  $C$   $\langle \dots \rangle$   $P$  designates a specific (but unspecified) person's degrees-of-belief function, to which all sentences containing the symbol  $\rightarrow_B$  are taken to implicitly refer" (Douven, 2014: 263). The latter is short for (i)  $P(C|A) > P(C)$  and (ii)  $0,5 \leq P(C|A) < 1$ , where (ii) is the commonly accepted interval to a threshold value such that  $A$  makes  $C$  *highly* probable, not just *more* probable.<sup>11</sup> It is in this sense that  $A \rightarrow_S C$  strengthens  $A \rightarrow_B C$ . For the reasons of this paper, I will not discuss  $A \rightarrow_B C$  and henceforth,  $\rightarrow$  means  $\rightarrow_S$  only.

The main result of Douven's paper is that out of 33 principles (see Table 1 in *ibid.*: 265), the below 11 ones hold for  $A \rightarrow C$ , where  $\vdash$  is classical derivability relation and ANT, CNC, M<sub>2</sub>, M<sub>3</sub>, MOD, RCE, RCEA, RCEC, REF, WAND, XOR are their Douven labels.<sup>12</sup>

- ◊ (ANT) Whenever  $A \rightarrow B$ , then  $A \rightarrow (A \wedge B)$ ;
- ◊ (CNC) Whenever  $A \not\vdash \perp$ ,  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $A \rightarrow \overline{B}$ , then  $\perp$ ;
- ◊ (M<sub>2</sub>) Whenever  $A \rightarrow (B \wedge C)$  and  $A \rightarrow (B \vee C)$ , then  $A \rightarrow B$  or  $A \rightarrow C$ ;

<sup>10</sup>For conditionals, see, for example, (Flaminio, Godo, Hosni, 2020).

<sup>11</sup>I discuss this passage preliminary when I clarify Definition 2.12 above.

<sup>12</sup>Douven deciphers some of them (for example, he attributes M<sub>2</sub>–M<sub>3</sub> to Milne, 2000) and also mentions their alternative labels. I do not replace his  $\overline{A}$ -notation with my  $\neg A$ -notation.



- ◇ (M<sub>3</sub>) Whenever  $\vdash \overline{B \wedge C}$ ,  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $A \rightarrow C$ , then  $A \rightarrow (B \vee C)$ ;
- ◇ (MOD) Whenever  $\overline{A} \rightarrow A$ , then  $B \rightarrow A$ ;
- ◇ (RCE) Whenever  $\vdash A \supset B$ , then  $A \rightarrow B$ ;
- ◇ (RCEA) Whenever  $\vdash A \equiv B$ , then  $(A \rightarrow C) \equiv (B \rightarrow C)$ ;
- ◇ (RCEC) Whenever  $\vdash A \equiv B$ , then  $(C \rightarrow A) \equiv (C \rightarrow B)$ ;
- ◇ (REF)  $A \rightarrow A$ ;
- ◇ (WAND) Whenever  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $A \wedge \overline{C} \rightarrow \perp$ , then  $A \rightarrow (B \wedge C)$ ;
- ◇ (XOR) Whenever  $\vdash \overline{A \wedge B}$ ,  $A \rightarrow C$  and  $B \rightarrow C$ , then  $(A \vee B) \rightarrow C$ .

Notice that Douven's proofs are not automatically applicable to  $\approx$ . In fact, it turns out to be possible in the case of (XOR) only. On the other hand, I highlight every time I employ Douven's proofs.

To prove (ANT) one needs a special case of axiom 5 in Definition 2.4:  $P(A \wedge B)/A = P(A/B \wedge A) \cdot P(B/A)$  and the fact that  $B \wedge A \models A$ . The latter implies  $B \wedge A \approx A$ , by Lemma 2.13, with  $P(A/B \wedge A) = 1$ .

To prove (CNC) one needs axiom 4 in Definition 2.4 that guarantees the unsatisfiability of the "whenever" clause of (CNC).

A stronger version of (M<sub>2</sub>) which I label ( $M2_{str}$ ) is valid for  $\approx$ :

( $M2_{str}$ ) whenever  $A \approx B \wedge C$ , then  $A \approx B$  and  $A \approx C$ . W.l.g., I assume that  $P(A) \neq P(\perp)$ : otherwise,  $A \approx B$  and  $A \approx C$  hold via Lemma 2.13.

1.  $A \approx B \wedge C$  — given
2.  $P(B \wedge C/A) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]$  — from 1 by Definition 2.12
3.  $\frac{P((B \wedge C) \wedge A)}{P(A)} \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]$  — from 2 by Definition 2.11
4.  $\frac{P((B \wedge C) \wedge A)}{P(A)} \leq \frac{P(A \wedge C)}{P(A)}$  — by truth-table calculations<sup>13</sup>
5.  $\frac{P(A \wedge C)}{P(A)} \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]$  — from 3 and 4 by math
6.  $A \approx C$  — from 5 by Definition 2.11
7.  $\frac{P((B \wedge C) \wedge A)}{P(A)} \leq \frac{P(A \wedge B)}{P(A)}$  — by the above truth-table calculations
8.  $\frac{P(A \wedge B)}{P(A)} \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]$  — from 3 and 7 by math
9.  $A \approx B$  — from 8 by Definition 2.11

(M<sub>3</sub>) is  $\approx$ -invalid. To show its invalidity, let me follow Douven and apply the probability law  $P(B/A) + P(C/A) = P(B \wedge C/A) + P(B \vee C/A)$ <sup>14</sup> because  $A \approx B$ ,  $A \approx C$ , and  $\vdash \overline{B \wedge C}$ . Hence,  $P(B \vee C/A) > 1$  which is absurd.

<sup>13</sup>In a joint truth-table for  $A, B, C$ , if one takes into account only the rows, where  $A$  is true, then the number of rows where  $B \wedge (C \wedge A)$  is true does not exceed the number of rows where  $A \wedge C$  is true.

<sup>14</sup>Note that I do not argue Douven's proof to be erroneous.

However, a modified version of  $(M_3)$  which I label  $(M3_{mod})$  is  $\approx$ -valid:  
 $(M3_{mod}) \vdash \overline{B \wedge C}, A \rightarrow B, \text{ then } A \rightarrow (B \vee C).$ <sup>15</sup>

A proof of  $(M3_{mod})$  is essentially the Douvenian one of  $(M_3)$  (Douven, 2014: 271–272), who cites Milne, in turn (Milne, 2000: 316). W. l. g., I assume that  $P(A) \neq P(\perp)$ : otherwise,  $A \rightarrow (B \vee C)$  holds via Lemma 2.13.

(MOD) is proven via  $P(A/\overline{A}) = 0$  (Douven, 2014: 273) unless  $P(A) \neq P(\top)$ . In that case, however,  $P(B/T) = 1$ .

(RCE) is proven via  $\models A \supset B \Leftrightarrow A \models B$  and Lemma 2.13.

(RCEA) and (RCEC) are proven via Lemma 2.13.

(REF) is proven via Lemma 2.15.

To prove (WAND) let me notice that  $A \wedge \overline{C} \approx \perp \Leftrightarrow P(A \wedge \overline{C}) = P(\perp)$ . There are three cases: (1)  $P(A) = P(\perp)$ , (2)  $P(\neg C) = P(\perp)$ , and (3)  $P(A \wedge \overline{C}) = P(\perp)$ , whilst neither (1), nor (2).

(1) implies  $\perp \approx B \wedge C$  that holds, by Lemma 2.13. (2) implies  $P(C) = P(\top)$ . Hence, by **CPL**, (WAND) reduces to the trivially valid formulation: whenever  $A \approx B$  and  $\perp \approx \perp$ , then  $A \approx B$ . At last, (3) implies  $P(A) = P(C)$ . Hence, by **CPL**, (WAND) reduces to the following formulation: whenever  $A \approx B$  and  $A \wedge \overline{A} \approx \perp$ , then  $A \approx (B \wedge A)$ . By Lemma 2.13 and axiom 7 from Definition 2.4, it then reduces to the above-proven (ANT): whenever  $A \approx B$ , then  $A \approx (A \wedge B)$ .

(XOR) is provable by Douven (Douven, 2014: 276).

Now let me consider the two principles that Douven highlights: they, and only they, are both  $\rightarrow_B$ -valid and  $\rightarrow_S$ -invalid.

◊ (Contraposition) Whenever  $A \rightarrow \overline{B}$ , then  $B \rightarrow \overline{A}$ ;

◊ (M1) Whenever  $A \rightarrow B$  and  $A \rightarrow C$ , then  $A \rightarrow (B \wedge C)$  or  $A \rightarrow (B \vee C)$ .

(Contraposition) fails for  $\approx$ , too:  $\top \approx \overline{(p \wedge q)}$ , but  $p \wedge q \not\approx \neg \top$ .<sup>16</sup>

However, (M1) is valid for  $\approx$ . In fact, its stronger version, which is labeled  $(M1_{str})$  is already valid:

$(M1_{str})$  whenever  $A \approx C$ , then  $A \approx B \vee C$ .<sup>17</sup>

1.  $A \approx C$  — given
2.  $A \not\approx B \vee C$  — assuming for the sake of contradiction
3.  $P(A) \neq 0$  — from 2 by Definition 2.12

<sup>15</sup>Another variant of  $(M3_{str})$  is  $\vdash \overline{B \wedge C}, A \rightarrow C, \text{ then } A \rightarrow (B \vee C)$ . Its proof is analogous to the one below.

<sup>16</sup> $P(\overline{(p \wedge q)}/\top) = \frac{3}{4}$  and  $P(\overline{\top}/p \wedge q) = 0$ .

<sup>17</sup>Another variant contains  $A \approx C$ , and its proof is analogous to the one below.

4.  $P(C) \neq 1$ —from 2 by Definition 2.12
5.  $P(C/A) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ —from 1 by Definition 2.12
6.  $P(B \vee C/A) < \frac{1}{2}$ —from 2 by Definition 2.12
7.  $P(\overline{(B \wedge C)}/A) < \frac{1}{2}$ —from 6 by **CPL**
8.  $1 - P(\overline{B} \wedge \overline{C}/A) < \frac{1}{2}$ —from 3 and 7 by axiom 4 in Definition 2.4
9.  $\frac{1}{2} < P(\overline{B} \wedge \overline{C}/A)$ —from 8 by math
10.  $\frac{1}{2} < P(\overline{B}/\overline{C} \wedge A) \cdot P(\overline{C}/A)$ —from 9 by axiom 5 in Definition 2.4
11.  $\frac{1}{2} < (1 - P(B/\overline{C} \wedge A)) \cdot (1 - P(C/A))$ —from 3, 4, 10 by axiom 4 in Definition 2.4
12.  $P(B/\overline{C} \wedge A) - P(B/\overline{C} \wedge A) \cdot P(C/A) < \frac{1}{2} - P(C/A)$ —from 11 by math
13.  $x - xa < \frac{1}{2} - a$ —from 12 by obvious substitutions<sup>18</sup>
14.  $x(1 - a) < \frac{1}{2} - a$ —from 13 by math
15.  $x < \frac{\frac{1}{2} - a}{1 - a}$ —from 14 by math
16.  $P(B/\overline{C} \wedge A) < 0$ —from 15 and 5
17.  $P(B/\overline{C} \wedge A) \in [0, 1]$ —by Lemma 2.7

Last but not least, to check  $\approx$ -validity of the 20 remaining Douvenian principles, which are both  $\rightarrow_B$ -invalid and  $\rightarrow_S$ -invalid, deserves a separate paper.

### 3.2. THE HLOBILIAN SHOPPER'S GUIDE TO NONMONOTONIC LOGICS

In (Hlobil, 2018: 3), Hlobil *presents an exhaustive menu of nonmonotonic logics*:

You cannot get a nonmonotonic logic without having to give up some principles that many find desirable. The good news is that you get a choice regarding which principles you want to give up. [...] I will go through some of these choices. The result will be an exhaustive (but not exclusive) classification of nonmonotonic logics into seventeen types.

It might be helpful to refer to that paper for details, especially to the tree of choices in Figure 1 (Hlobil, 2018: 5).<sup>19</sup> For the reasons of the current study, it would make sense to list Hlobil's choices and specify  $\approx$  on them (for

<sup>18</sup>Note that  $P(B/\overline{C} \wedge A)$  is an unknown in the inequality and hence denoted by  $x$  whilst by 5,  $P(C/A)$  is a parameter and hence denoted by  $a$ .

<sup>19</sup>The full tree is not included here, but a direct reference to Hlobil's paper on the web has been provided in References below for convenience.

unifying reasons, I change the original notation and, if any, add [Douven's labels] from (Douven, 2014):<sup>20</sup>

- ◊ (CO) If  $A \in \Gamma$ , then  $\Gamma \approx A$ ;
- ◊ (RE) [REF]  $A \approx A$ ;<sup>21</sup>
- ◊ (Mixed-Cut) If  $\Gamma \approx A$  and  $\Delta, A \approx B$ , then  $\Gamma, \Delta \approx B$ ;
- ◊ (DDT) If  $\Gamma \approx A \rightarrow B$ , then  $\Gamma, A \approx B$ ;
- ◊ (CT) [CT] If  $\Gamma \approx A$  and  $\Gamma, A \approx B$ , then  $\Gamma \approx B$ ;
- ◊ (PEM)  $\Gamma \approx A \vee \neg A$ ;
- ◊ (CM) [Cmon] If  $\Gamma \approx A$  and  $\Gamma \approx B$ , then  $\Gamma, B \approx A$ ;
- ◊ (PF) [SDA]  $\Gamma, A \vee B \approx C$  iff  $\Gamma, A \approx C$  and  $\Gamma, B \approx C$ ;
- ◊ (DI) If  $\Gamma, A \vee (B \wedge C) \approx D$ , then  $\Gamma, (A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C) \approx D$ ;
- ◊ (FU)  $\Gamma, A \wedge B \approx C$  iff  $\Gamma, A, B \approx C$ .

**Lemma 3.1.** CO, RE, PEM, FU, and DI are the only  $\approx$ -valid principles from the above list.

*Proof.* For the invalidity of CT, CM, PF, and FU see (ibid.: 270, 268, 275–276, 266–267, respectively). The from-left-to-right part of DDT fails if  $r \approx p \rightarrow q$  and  $r, p \not\approx q$ .<sup>22</sup> Mixed-Cut fails if  $r, p \approx p \vee q$  and  $r, p \vee q \approx q$ , but  $r, p \not\approx q$ .<sup>23</sup> The  $\approx$ -validity of CO follows both from the fact that if  $A \in \Gamma$ , then  $\Gamma \models A$ , and Lemma 2.13. The  $\approx$ -validity of RE follows from Lemma 2.15. The  $\approx$ -validity of PEM follows from  $\Gamma \models A \vee \neg A$  and Lemma 2.13. The  $\approx$ -validity of FU follows from the truth-table fact that its rows, where  $A \wedge B$  is true, are the same, where both  $A$  and  $B$  are true. At last, the  $\approx$ -validity of DI follows from  $P(A \vee (B \wedge C)) = P((A \vee B) \wedge (A \vee C))$ .  $\square$

Lemma 3.1 indicates that  $\approx$  is in 2 out of the 17 Hlobil types specified in the quote from the beginning of this subsection. In the tree in Figure 1 (Hlobil, 2018: 5),<sup>24</sup> the 3 branches having the node *rej-CO* are discarded for the reason that *CO* is  $\approx$ -valid. The 6 branches having the node *rej-PEM* are discarded for the reason that *PEM* is  $\approx$ -valid. Each branch having the end-node *rej-FU* or the end-node *rej-DI* is discarded for the reason that *FU* is  $\approx$ -valid or *DI* is  $\approx$ -valid, respectively, which leaves 4 branches in total. For the reason of the  $\approx$ -invalidity of *CM*,<sup>25</sup> the 2 branches having

<sup>20</sup>As in the case of Douven, I refer to the Hlobil paper for decoding the labels below.

<sup>21</sup>Note that in Douven's [REF],  $A$  is plausible.

<sup>22</sup> $P(p \rightarrow q/r) = \frac{3}{4}$  and  $P(q/r, p) = \frac{1}{2}$ .

<sup>23</sup> $P(p \vee q/r, p) = 1$ ,  $P(q/r, p \vee q) = \frac{2}{3}$ , and  $P(q/r, p) = \frac{1}{2}$ .

<sup>24</sup>See footnote 19 above.

<sup>25</sup>Note that Hlobil's choice branchings are not mutually exclusive: rejecting a principle does not inherently mean the rejection of its "counterpart".

the end-node *rej-PF* on the third level [C<sub>3</sub>] are discarded. As a result, only two types remain: the branch having the nodes *rej-MO*, *rej-Mixed-Cut*, *rej-CT*, *rej-CM*, *rej-PF* and the branch having the nodes *rej-MO*, *rej-Mixed-Cut*, *rej-DDT*, *rej-CM*, *rej-PF*. They are obviously reducible to the unique  $\approx$ -friendly type: the branch having the nodes *rej-MO*, *rej-Mixed-Cut*, *rej-CT*, *rej-DDT*, *rej-CM*, *rej-PF*.<sup>26</sup>

So, what is  $\approx$  even if the Hlobil classification answers this question apagogically only? I answer this question by employing the four nonmonotonic logics that Hlobil mentions explicitly. The  $\approx$ -validity of *CO* implies it is not a relevance-like logic like **R** (Anderson & Belnap, 1975) or Hlobil's **NM-LR**.<sup>27</sup> The  $\approx$ -invalidity of *CT* implies it is not a cumulative logic like **KLM** (Kraus & Lehmann & Magidor, 1990). At last, the  $\approx$ -invalidity of *DI* implies it is not like Hlobil's **NM-G3cp**.<sup>28</sup> With regard to the *motivating choices* that Hlobil discusses (Hlobil, 2018: 6–7),  $\approx$  prioritizes *staying supraclassical* over *rejecting as few structural principles as possible*. On the other hand,  $\approx$  does not make a choice between rejecting principles regarding the behavior of connectives and rejecting structural principles:  $\approx$  fails *PF* and *DDT* and hence  $\rightarrow$  and  $\vee$  do not behave properly (but it is not the case for  $\wedge$  because *FU* is  $\approx$ -valid) as well as  $\approx$  anticipatedly fails *Mixed-Cut* to avoid the supraclassical trivialization discussed at the end of Section 2. As a result,  $\approx$  is not suitable for *inferentialism-friendly* nonmonotonic logics such as **NM-G3cp** and **NM-LR** which are Hlobil's favorite kind of nonmonotonic logic.<sup>29</sup>

### 3.3. COBREROS ET AL.'S PRAGMATIC-TO-TOLERANT ENTAILMENT FOR TOLERANT REASONING

Furthermore, it would be beneficial for this research to turn to Cobrerros et al.'s *nonmonotonic and/or nontransitive* approaches to tolerant reasoning

<sup>26</sup>According to Hlobil (Hlobil, 2018: 5), “Figure 1 should be read as follows: Every nonmonotonic logic must reject all the principles that occur on at least one complete branch of the tree. [...] Of course, a logic can always reject more principles than what the tree in Figure 1 requires. Hence, a logic can belong to several of my seventeen types”.

<sup>27</sup>The latter is a nonmonotonic variant of Bimbo's distribution-free relevance logic **LR** (Bimbo, 2015).

<sup>28</sup>**NM-G3cp** is a nonmonotonic variant of Troelstra and Schwichtenberg's classical sequent calculus **G3cp** in which the structural rule of *weakening* is absorbed (Troelstra, Schwichtenberg, 2000). Hlobil also employs the name **G3cp-NM**.

<sup>29</sup>He proposes sequent-style axiomatizations for two of them (Hlobil, 2018: 11, 13) which preserve Makinson's result that nonmonotonic entailment relation is not closed under substitution (Makinson, 2003).

(Cobrerros & Egré & Ripley, 2021: 682) which (appropriate for the topic of this paper) are aimed at disproving the following thesis (the *italic* is original):

According to one influential view of the sorites paradox, the tolerance principle—the constraint whereby if someone is tall, for example, then someone whose height is imperceptibly shorter is tall too—is an *unsound* rule of reasoning (see Williamson, 1994).

To that end, the authors propose three specific consequence relations, with one of them (called *pragmatic-to-tolerant* consequence and denoted by  $\models^{prt}$  as well as its updated version called *Pragmatic-to-tolerant* consequence and denoted by  $\models^{Prt}$ ) being reflexive, contractive, nonmonotonic, and nontransitive, i. e., it is closer to  $\approx$  than the other two. Despite the fact that analyzing Cobrerros et al.’s approaches exceeds the scope of this paper and the fact that formulating the tolerance principle needs a first-order language, it may well be prospective for further applications.

It is not the case that all classically valid modes of reasoning are  $\models^{Prt}$ -valid as in the case of  $\approx$ .<sup>30</sup> The reason to update  $\models^{prt}$  to  $\models^{Prt}$  is a flaw of the former in that it separates the premisses and their conjunction, i. e.,  $p, \neg p \models^{prt} q$ , but  $p \wedge \neg p \not\models^{prt} q$ .<sup>31</sup> With regard to  $\approx$ , it is simple to confirm that the target separation is not the case for  $\approx$ :  $A, \neg A \approx B$  iff  $A \wedge \neg A \approx B$ , due to truth-table calculations. I highlight two *Prt*-features. The first one is  $A, \neg A \not\models^{Prt} B$  which is  $\approx$ -valid, on the other hand, because the explosion is  $\models$ -valid. The second *Prt*-feature—the standard  $\wedge$ -elimination entailments  $A \wedge B \models^{Prt} A$  and  $A \wedge B \models^{Prt} B$ —holds for  $\approx$ , too.

#### 4. RELATED WORK

In this section, the main focus lies with related papers that share the approach of the present study in that all the  $2^n$  truth table distributions for a formula containing  $n$  distinct propositional variables are equiprobable. Hence, a classic approach by Carnap, for example, is beyond the scope of this section (Carnap, 1962). Section 4.1 considers the approach by Bocharov and Markin (Bocharov & Markin, 2008) who avoid employing the principle of *reverse deduction* which is considered together with two approaches that apply it in Section 4.2. Section 4.2.1 considers the approach by Voishvillo and Degtyarev (Voishvillo & Degtyarev, 2001) whilst Section 4.2.2 considers

<sup>30</sup>Note that another entailment proposed there under the name of *strict-to-tolerant* entailment validates all classical modes of reasoning.

<sup>31</sup>It is not a  $\models^{prt}$ -specific feature. For example, see Weir’s nontransitive trivalent logic of neo-classical entailment  $NC_3$  (Weir, 2013). And this feature troubles him in no way at all.

Ivlev's method (Ivlev, 2008; 2015). This Section ends with a summary table that contains a comparative analysis of the classical and the four probabilistic entailments of this paper. While exposing the approaches in question, I unify the original notations.

