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THE SCHOOL OF ANALYTICAL MARXISM VERSUS THE SCHOOL OF ILYENKOV**

A COMPARISON OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
IN THE 1960S–1980S

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Abstract: *Analytical Marxism* challenges it by utilising *methodologies* from *analytical philosophy* specifically designed to study *particular cases*— either focusing on individual reasons behind social phenomena (*individualistic methodology*, usually based on game theory, i. e., on subjective teleology, but without being reduced to *methodological atomism*) or on the functions of supra-individual entities (*functionalist methodology*, which studies the specific objective teleology of social entities, without, however, reducing itself to *methodological radical holism*). Meanwhile, the *School of Ilyenkov* tries to explain positively the original *method* used but not elucidated by Marx (*materialist dialectics*, which focuses on the essence of the *social whole*) and to improve it by confronting it with ideas of classical philosophical thought (Hegel, Spinoza, Plato, etc.). Analytical Marxism (Cohen, Elster, Przeworski, Roemer, van Parijs, Wright, Levine, Sober, etc.) has provided critical insights into specific social phenomena and empirical validation, while the School of Ilyenkov (Ilyenkov, Naumenko, Potemkin, and others, within the framework of Soviet Hegelian Marxism founded by Lenin and Deborin) underscores the importance of understanding systemic unity and the foundational critique of capitalism. This article critically compares these two Marxist currents, highlighting their strengths, weaknesses, similarities and differences. The article ultimately underlines the importance of both currents in the history of Marxism and their value for contemporary historical analysis.

Keywords: Analytical Marxism, Soviet Hegelian Marxism, Soviet Creative Marxism, Evald Ilyenkov, Philosophy of History, History of Marxism.

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INTRODUCTION

This article compares the historical research methodologies of two Marxist schools that matured in the 1960s and 1970s and remain active in contemporary philosophical debate: on the one hand, the School of Evald V. Ilyenkov

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(which forms part of the so-called Soviet Hegelian Marxism); on the other hand, the School of Analytical Marxism, articulated in dialogue with analytical philosophy as a response to the crisis of leftist ideas and as an attempt to adapt Marxism to the standards of Anglo-American science. Although both schools have coexisted for decades, they have largely developed in parallel and with little dialogue; hence there is still a lack of critical comparisons that would highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses.

Given that both Marxist currents — the Ilyenkov School and the School of Analytical Marxism — have extensively explained what they consider to be the proper form of historical research, the confrontation of their methodological proposals constitutes the most exhaustive and direct philosophical comparison that can be carried out. Therefore, this article develops this type of comparison. Moreover, it must be anticipated that the principles governing the methodologies of both traditions are essentially distinct, and if one were to adhere strictly to these principles, it would be a completely fruitless and dogmatic task to establish a preference for one set of principles over the other. Rather, the aim of this philosophical comparison is to evaluate what kind of theoretical results are obtained by implementing the methodological principles of one or the other Marxist school in historical research, in order to confront the explanatory power of both philosophical traditions.¹

It should be clarified that, in addition to this *methodological comparison*, two other types of comparison could be considered, which the present article will not examine:

1. *Ontological comparison*: That is, what entities truly constitute social being according to both traditions (individuals, relations, institutions, social formations, etc.). Nevertheless, Analytical Marxists — by virtue of the orientation of their analytical tradition — distrust this type of discussion, which they would label as metaphysical or transcendent (Gutiérrez, 2001: 145), and at most restrict themselves to acknowledging certain *ontological assumptions* within the framework of broader methodological debates (Przeworski, 1985: 381). By contrast, the philosophy of Diamat (politically dominant in the USSR) was *ontological* by definition, since it was devoted

¹This methodological appreciation comes from Marx, who, in his defense of Epicurean atomism, argued that principles must be justified only by the theory that is deduced from them, since “to inquire after the cause of this determination [of the atom] means therefore to inquire after the cause that makes the atom a principle — a clearly meaningless inquiry to anyone for whom the atom is the cause of everything, hence without cause itself” (Marx, Lough, 2010a: 50).

to the study of the most general laws of being (Maidansky, 2014: 125). However, one of the most distinctive features of Ilyenkov's School is its explicit renunciation of ontology,² and its substitution by a philosophy focused on the *method* of investigating cultural forms or, in other words, a philosophy understood as a "science of ideas" (ibid.: 139). Therefore, an ontological comparison would prove rather unfortunate, since it would contradict the spirit of both Marxist schools.

2. *Epistemological* (or *gnoseological*) *comparison*: In essence, the epistemologies proposed by Analytical Marxism start from a subject as bearer of *individual reason* (Elster, 1983; Cohen, 2000: XXIII), whereas the theory of knowledge developed by Ilyenkov and his school is less intuitive, since it pivots on the definition of *the ideal* as a cultural and objective phenomenon (see Ilyenkov, Levant, 2012). This dimension, despite having strong academic interest, goes beyond the scope of the present article and could be fruitfully explored in future research.

What follows presents the fundamental historical-philosophical definitions of both Marxist currents and reconstructs their methodological proposals for historical research. Subsequently, the reciprocal criticisms between the two schools are examined, and a dialogue is proposed with the aim of highlighting their methodological strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the article concludes with a proposal for synthesis that seeks to reconcile—insofar as possible—the main strengths of each school.

HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEFINITION OF SOVIET HEGELIAN MARXISM AND ANALYTICAL MARXISM

Under the obscure label of *Soviet Philosophy* lies a plurality of forms of philosophical thought: politically dominant vulgar Marxism (sometimes referred to as *Diamat*), liquidationism, Proletkult, mechanicism, physicalism, philosophy of cybernetics, Soviet philosophy of science, the Bakhtin Circle, the Moscow Methodological Circle, the Stepin-Shvyrev-Rozin School, and so forth. Therefore, Soviet Hegelian Marxism must be understood as a current of Marxism in coexistence, dialogue, and conflict with these and other Soviet forms of philosophical production. The specific difference between this Soviet Hegelian Marxism and *Diamat* was the treatment given to the history of philosophy: while politically dominant Marxism was mainly devoted to the refutation of bourgeois philosophy (by means of a transcendent or external

²For example, Potemkin criticizes philosophy understood as a "science of sciences," doctrine of being, ontology, metaphysics" (Potemkin, 2003: 102).

critique that was often dogmatic) (Plá León, 2009: 3), Soviet Hegelian Marxism focused on the immanent critique of the Marxist method itself in order to overcome its main defects. For this critique it drew on the ideas of the classical authors, especially Hegel. For this reason, this current could be described as Hegelian, insofar as it seeks to define and develop the Hegelian moment (above all dialectical logic) already present in classical Marxism; however, we should not underestimate the fact that this philosophical current, in addition to Hegel's theory, also relies on the ideas of many other pre-Marxist philosophers, such as Plato, Spinoza, Kant, and others.

