The Problem of Individuation in Processual Philosophy of Biology

Abstract

The paper examines the problem of individuation in the context of the processual philosophy of biology. It arises from the tension between continuity and heterogeneity as attributes of the process and can be formulated as follows: how is a heterogeneous set of processes possible if all of them eventually merge into a dynamic continuum? Within this metaphysical problem, two dimensions are distinguished — synchronic and diachronic. It is shown that a satisfactory formulation and solution of this problem among the theorists of the processual philosophy of biology is lacking. Due to the dominance of substance-based thinking, either the continuity of processes is excluded (as in the case of the conception of J. Dupré) or their qualitative heterogeneity (as in the case of the conception of life as “space-filling stuff”). In the article, the proposed solution to the problem of individuation is based on H. Bergson's conception of duration. It allows to combine abovementioned attributes of processes. An essential feature of the life process, interpreted per this conception, is the preservation of the past within the present. The proposed solution to the metaphysical problem of individuation is related to more specific conceptions in the philosophy of biology and biology itself. Thus, the notion of preservation of the past within the present is confirmed from the point of view of modern genetics, but to a limited extent. The notion of the individuality of living as a tendency leads to a multiplicity of degrees and contexts of consideration of individuality relative to various biological disciplines.