4.1. AN APPROACH THAT IS NOT BASED  
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REVERSE DEDUCTION

**Definition 4.1.** (Bocharov & Markin, 2008: 450–451) Let  $n, n > 0$ , be the total number of rows in a truth table for  $A$  and let  $m, m \leq n, m \geq 0$ , be the number of rows in this truth table, where  $A$  is true. Then an unary probability  $P^*$  of  $A$  is determined as follows:

$$P(A) = \frac{m}{n}.$$

It is clear that

**Lemma 4.2.** Definition 4.1 meets the provisions of Definition 2.2.

**Definition 4.3.** (ibid.: 451) A binary probability of  $B$  given  $A_1, \dots, A_k$ ,  $k \neq 0$  (denoted by  $P^*(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)$ ), is determined via a *joint* truth table of  $A_1, \dots, A_k, B$  as follows, where  $P(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \neq 0$ :

$$P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) = \frac{P((\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i) \wedge B)}{P(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)}.$$

It is clear that

**Lemma 4.4.** Definition 4.3 meets the provisions of Definition 2.4.

A probabilistic entailment relation between  $\Gamma$  and  $B$  (denoted by  $\Gamma \approx^* B$ ) is defined as follows.

**Definition 4.5.** (ibid.: 452)  $\Gamma \approx^* B$  iff  $P(B) < P(B/\bigwedge_{i=1}^k A_i)$ .

Let me move on to the investigation of the properties of  $\approx^*$ . In contrast to  $\approx$  (Lemma 2.13),  $\approx^*$  is not a generalization of  $\models$ :

**Lemma 4.6.** There are  $\Gamma, B$  such that  $\Gamma \approx^* B$  and  $\Gamma \not\models B$ . On the other hand, there are  $\Gamma, B$  such that  $\Gamma \not\approx^* B$  and  $\Gamma \models B$ . In particular, there is no  $A$  such that  $\approx^* A$ .

*Proof.* A proof of Corollary 2.13 contains an example that proves the first part of this Lemma.  $p \models \top$  and  $p \not\approx^* \top$  prove its second part. At last,  $\not\approx^* B$ , for any  $B$ , follows from the nonemptiness of  $\Gamma$  in Definition 4.5.  $\square$

**Lemma 4.7.**  $\approx^*$  is symmetric, contractive, and permutative, i. e., if  $A \approx^* B$ , then  $B \approx^* A$ ; if  $A, A \approx^* B$ , then  $A \approx^* B$ ; if  $A, C \approx^* B$ , then  $C, A \approx^* B$ , respectively.

$\approx^*$  is not reflexive, monotonic, and transitive, i. e.  $A \not\approx^* A$ ; if  $A \approx^* B$ , then  $A, C \not\approx^* B$ ; if  $A \approx^* B$  and  $B \approx^* C$ , then  $A \not\approx^* C$ , respectively.

*Proof.* The first part of this Lemma derives straight from Definition 4.5. As regards the second part of this Lemma, proof of Lemma 2.15 contains the respective examples that prove the lack of both monotonicity and transitivity. The lack of reflexivity follows from  $\top \not\approx^* \top$  or  $\perp \not\approx^* \perp$ .  $\square$

Despite  $\approx^*$  not being reflexive, I highlight the following easy-provable (see also Definition 2.1 above)

**Lemma 4.8.**  $A \approx^* A$  iff  $A$  is plausible.

**Lemma 4.9.**  $\approx^*$  is inconsistent, i. e., it is not the case that  $A \approx^* B$  and  $A \approx^* \neg B$ .

*Proof.* (On contrary)

1.  $A \approx^* B$  and  $A \approx^* \neg B$  – given
2.  $A \approx^* B$  – from 1
3.  $A \approx^* \neg B$  – from 1
4.  $P(B) < \frac{P(A \wedge B)}{P(A)}$  – from 2 by Definition 4.5
5.  $P(\neg B) < \frac{P(A \wedge \neg B)}{P(A)}$  – from 3 by Definition 4.5
6.  $1 - P(B) < \frac{P(A \wedge \neg B)}{P(A)}$  – from 5 by Remark 2.3
7.  $P(B) * P(A) < P(A \wedge B)$  – from 4
8.  $P(A) - P(B) * P(A) < P(A \wedge \neg B)$  – from 6
9.  $P(A) - P(A \wedge \neg B) < P(B) * P(A)$  – from 8
10.  $P(A) - P(A \wedge \neg B) < P(A \wedge B)$  – from 7, 9
11.  $P(A) < P(A \wedge B) + P(A \wedge \neg B)$  – from 10
12.  $P(A) < P(A)$  – from 11 by axiom 3 in Definition 2.2
13. it is not the case that  $A \approx^* B$  and  $A \approx^* \neg B$  – from 12  $\square$

Due to Definition 4.5,  $A$  in Lemma 4.9 is readily generalized to  $\Gamma$ . This is avoided for the sake of simplicity.

Another key thing worth noting is the form of inconsistency in Lemma 4.9 which is stronger than the  $\approx$ -one discussed on pages 223, 225 above.



#### 4.2. TWO APPROACHES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF REVERSE DEDUCTION

Next, two mutually related approaches to plausible entailment that are based on the so-called *principle of reverse deduction* will be analyzed: see quotes on pages 233 and 233 below.

**4.2.1. Voishvillo and Degtyarev's Approach.** Voishvillo and Degtyarev put it as follows (the quote is changed cosmetically):<sup>32</sup>

It is essential to pay attention to the fact that if  $B \models A$  ( $A$  deductively follows from  $B$ ), then  $A \approx_{VD} B$ . The opposite is not true, though. This way of establishing inductive entailment between  $A$  and  $B$  on the basis of deductive entailment between  $B$  and  $A$  is said to be the principle of *reverse deduction*. Additionally, for the relation of deductive entailment that is under consideration here, one excludes paradoxical cases of the relation [...], i. e., the cases when  $A$  is a negation of some logical law of the system under consideration or when  $B$  is some logical law [...] (Voishvillo & Degtyarev, 2001: 389).

On the previous page, they propose the following definition of plausible entailment, which they call *inductive entailment*:

**Definition 4.10.** (ibid.: 388)  $A \approx_{VD} B$  iff  $B \not\models A$  and  $P(B) < P(B/A)$ , where  $A, B$  are plausible.

Regretfully, there is a contradiction between the fact that “if  $B \models A$  ( $A$  deductively follows from  $B$ ), then  $A \approx_{VD} B$ ” mentioned in the quote on page 233 and Definition 4.10. Due to the former,  $p \approx_{VD} p$ , due to  $p \models p$  whilst due to the latter,  $p \not\approx_{VD} p$ .

Even if one considers Definition 4.10 rather than the fact under question to be the proper source that explicates their account on plausible entailment, then one cannot consider it satisfactory still. Definition 4.10 implies  $\approx_{VD}$  to be irreflexive, i. e.,  $A \not\approx_{VD} A$ , for any  $A$ . This property of plausible entailment is very unlikely to have some philosophical background, let alone that Voishvillo and Degtyarev never mention it explicitly. Notice also that according to Lemma 4.8,  $\approx^*$  is not reflexive rather than irreflexive, i. e.,  $A \approx^* A$ , for any plausible  $A$ .

**4.2.2. Ivlev's Approach.** Ivlev's approach is slightly different from the one by Voishvillo and Degtyarev (Ivlev, 2015: 94); the quote is changed cosmetically:

*Reverse deduction* is as follows. One needs to justify a sentence  $A$ . One establishes that each sentence  $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n (n \geq 1)$  follows from  $A$  or, equivalently,

<sup>32</sup>All the translations below belong to me.

a conjunction of these sentences follows from it. Additionally,  $A$  is not contradictory, whilst  $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n$  are not valid. One concludes that the sentences  $B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n$  support the sentence  $A$ , i. e.

$$\frac{A \models B_1 \wedge B_2 \wedge \dots \wedge B_n, \not\models \neg A, \not\models B_1, \not\models B_2, \dots, \not\models B_n}{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n \approx_* A} \quad (4.1)$$

In other words, Ivlev accepts the restriction for  $A, B$  to be plausible.

Thus defined,  $\approx_*$  needs an auxiliary condition nevertheless in order to avoid undesired plausible entailments. For example,  $p \approx_* p \wedge q$ , due to  $p \wedge q \models p$ . However, the former entailment states that  $p$  supports its conjunction with an arbitrary sentence, which one could hardly accept. Moreover, if one generalizes the previous example by conjuncting  $p$  and a conjunction of  $n$  arbitrary sentences, then  $p \approx_* p \wedge (q_1 \wedge \dots \wedge q_n) \dots$ , due to  $p \wedge (q_1 \wedge \dots \wedge q_n) \dots \models p$ , etc. And this example states the absurdity that  $p$  supports any conjunction consisting of it and  $n$  arbitrary sentences.

To this end, one additionally imposes the condition which one calls *positive relevancy* and which is nothing but the right-side condition of Definition 4.5:  $P(A) < P(A/B)$ .<sup>33</sup> As a result, one obtains  $\approx_*$  to be *quite the same* as  $\approx^*$ , where two differences need to be highlighted.

$\approx_*$  might be determined in the same way as  $\approx^*$  and it can be determined differently by employing the machinery of crossing out formulae in a truth table while calculating conditional probability (both approaches in question determine an unconditional probability in the same way).

$p \vee q$	$p \wedge q$
$F$	$F$
$T$	$F$
$T$	$F$
$T$	$T$

Table 1. Truth table with crossing out for  $p \vee q, p \wedge q$

I take an example of calculations from (Ivlev, 2015: 95) and apply the needed changes.

$p \vee q$  supports  $p \wedge q$ , due to the fact  $p \wedge q$  classically implies  $p \vee q$ . The conditional probability of  $p \wedge q$  is determined as follows. One establishes a probability of the proposition in question given the truth of the proposition  $p \vee q$ , i. e., one establishes the degree of support of the initial proposition by the proposition  $p \vee q$ . One builds up joint truth tables for these propositions: see Table 1.

One crosses out those rows where the proposition  $p \vee q$  is false, i. e., one is presupposed to have received the information about the truth of  $p \vee q$ : see Table 1.

The probability of the sentence  $p \wedge q / p \vee q = \frac{1}{3}$ . Notation:  $P(p \wedge q / p \vee q)$ . (It reads: the probability of  $p \wedge q$  given  $p \vee q$ .)

<sup>33</sup>I repeat the mantra on the possibility of generalizing  $A$  to  $\Gamma$ .

The second difference between  $\approx_*$  and  $\approx^*$  is that the former is reflexive.

**Lemma 4.11.**  $\approx_*$  is reflexive, contractive, permutative, symmetrical and neither transitive nor monotonic.

*Proof.*  $A \approx A$  follows from  $P(A/A) = 1$ . The other properties are proven in Lemma 4.7. □

**Lemma 4.12.**  $\approx^*$  is inconsistent, i. e., it is not the case that  $A \approx^* B$  and  $A \approx^* \neg B$ .

*Proof.* It is analogous to the one in Lemma 4.9. □

With regard to  $\approx^*$  and  $\approx_*$ , their equality is established with the following

**Lemma 4.13.**  $A \approx_* B$  iff  $A \approx^* B$ .

*Proof.* It is obvious in the case from left to right. The case from right to left holds because  $A \not\approx^* B$ , if  $A$  or  $B$  are not plausible: (1) if  $A$  is  $\perp$ , then  $P(A) = 0$ ; (2) if  $A$  is  $\top$ , then  $P(B) = P(B/\top)$ ; (3) if  $B$  is  $\perp$ , then  $P(B) = P(A/B) = 0$ ; (4) if  $B$  is  $\top$ , then  $P(B) = P(A/B) = 1$ . □

To summarize, a comparative analysis of the four probabilistic entailments discussed in the paper:  $\approx$ ,  $\approx^*$ ,  $\approx_{VD}$ , and  $\approx_*$  in sections 2, 4.1, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively, is presented in Table 2, below.

The following properties hold for each probabilistic entailment in question: permutation, contraction, and the lack of both transitivity and monotonicity.

	INCONS	CONPRIM	SUP	DEF	REF	SYM
$\models$	-	inapp	-	inapp	+	-
$\approx$	-	+	+	$\frac{1}{2} < P(B/A) \leq 1$	+	-
$\approx^*$	+	-	-	$P(B) < P(B/A) \blacklozenge$	-	+
$\approx_{VD}$	co	nt	ra	di	ct	ion
$\approx_*$	+	+	-	$P(B) < P(B/A) \diamond$	+	+

Table 2. A comparison of  $\models$ ,  $\approx$ ,  $\approx^*$ ,  $\approx_{VD}$ ,  $\approx_*$

CONS, CONPRIM, SUP, DEF, REF, SYM mean a strong form of inconsistency, primitiveness of a conditional probability, supraclassicality, definition of an entailment, reflexivity, symmetricity, respectively, whilst + and - mean the fact an entailment holds or does not hold this property; at last, “inapp” means inapplicable.<sup>34</sup> The entries of the  $\approx_{VD}$ -row are filled with “contradiction” (see page 233). The conditions  $\blacklozenge$  and  $\diamond$  mean  $A$  is not

<sup>34</sup>An entailment holds the property of the primitiveness of a conditional probability iff it does not have the property of the primitiveness of an unconditional probability. The analogous equivalence is true with respect to the strong vs. the weak forms of inconsistency.

$\perp$  and  $A, B$  are plausible, accordingly. As before, the definitions of these entailments are for the particular case, due to simplicity reasons.

## 5. CONCLUSION

In the paper, a nontrivial plausible probabilistic entailment relation is proposed. Its original feature is a combination of the primitiveness of a conditional probability, which one calculates with the method of truth tables for **CPL**, and supraclassicality. Moreover, a comparison with some closely related probabilistic entailments is provided, along with a position on certain nomenclatures in related literature. The main topic for future research on the surface is to set up proof-theoretic axiomatizations of each consistent entailment discussed in the paper as well as to continue checking the  $\approx$ -validity of the other Douven properties to whom Section 3.1 is devoted.

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## СУПЕРКЛАССИЧЕСКОЕ ВЕРОЯТНОСТНОЕ ОТНОШЕНИЕ СЛЕДОВАНИЯ

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**Аннотация:** В статье задается оригинальное суперклассическое нетривиальное правдоподобное отношение следования  $\vDash$ , основанное на колмогоровской теории вероятностей.

Его важной чертой является примитивность условной вероятности, которая вычисляется с помощью метода таблиц истинности для классической логики высказываний. Мы изучаем свойства заданного отношения. В частности, мы показываем, что, будучи суперклассическим, т.е. все классически общезначимые формулы и выводимости имеют место для  $\approx$ , но обратное утверждение неверно, оно нетривиально и для него имеет место такой же вариант свойства непротиворечивости, что и для классического следования  $\models$ . Мы определяем место предложенного следования в некоторых классификациях, найденных в соответствующей литературе. В частности, мы используем дювеноский анализ некоторых вероятностных отношений следования, содержащий десятки свойств, которые являются важными для любого вероятностного отношения следования, а также клобиловский *руководитель покупателя при выборе своего немонотонного отношения следования*, благодаря немонотонности  $\approx$ , и предложенные Кобреросом, Эгром, Рипли и ван Руем отношения следования для толерантных рассуждений. Наконец, мы делаем сравнительный анализ классического, предложенного и некоторых тесно связанных со вторым отношений следования: то, что предложено В. А. Бочаровым, В. И. Маркиным, то, что предложено Е. К. Войшвилло, М. Г. Дегтяревым, а также то, что предложено Ю. В. Ивлевым, где два последних отношения основаны на так называемом принципе *обратной дедукции*, который является интуитивно приемлемым способом, который позволяет связать классическое и вероятностные отношения следования.

**Ключевые слова:** классическая логика, вероятностная логика, Байес, свидетельство, следование, обратная дедукция.

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FEDOR NEKHAENKO\*

## AN UNKNOWN DEMONOLOGIST AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS? \*\*

THE OPUS II.7–8 BY HUGH OF SAINT-CHER

**Abstract:** Though *Daemonologia*, like *ontologia* and *anthropologia*, is not genuinely medieval, but conceived in the Renaissance, it remains valid to apply such categories to the medieval intellectual culture. By doing so, we can restore the continuum of historical development. The present paper investigates the role of Hugh of Saint-Cher (ca. 1190–1263) within the domain of scholastic demonology. Specifically, it focuses on distinctions II.7–8 from Hugh's commentary on the *Sentences* (ca. 1231–1234) which has been transcribed, collated, and translated by me for the first time. I begin by examining Hugh's forerunners among scholastics in order to ultimately pick out Alexander of Hales. He was the sole precursor who invested in pushing demonology beyond conventional boundaries. Onwards, I demonstrate the diversity of thematic issues Hugh addresses. His text aims at accommodating a rational explanation and critique of the demonic procreation, healing, body assumption, locution, and wonders. Notably, Hugh's work demonstrates a relatively limited influence of Aristotle. The Dominican instead endows Lombard's text with illuminating stories about Balaam, Simon Magus, Apuleius, and Bartholomew. Hugh's ideas would go on to serve as the cornerstone for further elaboration of the demonology in the 1230s and 1240s. Subsequently, I offer an extensive overview of Hugh's impact on the handwritten tradition, clearly discernable through critical reception in Richard Fishacre, John de la Rochelle, and Eudes Rigaud's writings. What is more, I point out alternative ways to entail demonology by drawing upon evidence from Roland of Cremona and Alexander of Hales. After all, I consider Aristotle's impact on early scholastic demonology between 1225 and 1245.

**Keywords:** Hugh of Saint-Cher, Demonology, «Sentences», Scholastic Theology, Condemnation of Magic, Roland of Cremona, Alexander of Hales, Eudes Rigaud.

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A plethora of myths and misconceptions often accompany medieval history. Historians are expected to address this each time they embark on scholarly endeavors. The flat earth surface, lack of science, and witch-hunting

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account for a major part of such superstitions. Paradoxically, sometimes history performs a loop in demolishing preconceived notions already once criticized and transformed. It may occur in the future with demonology and witchcraft when traced back to their historical roots. Over the past two decades, notable French scholars demonstrated how scholastic refutation and deliberation of demonology had a profound influence on Renaissance history. In the meantime, the same Renaissance remains the turning point for the majority of English and German historians whose attention towards medieval demonology is regrettably reduced to prominent figures like William of Auvergne (1180?–1249) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). It even resembles Neothomistic adherence still strong among medievalists (Broedel, 2003; Cohn, 1975; Russell, 1972; 1984). On the contrary<sup>1</sup>, Alain Boureau and Maaike van der Lugt have emphasized the crucial contribution to the growth of demonology on the part of the scholastic tradition (Boureau, 2004; 2020; Van der Lugt, 2001; 2004b; 2009). Illuminating almost all essential scholastic sources, M. van der Lugt has delved into theories of generation. A. Boureau has focused on “the demonological turning point” (le tournant démonologique) within late scholasticism, primarily Thomas Aquinas, Peter Olivi (1248–1298), and Richard Mediavilla (ca. 1249–1308). Taking into account the profound character of their work, not to mention many recent volumes written on medieval magicians themselves (Boudet, 2006; Delaurenti, 2007; Véronèse, 2007; Vescovini, 2011; Weill-Parot, 2002) and demonology in the cloister (Page, 2013; Schmitt, 2021)<sup>2</sup>, my contribution seeks to shed some light on the origins of scholastic university theology.

I will center on Hugh of Saint-Cher (ca. 1190–1263)<sup>3</sup> whose *Sentences*<sup>4</sup> II.7–8 (1231–1234) would form vital evidence of a shift in university demonology. Hugh’s case breaks up a well-grounded historiographical law according to which most of his thoughts represent a patchwork filled with the doctrines of his teachers. Historians correctly believe that on many

<sup>1</sup>Most recently, B. Delaurenti has authored a book dedicated to another “fascinating” aspect of the scholastic theory of magic, namely evil eye and fascination (Delaurenti, 2023).

<sup>2</sup>See for an introductory and exhaustive overview Véronèse, 2007: 214–216, 224–231. Meanwhile, the research on medieval demonology has been extensively advanced in the field of art and visionary history of the Middle Ages by J. Baschet and P. Faure (Baschet, 1995; Faure, 1994).

<sup>3</sup>I advise interested readers to consult two papers for an exploration of the historical and intellectual milieu around Hugh of Saint-Cher. These papers furnish a more comprehensive summary of his biography (Nekhaenko, 2023b; 2024). Herewith, sparing you from excessive details, I will abridge most of the details only briefly outlined in the first and last sections.

<sup>4</sup>For Peter Lombard, the author of the initial *Sentences* manual see Colish, 1994: 323–342.

occasions Hugh encompasses and reassembles texts authored by Stephen Langton (1150–1228), William of Auxerre (1150?–1231), Alexander of Hales (1185?–1245), Philip the Chancellor (1160?–1236), and Gui d’Orchelles (d. 1225) (Lynch, 1953: 146; Van der Lugt, 2004a: 263–266, 268; Boureau, 2007: 59, 87–88). In the course of the transcription of the second book, I myself have encountered compelling proof of how many ideas Hugh could have drawn upon to furnish his refutation of Aristotle’s eternity and heretical dualism. Nevertheless, this rule does not hold truth either in his angelological distinction II.2 or regarding demonology in II.7–8. The former section is filled with new arguments to dialectically approach the empyrean heaven, time, and angelic cognition (Nekhaenko, 2023b). The latter embodies my following analysis, transcription, and translation, so that its originality is at issue here.

Despite the picture of logically succinct and rigorous formal thinking, the scholastic imaginary arsenal was clearly ahead of modern-day fantasy. Medieval scholars ventured far beyond natural limits when discussing the Last Things, the empyrean, or angels in the *Sentences* (Boureau, 2014; Dahan, 2011; Sorokina, 2021; Suarez-Nani, 2002). However, the masters before Alexander of Hales and Hugh of Saint-Cher had been restrained in discussing demons and magic, as it is evident in texts created at Paris cathedral school.

Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers (1160s) paraphrases Lombard’s statements on the magical art connected with demons, occult semen, and demonic possession of the bodies (Ms. BNF lat. 14423. fol. 67rb, 67vb). According to Simon of Tournai (ca. 1130–1201), demons possess superior empirical knowledge, can create from the four elements but lack the ability to assume corporeal forms (Ms. BNF lat. 14886. fol. 23vb, 24r). Praepostinus of Cremona (ca. 1135–1209) suggests that diabolic actions are divinely permitted in the sense that the consequences of their actions satisfy the divine goodness. He also states that the devil tempts humanity through exterior signs and inside the bodies. The Paris Chancellor keeps silent regarding the rest of the questions and defends himself by saying “we can neither explicate this [...] diabolical persuasion [...] nor desire to do so” (Ms. BNF lat. 14526. fol. 18ra). Stephen Langton who taught at Paris before moving to England acknowledges that the demonic actions permitted by God ultimately lead to good consequences without any substantial elaboration (Stephen Langton, 1952: 80–81). All three aforementioned masters formally taught at the Paris School of Notre Dame prior to the official recognition of the university’s birth. M. Colish provides a good explanation of why theologians before the Fourth Lateran Council might be reluctant to invest in demonic epistemology,

ontology, or anthropology. They had focused on moral theology<sup>5</sup> of the diabolic fall and its effect framed by Anselm's *De casu diaboli*, a legacy that the first generation of university scholars inherited (Colish, 1995).