Institutionally, the origin of Soviet Hegelian Marxism goes back to Lenin's initiative in 1923 to allocate material and human resources to the task of "the systematic study of Hegelian dialectics from a materialist standpoint," creating a sort of "Society of Materialist Friends of Hegelian Dialectics" (Lenin, Skvirsky & Hanna, 2012: 233–234). In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the school of A. M. Deborin embodied this Hegelian orientation in its polemic against the *mechanists*.³ After the consolidation of *Diamat* as the politically dominant type of Marxism in the early 1930s, the popularity of Hegel declined markedly, and the Hegelian line of Marxism shifted from being politically dominant to politically dominated (Vladimirov, 2023: 15–17). Nevertheless, the current did not disappear, as attested by the influential work of the Hungarian György Lukács (who spent approximately 13 years in the USSR) and of Mikhail Lifshitz.

Soviet Hegelian Marxism regained popularity in the 1950s–1960s as a response to the dogmatic and vulgar version of Marxism. Here the figure of Evald V. Ilyenkov acquired a central role (Mareeva, 2004: 67; Bakhurst, 1991: 4), since his proposal represented a new major synthesis within the current of Soviet Hegelian Marxism, creatively developing the theory of dialectical logic, the ideal, and — among other issues — the critique of positivism. Around this program a school of collaborators and like-minded thinkers took shape, among them Naumenko, Potemkin and Mareev. At present, it is particularly noteworthy that the heirs of this school have succeeded in making it the only "active Marxist school" in Russia (Maidansky & Pavlov, 2018: 225). Moreover, there has been a renewed interest in recent years in eminent figures of Soviet Hegelian Marxism and of this school in particular (Maidansky, 2020: 15; Lotz et al., 2024: 347).⁴ Finally, with regard to the political ideas of this school, it should be noted that authors

³See Bakhurst, 1991: Chapter 2.

⁴See also International Friends of Ilyenkov (<https://ilyenkovfriends.org/>).

such as Ilyenkov himself and Mareev have criticized the concept of Soviet socialism — understood as *formal socialization*, not fully real — in order to reinterpret critically the history of the USSR (Mareev, 2004).⁵

At a distant geographical, political, and philosophical coordinate from the Soviet Hegelian debates, Gerald A. Cohen published *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence* in London in 1978, a work widely regarded as the founding text of a new current of Marxism. There he set the goal “to construct a tenable theory of history [...] with those standards of clarity and rigour which distinguish twentieth-century analytical philosophy” (Cohen, 2000: IX). The debates surrounding this book — especially those concerning the methodology of history — became the point of departure for what would soon be called the *School of Analytical Marxism*.

This school was, in part, a response to the crisis of leftist ideas and an attempt to adapt Marxism to the standards of Anglo-American science; and at its heart it was a methodological project, conceived as a toolkit for analysing social phenomena. Analytical Marxism is the only Marxist tradition explicitly committed to deploying the tools of analytical philosophy: formal logic, the rigour of symbolic language, argumentation theory, and related approaches. Its proponents maintain that there is no distinction between “Marxist and bourgeois methodologies” (Cohen, 1982: 492), since historians (and philosophers of history) face the same methodological problems.⁶ Consequently, the Analytical Marxist differentiates himself from other Marxists by replacing or purifying the methodological ideas of dialectical Marxism as a precondition for tackling substantive social, political, and economic questions in Marx’s oeuvre.⁷ The School’s most salient methodological discussions — especially from the late 1970s through the 1980s — concerned its own philosophical foundations and, in particular, the principles guiding historical inquiry.

The school of Analytical Marxism has produced highly influential works that go beyond Marx’s original project. In the field of political ideas, it advocates for very concrete reforms — although not necessarily moderate ones — which result from the strict implementation of its methodologies. Arguably the best-known proposal is the defense of universal basic income,

⁵To explore in greater depth the political and economic differences between *Diamat* and the Ilyenkov School, see Castañón-Rincón, 2025.

⁶ “[Dialectical] Marxian claims to methodological distinctiveness, generally, are misleading at best and harmful at worst” (Wright et al., 1992: 127).

⁷Despite the fact that analytical Marxists disavow the method of *Capital* and therefore the Marxist theory of value itself, which they describe as “false and irrelevant” (Cohen, 1979: 358).

advanced as a means of achieving socialism (Basic Income on the Agenda..., 2000; Van Parijs, 1995; Wright, 2004).

Specifically in terms of methodology — although it is explained in detail below, — it is worth noting that Analytical Marxists are supporters either of *methodological individualism* (whose leading author is Jon Elster) or of *methodological functionalism* (led by Gerald A. Cohen). Thus, Analytical Marxism does not propose a single historical methodology; instead, internal controversies exist, yet it is possible to classify nearly all Analytical Marxists as either *methodological individualists* or *methodological functionalists*.⁸

THREE FORMS OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

A. THE METHODOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALIST ANALYTICAL MARXISM

Przeworski describes in this way the academic context in which methodological individualism began to combine with the various historical disciplines: “Social sciences are beleaguered today [1985] by an offensive not seen since the 1890s: a deliberate thrust to impose the monopoly of the economic method over all study of society” (Przeworski, 1985: 379). And Roemer represents a clear example of how these ideas are very soon transferred into Marxism: “with respect to method [...] Marxian economics has much to learn from neoclassical economics” (Roemer, 1986: 191). And this is why some authors even refer to Analytical Marxism as “Neoclassical Marxism” (Anderson & Thompson, 1982).

This type of *individualistic Analytical Marxism* is usually described with a definition like the following: the central premise of its methodology is that “all social phenomena are best explained by the properties of the individuals who comprise the phenomena” (Wright et al., 1992: 108), or, expressed by analogy, “to go from social institutions and aggregate patterns of behaviour to individuals is the same kind of operation as going from cells to molecules” (Elster, 1985: 5).

