Contexts of Philosophy and Philosophers' Intentions

In Defense of the Intellectual History Approach to Research in the History of Philosophy

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of applying the intellectual history approach to research in history of philosophy and demonstrates the heuristic potential of this application for a more comprehensive understanding of both the ideas proposed by thinkers of the past and theoretical philosophy in general. Although Skinner emphasized the necessity of this application, the relevance of his approaches to the field of theoretical philosophy has often been questioned. The article presents three arguments in defense of said application. First, the theoretical approaches that Skinner relied on were conceived by analytical philosophers of language as applicable to the analysis of philosophy itself. Second, Skinner's method at the level of the subject of the study involves considering the intentions of intellectuals and real polemical contexts, which draws attention to the theoretical content of philosophical concepts and discussions. Third, the opposition of intellectual history and theoretical philosophy by Anglo-American scholars is based on analytical philosophy, which means that this opposition is not obligatory for other contexts. Furthermore, the paper proposes a comprehensive methodology that complements Skinner's ideas with other approaches, in particular, I. Hunter's study of philosophers' personalities and their ways of thinking, a critical analysis of philosophical discourse and its social institutionalization in the Foucauldian way, E. van der Zweerde's concept of political (pre-)conditions of philosophical culture, and H. Lübbe's idea of the struggle for the naming.