A study of the first generation of university scholars shows that the emphasis on demonology diminished. In the 1220s, William of Auxerre and his fellow Philip the Chancellor did not exhibit a particular interest in demonic anthropology. William briefly touches on topics such as demonic cognition and false prophecy. For the most part, he speculates about the phenomenon of possession and demonic exit from the possessed with a grumble *murmur*, that is a sin of language (Guillermus Altissidorensis, 1982: tr. III; Casagrande & Vecchio, 1987: 241–246). Philip's discussion primarily revolves around pharaoh's magicians who feigned snakes and frogs, a theme interrelated with the occult semen theory (Ms. Vat. lat. 1098. fol. 67rb–67vb). The last theory represents a historical tradition too long to recite. In short, Augustine borrowed the theory of “seminal reasons” (λόγοι σπερματικοί) or *rationes seminales* from Stoic thinkers like Chrysip and Zeno in order to reinforce his account of the creation of the world at once *simul*. From his point of view, the world subsequently developed through imprinted semen without divine direct action. The bishop as well applied this idea to the demonic way of interfering with human life (Aug. De gen. 5.20, 6.16, Aug. De civ. D. 11.27, Aug. De trin. 3.9.16; Colish, 1985: 203–207).

The picture began to shift solely with Alexander of Hales who alone among contemporaries exercised an undeniable and distinct influence on Hugh's demonology. The English theologian summons Augustine's authority to elucidate the occult knowledge of demons, demonic magic, and divine permission to demons tempting humans. Beyond that, Alexander introduces Gennadius' conception of demonic possession, corporeal assumption of demons, and Apuleius' definition of the demons frequently referenced by Augustine. These additions would serve as the basis for Hugh to expand upon and discuss further topics and examples within the preestablished framework (Alexander de Hales, 1952: VII.6–10, VIII.4).

After studying Assisi manuscripts of Hugh of Saint-Cher, B. Faes de Mottoni proposed that Hugh's work had been prepared in haste by combining elements of oral education, still evident in some parts. For instance, the

<sup>5</sup>Doubtless, this results from a repercussion of the moral concern and practical approach widespread inside the so-called “Peter the Chanter's Circle” to which Simon, Praepostinus, and Stephen were close (Baldwin, 1970: 18, 25–32). Having acknowledged that, J. Baldwin still insists that these theologians were preoccupied more with speculative theology, although it is questionable in terms of angelology elucidated above (ibid.: 43).

question about the guardian angel defending the antichrist was announced but left unaddressed (Faes de Mottoni, 2002: 294–295). I may reply that precisely this issue was posed and effectively handled by Hugh’s university master Roland of Cremona (ca. 1178–1259) (Ms. Vat. lat. 729. fol. 35r)<sup>6</sup>. Given that Roland finished his *Summa* after leaving Paris around 1234 but could have exercised oral influence on Hugh since 1226 (Gorochov, 2012: 439), he is the last scholastic to be taken up before Hugh. He was a groundbreaking thinker in his own right, despite largely being neglected in the Middle Ages and nowadays. One way or another, Roland’s approach to demonology is very different, notably naturalistic and physical. Well-versed in magical tradition as well as William of Auvergne, Roland deliberates the formation of the angelic voice through mediating spirits, the temptation of infants upon birth, and the acquisition of ordinary learning from demons on the ground of vast scientific knowledge and imagination (Ms. Vat. lat. 729. fol. 33va, 43r). Thus, his physical attitude conspicuously does not leave any trace in Hugh’s theological approach<sup>7</sup>.

Not only the content but also the textual structure set Hugh apart from his forerunners and contemporaries<sup>8</sup>. The master was the first to deploy a commentary in a continuous form where “Stichwortglossen” (keyword glosses) were inserted into the main text in the form of the *quaestio* (Bieniak, 2009: 112). It is noteworthy that all manuscripts I have taken into consideration divide the text of distinctions into separated thematically subquestions. Composed between 1231 (following the end of the university’s great strike) and 1234 (prior to the *Liber extra* and Hugh’s departure from the university)<sup>9</sup>, his tractate would function as a model for later commentators who lectured on the *Sentences*.

<sup>6</sup>As a matter of fact, the problem was posed before by Geoffrey of Poitiers and William of Auxerre without much success.

<sup>7</sup>For further exploration of other intricacies of Roland’s thoughts about nocturnal flight, plasmatic physiology of diabolic phantasms, and necromantic experiments from the “Book of the Cow” *Liber vaccae* I recommend consulting the following scholarly papers (Van der Lugt, 2004b: 256–257, Van der Lugt, 2009: 264–265; Even-Ezra, 2017; 2018).

<sup>8</sup>He could have embarked on studying liberal arts at Paris in ca. 1205–1210 at the same time as Alexander of Hales, even though the Dominican was under a powerful spell of Alexander’s theology (Gorochov, 2012: 194). For a detailed biography see Paravicini Bagliani, 1972: 257–263.

<sup>9</sup>I am handing down more or less the traditional chronology of Hugh’s intellectual life. Albeit, I cannot fail to briefly mention that Hugh might take Dominican vows in 1226, begin the course of lectures *lectio* on the *Sentences* as early as 1227, and then secure a vacant theological chair in 1230 after Roland of Cremona, according to engrossing study by N. Gorochov (Gorochov, 2012: 439–440, 512).

## SCHOLASTIC AUTHORITIES: APULEIUS, BALAAM, SIMON, AND MERLIN

Medieval text conveys a complex tapestry of authorities and quotations that sometimes make it challenging to discern between the layers of the scholastic labyrinth. In the discussion to follow, I am going to oscillate between Hugh's sources and the manner in which the theologian uses them to foster his own reasoning. By no means intending to encompass all, I prompt that the exposition will gradually run from a focus on the demons to the modalities of their interaction with human beings and magicians, in other words from demonic metaphysics towards demonic anthropology.

One of the foundational principles Hugh repeats several times is that demons lack bodies among demons [10, 13, 17]<sup>10</sup>. He takes issue with Augustine's perspective which, in Hugh's view, echoes certain philosophers and physicians [13]. Such a redemption of Augustine goes back to the Lombard's school outlined above. Generally, the idea runs as follows: angels lack bodies in an absolute sense *simpliciter* and are spoken to have them in a relative sense, juxtaposed with God *respectu dei*. On one occasion, Hugh writes that the belief in incorporeal angels, whether fallen or confirmed, has been declared orthodox *fides ecclesie est* by the church, alluding to the Fourth Council of the Lateran [17]. The canon that affirms angelic spirituality does not yet preclude angels from featuring spiritual matter, nor do saints hold a common and uniform view regarding this issue, contrary to Hugh saying "the saint agree regarding this" *in hoc conueniunt sancti*. Moreover, Apuleius<sup>11</sup> evoked explicitly is not the sole philosopher who falls under the category of Hugh's opponents<sup>12</sup> [13].

By directly citing Plato's *Timaeus*, Hugh contends that for Plato three orders of the demons exist in the air. Broken into three aerial parts, these orders comprise good demons *calodemones*, evil demons *cacodemones*, and those in the middle who are neutral [13]. It is no question that Plato did not develop any "daimonology", a subject first introduced in Calcidius' Latin commentary (Somfai, 2003: 135–137) and then endorsed in a form close to Hugh in William of Conches' *De philosophia mundi*<sup>13</sup>. Plato as well as

<sup>10</sup>Henceforth numbers in brackets correspond to the division into paragraphs of the *Opus*.

<sup>11</sup>It is worth noting that Apuleius had a reputation as a Platonic magician.

<sup>12</sup>For other 12th century proponent and adversaries of the angelic embodiment see Faes de Mottoni, 1993.

<sup>13</sup>For this finding, I express my sincere gratitude for the invaluable aid offered by my professors Karen Sullivan and Charles Burnett. I also sincerely thank Charles Burnett for an opportunity to read and deliberate an excerpt from Hugh's text during the Latin paleography seminar held at the Warburg Institute.

his adherents, be it Apuleius, Calcidius, or William of Conches<sup>14</sup>, assumes that demons who represent creatures akin to angels possess bodies [13]. Thus, by attacking those whose unorthodox views he denounces Hugh might target Chartres' Platonism which cannot be reduced only to the problem of corporeality<sup>15</sup>. Take as an example the controversy over the world soul or the Trinity. Despite the fact that Hugh does not launch an outspoken attack, his robust commitment to enumerating, explaining, and criticizing all activities which involve demons drives to the ensuing conclusion: the status of demons requires an additional justification not provided by his predecessors.

Demonic incorporeality pends a question of the body assumption and life functions exposed in the eighth distinction. Ignoring Augustine's precaution against speculating about demon's bodies, Hugh proceeds to reconstruct the three-fold distinction which he terms a rule for understanding the nature and body involved in angelic operations [18]. According to Hugh's framework, such potency as erasing Sodom from the ground should be attributed to angelic nature; life functions and conditions like eating shall be referred to the assumed angelic body which consists of air; ultimately, in the case of violence infliction it must be asserted regarding assumed demonic body from which blood can be spilled. Such a universal framework is a simple tool for reconciling Biblical references where angels and demons are spoken to have bodies with theological reasons behind denying their corporeality. Thereby, the Dominican preserves the exclusively spiritual character of angelic beings. Besides, it provides a tool for apprehending whether certain actions are performed by angels or demons, although at first glance it may not offer a clear resolution for cases of violence executed by an angel, as attested in Ex. 12:23. Therefore, Hugh goes on to argue that God punished indifferently through His evil and good ministers. This concluding remark might explain that the angel in Exodus executes punishment according to his potency rather than assumed body [22].

Demonic power is not reduced to bodily assumption because they can also possess bodies in two different ways [20]. Gennadius of Massilia, as transmitted through Peter Lombard and Alexander of Hales, stays behind

<sup>14</sup>P. Lucentini enlists most of the authorities who referenced and deliberated this conception before the 13th century (Lucentini, 2007: 214).

<sup>15</sup>Unlike his university fellows William of Auvergne and Bonaventure, Hugh does not propose an alternative Christian demonic hierarchy in opposition to Chartres' Platonic demonology (see Luscombe, 2008; Nekhaenko, 2023a: 315–316).

the first mode of possession from within by means of energy<sup>16</sup>. Demons enter bodies and affect corporal perception, especially the heart, while remaining unable to penetrate the soul. This mode differs from the possession from without. What appears to be new in Hugh's depiction is the terminological distinction between these two modes of possession. People possessed in the first way are called *inergumini*, while the second class receives the name *obsessi*. Correspondingly, Hugh feigns a new distinction founded on poor acquaintance with Greek. For the Dominican, the *inergia* is an intentional power produced by the Devil inside and the *energia* aims at the Lord. Such black-and-white opposition underscores the "Majesté maléfique" of the demons (Baschet, 1995), whose power mirrors the divine in each human being. This case as well gives a good chance to comprehend how Hugh generally moves in these distinctions by first furrowing a soil enriched with various authorities and then reaping the fruits that contain new ideas.

Back to the seventh distinction, the Dominican puts several stories in action to elaborate on how demons occupy animals and material objects. First, angels could make their way into animals and produce from the air voices in them "it was not the donkey who spoke but an angel inside him who can form air into voice" *non enim ipsa locuta est, sed angelus in ea, qui potest formare aera in uocem*, as it is clear in the story about Balaam's donkey [7]<sup>17</sup>. The biblical narrative is rationalized through physics since angels are thought to condense and rarefy the air to simulate vocalization. This concept gains significance with later scholastic generations to come. Roland of Cremona, John of la Rochelle, Eudes Rigaud, and most notoriously Thomas Aquinas would impose the discussion over angel's speech and vocal physics in the empyrean heaven where saints are at pains to articulate voiced praise *laus uocalis* (Ms. Vat. lat. 729. fol. 33rb–33va; Ms. Vat. lat. 691. fol. 57r; Ms. Vat. lat. 5982. fol. 82r; Aqu. Super I Sent. 72–75; Roling, 2008: 63–87; Sorokina, 2019). Not immersing in details, Hugh furnishes a plain and satisfactory solution of voice generation through the air in the possessed body.

<sup>16</sup>For the historical and linguistical genealogy of the notion ἐνέργεια from the Gospels and Paul towards Nemesius, John of Damascus, and Burgundio of Pisa see de Libera's lecture (Libera, 2022).

<sup>17</sup>In the exhaustive survey of medieval attempts to conceptualize angelic speech B. Roling unfortunately passes over one of the initial attempts executed by Hugh to convey a simplistic account of angelic parole addressed to people. Notwithstanding, the scholar discovers within *Postillae* attributed to Hugh the mature synthesis of William's conception of intelligible language and Philip's illumination theory to accommodate inter-angelic communication (Roling, 2008: 66–68).



Next, the same model finds its way into the realm of demons. Simon Magus is reported to employ demons in fighting against Peter [7]. In the apocryphal text *Actus Petri cum Simone*, Simon makes dogs sing *canes cantare* through the agency of demons inside. Hugh acknowledges this in line with one of several negative connotations around Simon's notorious portrait (Ferreiro, 2005: 147–200). Peculiarly, Hugh's choice of examples is not arbitral for there exists a connection between the Bible and the apocrypha, intertwining magicians (Simon Magus) with diviners (Balaam), both of whom defy divine authority. Balaam comes perilously close to being slain by an angel, whereas Simon ultimately loses the contest against Peter. The only difference lies in the fact that angels directly execute divine punishment and demons act in accordance with God's plan. As a result, demons conferred upon Simon unwavering faith in the power to such an extent that he ended up challenging the apostles.

Lastly, a story about Bartholomew who abolishes the demonic idol supplements presented narratives from the Bible and apocrypha. In this story as one Oxford manuscript reads, on his mission Bartholomew found out that indigenous people had erected idols believed to have the ability to procure diseases [7]. After performing miracles, the apostle approached the idol, doubted its efficacy, and exorcized the demon residing within who was called Astaroth, a figure found in both the Bible and various occult texts (Clm. BSB 10268. fol. 114va)<sup>18</sup>. The story of the confrontation between the saints on the one side and pagans engaged in the demonolatriy on the other unfolds around the demonic false power to display futile and deceiving miracles. Hugh meticulously elucidates this subject in the fictitious dialogue between Peter and Clement.

<sup>18</sup>I do not give much credit to historical coincidences but at the same time when at Paris university Hugh was occupied with editing his *Opus*, at Frederick's court Michael Scot (ca. 1175–1235) engaged in composing a threefold introduction to astrology called *Liber introductorius*. The emperor's magician condemned magic and advised simultaneously how to invoke by names, signs, and sacrifices angels and demons in the fashion of the Neoplatonic theurgy. His perception of magic astoundingly bordered the same ambivalent development of the medieval demonology by Hugh along with other scholastics like Roland of Cremona, William of Auvergne, and Richard Fishacre we will have a chance to discuss in the next section (Boudet, 2006: 181–186; Voskoboynikov, 2008: 339–345; Voskoboynikov, 2014: 273, 367–368). Embarking on the inquisitorial mission in Italy, Roland was even reported to have held a dispute with Theodore who was Frederick's astrologer. In Roland's late commentary on Job, he castigated the emperor and Michael Scot for magic and heresy (Voskoboynikov, 2008: 267–268; Burnett, 2009: Pt. IX, 250–251, 255–257; Parmeggiani, 2009: 38–39).

The question concerning the reason behind the fabrication of the dialogue, which comprises a long paragraph pivotal to the dichotomy drawn between miracles and wonders [9], remains unresolved. To the best of my knowledge and present-day research, no apocrypha translated into Latin, be it the *Recognitiones* or *Homiliae viginti*, contains anything akin to Hugh's account of the dialogue. M. van der Lugt, in her excellent exploration of Hugh of Saint-Cher's miracle theory, states that the friar speaks up for "The Book of Clement" *Liber Clementis* (Van der Lugt, 2004a: 404). Unfortunately, no extant record exists for this title, aside from Roland of Cremona, who probably invented this label while addressing the definition of the empyrean and Simon Magus' demons (Ms. Vat. lat. 729. fol. 30ra, 32ra, 42vb). It is highly probable that M. van der Lugt took the name from Roland on the condition that Hugh did not give this reference. In fact, following Hugh's steps, Eudes Rigaud would cite "The Itinerary of Clement" *Itineratio Clementis* for the same story under this name which was traditionally associated with the *Recognitiones* and further transmitted to Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Jacobus de Voragine (Ms. Vat. lat. 5982. fol. 88rb). This said, it is highly plausible that Hugh might invent from the two apocrypha the entire disputation between Peter and Clement to expose the distinction between magicians' wonders and apostles' miracles [9]<sup>19</sup>. According to the dialogue, Clement justifiably notes that both Peter and Simon performed similar feats with the same power. Peter objects that God indeed confers equal might to gauge the good and expulse the evil upon Christians and their adversaries. Divine providence frames great conflicts: pharaoh's magicians versus Moses, the Philistines versus Isaac, Simon versus Peter, and antichrist versus Christ. Half of the Christian enemies invoked are magicians arguably aided by malevolent spirits. The critical insight Hugh communicates is that demonic and magical wonders do not heal the body or soul. In contrast, Christian genuine miracles cure the body and lead the soul to God. Hugh's binary opposition provides the context for understanding why demons can wield powers similar to angels. Onwards, demons have at their disposition power-hungry agents who assist them.

<sup>19</sup>Having encountered long ago approximately fifteen references to the "The Book of Clement" in Roland and one in Hugh's *Postillae*, C. Hess was perplexed as much as me. He plausibly inferred that Roland put in use this title to denote the *Recognitiones*, while supplying his disciple with the same reference (Hess, 1968: 431). Nonetheless, Hugh's *Sentences* precedes Roland's *Summa* and the aforementioned dialogue does not appear in the *Recognitiones*. Perhaps, we lack some piece of evidence regarding Latin apocrypha.

To finish the gallery of personalities with reputed names, I turn to the figure of Merlin, a renowned magician from the *matière de Bretagne* especially notorious thanks to Geoffrey of Monmouth. In the stark distance from the theory of artificial semen or the transposition of seed in vessels (Van der Lugt, 2004b: 252–253), Hugh dismisses the possibility of Merlin being generated by an incubus *genito de incubo demone* [7]. Demons may appear at night in the dreams of men and women to incite their sexual desires, steal semen (regrettably, Hugh does not elaborate), and place it in the female womb *proiacent in matricem mulieri*. This, however, will not result in the generation of a fetus for two reasons. First and foremost, demons are not creators endowed with the capacity to bring forth new beings by decision or generation because this role is reserved exclusively for God. Instead, they manipulate the seeds imprinted in matter by God during creation and use matter which has undergone putrefaction to produce certain animals (v.g., real sneaks and frogs from the Exodus narrative) or creatures which were not originally saved in Noah's ark (e.g., dragons from the same story) [8]. This conceptual apparatus has been extensively and identically developed by Alexander of Hales and Philip the Chancellor; historians continue to argue who was the first to propose it (Wicki, 2005: 6; Bieniak, 2010: 109–112; Gorochov, 2021: 155).

Hugh contributes to the theory of demonic generation by implicating a critique of his master Alexander, who asserted that demons could fake artificial semen to progenerate sons and daughters. Respectively, they would become human beings for the sake of natural harmony (Alexander de Hales, 1952: II.8.VI; Van der Lugt, 2004b: 251). In Hugh's judgment, the participation of both genders is essential for a child to come into existence *exigitur opus utriusque* [7]. In my view, this accords more harmoniously with the natural order than artificial offspring of demoniacs advanced by both Alexander of Hales and John of la Rochelle<sup>20</sup>, although the meaning and implication of the latter theory remain a subject of debate among scholars (ibid.: 252; Colish, 1995: 107). Even if Hugh's stance can be viewed as

<sup>20</sup>On the basis of M. van der Lugt's transcription of Hugh, F. Harkins surmises that he was also a proponent of the artificial semen theory contrary to stolen sperm conception, a division F. Harkins himself casts doubts on by exploring Albert and Thomas' synthesis of both theories (Harkins, 2011: 32–33). I do not see the ground for such a reading because a negation of demonic capability to eject semen does not bind Hugh over to imply that semen can be artificially produced. On the contrary, Hugh is coherent to neatly speak up throughout the second book that demons have to conjure seeds bestowed by God and no ability to feign semens is prescribed to them.

reactionary<sup>21</sup>, he exercises a significant degree of autonomy to maintain his own line of demonology in this question. Conversely, I would say that other issues, like the divination by stars or a magician's desire to imitate demons, better exemplify Hugh's conservatism. They happen to be traditionally addressed and condemned without any substantial consideration [6].

Last but not least, Hugh does not hesitate to contemplate the idea of demonic nobility that might perplex and complicate the concepts presented. Demons fear seducing and tempting on the first and second day people who have recently committed despicable sins "due to the aversion of sin and shame" *propter peccati abhominacionem et pudorem* [11]. In the eyes of the 13th-century theologian, sodomy and fornication have a connotation of the most vicious moral depravity [11]. Hugh's rationalization invented from scratch reinforces his devotion to demonology which could grant a sense of moral dignity to the wretched demons and level them up in comparison with human debaucheries. It is worth mentioning at the same time, while Hugh pursued this rational approach, inquisitors like Conrad of Magdeburg began to prosecute Luciferians, whom he reported sinning sexually with demons<sup>22</sup>. Being less rational and more appealing to theologians and canonists, the latter path to construe demonic consciousness would eventually gain more traction.

All in all, I have furnished multiple thematic spheres where Hugh elaborates on demonic activity, including bodily assumption, possession, generation, creation, healing, wonders, and most prominently magic. For a concise early scholastic testimony, the breadth of issues developed further with different examples and independent considerations makes a profound impression unparalleled among his contemporaries and other distinctions of the same book<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>21</sup>In the scholastic tradition *grosso modo*, the common opinion represented by Giles of Rome, Richard of Mediavilla, and Durand de Saint-Pourçain has been established somewhere in the middle between Alexander and Hugh. On the one hand, demons were believed to lack vital functions and natural relations with human bodies, so that no angel could feign the semen. On the other hand, they were affirmed to generate giants and deformed offspring. In this regard, demons transport the seed and predict astral circumstances appropriate to form a fetus of aggressive and giant humans who can be easily controlled. Richard of Mediavilla went so far as to maintain that demons mold pseudo-bodies and counterfeit reproductive organs as happened in the case of Merlin (Roling, 2010: 407–410).

<sup>22</sup>In general, same-sex and cross-species intercourse had been a grievous and tremendous sin on such a scale that it eventually contributed to the accusation of witches (Chiffolleau, 1990: 294–296, 302–304).