However, this kind of definition is problematic because it seems to imply that individualistic Marxism reduces methodology exclusively to the *properties of individuals*, when, in reality, it is necessary to clarify — as some authors rightly have pointed out — that methodological individualism is not committed to the methodological assumption that “society is a collection of undifferentiated and unrelated individuals” and therefore, according

⁸Although there are also Analytical Marxists who attempt to combine aspects of both methodologies (for example, see Van Parijs, 1982).

to methodological individualism “the appropriate view is [...] [not] of abstract individuals, but of individuals who are embedded in different types of relations with other individuals within a multidimensionally described social structure” (Przeworski, 1985: 393). In other words, methodological individualism considers individuals as immersed in their social relations.

Methodological individualism versus Atomism. *Methodological individualism* is confronted by *Atomism*, which only analyses abstract individuals without their social relations with other people. *Atomism* can be defined as “a methodological stance that denies that relations are ever genuinely explanatory, whether those relations are between individuals or between social entities” (Wright et al., 1992: 109). What atomists claim, in essence, is not that social interactions are inconsequential, but that interactions are entirely governed by mechanisms located within the atomically constituted entities involved in the interactions.

For example, an atomist would argue that educational achievements among students (*social interactions*) are important for explaining the success of educational systems, although atomists would reduce these achievements (or learning processes) to internal cognitive mechanisms that operate solely within each student considered independently, which would never be acceptable to methodological individualists. This positive definition of atomism thus serves as a negative definition of methodological individualism; following the example: for a methodological individualist, the existence of a high-achieving student should not be explained exclusively by individual student factors, but rather it would require an *explanatory relationship* with peers, teachers, and the educational and economic context.

In order to properly understand the differences between this current and traditional Marxism, it is worth noting that Marx himself criticised the fact that the “classical economists and contractarian philosophers” used in their theories “individuals abstracted from social relations;” therefore, Marx, in his own way, “inveighed against the [methodological] *individualism*” (ibid.: 107) or, according to the terms we have defined, against social atomism.

Theory of rational choice. According to Analytical Marxism grounded in methodological individualism, *individuals* and *social relations* exist — in opposition to atomism — and the causal processes of history are not reducible solely to within individuals. Consequently, to advance our understanding of individualistic Marxism, it must also be examined the specific relationship that the *individuals* and *social relations* hold according to it. The answer to this question is the *theory of rational choice*.

It is often stated that explanations derived from methodological individualism are given at the *micro-level* (that is, at the level of the individual, although taking into consideration the social relations to which the individual belongs) and, therefore, for the methodological individualist, explaining a phenomenon is simply offering an account of the micro-mechanisms that produce it (Wright et al., 1992: 111–113). In fact, it is possible to propose individualism based on one of many possible micro-level methodologies; however, the truth is that practically all individualistic analytical philosophers subscribe to the so-called *rational choice Marxism*. Because the “ontological assumptions of the rational choice framework” are fully predominant (Przeworski, 1985: 381), only this main subtype of methodological individualism is examined below.

Rational choice methodological individualism is based on the assumption that “individual behaviour is rational in the instrumental sense of the term” (ibid.: 401, n. 1). That is why Przeworski proposes that micro-level explanations must be based on rational actions, which — in full alignment with classical utilitarianism (Bentham, Stuart Mill) — are defined as individual reflective activity oriented towards maximising expected utility (ibid.: 379; Elster, 1986: 27). Of course, this notion of reason is entirely individual and allows for the satisfaction of personal preferences, which are also affected by social change. Furthermore, the linkage between several individuals with opposing preferences generates general patterns and schemes of behaviour.⁹

There are several sub-theories of “*rational choice models*: general equilibrium theory, game theories, and the arsenal of model construction techniques developed by neoclassical economics” (Roemer, 1986: 192). But surely, the *theory* (or *theories*) of *games* is the most illustrative regarding the social methodology of rational choice theory.¹⁰ One of the best-known authors in this field is Jon Elster, who points out that game theory is based on the methodological assumption that “the individual emerges as a microcosm epitomizing the whole network of social relations” (Elster, 1982: 469). By applying this principle, for example, to social classes, Elster reaches several conclusions, one of which is that the emergence of *class consciousness* occurs when an individual (crossed by social relations that define their interests) through the use of his reason (individual, instrumental) overcomes the

⁹Such as in the famous *prisoner’s dilemma*, which is a model of a situation where two individuals, acting in their own self-interest, fail to cooperate, leading to a worse outcome for both than if they had chosen to work together.

¹⁰It is noteworthy that some analytical Marxists have contributed to development of the theory of games.

so-called *sniper problem* (a constant conflict scheme in history that links several individuals with conflicting interests).¹¹

An example that illustrates how individualistic Analytical Marxism (drawing on rational choice theory and game theory) approaches the relationship between individuals and their social relations: In the context of class struggle, individual workers might face poor working conditions but choose to address these issues independently rather than joining forces with others. Each worker may decide to negotiate directly with management for personal improvements, such as a pay rise or better hours. Without coordinating with their colleagues who are facing similar problems, a rational choice game theory model, such as the *sniper problem*, should be used to describe how socially conditioned individuals would act in this situation. In turn, although collective action could lead to more significant changes for all workers, the lack of coordination and unity results from individuals prioritizing their own immediate gains. Consequently, when individuals' actions are analysed through the model, it becomes apparent how these actions weaken the potential for building a unified class consciousness, which could lead to more significant improvements

B. THE METHODOLOGY OF FUNCTIONALIST ANALYTICAL MARXISM

Methodological individualism has been discussed above. In his theories, Marx would replace the methodological assumption that individuals exhaust (in essence) the social being by another starting point: there are in fact *social totalities*. The social totality, in turn, consists of social relations stably organised in *supra-individual entities*: commodity (which is the principle that under certain conditions forms the capitalist mode of production), capital, state, government, parliament, business associations, banks, unions, family, and so forth (Przeworski, 1985: 382, 385, 399).

Next, two methodologies based on supra-individual entities are analysed: *radical holism* and *functionalism*.

Radical holism. This methodology is based on the premise that individual relations are secondary or irrelevant to social explanations:

They are generated by the operation of the whole, and in their own right they explain nothing. It is not simply that *the whole is more than the sum of its parts*.

¹¹Elster explains that the *sniper problem* refers to a situation of ongoing conflict where individuals with conflicting interests act independently, aiming to maximise their own benefits without coordinating with others. This issue underscores the challenge of achieving collective action due to individuals prioritising their personal interests over collective goals (Elster, 1982: 466–467).

Rather, the whole is the sole genuine cause and the parts (even when constituted relationally) are mere artifacts. Macro-social categories — capitalism, the state, class relations — are not merely irreducible to micro-level processes. They are unaffected by these processes (Wright et al., 1992: 113).

