On the Interpretation of Philosophy and Science as “Knowledge” in the Context of Their Ontological Characteristics

Abstract

The first and the most important step in the determination of any object of thinking is specifying what type of objects of known nature the object is assigned to. The author calls this operation “assignment to a genus” generally and “ontological assignment” in the narrow sense of being used to specify (clarify) the ontological status of the object. In the case of clarifying the nature of philosophy, mathematics, science in general, or other particular sciences and scientific disciplines there are four main ontological attributions: understanding them as a knowledge, as a sphere, an area of knowledge, as a kind of activity and as a sphere of activity (as a social institution). Each of these interpretations is associated with the adoption of some ontological and epistemic premises and conclusions about time, place and circumstances of the genesis of philosophy and sciences. This article demonstrates general principles of the author’s approach and analyzes the first of the marked interpretations of the nature of philosophy and sciences: their interpretation as knowledge. This interpretation is most widespread, but it is usually unexplicated. Nevertheless, the interpretation is connected with making the strongest ontological assumptions about existence of the extra-cultural an extra-historical forms of knowledge and the most radical historical-cultural conclusions about the presence of philosophy and science in all human societies and at all times. This paper is focused on the interpretation of nature and genesis of mathematics, whose history is closely connected with philosophy, science and many fields of practice.