<sup>23</sup>Hugh's approach to popular culture, be it Merlin, Simon Magus, or Bartholomew, bears a tenet of the 13th century Zeitgeist. Combatting heretics and oppressing illiterate people,

## DEMONS AND FRIARS

Hugh of Saint-Cher's profound impact on the next generation has been recorded several times (Torrell, 1974: 267–280; Bierniak, 2007: 162–164). His demonology had eminent repercussions which could be traced by the common examples and allusions. I am going to illuminate tenants of the reception and polemics found in unedited codices composed by Jean de la Rochelle (1200?–1245), Eudes Rigaud (ca. 1210–1275), and Richard Fishacre (ca. 1200–1248) before exploring the distinguished approach Roland of Cremona and Alexander of Hales.

Before entering the gallery of famous personalities, I would like to start on the ground of the scholastic educational system since on the basis of Hugh's writings an anonymous manual for students was composed in the 1240s (Harkins, 2015). Called by scholars "Daughters of the Master" *Filiae magistri*, the handbook gives an opportunity to look into what ordinary disciples studied and how, if it actually happened, they engaged with ideas delineated by Hugh. In the early Paris *Filia magistri*, a lot of Hugh's concepts find their place, namely the nobility of demons fearing to tempt people along with the demonic usage of the putrefaction. One gloss in the margin, meanwhile, departs from Hugh by introducing a four-fold differentiation of how the devil is said to possess human being: by the subjection to evil, oppression of natural organs, torment of body parts, and removal of the gifts of grace (Ms. BNF lat. 16412. fol. 53vb–54ra). This elaborate scheme provokes suspicion and raises consecutive questions about why a particular disciple would deviate from the course of Hugh so extensively. An anonymous compiler can derive this model either from Alexander of Hales' *Glossa*, or through the mediation of Alexander by John of la Rochelle (Alexander de Hales, 1952: VIII.14; Ms. Vat. lat. 691. fol. 61v–62v).

John's *Sentences* is reported in a Vatican manuscript along with a wide array of Hugh's text on three demonic orders, elements, divine apparitions, *energia-imergia* (Ms. Vat. lat. 691. fol. 62r–62v). However, John's proper thoughts (usually located on the top and at the bottom of each folio) diverge from Hugh on many issues. These include but are not limited to artificial semen, demonic temptation, bodily assumption, magical enactment, and

the church attacked and locked up all marvelous and naturally ambivalent creatures on the verge of identity (e.g., a saint dog or magician) in the kingdom of demons, as J.-C. Schmitt effectively revealed. Theologians incorporated figures and narratives from the vernacular culture in order to expand the grip of church power (Schmitt, 1981: 341–346). Hugh's example equally testifies this.

demon's voice (Ms. Vat. lat. 691. fol. 61v–62v). As a result, it is conceivable that Rochelle might have integrated Hugh into his proper reflections. The Franciscan yet does not hesitate to overcome Hugh by fortifying Alexander's position on demonic generation and Aristotle's innocence regarding eternity (Ms. Vat. lat. 691. fol. 54v).

Eudes Rigaud borrows some reference to examples transmitted by Hugh. Simon Magus, Clement, Peter, Bartholomew, and Balaam indicate Eudes' direct acquaintance with Hugh's assemblage of stories. Above all, Eudes is the sole master I know who reproduces an abridged version of Peter and Clement's dialogue (Ms. Vat. lat. 5982. fol. 88rb–88vb). Even though Eudes' adherence to Hugh's path does not raise doubt, there are instances where he either criticizes the older master or significantly expands Hugh's findings. E.g., Eudes attacks Hugh for holding that demons could not steal and restore eyes, enormously deepens his initiative concerning angelic embodiment<sup>24</sup>, and uses Aristotle-Avicenna's threefold division of the soul to delineate the demonic power (Ms. Vat. lat. 5982. fol. 89va, 90va). These are the most vivid cases of Eudes' rationalization achieved by virtue of new philosophical sources and instruments.

The dissemination of Hugh's concepts extends beyond the confines of Paris. Across the channel, Richard Fishacre was the first to lecture on the *Sentences* at Oxford. The blackfriar closely follows Hugh in elaborating on Merlin, the projection of semen, the theft of an eye, Simon Magus with his chanting dogs and walking statues, demonic wonders denounced as useless, putrefaction-generation, Balaam, three demonic orders, and *obsessio-energumini* distinction (Richard Fishacre, 2008: 141, 157–158, 162, 171). Such a list, which can continue infinitely, is obviously enriched with new ideas like the rejection of a universal herb to attract all demons and the defense of Solomonic learned magic before the advent of Christ (ibid.: 144, 148). To sum up, Richard Fishacre haunts the ground of the material gathered and assembled by Hugh while advancing new intellectual strongholds.

At present, I would like to introduce two alternative approaches which entail Roland of Cremona, who prepared his *Summa* while traveling in Italy (ca. 1234), and Alexander of Hales, who significantly enlarged the demonological content of his *Glossa* within mature *Quaestiones disputatae* pronounced after he took the Franciscan vows in 1236. The former master

<sup>24</sup>Eudes' substantive disputation over whether and how angels form their bodies from four elements or empyrean matter foreshadows Bonaventure's premise according to which angels form bodies mostly from air admixed with other elements (Faes de Mottoni, 1999).

invents meticulous demonology with unparalleled scrutiny in a naturalistic-realistic examination of demonic phantasies, nocturnal flight, and learning. His demonology does not correlate with his animadversion towards Aristotle, whom he accuses of contradicting Plato with hollow arguments and belief in angelic spiritual matter. Both facts do not impede the Italian inquisitor from integrating Aristotle's ideas into demonology. Issues, like the demonic capacity to enter the soul or procreate, are reviewed by Roland within peripatetic philosophy (Ms. Vat. lat. 729. fol. 41vb–43rb).

Two series of Alexander's questions (Horowski, 2012: 511), which remain unedited, dwell upon the divination and miracles. Alexander developed ideas that transcend all boundaries and Hugh's reasoning. To name a few, he deals with a perverted demonic hierarchy that places women as more susceptible to demons and seduction than men *doctrina sortilegii stat in mulieribus magis, quam in uiris*, attacks the "Art of Memory"<sup>25</sup> widespread among medieval students obliged to learn a lot by heart, and reassess the theory of miracles to turnover unreal magic into action with hazardous consequences (Ms. BNF lat. 16412. fol. 85vb, 88va–88vb, 90vb)<sup>26</sup>. Alexander is adamant that the incantations do not have internal power *uirtus uerborum* except through demonic ministry. He juxtaposes enchantments with sacramental formulas ordained with effective and real divine might (Ms. BNF lat. 16412. fol. 90vb). All in all, Alexander even does not need a sacramental pact theory, founded by William of Auvergne and Richard Fishacre, to proclaim magical signs and enchantments ineffective (Courtenay, 1972: 191–193; Rosier-Catach, 2005: 94–103).

<sup>25</sup>To put it simple, *Ars notoria* was a magic of memory that promised to obtain eidetic knowledge by purging oneself, reciting notes, and looking at enchanted figures. It allowed someone to acquire wisdom without actually learning things. Angels were constantly involved in imposing divine knowledge upon a practitioner. It might not be an accident that the first surviving version of this art dates back to 1225 precisely when Alexander read his *Sentences* before authoring disputed questions (Véronèse, 2002: 817–823, 830; Véronèse, 2007: 18).

<sup>26</sup>Eudes Rigaud seems to reinforce Alexander's theory of miracles with one small and still essential adjustment. Taking Philip the Chancellor's distinction between two temporal modalities (Ms. Vat. lat. 7669. fol. 14vb), Alexander believes that the difference between angelic miracles performed "suddenly" *repente* and demonic mischiefs enacted "quickly" *subito* is so minimal no one among humans can discern one from another (Ms. BNF lat. 16412. fol. 88va). The Franciscan deeply deviates from Augustine and Gregory the Great's vague idea of innate ability to discern miracles. Conversely, Eudes Rigaud corrects his teacher that wise souls discriminate evil miracles from good by considering the aim and circumstances in which a certain action takes place (Ms. Vat. lat. 5982. fol. 88vb). Thus, Eudes rationally restores the spiritual ability of pious souls and exacerbates surveillance over magicians and demons.

Be as it may, I have no option but to conclude that Aristotelianism<sup>27</sup> can pretend to elucidate an extension of the discourse surrounding demonology in the Frühscholastic. In opposition to what J. Russel thought about the antinomy between Neoplatonism friendly to demons and anti-demonological Aristotelianism (Russell, 1972: 111–112, 116, 143; Russell, 1984: 161, 185, 193; 1992: 131, 136, 157), Alexander of Hales and Eudes Rigaud, who were more inclined to reference and defend Aristotle's views, significantly enhanced scholastic theology of demons.

Different authors, Hugh first and foremost in my paper, reached unimaginable intellectual freedom and went down different avenues of the pure thought experiments spanning metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of demons. They rationally erected a scientific field full of demoniacs for future scholastic generations to explore. Perhaps, there was a turning point somewhere between 1225 and 1245... though I do not enjoy writing a generalized history of ruptures and rather prefer historical continuity of which medieval people knew more and better than us.

#### EDITION

The following sigla are introduced by me in the transcription: BAV lat. 1098 = *V*, BNF lat. 3073 = *P*<sub>1</sub>, Brugge 178 = *B*, Assisi 130 = *A*<sub>1</sub>, Assisi 131 = *A*<sub>2</sub>, BNF lat. 10728 = *P*<sub>2</sub>. *VP*<sub>1</sub>*A*<sub>1</sub>*A*<sub>2</sub> form a family of peciae sharing a common Leipzig exemplar. *B* is also a pecia of different origin, whereas *P*<sub>2</sub> represents a separate textual tradition (Faes de Mottoni, 2002; Faes de Mottoni, 2004: 275–285). Manuscript *V* has been chosen to be the principal codex for its legibility and clarity. Paragraphs, grammar, and punctuation of the transcription correspond to modern standards. | | denotes the start of a new column, ⟨ ⟩ stays for editorial supplements to the Latin text. Now, let Hugh of Saint-Cher throw light on all angelological and demonological mysteries, comprising those left unnoticed in my overview.

#### ABBREVIATIONS

Aqu. Super I Sent. Thomas Aquinas. 1929. [in Latin]. Vol. 1 of *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. by P. Mandonnet. Paris: P. Lethielleux.

<sup>27</sup>To my surprise, no other than genius art historian J. Baschet discloses that Aristotle was responsible for the new Thomistic idea of evil order in opposition to Augustine's confidence that no order of evil exists (Baschet, 1995: 195). As I am striving to show, Aristotle's impact may exceed the boundaries of order and dominate demonic psychology, physiology, and constitution.



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ФЕДОР НЕХАЕНКО

СТАЖЕР-ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬ

ЦЕНТР ФУНДАМЕНТАЛЬНОЙ СОЦИОЛОГИИ, НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ  
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## НЕИЗВЕСТНЫЙ ДЕМОНОЛОГ В ПАРИЖСКОМ УНИВЕРСИТЕТЕ? СОЧИНЕНИЕ II.7–8 ГУГО СЕН-ШЕРСКОГО

**Аннотация:** Термин *Daemonologia* аналогично понятиям *ontologia* или *anthropologia* не принадлежит Средневековью, как и само название эпохи. Тем не менее эти категории полезны при анализе средневековой интеллектуальной культуры, поскольку они позволяют восстановить историческую преемственность. Настоящая статья посвящена рассмотрению вклада в схоластическую демонологию Гуго Сен-Шерского (ca. 1190–1263). Дистинкции II.7–8 из его комментария на Сентенции (ca. 1231–1234) были транскрибированы, сличены и переведены мною на английский впервые. В предисловии я обсуждаю предшественников Гуго среди схоластов и подчеркиваю значение Александра Гэльского. Александр являлся единственным предшественником Гуго, расширившим границы демонологии. Затем я показываю разнообразие проблем, которые занимали Гуго: рационализация демонического порождения, исцеления, присвоения тела, речи и чудес. За пределами влияния Аристотеля Гуго наполняет сухой текст Петра Ломбардского — основание его комментария — прекрасными историями о Валааме, Симоне Волхве, Апулее и Варфоломее. Идеи Гуго формируют основание для эволюции демонологии в первой

половине XIII века. Наконец, я рассматриваю влияние Гуго на следующие поколения схоластов, а именно Ричарда Фишакра, Иоанна де ла Рошель и Одона Риго. Более того, используя манускрипты Роланда Кремонского и Александра Гэльского, я рассматриваю альтернативные проекты ранней схоластической демонологии. В завершении, я обсуждаю влияние Аристотеля на раннюю схоластическую демонологию между 1225 и 1245 гг.

**Ключевые слова:** Гуго Сен-Шерский, демонология, «Сентенции», схоластическая теология, осуждение магии, Роланд Кремонский, Александр Гэльский, Одон Риго.

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HUGH OF SAINT-CHER

[QUESTIONS ABOUT ANGELS AND DEMONS]\*

DOI: 10.17323/2587-8719-2023-4-264-286.

HUGO DE SANCTO CARO  
OPUS. LIBER II. PARS III  
DISTINCTIONES VII–VIII

HUGH OF SAINT-CHER  
THE WORK. BOOK II. PART III  
DISTINCTIONS VII–VIII

DISTINCTIO VII

DISTINCTION VII

5 <Q. 7.1> PROBACIO QUOD NULLI  
ANGELI POSSUNT MERERI VEL  
DEMERERI

<Q. 7.1> ANGELS CANNOT GAIN OR LOSE 5R  
MERIT

1. Supra dictum est et cetera.  
10 Sed cum nec boni peccare et ce-  
tera. Si boni angeli non possunt  
facere malum neque uelle, simili-  
15 ter mali non possunt facere bo-  
num neque uelle, ergo neque hii  
neque illi uidentur posse mereri  
uel demereri. Sed dicimus quod  
in non posse facere uel uelle ma-  
lum et similiter in non uelle et  
non facere malum nullum est me-

1. It was mentioned above etc. But  
since good angels cannot sin etc. If good  
angels cannot neither do nor desire evil 10R  
and in the same way evil angels cannot  
neither do nor desire good, then both  
cannot gain or lose merit. But we say  
that there is no merit in the impossi-  
bility to do or will evil and similarly in 15R  
not willing or not doing evil; this does  
not concern the free will but merit con-  
sists in making or desiring good. It is

3 V: 51ra–52va; P<sub>1</sub>: 35vb–37vb; B: 42va–43vb; A<sub>1</sub>: 46rb–47vb; A<sub>2</sub>: 46ra–47va; P<sub>2</sub>: 103vb–105va

4 VII]  *marg. M<sub>2</sub> quod artes magice et prestigia sint reprobata lege in secundo libro De doctrina  
kristiana Augustini et in libro LXXV questionum in questione LII A<sub>2</sub> 9 nec] om. VP<sub>1</sub>BA<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>  
11–13 similiter ... bonum] marg. V 13 neque uelle] om. V 14 uidentur posse] possunt V*

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20 ritum nec hoc respicit liberum  
 arbitrium, sed in hoc quod est fa-  
 cere uel uelle bonum, quod cessa-  
 re non dicitur liberum arbitrium,  
 quia flecti possit ad utrumque,  
 25 sed quia possit eligere quod sibi  
 placet, supra v distinctio: *habe-*  
*bant* et cetera. De prodigo filio  
 super Lucam XV: solus deus est  
 <quem peccatum cadere non po-  
 test> etc, hanc auctoritatem ex-  
 30 ponit magister infra, non ergo  
in utramque partem flecti pos-  
sunt secundum statum creatio-  
nis; omnis creatura in libero ar-  
bitrio unde uidetur innuere quod  
 35 in deo non sit liberum arbitrium,  
 sed aliter est in domino liberum  
 arbitrium, aliter in angelis siue  
 in aliis.

2. Ad utrumque flecti pos-  
 40 sunt uerum est naturaliter id est  
de prima condicione malum re-  
spuunt, in malis angelis non est  
necessitas ad malum impellens,  
 45 sed ex gratia substracta neces-  
sitas deficiendi a bono, habent  
etiam post lapsum naturalem po-  
tenciam faciendi bonum, sed non  
habilitatem. Multo liberius in-  
 50 tensio libertatis attendatur se-  
cundum maiorem elongationem  
a seruitute, licet autem in angelis  
nulla esset ante confirmacionem  
seruitus, tamen poterat in eis es-

not supposed to be chosen by the in-  
 stance of free will which can bend to-  
 ward each side. However, since an angel 20R  
 can choose what he likes, as it was as-  
 serted in the fifth distinction above: they  
 had etc. About the prodigal son Luke  
15:11–24: only God is in whom one could  
not fall into the sin, the teacher explains 25R  
this authority below, therefore, others  
cannot bend in each part by the free  
will according to creature's condition,  
all creatures made with the free will,  
 30R whence it seems that there would be no  
 free will in God, though the free will  
 exists differently in God and in angels  
 or in other creatures.

2. But they could turn to both, nat-  
 35R urally, that is in the first condition, an-  
gels rejected evil, there is no necessity  
for malevolent angels to impel towards  
bad. Nevertheless, without grace there  
is a necessity to fail from good, they  
 40R even have natural potency but not an  
ability to do good after the fall. More  
freedom in, they are inflamed with the  
intensity of freedom according to bigger  
redemption from the servitude, though  
 45R among angels none would be a slave be-  
fore the confirmation, yet a slave of the  
sin can exist among them. Nevertheless,  
after the confirmation he could not exist;

26 V: fol. 50v

39 Ad] *add.* siue P<sub>1</sub>

26–29 Lc. 15:11–24

se seruitus peccati, sed post confirmacionem non potuit, et ideo magis fuit elongatum tunc liberum arbitrium a seruitute quam ante, et ideo liberius fuit.

3. Triplex est libertas a culpa, miseria, coactione. Item in libero arbitrio est aliud libertas, aliud potestas. Libertas dicitur respectu coactionis, quia non potest cogi, potestas respectu actionis, quia non potest cadere id est potens agere quo ad libertatem eque liberum est modo ut ante peccatum, quo ad potestatem corruptum est et debilitatum; non potest seruire peccato Iohannes VIII: qui facit peccatum; ad Romanos VI: sicut exhibuistis; natura creaturarum celestium mori potuit spiritualiter scilicet, peccare potuerunt, hoc uidetur falsum quia adhuc naturaliter id est de natura sue conditionis peccare non possunt; ideo sic construe litteram: post confirmacionem non potest pec | 51rb | care sicut ante, quod scilicet erat de natura uel sicut ante, id est ita de facili uel de natura non potest peccare, quia plus ualet in eis gratia quam natura.

4. Viuaci sensu id est sciencia naturali. Notandum quod synde-

therefore, the liberation of free will from the servitude was bigger than before the confirmation, thus an angel had more freedom.

3. The freedom from guilt of the miserable constraint is threefold. Similarly, regarding the instance of free will freedom is one thing, power is another. Freedom is said in relation to the constraint since it is impossible to understand the power to act in relation to actions. Since it is impossible to fall, that is one can act in the only way that leads to equal freedom as before the sin, by which one was corrupted and weakened in his power, it is impossible to serve the sin, Jn. 8:34 who sins; Rom. 6:19 just as you used to offer yourselves; celestial creatures' nature could perish, spiritually, that is one can sin that seems to be false because hitherto angels cannot sin naturally due to their natural condition. For that reason, adhere to the following account: after the confirmation one cannot sin as before, being confirmed insofar as evident that the angel existed according to nature; or as before the confirmation, that is in such an easy way or by nature one cannot sin because grace outweighs nature in them.

4. A lively sense, that is of natural knowledge. It should be noted that the

59 Triplex est libertas | marg. Quod triplex est libertas  $P_1$  triplex est libertas  $P_2$  60 Item | add. quod triplex est libertas  $A_1$  85 gratia | terra V 87-88 synderesis | marg.  $M_2$  quod synderesis in quantumcumque uiatore non est extincta nec in demonibus quo ad unam partem  $A_2$

71-72 Io. 8:34 72-73 Rom. 6:19

90 resis duo facit: discernit bonum  
 a malo; eligit bonum, malum fu-  
 git quo ad primum ratio in demon-  
 95 nibus non est penitus extincta,  
 sed quo ad secundum omnino ex-  
 tincta est, sed in uiatore quantum-  
 100 cumque malo non est extincta  
 synderesis neque quo ad primum  
 neque quo ad secundum. Subti-  
litace nature quanto quis subti-  
 105 lioris est, naturale tanto perspi-  
 caciore est ingenis. Ab omnipo-  
tenti deo discunt ut cum deus  
 per bonos angelos reuelat de om-  
 nibus, quod completa sunt pec-  
 cata eorum et quod tempus est  
 110 ut puniantur per eos; diuinando  
 quia per coniecturas et scienciam  
 astrorum quam habent presciunt  
 ipsi quedam futura et secundum  
 hoc proponunt se aliquid factu-  
 ros et aliquid predicunt, potencia  
 115 dyaboli est a deo, non actus; quo-  
rum sciencia sciencia dicit, quia  
 sciunt per que incantaciones fieri  
 possunt; uirtute dicit quia pote-  
 statem habent subito discurren-  
 di et afferendi illa quod etiam, si  
 homo sciret, non posset facere in  
 multo quod tempus subito ipsi.

5. Omnis sciencia a deo creata  
 est Ecclesiasticus I, omnis pote-  
 120 stas ad Romanos XIII: non est po-  
testas, nisi a deo; ad fallendum  
fallaces sicut egyptii per miracu-

synderesis accomplishes two things: it  
 differentiates good from evil and chooses  
 good avoiding evil. Whereupon, for the  
 first instant there is a ground among  
 demons, while for the second every- 85R  
 thing is demolished. Nevertheless, in this  
 world regardless of evil synderesis is not  
 destroyed either in the first sense or in  
 the second sense. The thinness of nature,  
 the more one is thin, the more one has 90R  
 a natural capacity to perceive, they learn  
from omnipotent God, just as when God  
 reveals all to benevolent angels, their  
 sins were also perfected and the time  
 has come for demons and sinners to be 95R  
 punished by angels; divining, demons  
 themselves foresee certain events in the  
 future by the divination and knowledge  
 of stars which they have. According to  
 this, they display what they will do and 100R  
 predict something, though only the dev-  
 ilish power stems from God, not an act.  
Whose knowledge, one says knowledge  
 since they know through which incanta- 105R  
 tions it could happen and virtue since  
 they have the power to suddenly wan-  
 der and fetch certain things. Even if  
 a human being knew it, he would not  
 be able to perform on several occasions  
 what a demon suddenly accomplished. 110R

5. All the knowledge is created by  
God, Eccl 1:1, that is all the power,  
Rom 13:1: there is no power except  
by God; to deceive deceivers, just as  
 the Egyptians desired to believe Moses 115R

91 non est | inest V 91 extincta] synderesis nec quo ad primum V 115 etiam | add. et V  
 117 multo | add. tempore V 122 egyptii] add. sit V 122 per] propter B

118-119 Ecclesiasticus. 1:1 119-121 Rom. 13:1

la facta a magis uolebant credere  
 Moysi et magi magis excetaban-  
 125 tur, quia mirabiles se credebant  
 in conspectu hominum per mi-  
 racula, que faciebant magi pha-  
raonis, Exodus XVI; digitus dei  
 (*est hic*) Exodus VIII; in sui ge-  
 130 neris id est demonum carcerem,  
 cum infinitus sit carcer eorum  
 proprie uel sui generis secundum  
 opinionem, que dicit demones ha-  
 bere aerea corpora, puritatis ha-  
 135 bitatione id est empireo, datur  
id est permittat, uel melius da-  
tur sciencia id est permittitur,  
 uel melius datur sciencia et per-  
 mittitur usus sciencie quem ipsi  
 140 retorquent ad fallendum, II Para-  
 lipomenon ultimo: *dixit dominus*  
*«quis mihi decipiet Achab»* et  
 post dixit illi qui se optulit uade  
 id est permitto ut eas. Similiter  
 145 illud: *Quod facis, fac citius* id  
 est facies me permittente.