This analysis leads directly to *conspiracy theories* and other alleged methodological flaws. In fact, theories of radical holism are based on the thesis that:

All activities benefit the capitalist class, and these benefits explain their presence. This conspiratorial world view, in which all apparently innocent activities, from Sunday picnics to health care for the elderly, are explained through their function for capitalism (Elster, 1982: 456).

It is important to stress, however, that actually “in most cases, such expressions are simply elliptical or at worst express a certain expository sloppiness rather than methodological error” since “few, if any, Marxists have ever imagined that functional relations could be established in the absence of micro-level mechanisms” (Wright et al., 1992: 114–115); that is, there is no History without individuals who act. In other words, supporters of *functionalism* reject the conspiracy theories proposed by radical holism.

Methodological functionalism. Functionalism could be presented as an inference: (a) an event of type E would cause an event of type F ($E \rightarrow F$), (b) there is the *empirical certainty* of f (f is a F -type function), (c) it is inferred ($F \rightarrow E$) a cause e (e is an E -type explanation): “ e occurred because the situation was such that an event of type E would cause an event of type F ” (Cohen, 1982: 485–486). In other words, *functionalism* is based on a certain kind of logical inference that moves from *consequence* (or f , *function*) to *cause* (or e , *explanation*).

Historical materialism’s central explanations [that is, Marx and Engels’ materialist conception of history] are unrevisably functional in nature [...and therefore] Marxism in its traditional form is associated with explanations of a special kind, to put it roughly, consequences are used to explain causes (ibid.: 483), or “ F functionally explains E ” (ibid.: 492).¹²

¹²Marxist functionalists draw on some of Marx’s methodological ideas, albeit thoroughly redefined: “historical materialism with the tools of analytic philosophy” (Van Parijs, 1982: 497). For a criticism of Marxist functionalism see Elster (“from Marxist history to Marxist social science proper, we find that functionalism is rampant”) (Elster, 1982: 460), in particular the Mandeville’s weak functional paradigm: “an institution or behavioral pattern often has consequences that are (a) beneficial for some dominant economic or political structure; (b) unintended by the actors; and (c) not recognized by the beneficiaries as owing to that

The following is an example of the use of this methodology to study a specific case in the context of class struggle: it is assumed that *E* (the set of collective action) always leads to *F* (a certain level of improvement in workers' rights); from this relationship, it is inferred that if there is *f* (a specific improvement in rights, corresponding to type *F*, for example a wage increase), it is because a form of collective action (*e*, corresponding to type *E*) has been undertaken.

C. THE METHOD OF THE ILYENKOV SCHOOL

Ilyenkov's School shares the idea defended by György Lukács in his famous book *History and Class Consciousness*: the essence of Marxism — which he calls *orthodoxy* — “refers [...] exclusively to the *method*, [...that is, to] materialist dialectic” (Lukács, Livingstone, 2024: 1–2), which is thus based on the relationship between *materialism* and *dialectics*.

Firstly, we can think of *matter* or *materiality* from the point of view of *nature* (bodies, relations, totalities). In this sense, Friedrich Engels points out in *Dialectics of Nature* (1882) what, in his opinion, are the fundamental forms of movement of matter: mechanics (translation or displacement), physics (molecular transformation), chemistry (atomic transformation), biology (organic transformation) (Engels, Dutt, 2010: 522–535). In this same work, however, Engels distinguishes another kind of materiality, quite different from the previous ones. It is no longer a *merely natural matter*, but a *matter as natural as it is social*: “social production [...] is] the most essential historical activity of men, the one which has raised them from the animal to the human state and which forms the material foundation of all their other activities, namely the production of their requirements of life” (ibid.: 331). The fact is that Marx and Engels studied this question much earlier, beginning with *The German Ideology* (1846). In it, they refer to social production, among others, with the following expressions: “material basis,” “material conditions,” “material forces,” “material power,” “material relation” and “material life;” moreover, in all these cases, they contrast social materiality with “spiritual” activity (Marx & Engels, Dutt et al., 2010: 27–96).

behavior” (Elster, 1982: 454). For example, functionalist Marxism would be interested in the Court Judgment in favor a financial institution, as long as (a) they were beneficial to the capitalist system, (b) the actors, such as the judges of the High Court, did not seek this consequence, and (c) the rulings were not recognised by the financial institution as being due to the capitalist system itself.

Secondly, the Soviet philosophers who developed Hegelian Marxism considered the Marxist method to be *dialectical*, primarily because it arises as an overcoming of the dialectical method of absolute idealism conceived by Hegel, in particular, of the ascent from the abstract (the substance or system-forming principle) to the concrete (the manifold categories that serve as the form of existence of the substance). Thus, while — according to Hegel — the *concept* is the substance that causes all forms of spirit, Marx and Engels exposed that a *specific mode of social production* is responsible for shaping the *categories of a specific social formation*. That is why Ilyenkov calls Marx's method “the dialectical materialist conception of deduction of categories” (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 134), and it can be summed up, according to him, in the process of ascent “from the universal (which is in itself quite a definite particular) to the particular (which also expresses a universal and necessary definition of the object)” (ibid.). For example, if Marx's *Capital* — which contains Marx's most refined method of investigation (Ilyenkov, 2001) — is analysed according to the specifics of the method described here, it becomes clear that all the categories — labour-power, surplus value, etc. — are deduced from the *substance of commodity value*. Even later, in the third volume of *Capital*, *profit* continues to be presented “as developed value” (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 151).

It is important to note that this method of *materialist dialectics* does not presuppose that all phenomena are immediately reducible to the mode of production. In fact, even Engels, before the Soviet Marxists, pointed out this misinterpretation:

According to the materialist view of history, the determining factor in history is, *in the final analysis*, the production and reproduction of actual life. More than that was never maintained either by Marx or myself. Now if someone distorts this by declaring the economic moment to be the *only* determining factor, he changes that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, ridiculous piece of jargon (Engels, Dutt, 2010: 34).

In this perception, Evald Ilyenkov is very precise in distinguishing between the “abstract intellectual deduction” (or *reductionism*) and the “materialist deduction” of Marx and Engels (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 183): On the one hand, *reductionism* consists of comparing an “abstract general or generic concept” (for example, the capitalist mode of production allows the capitalist to accumulate surplus value) with a particular phenomenon; and if there is no formal contradiction between the two, then we will conclude that this phenomenon is part of the abstract concept (ibid.: 184). For example, as we

do not directly see that a professor in a public university allows a capitalist to accumulate surplus value, we will say that there is no capitalist mode of production in that place.

On the other hand, *materialist deduction* does not deny contradiction, but presupposes it. According to it, the theory must “*directly* reflect the contradiction of the object that is the inner stimulus of its development, of the growth of its complexity and development of its forms of existence” (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 183). In the example above, it should be explained how the capitalist mode of production, which consists in the production of surplus value, creates social forms which are apparently detached from capital. The Cuban philosopher Rubén Zardoya — who was a pupil of A. V. Potemkin, and in his own way remains a disciple — masterfully summarised this aspect of the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete:

...the antagonistic mode of material production constantly engenders ideological forms which express and complement political consciousness, transform it, oppose it, confront each other, manage to acquire a relative autonomy and, at the same time, are determined and unified by it (Zardoya, 2015: 45).

Moreover, one idea should be emphasized here as crucial to the method of materialist dialectics, to which we shall return later as a key to the distinction between Analytical Marxism and Soviet Hegelian Marxism, which is that the latter emphasises the *whole* (or, expressed with respect to history, the *social formation* or *historical totality*). Thus, according to Naumenko, when we study a totality, we must study the things (or forms) that it produces as moments of its own movement, whereby the thing and the totality are differentiable and are in turn the same: “[t]he system of the whole is not merely something else, but is the same as the thing itself, considered in development” (Naumenko, 1968: 305). This is in full harmony with Ilyenkov’s idea that the *essence* of the thing is not something separable from the totality, but “the concrete system of its interaction with other things, in the system of objective conditions within which and through which it is what it is” (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 185).

COMPARISON BETWEEN ANALYTICAL MARXIST
AND SOVIET HEGELIAN MARXIST FORMS OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH
CRITIQUES FROM ANALYTICAL MARXISM

As already mentioned, it is worth pointing out that Analytical Marxists themselves are divided between two distinct groups: the *methodological*

individualists and the *methodological functionalists*. In short, the *individualists* criticise the *functionalists* for the absence of empirical validation of the objective teleology guiding their investigations and the lack of emphasis on the causal mechanisms of individual reasoning. Meanwhile, the *functionalists* reproach the *individualists* for not paying sufficient attention to the methodological specificity required by social relations organised in *supra-individual entities* and their corresponding *functions*.

As for the criticisms of Ilyenkov's school, several of the criticisms of Analytical Marxism directed at traditional Marxism are equally valid against Soviet Hegelian Marxism.

On the one hand, *methodological individualists* propose a critique similar to the one they raise against functionalists, namely, the basis of theory must be that of which we are certain: the causal mechanisms of the subjective reason of individuals acting in a socially conditioned way. The other *supra-individual* methodological elements introduced by Hegelian Marxism, not being grounded in individual reason, are simply unscientific and introduce the false notion of *objective teleology*, which has been defined as the assumption that there are "processes guided by a purpose without an intentional subject" (Elster, 1982: 454-455).

On the other hand, both *methodological individualists* and *functionalists* agree on four additional criticisms concerning the methodology of Ilyenkov's school:

- (1) *Excessive dogmatism*: From a methodological point of view, Soviet Marxism in general was *dogmatic* (or orthodox, in a pejorative sense): a "the view that a correct 'reading' of Marx is equivalent to a correct understanding of the world" (Kirby, 2001: 19). Criticism of the foundations of methodology is precisely what allows the sciences to advance; however, traditional Marxism would not be interested in thoroughly criticising the foundational texts of Marx and Engels, which ultimately leads to the false confrontation between Marx's method and other possible methodologies: "Belief in dialectic as a *rival* to analysis thrives only in an atmosphere of unclear thought" (Cohen, 2000: xxiii). Incidentally, Analytical Marxism itself is constituted as a direct result of this criticism, since — with its strengths and weaknesses — it is the direct product of the critique of the foundations of the classical Marxist method.
- (2) *Theoretical impossibility of historical totality*: Soviet Hegelian Marxists aim to investigate the totality of society from a dialectical principle (the mode of production), which is erroneous: "Dialectical deduction

is dialectics in one classical, pejorative sense of that term: spurious, scholastic reasoning” (Elster, 1983). Even if Soviet Hegelian Marxism truly disavowed the claim to reduce all social phenomena directly to the economic sphere (economism), the very idea of bringing together in one theory the knowledge of the whole of society by any other means makes the formulation of a clear and rigorous methodology based on the precision and strictness of formal logic impossible. In reality, social scientists and philosophers only have the tools to study either the causes of individual decisions — mainly through rational choice theory: “causal explanation of individual desires and beliefs” (ibid.) — or the functions of general types of social relations — “social formations and classes are depicted as entities obeying laws of behavior that are [...] a function of the behaviours of their constituent individuals” (Cohen, 2000: XXIII), — which inevitably limits the scope of scientific research. The only way to approach broader research is to aggregate different analyses of the causal links of particular situations in order to arrive at more general theories, but without ever claiming total or absolute knowledge of society.

- (3) *Loss of sight of particular cases*: Soviet Hegelian Marxism focuses on the study of the mode of production and social formation, leaving aside the investigation that is really possible for us to undertake, that is to say, the study of “empirical case studies” (Kirby, 2001: 6).
- (4) *Lack of empirical validation*: Analytical Marxism seeks to “avoid such grand a priori and teleological roads; instead they [analytical Marxists] construct accounts of historical materialism that are empirically testable” (Nielsen, 2007: 140). Sometimes it seems that Soviet Hegelian Marxists do not feel the need to prove their theories or those of Marx and Engels because they assume that their methodology is correct. But, in addition to reflecting on the methodology, hypotheses must also be put forward, operationalized, attempted to refute with empirical data, among other methodological requirements that are generally underestimated in classical and Soviet Marxist theory. In addition, the methodology must establish a precise language: the more formal and exact the better.

CRITIQUES FROM SOVIET HEGELIAN MARXISM

Similar to Analytical Marxism, the different philosophers and schools in the field of Soviet Hegelian Marxism naturally did not share an identical opinion on the many problems related to the method of historical research.