6. Pro magno desiderant sicut  
 stulti, per hoc decipiunt demo-  
 nes eos homines. qui uolunt eos  
 150 imitari in sollicita, acquisitione  
 uane sciencie, et ideo prohiben-  
 tur hec ab ecclesia, iustorum pa-  
tientiam, cum enim boni homi-  
nes uidebunt antixristum mira-  
 155 abilia facientem nec tamen ei con-  
sencient, magis merebuntur; in-

through miracles made by magicians  
 and magicians were encouraged more  
 because they believed themselves to be  
 wonderful in the eyes of men in virtue of  
 the miracles they performed, pharaoh's 120R  
magicians, Exod. 16:1–15; God's finger  
is here, Exod. 8:19; in their demonic jail  
since their prison is properly infinite or  
of their kind according to the opinion  
 which claims that demons have aerial 125R  
 bodies. Pure dwelling, the empyrean, is  
given, that it God permits. Or better:  
 knowledge is given, permitted; or better:  
 knowledge is given and the use of knowl- 130R  
 edge by which demons inquire to de-  
 ceive is granted, II Paralipomenon 18:19;  
 the Lord said: Who shall deceive Achab  
 king of Israel, and after he said that  
 those who sacrifice themselves should  
 go, that is I allow them to go. Similarly, 135R  
 John 13:27: What you are about to do,  
 do quickly, that is you will allow me  
 to do.

6. They who desire something greater,  
just as fools, by this demons deceive 140R  
those humans who desire to imitate  
them being agitated for whom knowl-  
edge is useless in action, consequently,  
these things are prohibited by the  
church; the patience of the just, when 145R  
indeed good people will see antichrist  
performing miracles and yet will not  
join him, they will gain more merit;

125 mirabiles | narrabiles  $P_2$  132 proprie | proprio  $P_1$  133 opinionem |  $P_1$  135 empireo |  
 add. celo B 140 II | add. I  $VA_1P_2$  I Regnum ?  $P_1A_1$  143 uade | *rade*  $P_1$  148 decipiunt |  
 testes V 149 uolunt | nolunt  $VP_2$  150 acquisitione | ad quis actione V

127–128 Exod. 16:1–15 128–129 Exod. 8:19 140–142 II Paralipomenon 18:19 145–146  
 Io. 13:27

160 commutabilis scilicet deus, iudicat id est concedit. Magi serpentes fecerunt et ranas fecerunt,  
 nota quod sicut dicit Augustinus super Exodo VII: demones ualde perspicaces sunt et ideo subito attulerunt quedam semina et quedam adminicula ad faciendum serpentes, unde nullum fuit ibi miraculum, sicut dictum est in primo libro, sed tantum operatio nature.

immutable, that is God judges what he allows magicians; magicians created snakes and frogs, note, Augustine says about Ex. 7:11 that demons are very perceptive and, therefore, suddenly bring semen and aid to make snakes, whence there is nothing miraculous but only the natural process, as was said in the first book.

150R

155R

170 <Q. 7.2> QUESTIO UTRUM

DEMONES POSSINT SANARE

HOMINES

7. Si autem queris, utrum possint generare homines, sicut dicitur de Merlino genito de incubo demone. Item si queratur, utrum possint restituere oculum uel huiusmodi sicut Symon Magus faciebat canes canere. Ad hoc dicunt magistri quod demones tantum possunt ea facere, que fiunt per uiam putrefactionis, unde possunt facere quiddam genus auium et ranarum que fiunt hoc modo. Ea uero que fiunt per decisionem siue generationem non possunt, unde etiam si haberent semen hominis et proiacent in matricem mulie-

<Q. 7.2> WHETHER DEMONS COULD HEAL HUMAN BEINGS

7. If you also inquire whether they have an ability to generate human beings, as it is said about the generation of Merlin from the demon incubus. If it is asked whether demons could restore an eye or such things as Simon Magus who made dogs sing. On this matter masters say that demons can only make what comes into existence by the putrefaction, thus they can make certain genera of birds and frogs which come into existence this way. Though they cannot make those things which come by decision or by generation, thus even if they had human semen and threw it into female womb, a human would not be made since for human generation the

160R

165R

170R

175R

160-168 Alexander de Hales, 1952: VII.30 167 V: fol. 15r 173-175 Geoffrey of Monmouth, 1985: 24, 107 177-178 Lipsius & Bonnet, eds., 1891: 12.2-25; Orderic Vitalis, 1855: 132

158 Magi | magis  $A_1$  162 ideo | ualde  $V$  169 utrum | uerum  $A_1$  171 homines | *mag.*  $M_2$  uel generare, sicut dicitur de incubo  $A_2$  172 Si autem queris | *mag.*  $M_2$  circa genitura Merlini  $P$  174 Merlino | Melinio  $A_2$  176 oculum | occulum  $BA_1A_2$  188 proiacent | prohicerent  $BA_1P_2$

190 ris, non fieret homo, quia ibi exi-  
 gitur opus utriusque id est maris  
 et femine nec oculum furare uel  
 restituere possunt, sed ledere uel  
 impedire possunt et facere, quod  
 195 illam non uideant actu et po-  
 stea cessant. Et ita uidetur fatuis  
 quod ydola eis restituant uel sa-  
 nent oculos, sicut legitur in uita  
 beati Bartolomei de Astaroth et  
 200 de incubo. Similiter dicunt quod  
 Merlinus uisset genitus ab incu-  
 bo demone, uerumptamen pos-  
 sunt illudere in sompnis et uide-  
 tur homini quod sit cum muliere  
 205 et econuerso. De canibus Symo-  
 nis dicunt quod nec canebant nec  
 loquebantur, sed demon in eis.  
 Sicut dicitur de asina Balaamis:  
 non enim ipsa locuta est, sed an-  
 210 gelus in ea qui potest formare  
 aera in uocem Numeri XXII.

**⟨Q. 7.3⟩** QUOMODO DEMONES ET  
 MAGI FACIANT QUEDAM NOUA  
 ANIMALIA

215 8. Item si dyabolus potuit fa-  
 cere serpentes a simili, quedam  
 noua animalia que non fuerunt in  
 archa Noe, quorum semina sunt  
 in elementis, unde Augustinus:  
 220 *sicut matres sunt grauide fetibus,*  
*sic ipse mundus grauidus est cau-*

197–199 Ms Bodl. 155b: fol. 169r–169v  
 196–197 sanent | facient  $P_1$  197 oculos | oculos  $BA_1A_2$  201 Merlinus | Mellinus  $A_2$

203 sompnis | sompniis  $P_1$

208–211 Num. 22:28

work of both, namely husband and wife,  
 is required. Furthermore, they cannot  
 steal or restore an eye but can injure  
 or hinder it. They also can make that  
 180R people do not actually see and only after-  
 ward recover. And so, it seems to fools  
 that idols would restore their health or  
 heal an eye as one reads in the life of  
 Saint Bartholomew about Astaroth and  
 185R incubus. By the same token, masters  
 say that there is nothing real and that  
 is not true that Merlin was born from  
 the incubus. Notwithstanding, demons  
 can hinder in dreams and make that it  
 190R seems to a man that he is with woman  
 and the other way round. Concerning  
 Simon Magus' dogs masters say that  
 a demon inside them spoke and sang.  
 Just as it is said about the donkey of  
 195R Balaam. For it was not the donkey who  
 spoke but an angel inside him who can  
 form air into voice, Num. 22:21–23.

**⟨Q. 7.3⟩** HOW DEMONS AND MAGICIANS  
 CAN MAKE SOME NEW ARTIFICIAL  
 200R CREATURES

8. Likewise, it is demanded if the devil  
 can make serpents from alike and new  
 creatures which were not in the ark,  
 nor whose semen are in the elements. 205R  
 Whence, Augustine asserts: like moth-  
 ers are pregnant with children, the world  
 is pregnant with reasons for things com-

219–225 Aug. De trin. 3.9.16; Alexander de

sis nascencium, que in illo non  
 creantur nisi ab illa summa es-  
 sencia, ubi nec moritur nec in-  
 cipit esse nec desinit. Magi pha-  
 raonis fecerunt sibi serpentes et  
 ranas, tamen creatores non sunt,  
 quia primas causas rerum non  
 ipsi, sed deus creavit nec ipsis  
 causis rerum dant ut sint cause  
 rerum, sed omnis cause rerum  
 hoc ipsum quod sunt cause ali-  
 cuius rei habent a prima causa.  
 Non sunt ergo demones nisi mi-  
 nistri talium, sicut parentes fi-  
 liorum et agricole fructuum, nec  
 tamen in hoc dicendi sunt demones  
 proprie ministri dei, quia per  
 hoc non intendunt seruire ei.

240 <Q. 7.4> DIFFERENCIA INTER  
 MIRACULA MAGORUM ET  
 SANCTORUM UT DIXIT PETRUS

245 g. Beatus Clemens, cum pri-  
 mo uellet adherere Petro, ita ei  
 opposuit: sicut tu modo facis mi-  
 rabilia contra naturam ita et Sy-  
 mon Magus quem secuti sumus,  
 uidimus enim canes cantantes  
 ymages ambulantes, quare di-  
 cis nos pecasse sequendo ipsum  
 et non peccare sequendo te? Cui  
 Petrus: deus in mundo multa pa-  
 ria permisit ad exercitium boni  
 et excecationem malorum secun-  
 dum suum rectum iudicium ut

ing into birth which are only created by  
 the highest essence, where neither some-  
 thing dies, neither comes into being, nor  
 ceases to be. Magicians of the pharaohs  
 made snakes and frogs. However, they  
 are not creators because not them but  
 God created first causes of things, given  
 that he did not allow these causes of  
 things to be first causes but all causes of  
 things have this very thing which makes  
 them to be causes of something from the  
 first cause. Therefore, demons are only  
 producers of such things as parents in  
 relation to children and farmers regard-  
 ing food. However, in this case demons  
 should not be called properly servants  
 of God since they do not intend to serve  
 him by performing these deeds.

<Q. 7.4> THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE  
 MIRACLES OF MAGICIANS AND OF SAINTS,  
 ACCORDING TO PETER

230R g. At first, Blessed Clement wished  
 to adhere to Peter but subsequently op-  
 posed him in such a way: just as you  
 perform miracles against nature, so did  
 Simon Magus whom we are following.  
 We have seen dogs singing, statues walk-  
 ing. For this reason, why do you say we  
 have sinned in following him and we do  
 not sin in following you? Peter objected  
 to him: God in the world has allowed  
 many equal things to be done in order to  
 exercise the good and expel the evil. Ac-  
 cording to his correct judgment, a magi-

243-245 Gersdorf, ed., 1838: III.60-61; Migne, ed., 1857: II.18, II.34

230-231 dant ... rerum] *om.* P<sub>1</sub> 243 Beatus Clemens] *margin.* M<sub>2</sub> Beatus Clemens A<sub>2</sub>  
 245-247 mirabilia ... sumus] *om.* P<sub>1</sub> 250 pecasse] peccare VP<sub>1</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

magus pharaonis permisit parificare se Moysi, per contrariam potestatem Ysaac Phylisteos, mihi Symonem et ad ultimum xristo antixristum, quia per miracula uidebitur antixristus parifirari xristo, sed in hoc est diferencia, quia miracula facta a contraria potestate non sunt utilia anime uel corpori. Que enim utilitas ut canes cantent uel ut ymagines ambulent, sed mirabilia facta per ministros dei et corpora sanant et animas ad deum conuertunt.

270 10. Ab originalibus id est naturalibus uel causis superioribus quibus regantur res. Adhibitis motibus cooperantur enim deo, sicut dicit Apuleius: coadiutores dei sumus, sed hoc spiritum, quod cooperantur a deo habent et corporis id est substantia, quod habent secundum quosdam uel quod assumunt, quod est uerius. In iubenti semina iubenti quo ad nos, semina id est causas latentes istarum rerum, temperationes id est commixtiones, spargunt id est ad aliquid efficiendum coniungunt, prebent occasiones non enim dant illis causis, que aliquid faciant, sed eorum ministerio et cooperaione hoc datur a deo unde non pos-

245R  
250R  
255R  
cian of the pharaoh was permitted to become equal with Moses through the contrary power, Isaac with the Philistines, Simon with me, and at last antichrist with Christ since through miracles antichrist will appear to be compared as someone equal to Christ. However, there is a difference. Wonders produced by the contrary power are not useful for the soul or body. What is the advantage of singing dogs or walking statues? In contrast, miracles performed by divine servants heal the bodies and turn souls to God.

260R  
265R  
270R  
275R  
10. Things are governed by natural or superior causes from which their existence derives, by the movements demons cooperate with God. As Apuleius points out we are divine assistants, but magicians obtain from God such a spirit to work together, and body, namely the substance demons have according to what they assume. The last statement is more true. In commanding seeds, commanding which means ordering to us seeds, viz. hidden causes of these things, by tempering of the mixtures, demons scatter, that is assemble these mixtures, to produce something; demons furnish the opportunities, for they do not bestow those causes which would produce something but by their service and cooperation a particular cause is given by God. Whence, demons cannot be called

**270–271** Aug. De trin. 3.8.13 **274–275** Lucius Apuleius, 1842: 12

**263** contraria] contrario  $P_2$  **272** regantur] regant  $V$  **275–276** spiritum] ipsum  $P_1$  **280** In iubenti semina] In III semina  $P_1 A_1 A_2$  In III semina sui  $B$  semina  $P_2$  **289** non] *om.*  $P_1$



290 sunt dici cause uel dare causas es-  
 sendi rebus, sed occasionem quia  
 non per se, sed per primam cau-  
 sam faciunt, quid faciunt. Sicut  
 enim predicator siue bonus qui  
 295 propter bona uerba predicat, si-  
 ue malus qui pro bono temporali  
 semina uerbi dei exterius admin-  
 istrat, solus autem deus fruc-  
 tificare facit in mente audientis.  
 300 Ita demones semina quarumdam  
 rerum possunt coniungere, sed  
 quod ex eis aliquid produ | 51vb |  
 catur non habent a demonibus,  
 sed a prima causa, ita in agri-  
 305 cultura et generatione filiorum  
 est. Iniqui malicia nominatiuus;  
mentem enim formare iusti non  
potest, nisi deus Ysaia XLIII: Ego  
sum, qui deleo iniquitates prop-  
 310 ter me, per ueritatem id est bo-  
nam intencionem, sed etiam ma-  
li per occasionem temporalium  
Epistula ad Philippenses I, uici-  
nas rei faciende uel eis cognitas  
 315 summo cardine id est uoluntate  
diuina.

⟨Q. 7.5⟩ QUOD MULTIS MODIS  
 IMPEDITUR UOLUNTAS DYABOLI

11. Acceptis opportunitati-  
 320 bus angelo cooperatore, propter  
dei prohibitionem dyabolus plus  
uult quam possit in malo, in bo-  
no econuerso. Posset enim ces-

causes or distribute these causes, guar-  
 anteeing a thing's existence. Although,  
 they would produce what they actu-  
 ally produce only accidentally through 280R  
 the first cause and not by themselves.  
 A preacher can be either a good one who  
 preaches with good words themselves or  
 a bad one who outwardly administers  
 seeds of the divine words, seeking a 285R  
 temporal good. Only God yet produces new  
 fruits in the mind of people who hear the  
 sermon. This way demons can assemble  
 seeds of certain things. But magicians  
 have what is produced from the seeds 290R  
 from the first cause and not from the  
 demons. The same applies to the agri-  
 culture and birth of children. Unjust  
wickedness, in the nominative case; if he  
is not God, he cannot shape the mind of  
 295R the right people, Isa. 43:25: I, even I, am  
he who blots out your transgressions, for  
my own sake, through the truth, namely  
via a good intention, but also an evil one,  
on a temporal occasion, Phil. 1:18. The  
 300R proximate thing, creation or understand-  
ing of which is achieved by the highest  
love, that is by divine volition.

⟨Q. 7.5⟩ THAT DEVIL'S WILL IS HINDERED  
 IN MANY WAYS 305R

11. They take advantage of opportu-  
 310 nities, the devil desires by angelic coop-  
eration more than he can gain in the  
evil due to the divine prohibition. He  
 315 could have been free from evil if he had

291 rebus] marg. M<sub>3</sub> quomodo dicuntur dare causas essendi A<sub>2</sub> 295 uerba] eterna B 297  
 dei] aministrantur V 297-298 administrat] aministrat V aministratur P<sub>1</sub> aministrantur  
 B 298 solus] add. solus V 300 semina] om. P<sub>1</sub> 313 Epistula ... I] om. P<sub>1</sub>B 321  
 dyabolus] add. id est caro A<sub>2</sub>

307-310 Isa. 43:25 312-314 Phil. 1:18

325 sare a malo, si uellet. Et notan-  
 dum quod impeditur dyaboli uo-  
 luntas et potestas per terminum  
 sue potestati a deo impositum,  
 item per miraculum impossibili-  
 330 tatis exterius factum ut in asina  
 Balaamis Numeri XXII; per im-  
 pedimentum exterius adhibitum  
 ut in duobus discipulis aurusia  
 percussis. Luca in fine: aurusia  
 335 est impedimentum uisus, quod  
 fit uelamine oculorum, que dicitur  
 egritudo oculorum. Item per  
 dei iudicium diuinitus disponen-  
 tis dispositis per obstaculum boni  
 340 angeli ut de Asmodeo interficiente  
 sponso uxoris Thobis, eodem XI;  
 Asmodeus per cautelam sui ipsius,  
 quia non uult aliquando, quod potest  
 ut peius fiat, id est prima Corintho-  
 345 rum V de corinthio quem uexauit  
 excogitatum, modo non uult propter  
 peccati abhominacionem et pudorem,  
 ut quidam angeli mali propter nobilitatem  
 350 sui in qua creati fuerunt abhominantur  
 temptare de uilibus peccatis ut de  
 sodomia uel etiam de forni-

desired this. And it must be noted that  
 devil's will and power are hindered by  
 the limit imposed upon his power by  
 God. It resembles the external divine  
 miracle of the impossibility, like in the  
 315R case of Balaam's donkey, Num. 22:21–22.  
 Moreover, the devil is impeded through  
 the external hindrance, as in two disci-  
 ples struck by blindness. Luke, in the  
 end, suggests that blindness is a visual  
 320R hindrance that blacks out eyes and is  
 called eyes' malady. By the same token,  
 it happens through the judgment of God,  
 which establishes the divine order also  
 by creating a hindrance through good  
 325R angels. It is the case with Asmodeus who  
 kills the grooms of Tobias' wife, the same  
 book Tob. 11:6. By virtue of divine cau-  
 tion Asmodeus does not want sometimes  
 330R the worse to take place, even though  
 he is able to do so. 1 Cor. 5:5 presents  
 the same idea about a Corinthian whom  
 the demon possessed and who did not  
 want to be known solely due to the  
 aversion to sin and shame. It happens  
 335R also with certain evil angels who, due to  
 the nobility in which they were created,  
 are abhorred to tempt those who com-  
 mitted despicable sins, such as indeed

**336** Alanus Insulensis, 1855: 1.58; Alexander de Hales, 1952: VII.38

**333** percussis]  *marg. M<sub>2</sub> quod est aurusia A<sub>2</sub>* **333** aurusia] arusia *VP<sub>1</sub>A<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>P<sub>2</sub>* **335**  
 uelamine] uolamine *P<sub>1</sub>* **335** oculorum] oculorum *BA<sub>1</sub>* **336** oculorum] oculorum *BA<sub>1</sub>A<sub>2</sub>*  
**339–340** ut de Asmodeo interficiente] ut assideo interficere sponso uxoris Thobis *V* ut de  
 asino interficiente *P<sub>1</sub>* de asino de demonis interficiente sponso uxoris *B* de asino dei interficiente  
 sponso uxoris *A<sub>1</sub>* **341–342** cautelam] cantelam *V* **349** propter] ~~ma~~ *V* **352** sodomia]  
 sodoma *V marg. M<sub>2</sub> quod diabolus de sodomia non temptat et de uilibus peccatis A<sub>2</sub>*

**329–330** Num. 22:21–2 **338–340** Tob. 3:8; 6:13; 8:2–3 **340–341** Tob. 11:6 **344–345**  
 1 Cor. 5:5

355 cacione simplici neque ad homi-  
nem qui fornicatus est accedunt  
maxime prima die uel secunda  
propter peccati retenciam, unde  
Ezechiel XVI: *multiplacasti for-  
nicacionem ad irritandum me*  
360 *et cetera, ibi dabo te et animas*  
*obiencium te*, demonum qui eru-  
bescunt in uia tua. Quia non per-  
mittit deus permissio angeli ni-  
chil ponit, sed tamen priuat pro-  
hibitionem, unde permittit an-  
365 gelus id est non prohibet, per-  
missio dei aliquid ponit scilicet  
diuinam essenciam et connotat  
naturalem potenciam quibus fit  
permissio, secundum hoc ange-  
370 li aliquid permittunt, quod deus  
non permittit.

(Q. 7.6) DIFFERENCIA INTER  
POTENCIAM, POSSIBILITACEM ET  
HUIUSMODI

375 12. Ex potestate dei possibili-  
tas dicit materialem potenciam,  
potencia dicit potenciam acti-  
uam, sed remotam, potestas di-  
cit potenciam actiuam aptatam,  
380 potentatus dicit potenciam con-  
iunctam actiu, unde potentatus  
dicitur quasi potencie status. Di-  
gitus id est uirtus dei, uel digitus  
id est prohibitio uirtutis dei Ex-

sodomy or fornication. These demons 340R  
do not approach the man who is a for-  
nicator, especially on the first or second  
day because of the preservation of sin.  
Whence Ezek. 16:26–27 states: aroused  
my anger with your increasing promiscuity... I gave you over to the greed of 345R  
the demons who are ashamed on your  
way. Since God does not permit, the an-  
gelic permission supposes nothing but 350R  
only deprives of the prohibition. Whence  
an angel permits, that is he does not  
prohibit. The divine permission implies  
another thing, namely divine essence,  
and connotes the natural potency to 355R  
whom the permission is granted. Accord-  
ing to this proposition, angels permit  
what God does not.