But, unlike the Analytical Marxists, it is possible to note that the effort of practically all Hegelian Marxist philosophers in the USSR was directed towards developing the so-called *materialist conception of history*. Naumenko captures this difference very clearly when he argues that “empirical analysis [promoted by the analytics...] sees the source of the forms of things and their comprehension in theory not in the object but in the subject, in the specific logic, methodology or ‘epistemology’ of scientific cognition” (Naumenko, 1968: 313);¹³ on the contrary, “[t]he main philosophical lesson of Marx’s *Capital* is the thesis that the forms of movement and development of thought coincide with the forms of movement and development of the object” (ibid.). It follows that Soviet Marxists did not promote the production of different *methodologies* (approaches or points of view) to obtain partial knowledge of history, but concentrated on developing the classical Marxist *method* which consists in understanding the historical totality in its essence. This is the most profound difference between the *Analytic* and the *Soviet Hegelian* current of thought about Marxism: *the acceptance or not of the social totality as the object of investigation*. And it is precisely this difference that underpins the criticisms made of the analytics by *Marxist* and *Hegelian* philosophers.

To a large extent, Hegel’s historical significance lies in having developed one of the most sophisticated critiques of *non-systematic* knowledge: “A philosophizing *without a system* can be nothing scientific” (Hegel, Brinkmann & Dahlstrom, 2010a: 43). According to him, without a system it is impossible to harmonize judgments on different matters, which therefore become *arbitrary* or “random in terms of [their] content;” accordingly, in a non-systematic philosophy, a “particular content” merely “represents an unjustified presupposition or a subjective certainty”—that is, in the absence of a system, there are only *opinions* (ibid.).

¹³As far as the *specific logic of analytics* (formal logic) is concerned, Ilyenkov points out that its function is to express thought adequately in language, because it serves “[e]xclusively for checking the correctness of so-called analytical judgments, i. e. ultimately, acts of verbal exposition of ready-made ideas already present in the head” (Ilyenkov, Creighton, 1977: 26). In this sense, Ilyenkov also calls it the “logic of empiricism, or, what is the same thing, the logic of reproducing in thought the practical design of mechanical systems,” and admits that it “is quite efficient and yields great practical results and benefits. But only insofar as the theoretician and practitioner are dealing with a mechanical system” (Ilyenkov, New Park Publications, 1982b: 39), that is, an inorganic system: non-biological, non-social. In contrast to this empiricist logic, since the time of Friedrich Hegel, dialectical logic can be described as the recognition that scientific thought is a historical process, subordinated to laws that are “independent of the will and consciousness of individuals” (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 102), therefore, *dialectical logic* allows above all to investigate these kinds of historical laws.

That is why Hegel had given unity to his philosophical *system* in accordance with his maxim: “The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development” (Hegel, Pinkard, 2018: 13). Marx, in turn, developed this idea applied to his materialist conception of history: “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations” (thesis VI on Feuerbach) (Marx, Lough, 2010b: 4). Lukács concluded in the same vein that a truly consistent examination of any social form or phenomenon must start from an analysis of the foundation (“the core,” “the essence”) of the social “totality” (Lukács, Livingstone, 2024: 1–10).¹⁴ In this conception, the *concept* of social formation is a *specific mode of material production*, from which it is possible to deduce the specific *categories* and corresponding *phenomena* of the historical totality.

Therefore, when we compare this *Marrist method* with *analytical methodologies*, it becomes clear why Soviet Hegelian Marxists accuse the analytics—despite their quest for clarity and logical rigour—of a profound disconnection of their theories with the real complexity and internal unity of historical phenomena.¹⁵ The two analytical methodologies presented above—rational choice methodological individualism and methodological functionalism—serve only to study isolated cases, be they individual decisions or social functions. Thus, if analytics needed to create a theory about a plurality of cases, they would have no alternative but to bring together in a single *theory*, in an aggregated form, the study of new cases analysed again on an individual basis. Ilyenkov describes the principle of these analytical methodologies as a

“logical argument” of the “on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand” type, an argument more or less accidentally isolating various aspects of the objects and placing them in more or less accidental connection (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 70).

¹⁴For example: “Thus we must detach the phenomena from the form in which they are immediately given and discover the intervening links which connect them to their core, their essence. In so doing, we shall arrive at an understanding of their apparent form and see it as the form in which the inner core necessarily appears” (Lukács, Livingstone, 2024: 8).

¹⁵A critique that, once again, goes back to Hegel: “...if a person were to have only a general notion of, for example, anatomy, or, to put it roughly, if he were to have an acquaintance with the parts of the body taken in accordance with their lifeless existence, nobody would thereby think that he has come into full possession of the salient subject matter of that science, which is to say, its content. One would think that in addition he would have to go to the trouble to pay attention to the particularities of the science.—Furthermore, that kind of an aggregation of little bits and pieces of information has no real right to be called science” (Hegel, Pinkard, 2018: 3).

Quoting Lenin, Ilyenkov points out that even a simple glass contains an infinitude of characteristics, that is, it contains the innumerable definitions of circle, cylinder, mineral, social utility, perhaps exchange value, and so forth. And, if this is the case with a simple glass, it is simply impossible to investigate the vast variety of social forms by way of accumulating results of isolated investigations of social phenomena that ignore the inner bond of society itself. In conclusion, according to Ilyenkov, the main defect of analytical philosophy consists in the “[r]easoning gliding from one abstract one-sided definition of the object to another, just as abstract and one-sided, is endless and does not lead to anything definite” (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 70). Precisely for this reason, in order to avoid this endless loop of methodological impotence in the face of historical research, materialist dialectics “does not reason on the ‘on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand’ principle but always points out the determining aspect, that element in the unity of opposites which is in the given instance the leading or determining one” (ibid.: 196).

Moreover, Hegel not only justifies the necessity of a philosophical *system*, but also explains how, in his view, a more advanced system must appropriate the true elements of other philosophical systems. That is, philosophical critique should not consist in defending “a philosophy built on a narrowly circumscribed *principle* distinct from other such principles” (Hegel, Brinkmann & Dahlstrom, 2010a: 43). Rather, the task is to overcome the rational principles of other systems by integrating them on the basis of the principle of one’s own philosophy: “it is a principle of any genuine philosophy that it contain all particular principles within itself” (ibid.). In this way, the method must appropriate “the whole mass of its preceding content, not only not losing anything through its dialectical advance, or leaving it behind, but, on the contrary, carrying with itself all that it has gained, inwardly enriched and compressed” (Hegel, Di Giovanni, 2010b: 750). The Hegelian method even aims to attain the *absolute* form, surpassing *all* previous philosophical developments—namely, once “there is no content that would stand out over against it and determine it as a one-sided external form” (ibid.: 749).

For this reason, Hegel seeks to reconcile *analysis* (the method “remains strictly within the concept”) with *synthesis* (“for through the concept the subject matter is determined as dialectical and as other”) (ibid.: 748). With regard specifically to the *analytical* aspect of philosophy, this consists in studying all the phenomena associated with a particular state of consciousness (a “subject matter”), taking as its point of departure its simplest or most abstract principle: “the method finds the further determinations of its

initial universal simply and solely in this universal” (ibid.). At the same time, the method is *synthetic* insofar as “its subject matter [...] proves to be an *other*” (Hegel, Di Giovanni, 2010b: 741); that is, the content of the concrete concept does not belong to a single, restricted analytical domain, but rather exceeds any such limits step by step, through successive analytical stages, advancing in an ascent from the most abstract states of consciousness to the most concrete ones.

In this same sense, albeit renouncing the absolute pretension of the Hegelian concept, Evald Ilyenkov maintains that *analytical* rationality must constitute a necessary moment in the development of the method of materialist dialectics (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 153–158). According to him, the problem of purely analytical philosophy lies in its attempt to reduce qualitatively distinct phenomena to “one-sided analytical abstractions” (ahistorical principles), “in which the entire concrete historical definiteness of the object is extinguished” (ibid.: 153). To overcome this limitation, “Marx’s analytical method” contains both *analysis* and *synthesis* in a sublated form (ibid.). For example, according to Ilyenkov, a one-sidedly analytical approach leads to conceiving “labour” in ahistorical terms as the constitutive principle of commodity value; by contrast, Karl Marx *analyzes* “labour” in a *concrete-historical* manner, revealing that only its form as “abstract labour” (that is, the labour of isolated producers) constitutes the true “substance of value” (ibid.: 155). Moreover, on the basis of this *historically concrete analysis*, Marx is able to advance toward the “theoretical synthesis of categories” of the capitalist mode of production (ibid.: 157). Thus, Ilyenkov concludes that “analysis and synthesis prove to be powerful logical means of processing empirical facts exactly because they are consciously used in the service of an essentially historical approach to research” (ibid.: 156).

In sum, Ilyenkov criticizes purely analytical principles for being abstract (in the sense of ahistorical) and for constituting only one of the two principal directions — alongside synthesis — of any concrete historical inquiry.

DISCUSSION

A comparison of the *methodologies of the School of Analytical Marxism* and the *method of the School of Ilyenkov* makes it possible to clarify their main points in common: Both philosophical currents apply certain *political* or *economic* ideas of Marx, although the analytics explicitly reject his *methodological ideas*. Both Marxists criticise the materialist conception of history of Marx and Engels, although with a fundamental difference: since

the analytics criticise it in order to replace it with their own methodologies and the Soviets in order to deepen the original method.

However, although it is possible to note these and other similarities, it should not be overlooked that these are merely external determinations (*abstract universals*) that do not define the rational core of both philosophical currents. And this is because the critical comparative analysis reveals deep contradictions of thought between two philosophies whose relationship is, in essence, one of confrontation in their methodological principles. And, starting from the acknowledgment of the difference in methodological principles, what remains to be discussed is what kind of dialogue the two Marxist schools could maintain.

If we were to analyze exclusively the methodological principles of both schools — fundamentally, subjective reason or supra-individual function *versus* the organic development of the mode of production — we would find no grounds for claiming that the principles of analytical philosophy are better or worse than those of the Ilyenkov's School, since the methodological principles themselves are incomparable and owe their sole justification to the theory that can be produced with them. Therefore, what is really at stake is comparing *what results and what kind of theory we obtain from the application and development of one set of principles or the other*. In other words, within the framework of a dialogue between both schools, the kind of results derived from the application of each school's methodological principles constitutes the criterion for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each.

For this reason, the following discussion avoids criticisms that merely rest on the choice of one or another methodological principle without considering the theories deduced from them. For example, there is little value in the critique of Analytical Marxism that reproaches it for not accepting the mode of production as the generative principle of social formation, just as it is completely sterile to demand from the Ilyenkov School a renunciation of dialectics and of the organic totality on the grounds that they are supposedly unscientific. This type of critique, reduced to the level of principles, leads to no productive conclusion.

Therefore, what follows presents not a critical comparison of the principles themselves, but of the kind of theory that can be deduced from them. To begin with: what kind of theory results from the application of the methodological principles of the Ilyenkov School?

1. *Dogmatism*: It could be argued that the Ilyenkov School produces a dogmatic theory, insofar as the main ideas of Marx, Engels, and, to a lesser extent, Hegel, are not called into question. However, this school

stood out precisely for breaking with dogmatism by subjecting the Marxist method itself to critique on the basis of ideas from classical philosophy, even going so far as to accept methodological ideas that are not found in Marx's work or that diverge from it. For example, although Marx dismissed Spinoza's work, Ilyenkov engaged deeply with it in order to develop some of his main contributions (Maidansky & Pavlov, 2018: 223). Therefore, the more this type of Marxism delves into the history of classical philosophy, the more tools it will find to overcome definitively the problems of dogmatism without abandoning its own method.

2. *Teleology*: Several individualist analytical authors label both the functionalist theories of Analytical Marxism and those of classical Marxism as teleological. For instance, Roemer believes that analytical functionalists hold that social phenomena occur "for teleological reasons" (Roemer, 1986: 192) and goes further when he adds that "what is lost with rational choice Marxism is, principally, teleology" (ibid.: 201). However, this methodological challenge is unfounded, since in reality both functionalist and individualist Marxists accept teleology; for there is no doubt that one of the foundations of rational choice theory is *subjective teleology* (that is, the existence of a *final cause* of the subject's action). This means that none of the methodologies reviewed is devoid of teleology, whether in its *subjective* or *objective* form. Therefore, the acceptance of *subjective teleology* (rational choice) or *objective teleology* (functionalism, Soviet Hegelian Marxism) should not be understood prejudicially as an arbitrary decision, because teleology itself forms part of the constitutive principle of the methodology (individual reason or supra-individual entities). Ultimately, the validity of one or another teleological principle is not given *a priori*, but depends exclusively on the explanatory power of the theory deduced from it.

3. *Neglect of particular cases and the problem of verification*: This is probably the most accurate critique of the Ilyenkov School, since its emphasis on studying the method did not crystallize into systematic works that concretely explained how, starting from the mode of production, one arrives at the explanation of specific forms of spiritual production, such as particular juridical or artistic forms, and so forth. At the same time, the presence within the tradition of Soviet Hegelian Marxism of intellectually towering figures such as Vygotsky—who employed in psychology a method influenced by both Marx and Hegel—demonstrates the great value of undertaking this kind of concrete research, which also allows for a higher degree of verification.