(Q. 7.6) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
POTENCY, POSSIBILITY, AND SUCH THINGS

12. By the divine power, the possibil- 360R  
ity means a material potency. The po-  
tency signifies an active potency, though  
a remote one. The power implies an ac-  
tive adapted potency. The might signi-  
fies a potency united with active one, 365R  
therefore the might is said as the poten-  
tial status. The finger, viz. the divine  
virtue; or the finger, namely the prohi-  
bition on the part of the divine virtue,

353 neque | nec V 354 qui | quia  $VP_1A_1A_2P_2$  358 irritandum | irridendum  $VP_1A_1A_2P_2$   
359–360 animas obiencium | malias condenciam  $P_1$  animas condencium  $A_1$  in animas dictium  
 $P_2$  372–374 Differencia ... huiusmodi | marg. V 378–379 dicit | om.  $A_1$  380 dicit | om.  
 $P_1$  380–381 potenciam coniunctam actiu | potencia dicit potenciam actiuam, aptatam  
potentatus, coniunctam actiu  $A_2$

356–357 Ezek. 16:26 357–360 Ezek. 16:27 384–385 Exod. 8:19

385 odus VIII. Non sinantur id est  
 quid non possunt facere de con-  
 ditione sue nature, nouimus ho-  
minem uerba sunt Augustini, et  
 390 si permittat id est non prohibeat,  
per angelos suos bonos non per-  
 mittit et cetera ut angelus, qui  
 loquebatur cum Daniele et ange-  
 lus Persarum (regi); secundum  
 Gregorium: *liberare uolebant iu-*  
 395 *deos a captiuitate et hoc pote-*  
*rant, sed non sunt permissi a deo,*  
*qui rectificauit eos per principem*  
*Grecorum, quod non erat tem-*  
*pus liberacionis* Daniel x. Dicit  
 400 ergo: non permittit id est non  
 dat eis facultatem quibus dedit  
 potestatem.

(Q. 7.7) QUOD PLATO POSUIT  
 TRES ORDINES DEMONUM

405 13. Solet in questione uersa-  
ri et cetera hec questio orta est  
 a Platone in Tymeo, qui dicebat  
 tres esse ordines demonum posi-  
 tos in aere. Ponebat enim pisces  
 410 ornatum maris, gressibilia orna-  
 tum terre, uolucres et demones  
 ornatum aeris, sed calodemones  
 ponebat in superiore et puriore  
 parte aeris, cacodemones | 52ra |  
 415 in inferiori et densiori parte aer-  
 is, medios scilicet partim bonos

394–399 Gregorius Magnus, 1985: 25.2

395 *hoc*] ~~non~~ V 404 demonum] *margin.*  $M_2$  sed utrum sunt corporei *add.* Guillermo  $M_3$   
 requirere supra est distinctio III  $A_2$  409 pisces] pices  $P_1$  412 calodemones] caledemones  
 $VBA_1A_2$  tale demones  $P_1$

391–393 Dan. 10:1 399 Dan. 10:20

Ex. 8:19. Demons are not allowed, that 370R  
 is they cannot make something due to  
 the condition of their nature. We knew  
 a human being, these are Augustine's  
 words, and if He would permit, that is  
 375R if he would not prohibit, he does permit  
 through good angels etc, as an angel  
 who talked with Daniel and one who  
 spoke with the Persian king; according  
 to Gregory the Great: angels wanted to  
 free the Jews from their captivity and 380R  
 were able to do this, though they were  
 not allowed by God, who rectified the  
 Jews by the Greek king insofar as the  
 time of the liberation did not come, Dan.  
 10:20. Therefore, he says: He does not 385R  
allow, that means he does not bestow  
 an ability to whom he gives the power.

(Q. 7.7) THAT PLATO SET THREE DEMONIC  
 ORDERS

13. It is still customary to turn to 390R  
this question, the question originates  
 from the *Timaeus* by Plato who said  
 that three demonic orders are set in the  
 air. For he put fishes in the sea, walk-  
 ing animals on the earth surface, flying 395R  
 creatures and demons in the air. But he  
 placed calodemones in the superior and  
 cleaner part of the air, cacodemones in  
 the inferior and more thick part, demons  
 in the middle, who are partially good, 400R  
 partially evil, in the medium. They had

412–417 Guilelmus de Conchis, 1854: 47–48

partim malos in medio; corpora  
aeros habuerint Apuleius di-  
 xit: *demonēs sunt genera anima-*  
 420 *lia, corpora immortalia, mente*  
*rationalia. Elementum apcius ad*  
faciendum quam ad patiendum  
 terra et aqua sunt passiuā ele-  
 425 *menta et ideo inferiora et nomi-*  
*nibus generis feminini dicuntur.*  
 Ignis et aer actiuā sunt elementa  
 et ideo superiora sunt et generis  
 masculini, per actionem enim  
 430 ignis et aeris in aquam et terram  
 ista dicit Augustinus recitando  
 opiniones philosophorum, sicut  
 super Genesim multas rationes  
 siue opiniones physicas recitat.

aerial bodies, Apuleius said that demons  
 are animals in genus, immortal in body,  
 rational in mind. The elements more  
prone to an action than to undergoing 405R  
 a passion, earth and water are passive  
 elements and thus account for inferior  
 being named after female gender. Fire  
 and air are active elements and thus constitute  
 410R superior being pertaining to masculine  
 gender. Given that, everything  
 would come into existence by the activity  
 on the side of fire and air upon water  
 and earth. However, Augustine writes all  
 415R of this by reciting the views of philoso-  
 phers or physicians, as he recounts multiple  
 arguments over Genesis.

435

## DISTINCTIO VIII

(Q. 8.1) DE HOC QUOD DOMINUS  
 APPARET PER SE UEL PER  
 ANGELUM

14. Nec dubitandum octaua di-  
 440 stinctio. Gregorius super Exodo  
 dicit: *angelus qui Moysi appar-*  
*uisse dicitur modo angelus, modo*  
*dominus memoratur; angelus*  
 445 *quando exterius loquendo seruit,*  
*dominus, quia interius presidens*  
*efficaciam tribuit, cum enim lo-*  
*quens ab interiore regitur et per*  
*obsequium angelus, et per inspi-*

## DISTINCTION VIII

(Q. 8.1) THAT THE LORD APPEARS BY  
 HIMSELF OR THROUGH AN ANGEL

420R

14. And it must not be questioned.  
The eighth distinction. Gregory the  
 Great comments on the Exodus: the an-  
 425R gel, who is told to have appeared before  
 Moses, is commemorated both as an an-  
 gel and as the Lord; as an angel, when  
 he serves by speaking outwardly, as the  
 Lord since He, ruling inside, grants an  
 efficiency to angels, for the speaker is  
 430R governed from within and the angels are

421-422 Aug. De gen. 3.10.14 440-449 Gregorius Magnus, 1985: 28:1; Migne, ed., 1852:  
 Exod. 3:4; Alexander de Hales, 1952: VIII.9

418 habuerint] *mary. M<sub>2</sub>* hic est, quod credens se esse asinum transformatum?, secundum  
 Isidem reginam? ad captum *A<sub>2</sub>* 418 Apuleius] *add. tunc hoc Epuleius A<sub>1</sub>* 425 feminini]  
 femini *P<sub>1</sub>BA<sub>1</sub>* 432 opiniones] *oppiniones P<sub>1</sub>* 434 opiniones] *oppiniones P<sub>1</sub>*

*rationem dominus memoratur.*  
 450 Eodem modo Iacob quandoque  
 cum angelo, quandoque cum do-  
 mino luctatus dicitur, quod enim  
 angelus faciebat inspiracione et  
 imperio domini et sic per ange-  
 455 lum dominus apparebat. Appar-  
uisse probat in subiecta creatura  
 scilicet angelo assumente corpus  
 aptum officio suo, et sic dominus  
 apparebat per angelum, quando-  
 460 que etiam per se sine angelo in  
 aliqua nube uel in aliquo alio cor-  
 pore. Et quando apparuit sine  
 distinctione persone, ut quando  
 dixit: *Ego sum qui sum*; quando-  
 465 que cum distinctione, ut quando  
 spiritus sanctus apparuit in co-  
 lumba: Luca III, Matheus III; et  
 in linguis igneis Actus Aposto-  
 470 lorum II et Matheus III. Daniel  
 legitur quod in camino apparuit  
 unus similis filio dei, hic fuit sal-  
 uator quem timuit flamma qui  
 suos de camino mundi liberauit.

**<Q. 8.2>** PROBACIO QUOD DOMINUS  
 475 PER SE APPAREBAT

15. Sed ubi deum et cetera tri-  
 plex ponitur hic questio. Prima  
 est an deus ipse apparet in crea-  
 tura nouiter facta non per an-  
 480 gelum, sed per se et est credibi-

469 Alexander de Hales, 1952: VIII.7

454 domini] deum *VP*<sub>1</sub> *add.* faciebat *V* 455-456 Apparuisse probat] *margin.* *M*<sub>2</sub> quod  
 dominus apparebat per angelum *A*<sub>1</sub> 468 linguis] lignis *V* 478 apparet] *margin.* *M*<sub>2</sub> dominus  
 apparuit plures in subiecta creatura *P*<sub>1</sub> *margin.* deus per se apparuit *P*<sub>1</sub>

451-452 Gen. 32:24-28 464 Exod. 3:14 465-467 Lc. 3:22 467 Matt. 3:16 467-469  
 Act. 2:3 469 Matt. 3:11 469-473 Dan. 3:17

ruled through obedience. In the same  
 way, Jacob is said to fight sometimes  
 against the angel, sometimes against the  
 Lord because the angel was acting under  
 the Lord's inspiration and command. He 435R  
proves that God has appeared in a sub-  
 ordinate creature, that is in the angel,  
 assuming such a body suitable for his  
 duty. In this way the Lord appeared  
 through the angel, sometimes even by 440R  
 Himself in a certain cloud or another  
 body but without the angel. He also ap-  
 peared without a personality like when  
 he said: I am who I am. Sometimes He  
 showed up in a distinct person when 445R  
 the Saint Spirit came in dove's form,  
 that is Lk. 3:22, Matt. 3:16, and in fiery  
 tongues, as in AA. 2:3 and Matt. 3:11. It  
 is read in The Book of Daniel that there  
 in the blazing furnace one appeared sim- 450R  
 ilar to the Son of God, who was the  
 savior, whom the fire feared, and who  
 absolved his people from the world fur-  
 nace.

**<Q. 8.2>** THAT THE LORD APPEARED BY  
 455R HIMSELF

15. But where is God etc, the question  
 here is threefold. The first is whether  
 God Himself appears in a creature made  
 anew and not through an angel. It is con- 460R  
 vincing that God showed up sometimes

le, quod deus quandoque per se, quandoque per angelum apparebat, ut in Exodo XXXIII: *facies mea id est angelus precedet te,*  
 485 *quasi dicens ego de cetero non precedam te per me ipsum propter peccatum populi tui, sed angelus meus precedet te,* et dixit Moysi: *Si tu non precedis ne educas nos de loco isto* per quod uidetur quod dominus per se ipsum prius eos ducebat et quod per se eis apparebat, sed hoc non sequitur, quia poterat eos ducere  
 490 per se et apparere eis per angelum, quod potius uidentur uelle sancti, quia super illum locum Exodum loquebatur deus Moysi *facie ad faciem,* sicut solet loqui homo ad amicum suum. Dicit glossa: *secundum opinionem populi loquitur scriptura quod putabat Moysen loqui cum deo ore ad os,* cum per subiectam creaturam id est angelum et nubem ei loquiretur et appareret. Nam eius substanciam, sicut est, nec angelorum nec hominum quidsam uidere potuit. Prima epistula ad Timotheum id est Re-  
 500 gi seculorum; in VI et infra ad Timotheum ultimo: «*lucem habitat inaccessibilem*» hec glossa.

by Himself, sometimes through an angel, as in Exod. 33:14: My Presence, that is an angel, will go before you. As He were saying I will not go before you by Myself  
 465R on the rest due to the sin of your people, but My angel will precede you. Moses replied to Him: If your Presence does not go with us, do not send us up from here. Whence, it seems that the Lord  
 470R first led them and appeared to them by Himself. However, this does not follow since He could have led them by Himself and appeared to them in the angel. Saints seemed to imply this, given that  
 475R upon this place of Exodus God spoke to Moses face to face, like a man is accustomed to speak with his friend. The gloss says: according to the opinion of the people, the Holy Scripture tells that they thought that Moses spoke with God  
 480R mouth to mouth, when He would talk and appear to Him through a subordinated creature, namely an angel and cloud. For neither angels nor human beings could see his substance. 1 Tim. 1:17: “the eternal King”; 1 Tim. 6:16: “lives in unapproachable light”, this is what the gloss asserts. Furthermore, Gregory the  
 485R Great’s aforementioned words seemed to postulate that the Lord appeared to them not by Himself but by taking the angelic form.  
 490R

513 Migne, ed., 1852: Exod. 33:11; Alexander de Hales, 1952: VIII.7

483 Exodo]  *marg. M<sub>2</sub> Exodo A<sub>2</sub> 502 quod] que V 504 os] marg. M<sub>2</sub> Et in hoc notant distanciam iunter ueteram legem, que per angelum, et nouam, que per ipsum deum data fuit A<sub>2</sub>*

482-490 Exod. 33:14-15 509-511 1 Tim. 1:17 511-513 1 Tim. 6:16

Et supradicta Gregorii uidentur  
 515 uelle quod non per se, sed per  
 angelum dominus eis apparebat.

16. Sed queritur quare domi-  
 nus non apparuit per nubem  
 tantum sicut per nubem et an-  
 520 gelum, non enim sequeretur ex  
 hoc, quod ipse in se et imme-  
 diate uideretur. Sed scriptura  
 semper dicit angelum deum ap-  
 paruisse ubicumque refert domi-  
 525 num apparuisse, unde dubium  
 est, utrum dominus quandoque  
 per se ita quod non per ange-  
 lum apparuit, sed est credibili-  
 530 le quod |52rb| quandoque sic,  
 quandoque sic.

⟨Q. 8.3⟩ QUESTIO UTRUM ANGELI  
 MITTANTUR IN ALIQUO CORPORE

17. Secunda questio est utrum  
 angelus missus, qui loquebatur  
 535 ex persona domini, assumeret no-  
 uum corpus ad officium scilicet  
 aptum an in proprio corpore mit-  
 teretur. Tercia questio est, si an-  
 geli mittuntur in proprio corpo-  
 540 re, utrum illud corpus mutent  
 in aliam speciem aptam officio  
 suo an preter corpus suum as-  
 sumant aliud corpus sibi aptent.  
 Dicit Augustinus quod non suffi-  
 545 cit exemplificare questiones istas,  
 difficile enim est probare quod  
 angeli habeant corpora an non.  
 Dixerunt enim quidam philoso-

16. However, it is inquired whether  
 the Lord did not appear solely in a cloud, 495R  
 so that He showed up in the form of both  
 cloud and angel. For it would not follow  
 from this that He were seen in Him-  
 self and without anything mediating His  
 appearance. But the Holy Scripture al- 500R  
 ways says that God showed up as an  
 angel anywhere it states that God ap-  
 peared. Thus, it is doubtful whether the  
 Lord sometimes appeared by Himself, so  
 that not in the angel. Nonetheless, it is 505R  
 convincing that sometimes in one way,  
 sometimes in another.

⟨Q. 8.3⟩ WHETHER ANGELS ARE SENT IN A  
 CERTAIN BODY

17. The second question is whether 510R  
 a commissioned angel, who spoke on the  
 Lord's behalf, would assume a new body  
 for his service, that is a suitable body, or  
 he would be sent in his proper body. The  
 third question is the following: if angels 515R  
 were sent in their own bodies, would  
 they transform their bodies into different  
 form suitable for their service or assume  
 another body besides their proper one?  
 Augustine says that he is not able to 520R  
 solve these questions for it is difficult to  
 prove whether angels have bodies or not.  
 Certain philosophers indeed said that  
 angels possess bodies. It is complicated  
 to demonstrate that they do not possess 525R

548–550 Guilelmus de Conchis, 1854: 47

524–525 refert dominum] refert dominum  $VP_1$  refero dominum  $P_2$  533 utrum] *add.*  
 utrum  $B$  540 mutent] assumant  $A_2$



550 phi quod habebant corpora quibus. Difficile est probare quod non habent corpora, sed fides ecclesie est, quod non habent et in hoc conueniunt sancti.

555 18. Cui non subduntur sicut nos, sed subditum regunt et non ab eo perficiuntur secundum attributam potenciam. Notanda est regula, qua noscitur quod uerbum dictum de bono angelo uel malo, utrum debeat referri ad naturam angeli uel ad corpus assumptum, quotiens aliquid uerbum attribuitur angelo bono uel malo, illud uerbum notat potenciam uel condicionem uel uiolenciam. Si potenciam, ut est euersio sodome et aliarum uerbum attribuendum, est nature angeli, non corpori aereo assumpto. Si 570 condicionem, ut est comedere et huiusmodi sicut legitur de angelis susceptis ab Abraham, Loth et Thobia, illud referendum est non ad naturam angeli, sed corporis assumpti. Si uiolenciam, ut 575 est uulnerari, occidi, non est referendum ad naturam boni angelo nec corporis ab eo suscepti, sed tantum ad corpus mali angeli, iram mali angeli. Quandoque corpora complexionata assu-

bodies, but the church faith postulates that they are incorporeal to what saints agree.

18. To which they are not subordinated, as to us, but they reign a sub- 530R jected body, while they are not accomplished by this body according to the assigned potency. The following rule should be observed by which it is known that a particular word concerns a good 535R angel or an evil one, whether it should be assigned to an angelic nature or an assumed body, whenever a certain word is said about a good angel or evil one: the following expressions involve potency, 540R preservation, or violence. If it is potency, as the expulsion of Sodom and other cities, it must be attributed not to the assumed aerial body but to the angelic nature. If it is preservation, as eating and similar things like it is read about angels received by Abraham, Lot, and Tobit, this should be assigned not to the angelic nature but to the assumed body. If 545R it is violence, as being wounded or killed, it should not be assigned to good angel's nature and body received by him but 550R exclusively to evil angel's body and his wrath. Sometimes angels assume tempered bodies from which blood can be 555R shed. This should not be considered by

551 corpora | ~~quibus~~ V 555 regunt | quando B add. tamen VA<sub>1</sub> 557-562 Notandum ... assumptum | om. A<sub>1</sub> 557-558 Notanda est | add. B 558 regula | marg. M<sub>2</sub> regula, qua noscitur, quod uerbum dictum de bono angelo uel malo, utrum debeat referere ad naturam angeli uel ad corpora assumpta A<sub>2</sub> 561-562 assumptum | add. que regula est B 572 Loth | marg. M<sub>2</sub> XVIII A<sub>2</sub> 573 Thobia | marg. M<sub>2</sub> XIX A<sub>2</sub>

569-571 Tob. 12:19

munt, a quibus sanguis potest effundi, quod de bonis nequaquam est intelligendum.

585 19. Videtur Augustinus attestari ad hoc compulit eum pena demonum; numquam mortalis apparuit, sed nonne Paulus mortalis erat qui in raptu suo,  
590 ut dicit Augustinus ad Orisium: udidit deum facie ad faciem, sicut uident angeli, sed dicimus quod Paulus non erat tunc in statu mortalium, sed comprehensorum neque tunc corporeis sensibus utebatur. In euangelio Iohannis id est deum nemo uidit id ipsum id est inuariabile, multo minus uisibile hoc dicit, quia  
600 sunt multa mutabilia que non sunt uisibilia ut anime, angelus.

⟨Q. 8.4⟩ QUOD DEMONES POSSUNT INTRARE CORPORA, NON ANIMAS

605 20. Illud etiam dignissimum consideracione uidetur et cetera reuera corpora intrant demones, sed animam essentialiter possidere uel ei essentialiter illabi non possunt, hoc enim solius dei  
610 est qui eam creauit sui solius capacem, sed propter officium male suggestionis dicitur intrare in corporibus alicuius id est in

any means regarding good angels.

19. It seems that Augustine attested this. He was forced to approve this by the fact of the demonic punishment. He never appeared before mortal beings, though were not mortal Paul raptured, as Augustine tells Orosius: he looks at God face to face as angels see. Notwithstanding, we say that Paul then was not in a mortal condition. On the contrary, he did not make use of corporal senses but rather was in a state of comprehension. In the Gospel of John, that is no one saw God Himself in the unchangeable state, much less visible, it is stated since a lot of changeable things, which are not visible like souls and angels, exist.