Analogously, in the opposite direction, according to the criteria of the Ilyenkov School, what problems are contained in the theory produced by the methodological principles of the Analytical School?

1. *Subjective reduction of social relations*: It could be argued that some formulations of Analytical Marxism attempt to reduce social relations to individual subjects; however, as has been shown, even rational choice theorists acknowledge that the subject is influenced by the social environment (Przeworski, 1985: 393). In any case, the reducibility or non-reducibility of social relations is a question relative to methodological principles and therefore should not be justified in advance, but only on the basis of the results yielded by the application of those principles.

2. *Neglect of synthesis and failure to explain social totality*: Analytical Marxism emphasizes methodologies aimed at studying isolated cases, thereby rejecting the synthetic dimension of method required for investigating social totality as an organic whole. However, according to the Ilyenkov School, the unity of social theory rests on a single shared method. From this standpoint, Analytical Marxism encounters a series of methodological difficulties: it is not possible to reconcile the results obtained from different methodologies—such as functionalist and individualist approaches—whose principles diverge; therefore, any attempt to equate their results remains unjustified unless grounded in a common methodological basis.

Furthermore, with regard to the results produced by each methodology, there is no clear hierarchy that would allow new findings to be ordered according to their degree of generality and their capacity to ground further research. Without such a hierarchy, each new piece of knowledge cannot be incorporated as a necessary moment within an organic system of ideas. In the simplest terms, what is lacking is a general theoretical framework of a given society that would make possible a collective research effort in which each contribution can be situated within a unified theoretical structure.

3. *Ahistorical character of analytical principles*: The analytical abstractions employed by the Analytical School tend to be ahistorical and therefore formally applicable to any type of society. Precisely for this reason, however, they are incapable of grasping the specific determinations of modern capitalist society. As a result, they cannot serve as the foundation for a systematic theory of contemporary society.

CONCLUSION

The strengths of both schools are, on the one hand, that the School of Analytical Marxism has developed methodologies that allow for the study of

specific empirical cases and, on the other hand, that Ilyenkov's School has delved into the logic of the mode of production as a fundamental organic determinant of social forms. However, their weaknesses are that the logic of the mode of production, without its deployment into concrete cases, results in an abstract theory (as often occurs in the Ilyenkov School); but it may be argued that the results of a methodology without a unifying foundation (such as methodological functionalism or methodological individualism) are equally abstract. For example, to analyze the impact of a social policy on health in Mexico: it is not enough simply to state that it is based on the capitalist mode of production (an abstract truth), nor is it sufficient to apply a case-oriented methodology that ignores the deeper determinations of that social policy (for instance, an assessment of how patients behave in response to the new policy, which results in another abstract or incomplete truth).

In conclusion, it is possible to make two methodological proposals based on each of the schools in order to advance their respective methodologies without renouncing their own principles:

The most productive critique advanced from the Ilyenkov School maintains that the degree of fragmentation characteristic of Analytical Marxism is unnecessary and counterproductive. If analytical Marxism were to take this objection seriously, it would have to focus on constructing a general theoretical framework for modern society, capable of ranking different theoretical contributions according to their level of generality within a shared system of ideas.

In response to the objections raised by Analytical Marxism concerning the insufficient attention paid by classical Marxism to particular cases, a proposal advanced by Ilyenkov himself becomes especially relevant, and one that his followers would do well to take seriously. Ilyenkov acknowledges a moment of truth in analytical principles, even though they must be reworked through concrete historical analysis; only then can they be synthesized as differentiated moments within the theory of the materialist conception of history (Ilyenkov, Kuzyakov, 1982a: 153–158). By extension, on the historical basis of modern capitalist society, this would require a reinterpretation of the valid moments contained in contemporary analytical principles, namely rational choice theory for the study of subjective teleology and functionalism for that of objective teleology. In sum, analytical rationality must constitute a necessary moment in the development of the method of materialist dialectics, especially if the aim is to appropriate precise instruments for the study of particular empirical cases, even though it can never, on its own, provide a sufficient method.

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АНДРЕС КАСТАНЬОН-РИНКОН

АСПИРАНТ

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ШКОЛА АНАЛИТИЧЕСКОГО МАРКСИЗМА ПРОТИВ ШКОЛЫ ИЛЬЕНКОВА СРАВНЕНИЕ МЕТОДОЛОГИЙ ИСТОРИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ В 1960–1980-Е ГОДЫ

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Аннотация: Школа аналитического марксизма и школа Ильенкова стремятся усовершенствовать *материалистическую концепцию истории* Маркса. *Аналитический марксизм* бросает ей вызов, используя *методологии из аналитической философии*, специально разработанные для изучения *частных случаев*, сосредоточиваясь либо на индивидуальных причинах социальных явлений (*индивидуалистическая методология*, которая обычно основана на теории игр, то есть на субъективной телеологии, но без сведения к *методологическому атомизму*), либо на функциях надличностных сущностей (*функционалистская методология*, которая изучает конкретную объективную телеологию социальных сущностей, не сводясь, однако, к *методологическому радикальному холизму*). Между тем *школа Ильенкова* пытается дать положительное объяснение оригинальному *методу*, использованному, но не разъясненному Марксом (*материалистическая диалектика*, которая фокусируется на сущности *социального целого*), и усовершенствовать его, сопоставив с идеями классической философской мысли (Гегель, Спиноза, Платон и др.). Аналитический марксизм (Коэн, Элстер, Пшеворски, Ромер, ван Парейс, Райт, Левин, Собер и др.) дал ценные критические наблюдения относительно конкретных социальных явлений и обеспечил эмпирическую проверку, в то время как школа Ильенкова (Ильенков, Науменко, Потемкин и др., в рамках советского гегелевского марксизма, основанного Лениным и Дебориным) подчеркивает важность понимания системного единства и фундаментальной критики капитализма. В данной статье проводится критическое сравнение этих двух марксистских течений с выделением их сильных и слабых сторон, сходств и различий. В заключение подчеркивается важность обоих течений в истории марксизма и их ценность для современного исторического анализа.

Ключевые слова: аналитический марксизм, советский гегельянский марксизм, советский творческий марксизм, Эвальд Ильенков, философия истории, история марксизма.

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