⟨Q. 8.4⟩ THAT DEMONS CAN ENTER BODIES BUT NOT SOULS 575R

20. This seems to be the subject that deserves the most attention etc, demons enter real bodies, though they cannot possess or penetrate essentially souls. This power belongs exclusively to God who created the soul by his exclusive ability. However, for the sake of malevolent intimations demons are said to enter certain bodies, that is in the soul. Indeed, they are able to covertly enter 580R 585R

590–592 Migne, ed., 1852: 2 Cor. 12:2

584 intelligendum] *add.* archi Ω 588 Paulus] *marg.*  $M_2$  quomodo Paulus uidit deum in raptum  $A_2$  602–603 Quod ... animas] *marg.* Quod demones possunt intrare corpora  $P_2$  604 dignissimum] *add.* contra B 611 capacem] *marg.*  $M_2$  Nota, quod diabolus hominem temptat dupliciter: uel in ymaginatiua somnando et representando illarum rerum species, quas homine est desiderare cognoscat; uel adherendo et se coniungendo ipsi anime, ut infundit cognationes (cogitationes *corr.*) malas  $A_2$

615 animam, substanciam enim cor-  
dis subintrare possunt, sed ani-  
me substancialiter illabi nequa-  
quam, sed uidetur quod demones  
620 non intrans corpora ratione no-  
uis obsessi. Qui enim obsidet ali-  
quid castrum non est intra illud,  
sed potius extra. Et ita uidetur  
quod demones non intrans cor-  
pora obsessorum, sed in multis  
625 locis legitur quod demones uisibi-  
liter de corporibus exhibant. II Re-  
gum XXVIII legitur quod dyabo-  
lus intrauit corpus Samuelis mor-  
tui, eodem modo possit ut uide-  
tur intrare corpus hominis uiui,  
630 quod concedimus. Sed tales ho-  
mines proprie dicuntur inergumi-  
ni, quia intus faciunt eos demones  
laborare, aliquando autem  
non intrans, sed exterius existen-  
635 tes eos impediunt quandoque ne  
uideant uel audiant et turbant  
homines, et tales proprie dicun-  
tur obsessi. Euangelium aperte  
declarat Mattheus VIII. Per inher-  
640 gam id est uirtualem operatio-  
| 52va | nem. Inergia est quedam  
uis potestatiua et laboriosa im-  
pellente dyabolo intus in homine

substance into the heart, but they can-  
not penetrate the soul by any means.  
Albeit, it seems that demons do not en-  
ter the bodies of those who are named 590R  
obsessed by the definition itself. Some-  
one, who besieges something else, stays  
outside rather than in the castle itself.  
And it seems so in the case of demons.  
They do not penetrate bodies of the 595R  
obsessed, although on many occasions it is  
read that demons are seen to go out from  
these bodies. I Reg. 28:14 acknowledges  
that the devil entered Samuel's body.  
The same way the devil could make his 600R  
way into the body of living human to  
what we agree. Nevertheless, such peo-  
ple are properly called energumens since  
demons make them suffer inside. In the  
case of those, who are properly called 605R  
obsessed, demons hinder them from see-  
ing or hearing and disturb these peo-  
ple. By doing so, they do not enter in-  
side their body and appear outside. The  
Gospel plainly declares this, Matt. 8:52. 610R  
Through inergia, that is through po-  
tential operation. Inergia is a certain  
force charged with power and suffering.  
It is produced by the urging of the devil  
within human being. Energia is a certain 615R  
internal force and zeal of the Lord. It is

**630-633** Gennadius Massiliensis, 1862: 88

**626** quod] quia V **635** impediunt] *margin. M<sub>2</sub>* Nota, quod demon tribus modis dicitur esse  
in homine: uel per bonorum naturalium lesione immutis, unde Luca XI capitulum ibi eiciens  
demonum et illud eicit mutum; per ablationem gratiarum, ut in peccatoribus, unde et de  
Maria dicitur dominus eicisse VII demonia, id est uniuersa peccata, Luca VII; per cooperatione  
flagellato enim et bonorum temporalium ablationem, ut in Iob A<sub>2</sub> **639** declarat] *margin. M<sub>2</sub>*  
quis sit energia P<sub>1</sub> **642** potestatiua] potestatura P<sub>1</sub>P<sub>2</sub>

**625-628** I Reg. 28:14 **638-639** Matt. 8:52

645 facta. Energia est quedam uis interior, zelo domini ad bonum commota, qualem habuit Phineas; capabilis sue facture id est datiu casus.

⟨Q. 8.5⟩ AUCTORITAS QUOD

650 MELIUS EST IGNORARE QUAM A DEMONIBUS ADDISCERE

21. Origenes super Numeri: *Melius est ignorare quam a demonibus discere, melius nonno* 655 *a propheta discere quam a diuinis quarere. Diuinitas enim non diuinitus datur, sed per antifrasm sic dicitur. Non illabuntur demones substantialiter Abacuc: ecce* 660 *iste scilicet lapis, qui operatus est id est factus est auro et argento et omnis spiritus non est in uisionibus eius. Glossa: potest assidere simulacris spiritus inmundus, sed extrinsecus, intrinsecus esse non potest.*

⟨Q. 8.6⟩ QUOD DEUS

INDIFFERENTER PUNIT PER BONOS ET PER MALOS ANGELOS

670 22. Et nota quod sicut super

moved towards good, such as Phineas had; able to be present in its work, in the dative case.

⟨Q. 8.5⟩ AN AUTHORITY PROVING THAT

BEING IGNORANT IS BETTER THAN LEARNING FROM THE DEMONS

21. Origen on the Book of Numbers: being ignorant is better than learning 625R from the demons, is not it better to learn from a prophet than inquiring soothsayers? Divination is not granted by the divine inspiration, rather it is called so by an antiphrasis. Demons do not penetrate substantially, Hab. 2:19; behold, 630R that is the stone which has been labored, that is which has been made from gold and silver and all spirits are out of its sight. Gloss: the impure spirit can besiege someone by images only externally, 635R intrinsically it is impossible.

⟨Q. 8.6⟩ THAT GOD INDIFFERENTLY

PUNISHES THROUGH GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS

22. And take notice that it is said 640R

646–648 Gennadius Massiliensis, 1862: 49 652–658 Migne, ed., 1852: Num. 23:23 663–666  
ibid.: Hab. 2:19 670–678 ibid.: Ps. 77:49

647 capabilis] capax *V* 648 datiu] *om. V* 651 addiscere] *margin. M<sub>2</sub>* quia semper cum admiscione falsi *A<sub>2</sub>* 659 Abacuc] Abacubh *B* 661 id est] *om. B* 661 auro] auror *P<sub>1</sub>* 670 super] *margin. M<sub>2</sub>* Sed numquid deus per bonos angelos bonis hominibus flagella, quod sic uidetur per glosam super Daniele VII: *milia milium ministrabant ei et cetera*; contra tamen patet per Iob, quod a malo, scilicet sathana, flagellatus est; respondeo, numquam bonus angelus bonos homines flagellat, sed malus, sed tamen dicitur flagellare, quia a deo et persidit flagellati, et hoc ideo ipsum permittat secundum uoluntatem propriam punire, excedent enim modum libertatis in alius *A<sub>2</sub>*

647–648 Num. 25:11 659–663 Hab. 2:19

psalmum LXXVII, VI uersu: *misit deus per angelos malos, punit deus bonos et malos homines, sed bonos tantum corporalibus penis,* 675 *malos uero et corporalibus et spiritualibus penis. Per bonos uero angelos punit deus homines tantum corporalibus penis, nocere non sinuntur* a deo scilicet.

in Ps. 77:49, 6th verse: God unleashed bad angels, God punishes good and evil people. Though, he punishes good people exclusively by bodily punishments. In contrast, evil people are punished by corporal and spiritual penalties. God inflicts corporal punishments on people only through good angels, angels are not allowed to harm by God. 645R

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ГУГО СЕН-ШЕРСКИЙ

[ВОПРОСЫ ОБ АНГЕЛАХ И ДЕМОНАХ]

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# PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM

BOOK REVIEWS

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ФИЛОСОФСКАЯ КРИТИКА

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Ustyantsev, R. A. 2023. "Philosopher in Troubled Times : A Review on a Book by José Luis Villacañas" [in English]. *Filosofiya. Zhurnal Vysshey shkoly ekonomiki [Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics]* 7 (4), 289–293.

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ROMAN USTYANTSEV\*

## PHILOSOPHER IN TROUBLED TIMES\*\*

A REVIEW ON A BOOK BY JOSÉ LUIS VILLACAÑAS

VILLACAÑAS BERLANGA, J. L. 2023. *ORTEGA Y GASSET: UNA EXPERIENCIA FILOSÓFICA ESPAÑOLA* [IN SPANISH]. MADRID: GUILLERMO ESCOLAR EDITOR

DOI: 10.17323/2587-8719-2023-4-289-293.

A few months ago, a colleague expressed doubt in the reasoning behind studying the heritage of Ortega y Gasset at present. Despite seeming unnecessary at first glance, such questions are worth revisiting in order to affirm the logic behind the research. The critical state of his school and philosophy and whether his thought lacked relevance and would become purely historical interest are queries Ortega himself considered, as José Luis Villacañas Berlanga, a professor at the Complutense University of Madrid, describes in the introduction to his latest work on the Spanish philosopher.

In realizing oneself and falling into the account that we are, and what is in its authentic and primary reality that surrounds us, consists of philosophy (Villacañas Berlanga, 2023 11).<sup>1</sup>

It would not be easy to say if Ortega himself was satisfied with his philosophy and whether he thought he had reached his full potential. Scientific opinions on this issue differ. For instance, José Luis Villacañas states that he “was fully aware that his philosophy was inferior to what he could have been.” (Villacañas Berlanga, 2023: 11) However, this does not mean that his thought is insignificant, Professor José Luis Villacañas emphasises. The first thing a potential reader of Ortega will encounter upon conducting a brief search is his volume *Ortega y Gasset. Una experiencia filosófica española*, almost twelve hundred pages of text. This alone suggests that there is still much to be said and discovered about Ortega and his legacy.

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<sup>1</sup>Here and below, the translation is mine.

The study itself, which will be considered separately, along with the footnotes and bibliographical indexes, is of considerable value. Given the volume and thoroughness of the book, it may be considered one of the most significant revisions of early and mid-20th century philosophy through the lens of Ortega's approach. The author not only portrayed Ortega's thought and his development, but, no less importantly, situated it in a pan-European philosophical context. Thus, in addition to using this text as a basis for future research in the field of Ortegian thought, which continues to be relevant for the entire Spanish-speaking world, one might also refer to it as a guide to deciphering the intellectual environment of the early and mid-20th century, as seen from the perspective of the Iberian Peninsula.

At the same time, this aforementioned study cannot be classified as another biography. Many of those have been released throughout the decades as well as in recent years. Some are more focused on the revelation of Ortega's personality, presenting his philosophy as a direct outcome of his life path. Among such works, we can mention *Ortega y Gasset: La aventura de la verdad* by Javier Zamora Bonilla (Zamora Bonilla & Garrigues Walker, 2022), *José Ortega y Gasset* by Jordi Gracia (Gracia, 2014), or *El maestro en el erial* by Gregorio Morán (Morán, 2002), in which the author talks about the period in the philosopher's life in which he returns from exile to Franco's Spain. One could also recall the texts that focus, to a greater extent, on disseminating Ortega's philosophy. These were published by his closest students, especially Julián Marías (Marías, 1948),<sup>2</sup> and by more contemporary researchers.<sup>3</sup> Naturally, these are far from all the works dedicated to the study of the thought of the Madrid philosopher, but even among them, José Luis Villacañas's work deserves separate mention. Divided into twenty-one chapters, the study comprises both a biographical examination of Ortega's philosophical trajectory and an analysis of his philosophical system. The former unites him with some of his previous works, whereas the latter, as previously pointed out, sets him against the backdrop of European philosophy.

In other words, the scope of research extends beyond Ortega and the School of Madrid to include his relationships with students like José Gaos, María Zambrano, and Julián Marías, as mentioned earlier, together with those whose thoughts he repelled, with whom he argued, and whose point

<sup>2</sup>One can also remember many other works dedicated to the thought of Jose Ortega-y-Gasset and written by Julián Marías.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, Perez Borbujo, 2010.

of view he shared. Among them, of course, the German thinkers stand out significantly. Attentive readers of Ortega may immediately think of the comparison and polemic with Martin Heidegger, and they will not be mistaken. However, in addition to Heidegger, much attention is paid in this work to considering the philosophy of Kant, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and especially Husserl, a passion for whose ideas by Ortega is noticeable even in the first pages of this study (Villacañas Berlanga, 2023: 34). Nevertheless, it would be unwise to deny the importance of the comparison of Ortega and Heidegger's philosophies; therefore, this is the first key point to analyse. They have been measured against one another before; what's more, Ortega usually writes in his works that he states some things before Heidegger even expresses them. However, within the framework of this study, it is possible to trace how two such different thinkers began to present similar ideas within their philosophical systems.

In addition, it is important to draw attention to the structure of this work. The text is divided into four parts, and, as mentioned above, contains twenty-one chapters. Each part summarizes a stage of Ortega's life: "The European Workshop," "Ten Years of Idealism," "Deployment of the Vital Reason and the Announcement of a Storm," and "Under the Pressure of Forging the System." The following is a brief review of each part.

The first, "El taller europeo" ("The European Workshop"), deals with the very early stage of Ortega's life, his first trips to Germany, to Leipzig and Berlin, then to Marburg, where he learned about the work of Cohen and Natorp. At the same time, what is thought to be his first encounter with Husserl's phenomenology took place; even so, as José Luis Villacañas points out,

if Ortega read Husserl around 1911 after the publication of *Ideas*, however, I believe that little was noticed in his philosophical studies.<sup>4</sup>

This is a fundamental thesis in the study of Ortega's thought because it shows that his convergence with phenomenology did not occur suddenly, but instead through a chain of successive changes.

In the second, "Diez años de idealismo" ("Ten Years of Idealism") the author examines one of the critical periods in Ortega's life, which marked his formation as an independent thinker. It begins with "Meditations on Quixote," published in 1914, moves on to describe his first trip to Argentina,

<sup>4</sup>Villacañas Berlanga, 2023: 156: "si Ortega leyó a Husserl hacia 1911 tras la publicación de *Ideas*, sin embargo creo que se notó poco en su producción filosófica".

where he achieved incredible success and first philosophical fame through publications in his father's newspaper, the famous Spanish *El Espectador*, and concludes in two texts of utmost importance, *España invertebrada* (1921) and *El tema de nuestro tiempo* (1923). These are imperative to understanding the third part of the book, especially where the author considers the republican period of Ortega's life. Once more, a connection is established between the texts of the philosopher which can be referred to the field of political theory and those that focus more on ontology.

In the third part, "Despliegue de la razón vital y el anuncio de tormenta" ("Deployment of Vital Reason and the Announcement of a Storm") José Luis Villacañas draws a parallel between the development of Ortegian thought and the impact of the new political reality on its author. It is worth noting here that Ortega's republican stage is divided by the researcher into two partially overlapping parts: 1927–1931 and 1929–1935. This division is interesting mainly because it is, among other things, an essential statement in which Ortega's theory of rational-vitalism is not entirely isolated from the political context of the time, but intersects with it and derives directly from it.

The last part, "Bajo la presión de forjar el sistema" ("Under the Pressure of Forging the System"), is dedicated to a prolonged period of thirty-three years. During this time, Ortega tried to shape a philosophical system from everything that constituted his thought. It should be noted that, although he began to publish quite early, with first notes appearing in the newspaper *Faro de Vigo* as early as 1902, he lacked what might be termed a "system of thought". In addition, even though he returns repeatedly to concepts that he has considered before, such as the theory of "Ideas and Beliefs", and even revisits some of his earlier statements, he never manages to create a philosophical system as such. However, he perseveres with his attempts to combine his texts in later works, referencing earlier writings and altering the direction of his research, moving, to a greater extent, to the field of sociology.

To summarise, it is almost impossible to compress the material of such a detailed study into a few pages. The work of Professor José Luis Villacañas, *Ortega y Gasset. Una experiencia filosófica española*, examines both Ortega's philosophy and the context in which he found himself in great detail. Although it is a comprehensive study and should be read cover to cover, as the author intended, each of its parts may easily be presented as separate, in-depth, and detailed studies of various stages in the thinker's life and philosophy. In addition, the text not only allows to evaluate Ortega's legacy and his influence on modern thought, but also lets researchers, those who are just getting acquainted with his work as well as his most attentive readers,

to take a new perspective. José Luis Villacañas's findings urge to reconsider previously-encountered problems and to propose new interpretations. This fact alone means that Ortega's philosophy is still alive, engaging, and relevant.

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*Ustyantsev R. A. [Устьянцев Р. А.] Philosopher in Troubled Times [Философ в трудные времена] : A Review on a Book by José Luis Villacañas [рецензия на книгу Х. Л. Вильяканьяса] // Философия. Журнал Высшей школы экономики. — 2023. — Т. 7, № 4. — P. 289–293.*

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ФИЛОСОФ В ТРУДНЫЕ ВРЕМЕНА

РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ Х. Л. ВИЛЬЯКАНЬЯСА

VILLACAÑAS BERLANGA J. L. ORTEGA Y GASSET : UNA EXPERIENCIA FILOSÓFICA ESPAÑOLA. — MADRID : GUILLERMO ESCOLAR EDITOR, 2023.

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Gasparyan, D. E. and A. A. Kochekovskiy. 2023. "Bakhtin between the Personalist Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Novel : Review on Alina Wyman's Book on Philosophy of Sheller, Bakhtin, and Dostoevsky" [in English]. *Filosofiya. Zhurnal Vysshey shkoly ekonomiki* [*Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics*] 7 (4), 294–305.

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DIANA GASPARYAN, ALEKSANDR KOCHÉKOVSKIY\*

BAKHTIN BETWEEN  
THE PERSONALIST PHENOMENOLOGY  
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NOVEL\*\*

REVIEW ON ALINA WYMAN'S BOOK ON PHILOSOPHY OF SHELLER,  
BAKHTIN, AND DOSTOEVSKY

WYMAN, A. 2016. *THE GIFT OF ACTIVE EMPATHY: SHELLER, BAKHTIN, AND DOSTOEVSKY*.  
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS: NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

DOI: 10.17323/2587-8719-2023-4-294-305.

Alina Wyman's recent book undoubtedly embodies a lot of hopes that the project of intertextual literary criticism, in its broad sense, was endowed with. Her analysis of Dostoevsky's writings becomes enriched by her expertise in theories of dialogism by Bakhtin and Sheller. Wyman, however, does not leave this enrichment unilateral: it appears plurivocal because of the influence which Dostoevsky's writings themselves have on these theories in the whole complex of Wyman's analysis. This attitude, of course, ruins the linear logic of her expounding: Wyman starts her analysis with a peculiar concept, "active empathy," which turns out to be the third notion uniting Sheller's idea of Christian love and Dostoevsky's idea of textual "vzhivanie" (Einfühlung — a German synonym used by Bakhtin). This concept reveals its utmost meaning only at the end of the book, after different characters and plot fragments by Dostoevsky have been considered through the prism of "active empathy" (yet still left incomplete). Consequently, Wyman's

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book impressively realizes a dialogism which is rhymed and looped on the structure of research dedicated to it.

The risks of this approach are connected with the limits of intertextual senses which it is possible to seize within the framework of a single analysis. This is the reason why such an approach becomes both impressive and vulnerable to criticism. In particular, it is unobvious for what reasons Bakhtin's "vzhivanie" or active empathy should be returned to the contemporary dialogue with Dostoevsky via mediation by Sheller's philosophy. The author explains it through the prism of Bakhtin's early works, such as "vzhivanie" (empathy in Wyman's translation) and "stanovlenie" (becoming):

Dostoevsky's fictional world provides many intriguing case studies that could be productively illuminated through the lens of the Schelerian-Bakhtinian theory of intersubjectivity. The relevance of these phenomenological reflections to Dostoevsky's ethical concerns, only partly explained by the authors' common philosophical heritage, is due to the personalist agenda shared by all three thinkers and to the crucial importance of the Christological ideal in their respective models of the world. [...] A Dostoevskian character is deeply and often painfully aware of the profound divide between himself and others, lamenting that unavoidable asymmetry between individual experiences that makes complete self-revelation to the other impossible (Wyman, 201664).

Although this attitude is internally coherent, it also includes a kind of conceptual dead-end for intertextuality realized by the book. In other words, it encloses Bakhtin's allusions to Dostoevsky within a certain philosophical metaphor. This author's choice becomes a kind of contextual violation, because Bakhtin's work on Dostoevsky was written essentially later, at the end of the 1920s. However, it is not a historical and contextual approach which is at stake here, but the role of history and contextualism for Bakhtin's dialogical principle. This approach means additional risks for the domain of interpretation because it leads to the thesis on anti-objectivation as the crux of Bakhtin's theory. For instance, if Wyman points out Bakhtin's skepticism towards Marxist and Freudian explanative models and consequently develops the thesis of Bakhtin inheriting phenomenological personalism, the same contradictions between Bakhtin's and Freud's treating the question of the Other are considered by Tsvetan Todorov. He, in turn, explained Bakhtin's disinterest in Freud with the former's concentration on history-based interpretational shifts, which were rhymed by him with the everlasting process of misunderstanding and dealing with the difference between sense in the statement and perceived sense (Todorov, 1984: 72). Bereaving Bakhtin

from structuralist “technicism” for the sake of his putative reconsidering of idealism is also a controversial point because of Bakhtin’s well-known engagements (including those mediated by his collaborators, such as M. Kagan) with a broad circle of theoretical approaches connected with positivism, including those in sociology, psychology and even natural sciences.

What seems to be of utmost importance here is that Bakhtin’s dialogue with Dostoevsky, while being interpreted through the prism of the empathy question, lacks its connection with the history of ideas — in other words, with the optics crucially changing the terms Bakhtin’s theory of literature is interpreted through. Interpreting Bakhtin through the lenses of personalist phenomenology and its own intertextual tradition (including Dostoevsky’s texts as a common referent for different philosophers) is reasonable and stems from the common logic of considering Bakhtin’s complicated intellectual trajectory in comparison with other directions and schools he reflected or was influenced by. This comparison appears as devoid of dynamics — whereas this dynamic dimension of apparition or event is one of the crucial elements for the post-Bergsonian philosophies and theories Bakhtin himself shares.

However, it is seemingly impossible to convincingly distinguish any specific part of these broad intellectual contacts in order to label them as key points for explaining the whole corpus of Bakhtin’s work. For instance, in an interview given to Duvakin in the mid-1970s, Bakhtin emphasized the importance of a wide array of diverse authors for his theoretical worldview, with research by scholars such as Kierkegaard, Cohen and Cassirer becoming an addition to Bakhtin’s own work with literary analysis, which is, on its own, far from philosophical discourse.

Trying to find coherence within these logics, some authors posit that Bakhtin replaced personalist phenomenology with a kind of historical phenomenology (Brandist) (Poole, 2004). This approach allows to unite Bakhtin’s different topics as a philosophy of time. Temporality becomes in this case united on the historical level and on the level of personal development and interaction. Consequently, the dialogical principle by Bakhtin turns out to be a kind of post-Bergsonian reflection on dynamics, posed at the ontological crux of any object and apparition. In this case the concept of intertextuality (related to history and historical sociology, expressed last but not least in peculiarities of literary style and in its connections with the worldview) coexists with the context of dialogism (related to social and psychological aspects of the connection between self-awareness and relations with the Other, where all these aspects are transformations, embodied as reflections of time). This could be illustrated, for instance, by Bakhtin’s



sociological explanation of Dostoevsky's polyphony. Bakhtin characterizes Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel with the term "sociological document," whose peculiarity consists in seizing an "exceptionally acute feeling [oschuschenie] of another person" as a sociological phenomenon.

Despite being understood by Bakhtin in terms similar to personalism (for instance, in constation that any mediating social institutes and authoritative hierarchies lose their importance), this phenomenon is linked, in the scholar's opinion, not with spiritual experience, but with possibilities of social transformations based on a "micro-sociological" level of dialogical unity—where social transformations develop from changes in personal interaction in this way when the subject of said interaction reduces the distance between themselves and another person (Bakhtin, 2000: 173–174). Or, as in the case of Bakhtin's work on Rabelais, the temporal dimension turns out to be re-enacted in a single element of dynamics—namely, a temporal moment when birth and death are united in a single principle of rhetorical decline to the obscene. "Prohibited" themes appear here as the themes of life's renewal, where some lives come to their ends, whereas others—to their births. As a result, the carnival deduced by Bakhtin from Rabelais turns out to be a specific philosophy of history where the Renaissance cosmogonical sense of the "low" themes (compare Bakhtin with Cassirer's theories of the Renaissance worldview) rhymes with Bakhtin's contemporaneity, which includes wars, revolutions and violent extinction of modernist culture—these tragic events contributed to the worldview by being truthful and avoiding hypocritical evasion of "prohibited themes."

The above corresponds with another approach to Bakhtin—namely to the consideration of his works through the question of temporality. In this vein, Bakhtin's approach to Dostoevsky as a crucial author is sometimes compared with authors (such as Viktor Shklovsky and Lydia Gynzbourg) whose interpretations of history were concentrated around Tolstoy, whose realism turned history into a peculiar and, in fact, central character in the novel. Consequently, Tolstoy's monologism is appreciated as a kind of theoretical choice where the artfulness of fiction is deduced not by the multiplicity of voices, but by a phenomenological view on the entity, observable in the presented time and space (Morson, 1991). However, Bakhtin's approach is remarkable in this context because he emphasizes another dimension of temporality via considering Dostoevsky's dialogism. In Wyman's optics this temporality acquires spiritual or sublime traits where dialogical disappearance of personal borders overpass principles of linear temporality. It is considered by Wyman as being realized through a different implication

of “Christian love,” directly mentioned by Dostoevsky’s characters, and migrating into theoretical principles by Sheller and Bakhtin, who deduced their questions of empathy from it. However, it is important that Wyman does not concentrate on “The Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics” by Bakhtin, only on his “Toward a Philosophy of the Act” and “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” Dedicated to relationships between author and character in the novel, these texts do not concentrate on Dostoevsky, although they pay some attention to a comparison between spiritual experience resisting to the subject’s condition of aloofness and loneliness, and the situation of aesthetic unity realized in the novel.

It is a remarkable trait of Wyman’s attitude that she uses a “polyphony” as her own research tool and applies it to Bakhtin’s works first and the text influenced by Bakhtin’s interpretation in modern perception (such as Dostoevsky). This strategy is undoubtedly risky, because starting a deconstruction of the intertextual “chain,” it is worth remembering its proportions and all the multiplicity of references united by it. Instead, this chain may be torn and reduced to some certain point—inescapably outer for the work of Bakhtin’s own logic of intertextuality.

Wyman’s approach to Bakhtin then paradoxically becomes perceived as a complicated form of intellectual history concentrated on contextualizing Bakhtin—in particular, on studying his early understanding of dialogism through the prism of German phenomenological personalism, his contemporary. But this point omits a peculiar conceptual language by Bakhtin—namely, his concentration on literary analysis instead of using conventional philosophical implements. Early works by Bakhtin expressed it in the most impressive way because all the arguments were taken from the writing and reading experience. This aspect breaks a bridge between Bakhtin-Sheller dialogism instead of the unity of the subject—and Bakhtin’s references from Dostoevsky, which should, in turn, provide a connection with Sheller’s emphasizing of “the Christian love” concepts in his novels. Consequently, Bakhtin in fact disappears from this scheme. But it is he who justifies the very idea of “dialogization” and “intertextualization,” realized by Wyman’s research.

Wyman considers this by describing the following difference between Bakhtin’s and Sheller’s concepts of empathy in its comparison to love:

The divergence between Bakhtin’s and Sheller’s views on value-realization stems from the differences in the philosophers’ concepts of the ontological gulf. If Sheller posits the discrepancy in value between all individual persons, independently

of the I/other division, Bakhtin proclaims the radical difference between my self-value and my valuation of others. [...] For that reason the bestowal of value is precisely that, a bestowal, an unsolicited yet precious gift from the privileged other in Bakhtin's architectonic (Wyman, 2016: 30).

It seems to be important to concentrate on this comparison, aiming to accentuate this difference. In fact, Bakhtin's concentration on the self diminishes the very possibility of considering his conceptions through the "love to the Other" as a central category. Such a centralization would omit the question of *where* these dialogical relationships place themselves. Bakhtin's work with both the author and hero allows to ask the question regarding to what extent the subject's self-reflection is possible only through thinking of themselves as the Other (for instance, in creating the hero from the position of the author).

This way of analyzing seems to be prominent after an apparent crisis in interpretations of Bakhtin in humanities. In particular, the principle described above becomes frequently reflected in gender studies and queer studies. For instance, Jeffrey Nealon posits that Bakhtin's "voice" is so remarkable as a concept because it is not linked essentially to a specific point of view. Rather, a person should find their own voice and accept the other's voice into their common social context. Because of this, dialogism seems especially ethical, because it marks this social context as not based on struggle and domination (Nealon, 1997: 130). However, it is important to continue these observations to pose Bakhtin's Other *into* a single character, practice, position, or identity. In this case, Bakhtin's terms would be working as "indication" of the techniques and rhetorical grades between subjects finding some traits of "Otherness" within their position or identity, and the loss of this Otherness in a strict categorization of "the Other." In this way, Nealon compares Bakhtin's dialogue as a way to problematize identity with Adorno's criticism towards the unproblematized identity in "the dialectics of Enlightenment"—and, remarkably, correlates Bakhtin's "I" with Odysseus passing through different adventures, who "completed" himself while at the same time preserving himself from being "completed," so that only this "completing" reveals to Odysseus his own incompleteness (ibid.: 138). As such, it is important that Bakhtin's "I" revelation towards the "Other" concentrates on a certain kind of experience: measuring the borders of outer expression.

But does this mean that Bakhtin's conception could hardly be interpreted in the social vein? It seems important to reflect Bakhtin's understanding of sociality as linked with a certain and paradoxical way of communication:

literary fiction, and especially the novel, where it is difficult to find aesthetic completion (in comparison with a poem, for instance). And herein lies the problem with Wyman's statement about

an implicit connection between the author's intuition of the hero's essential unity and any act of real life 'authoring' or consummation, which allows a loving person to perceive the individualizing unity of the beloved (Wyman, 2016: 44).

The accents in Bakhtin's project of the novel as a peculiar form to express the "I" with the "Other" as the limits of the sayable and understandable. In fact, Bakhtin's work with novel turns the latter into a peculiar kind of space where the process of reflecting or guessing becomes placed and visualized—underscored by the very composition of the novel, as its main intellectual surplus is gained through words. To transform this question into the question of love or empathy means to shift the accents which are crucial for Bakhtin's phenomenalization of novel speech. One could compare these optics with a recent work by Jean Rancière (*Philosophy, Culture, and Politics*, 2002) on landscape, which is also understood as an artificially created space. It concentrates the time-consuming, dedicated to it, at imagining the situation of vision without the technical restrictions of optics and space-orientation. In the case of Bakhtin's novel, the same sense acquires the union of inner and outer between persons speaking and acting together.

Bakhtin's intention may have been to affirm this peculiar space into the novel format consisting from. The role of love and empathy for Bakhtin develops from the experience seized by the novel text—the experience conditioned by the novel being a peculiar spatial and temporal *locus*. This locus concentrates all attention on the rhythm in which wishes, thinking and positions can only be expressed and felt. Consequently, the novel as an aesthetic experience means, first, an appearance of character—as *something* ("nechto") identical to itself, as a certain reality which is affirmed lovingly in the novel (Bakhtin, 2000: 58), and second—the emphatical feeling caused by juxtaposing this affirmation with the rhythmic factor in our lives, that which terminates our lives and consequently our ability to experience and express empathy and love (*ibid.*: 60). As a result, the novel becomes a form for repositioning the roles and relationships which appear as usual in real life interactions and interlocutions. Speaking about the contemporary context of Bakhtin studies, it seems prominent to concentrate on such interdisciplinary value of Bakhtin's theories which could compare the experience given by the author and hero relationships in the novel with the experience of interaction. Bakhtin shows the novel as a form overriding the rift between inner and

outer, which is applicable most accurately not to the difference between “the I” and “the Other,” but rather to the inner and outer by the subject, such as appearance and self-awareness, realized conducts and the unpredictability of new actions and reactions of the present day.

First, the perspective of considering Bakhtin in the context of semiotics, which recapped his ideas in the late Soviet humanities is important. While there are works designated to comparing Bakhtin’s understanding of the sign with the that of Lotman and Pierce (Reid, 2016), it is possible to pose a wider question on the impossibility to separate Bakhtin’s dialogism and polyphony from the common Saussurean roots they have with the philosophy of language. Second, if Julia Kristeva’s influent interpretation of Bakhtin prepared the ground for developing his ideas in the broad domain of Cultural studies, these ideas have had to lose important parts which contribute to the work’s acuity and inner tension. Bakhtin’s way of posing the question could unite this early structuralist attitude of the surplus between sign and its interpretations with, for instance, Lotman’s occupation with the problem of uncertainty which becomes a genuine locus for seeking answers and expressing inner contradictions. Referring back to Wyman’s book, it is remarkable that some places of her discourse on Dostoevsky considered thought the prism of active empathy touch this optics and elaborate on the theses that also apply to the philosophy of language. Although it is written in terms, unconventional for this philosophy, this kind of formulation suggests some development and renewal of the philosophical view on communicative situations, where it is senseless and impossible for its participants to lead their conversation in accordance with logical principles or to persuade their interlocutors in accordance with their goals and convictions. Using an example from “The Brothers Karamazovy” Wyman demonstrates this idea of the sense’s dependence on the conversation—since it is in the very conversation that sense is required, because of the whole situation’s ethical and logical deadlock (and Dostoevsky’s novels outlined this phenomenon extremely poignantly and in detail):

Having thus usurped her judgment, he has disarmed his naive interlocutor by using her potential weapon against himself. A similar reactive strategy of using “words with a sideward glance” followed by “loopholes” is employed throughout the whole narrative against the reader, whose arguments against the major tenets of the underground philosophy are cleverly anticipated by the narrator (Wyman, 2016: 97).

Consequently, the attitude to the character of the novel which appears because of the principles of the latter is possible as a coherent and aesthetic unity, or the “artistic vision” (“khudozhestvennoe videnie”) becomes for Bakhtin the model of how and why one is able to concentrate on some certain event or phenomenon: both have empathy at their center (Wyman, 2016: 81). However, it is not empathy as some kind of sublime or spiritual experience which is crucial here. On the contrary, it means that empathy could hardly be experienced and expressed without digitalization and mediation realized in the artistic form (for instance, by the novel) in discovering certain traits and peculiarities which compose and distinguish a character — a novel embodiment of the single form of experience, position and individuality could bear the pressure of temporality and changeability.

In this context, Wyman’s choice of interpretational paradigm (comparing Bakhtin’s interpretation of Dostoevsky with Sheller’s concepts of “Christian love”) creates an effect where theoretical contexts, contemporary and topical, for Bakhtin become omitted and replaced by an intertextual idea of Dostoevsky’s writing as a peculiar kind of religious philosophy. Consequently, it evokes some contradictions from the view of contextualism — at both the “micro” level of intellectual history (paying attention to Bakhtin’s Circle, and its Marxist and sociological optics) and the “macro” level of Bakhtin’s own references during the whole period of his work.

In particular, if one refers directly to Bakhtin’s main work on Dostoevsky (*Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo*, 1929), scant evidence of this personalist phenomenology, expressed in connection with religious terms, may be found. Bakhtin’s research into the questions of author and hero took place much earlier, so the inner logic of his work does not demonstrate a coexistence between interpreting the authorship as a dialogic experience (or a kind of philosophy seizing this experience) and analyzing Dostoevsky’s style as a “polyphonic novel.”

For instance, Bakhtin notes that not one of Dostoevsky’s novels includes the dialectical becoming of the spirit; they fail to include becoming or growth at all. The same is applicable, according to Bakhtin, to Dostoevsky’s position as an author, because the author’s spirit does not develop within the novels’ frameworks — this spirit only contemplates or becomes one of the participants, or characters of the novel (Bakhtin, 2000: 34). Then Bakhtin directly states that it is not becoming which is the main part of Dostoevsky’s aesthetics, but coexistence and interaction, which is why the scholar eliminates any explanatory motives which appear from the temporal dimension of the novel: its imagination was not temporal, but first and

foremost spatial. This is the outcome of the character's lack of recollections and absence of biography: they are immanent with the present movement, which is immanent in its own right for them, as a certain dialog with other characters (or, with the Other) happening in this moment (Bakhtin, 2000: 36).

It seems like Wyman's book could aid future quests for strategies of dealing with this intertextuality. Perhaps the most convincing way to treat the intertextual tradition is to pose a research question from a position within it, continuing this intertextuality not by using it as a "device" (in Viktor Shklovsky's terms), but by enhancing some of the succeeding lines that were included in the intertextual "complex" and become more obvious with time.

Wyman's analysis, however, is not restricted to the earlier period in Bakhtin's work. This paper finds a new type of intertextuality in Wyman's research — in her hermeneutical work with Dostoevsky. As a result, a new branch of intertextual genealogy appears, which is actually placed not before Bakhtin's semiotic turn from synthesis between dialogism and the question of "creativity" ("tvorchestvo"), but, in fact, after the new turn in the perception of Bakhtin, which has changed Kristeva and Todorov's reinterpretations of his works. Wyman does not position Bakhtin's legacy as conceptually framing the whole 20th-century tradition of finding the dialogical and heteroglossic dimensions behind a putative unity of text — the tradition which was initiated last but not least by Dostoevsky's writing, but rather as an anachronistic kind of harbinger of Dostoevsky's philosophy of active empathy.

Bakhtin's position is beyond any single tradition or school — including cultural and language contexts. Consequently, while Kristeva and Todorov's interpretations include Bakhtin into cultural studies and literary criticism, some authors who inherited their interpretation of dialogism, heteroglossia and polyphony extend their interpretation of these concepts over applied humanities, cultural anthropology and psychology, others turn their efforts to incorporating Bakhtin's work into a complicated context of Marxist tradition, where his theoretical innovations share such domains as sociological thought and Marxist philosophy of history (in particular, for those parts of Bakhtin's heritage which are related to questions of temporality). In the same vein, Bakhtin's work, in particular his earliest essays on authorship, may also be interpreted through the prism of Russian phenomenological tradition and, last but not least, through such a peculiar trait of said philosophy as coexistence with spiritual and religious questions.

It is difficult to find which texts are the core of such intertextuality. In this streak of thought, the idea of intertextuality means the possibility to seize more complex and subtle concepts and statements than those which are possible in communication via implements of institutional disciplines, such as philosophy and philology. In the case of Dostoevsky — it is curious to what extent his texts suffice this trait and do not turn a discourse dedicated to it into a hermeneutical exercise which is not intertextual — because it does not try to operate within conceptual and referential common places, frequently borrowed from literature and other areas, of course without restriction by the legacy of a single author and an intentional, self-sufficient exegesis of it. As a result, there is a contamination of languages: on the one hand, those of philology and philosophy, on the other hand, of theory and ideology, and, last but not least, of the rhetorical or literary topos-based intertextual intention and the intention of hermitization on the basis of a restricted circle of texts and paradigms endowed with some symbolic or sacral senses.

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## БАХТИН МЕЖДУ ПЕРСОНАЛИСТСКОЙ ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЕЙ И ФИЛОСОФИЕЙ РОМАНА

РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ АЛИНЫ ВАЙМАН О ФИЛОСОФИИ ШЕЛЛЕРА,  
БАХТИНА И ДОСТОЕВСКОГО

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# ACADEMIC LIFE

CONFERENCES, CONGRESSES, SYMPOSIA

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АКАДЕМИЧЕСКАЯ ЖИЗНЬ

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LIBERAL THEORY IN THE XXI CENTURY:  
IDENTITY, TENDENCIES AND PERSPECTIVES  
A REVIEW OF A SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
«FUTURE WORLD/WORLDS» CONFERENCE  
OF THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURAL STUDIES  
(OCTOBER 7TH, 2023)

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On October 7th, 2023, during the traditional annual conference of the School of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, this year named “Future World/Worlds,” a section dedicated to liberalism both as a theory and a political approach was held at the Higher School of Economics. Graduate and Undergraduate researches who took part in this section, titled “Liberal Theory in the XXI century: Identity, Tendencies and Perspectives,” covered a wide range of topics, from the history of political thought to the current decline of liberal principles in actual politics, as well as the benefits and disadvantages of different attempts to reformulate liberalism or combine it with other theoretical frameworks. Although it lacked renowned experts in the field as guests, the event still managed to attract the attention of both the specialists who presented the results of their research and an interested audience, who stayed for the discussion that ended the section. All six presentations raised intense debates among the participants and guests, and this, along with the complex and rich contents of the addresses themselves, points to the fact that liberalism, although often considered a theory of the past, is still relevant and perspective.

DOES A UNITARY LIBERAL THEORY EXIST?

The first presentation by NIKITA KHARCHUK, a HSE Political Science student, was dedicated to the problem of internal contradictions within liberalism, which, according to the speaker, were inherently present in the tradition practically since its origins. In the conflict between the ideas of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, for example, we see clearly a certain pressure from within, which makes liberalism quite different from other political projects such as socialism or nationalism. The lack of a “founding father” and a set canon makes it rather difficult to present very dissimilar approaches and ideas that are labelled as “liberal” in a coherent conceptual

scheme. This problem, in a way, arises from the very nature of liberalism, as its focus on inclusivity leads to the necessity to combine a vast array of different, at times contradictory, positions. This paradoxical status of liberal theory, covered in detail by Nikolay's speech, will be addressed many times by the other speakers.

#### IS LIBERAL NATIONALISM POSSIBLE?

The next presentation, whose main point was to show and analyse different attempts to reconcile nationalism with liberalism, was read by KONSTATIN MOROZOV, MA in Philosophy from the MSU. The speaker considered different projects from both traditions—civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, liberal universalism among others, in order to point to a fundamental problem that could be summed up as the “status of non-nationalists in a liberal national state.” Even if we abandon essentialist notions of nationalism (as most contemporary thinkers on this topic tend to do), what enables us to consider different identities in our state as equal citizens? We still have little to no idea of the status of cosmopolitans or other people who fundamentally refuse national (or nationalist) values. One of the main points in Konstantin's speech was the impossibility of presenting a unified liberal-nationalist theory, although the debate that followed the presentation gave us some insights on how to try to conceptualise the problem in other methods (for example, through republicanism). Moreover, the fundamental problem concerning the inevitability of liberal values and the somewhat totalitarian nature of the latter, raised both in the presentation and during the questions, remained important in the upcoming addresses and during the final discussion.

#### THE TYRANNY OF TRUTH AND ITS ENEMIES

The third presentation by TIKHON SHEINOV, HSE philosophy undergraduate, switched the discussion from the domain of contemporary political theory up to political philosophy and its classics: Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss and their interpretation of Plato. The latter's *Republic*, being one of the foremost texts for political philosophy throughout history, was read quite differently by the two aforementioned 20th-century theoreticians from previous interpretations. We are used to the platonic critique of democratic politics, yet taking into account the dramaturgical reading of his dialogues, we may come to the notion of politics as independent from the realm of objective Ideas, such as Justice or Truth. Thus, in very different conceptualisations by Arendt and Strauss, we see Plato as, ironically, a defender of

liberal values opposed to the source of any totalitarianism — a claim for the highest form of Truth. This totalitarian notion of politics may be found in many modern ideologies — fascism and communism being the prime examples — and, in conclusion, it is only liberalism (or, at least a quite unique variation of it) that can function without said complaint. This address, that ended the first part of the section, was successful in combining the history of political philosophy with the topics passing through the whole conference — the nature of liberal values in comparison with other approaches and their status towards those who do not agree with the will of the majority, as the agonial character of liberalism, seen through this interpretation of Plato, tries to locate liberalism in the heart of any political system and not just as a simple alternative to those totalitarian ideologies.

Agonal Liberalism and Will towards Coexistence. On the Perspectives of Leibnizian Vocabulary for the Liberal Project

After a short break, the section resumed with a presentation by ALEXANDER MELNIKOV, also a HSE Philosophy Undergraduate. His speech converged the themes of leibnizian ontology with the liberal tradition. Often unseen, this connection seems rather plausible, considering the tolerant and inclusive nature of the world Leibniz and his followers had built. Even though the argument was rather speculative, as we cannot find any clearcut association between those two spheres, this historical reconstruction enables us to see how tolerance, among many other liberal principles in the end of the XVII century, grew from a standalone idea into a practical and crucial part of a coherent philosophical project. The depth of the address impressed the public, as the following questions helped to bring together its content with several problems that arose from previous presentations, mainly those concerning the meta-status of liberal theory — in some way, locating those principles at the level of ontology and not only political reality seems like a sound solution for them.

#### IMAGES OF THE FUTURE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

The next presentation by NATALIA CHEPELAYEVA, MSU Graduate Student in Philosophy, continued the theme of German political philosophy, from Leibniz to Kant. In her address, she covered an extensive body of the famous philosopher's work, from his pre-critical writings up to his well-known political texts, like the *Perpetual Peace*. It is still debatable how Kant fits into the liberal tradition, and Natalia's project showed different aspects of Kantian philosophy in relation to possible futures and the condition of

nations, states and people as political subjects in it. Although the discussion that followed was rather brief, the presentation itself enriched the field of possible inspiration for liberalism to adapt to contemporary problems that may be seen and possibly solved through the lens of Kantian legacy.

FROM MORAL EDUCATION TO PUBLIC REASON:  
RAWLS AS A THEORETICIAN OF VIRTUE

The last address in the session was read by one of the organisers, TIMUR SAEV, a HSE Philosophy student. It covered one of the most important authors for contemporary political philosophy— John Rawls, and not only his famous principles, such as the veil of ignorance, but also the somewhat more obscure parts of his legacy, such as the project of moral education for the cultivation of virtue. For Rawls himself, the problem of principles that should be universal for all actors in the political sphere was one of the most crucial and debatable— thus, Rawls' answers in earlier and later stages of his work were rather different. The presentation provided us not only with the analysis of Rawlsian attempts at solutions, but also with their reconciliation as a sound and useful enterprise that should raise the interest of liberal theoreticians nowadays. During the closing questions, the participants of the discussion compared this project with other liberal traditions and approaches and, additionally, with republicanism— thus, in the end, this peculiar and often misused, at least in Russian academic field, conceptual scheme of Rawls was understood as a rather plausible alternative for all of them.

THE CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

After the plenary part, all the participants engaged in an intensive discussion that concluded the section. This debate provided an opportunity to return to themes of the first presentations and to focus not only on their philosophical aspects, but also on the primary political ones. Moreover, it connected very different addresses with the red thread of discourse about the future— that of both liberal theory and the political sphere at large. The participants also placed the discussion into a broader context— for example, by bringing up the names of Martha Nussbaum or the already-mentioned republican project of Philip Pettir. The concluding inference was that the liberal tradition, although very unique among other political projects practically since its emergence, is far from being dead and obsolete. Thus, this section, the brainchild of not only well-established academics, but



also early-career researchers, for whom it was a first attempt at discussion in an international conference, can be considered successful and fruitful, as we expect a continuation of some sort in the upcoming projects of the School of Philosophy and Cultural Studies.

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